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Abstract	
	
Recent	accounts	of	workplace	union	representation	have	emphasised	the	exclusion	of	shop	
stewards	from	management	decision-making	processes,	and	have	posited	a	shift	in	shop	
steward	activity	away	from	dealing	with	collective	issues	through	bargaining,	towards	
dealing	with	individual	issues	through	casework,	as	part	of	the	wider	decline	of	union	
influence.	This	thesis	challenges	those	accounts	by	showing	that	they	utilise	a	problematic	
conceptual	framework	and	rest	upon	questionable	empirical	foundations.	An	alternative	
framework	is	proposed	which	incorporates	a	clearly	conceptualised	definition	of	bargaining	
–	something	missing	from	previous	accounts	–	and	which	develops	and	synthesises	
conceptual	elements	from	Marxist-influenced	sociologies	of	work,	bargaining	theory,	and	
industrial	relations	scholarship.	It	is	shown	that	efforts	to	influence	management	decision-
making	and	to	restrict	managerial	prerogatives	continue	to	figure	prominently	in	shop	
steward	activity,	even	though	the	reduction	of	union	influence	is	undeniable	and	formal	
arrangements	for	union-management	relations	have	been	recast.	Moreover,	these	efforts	
are	often	to	some	extent	successful.	This	analysis	is	supported	by	considerable	evidence	
from	two	detailed	workplace	studies,	including	an	innovative	use	of	diaries,	which	
contribute	important	new	insights	into	the	activity	of	contemporary	shop	stewards.		
	
This	thesis	argues	that	the	persistence	of	shop	steward	bargaining	is	best	understood	in	
relation	to	underlying	dynamics	of	conflict	and	exploitation	within	the	employment	
relationship	under	capitalism.	Bargaining	processes	are	explored	in	terms	of	changing	
patterns	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	resources,	which	are	linked	to	changing	
management	practices.	While	the	form	and	location	of	bargaining	processes	have	changed,	
the	prevalence	of	issues	around	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control	demonstrate	the	
continuing	influence	of	the	dynamics	of	workplace	relations	on	patterns	of	shop	steward	
activity.	While	further	research	is	required,	the	theoretical	and	conceptual	framework	
developed	in	this	thesis	suggests	that	similar	processes	are	likely	to	be	found	elsewhere.		
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Chapter	1:	Introduction		
	
What	do	shop	stewards	do?		
Once,	providing	an	answer	to	this	question	would	have	been	relatively	straightforward.	In	
the	1960s	and	1970s,	detailed	workplace	studies	produced	field-defining	accounts	in	which	
shop	stewards	featured	as	important	actors	(for	an	overview,	see	Kelly	1998:	6-7).	More	
recently,	answers	have	been	less	readily	available.	From	the	1980s,	there	was	a	remarkable	
decline	of	research	in	this	area.	The	focus	of	industrial	relations	shifted	away	from	the	
workplace,	as	researchers	sought	explanations	for	dramatic	declines	in	union	size	and	
influence	in	macro	features	of	employment	and	a	stronger	focus	on	management	(Brown	et	
al.	2009,	Hyman	1987:	27).	Although	the	decline	of	case	study	research	has	been	disputed	
(Fernie	and	Woodland	1995;	McCarthy	1994;	Millward	and	Hawes	1995),	there	can	be	little	
doubt	about	the	almost	complete	disappearance	of	the	workplace	ethnographies	that	were	
previously	well	established	(Greene	2001:	4).	Case	studies	of	shop	stewards	declined	
significantly	by	the	mid-1990s	(Terry	1995:	215),	and	disappeared	almost	completely	
thereafter	(cf.	Terry	2003,	2010).	Now,	field-defining	research	in	industrial	relations	comes	
not	from	detailed	studies	of	the	workplace	but	from	large-scale	surveys,	particularly	the	
WIRS/WERS	series	(discussed	in	Chapter	2).	Whatever	the	benefits	of	such	methods,	and	
there	are	many,	they	are	poorly	suited	to	investigating	industrial	relations	processes	at	
workplace	level	(Strauss	and	Whitfield	1998:	15).	The	shortage	of	recent	research	on	shop	
stewards	therefore	reflects	both	shifting	priorities	and	changing	methods	in	industrial	
relations.	As	a	result,	though,	the	shop	steward	in	the	workplace	has	gradually	slipped	from	
view.	The	question	–	What	do	shop	stewards	do?	–	is	now	far	more	difficult	to	answer	with	
any	certainty.		
	
The	central	issues	are	not	just	empirical,	but	also	theoretical.	Alongside	the	shortage	of	
factual	evidence	about	what	shop	stewards	do,	there	are	theoretical	questions	about	the	
significance	of	such	activity	and	how	best	it	can	be	understood.	Broadly,	the	literature	
contains	two	contrasting	views	of	shop	stewards.	The	first,	what	might	be	termed	the	
workplace	bargainer	view,	emerged	from	the	classic	studies	of	the	1960s	and	1970s.	In	this	
view,	shop	stewards	take	'all	the	opportunities	presented	to	them'	(McCarthy	1966:	70)	to	
bargain	with	managers	on	behalf	of	their	members,	over	a	variety	of	issues,	especially	
collective	ones.	More	recently,	this	view	has	been	displaced	by	what	will	be	termed	the	
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current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards.	According	to	this	view,	which	is	based	mainly	on	
evidence	from	management	surveys,	shop	stewards	no	longer	bargain	to	any	significant	
extent,	and	have	shifted	their	attention	from	collective	issues	to	individual	representation	
and	casework	(see	Chapter	2).	Clearly,	the	current	standard	view	stands	in	strong	contrast	
to	the	workplace	bargainer	view.	Unfortunately,	the	lack	of	recent	research	specifically	
examining	shop	stewards	has	meant	that	testing	these	accounts	has	not	been	possible.	In	
other	words,	theoretical	progress	has	been	limited	for	want	of	empirical	investigation.		
	
This	study	therefore	attempts	to	rectify	the	research	deficit	by	returning	to	the	tradition	
detailed	of	workplace	studies,	to	investigate	once	more	the	activities	of	shop	stewards.	The	
research	contributes	important	new	insights,	both	empirical	and	theoretical.	Empirically,	the	
first	ethnographic	study	of	shop	stewards	for	some	thirty	years	provides	considerable	and	
important	evidence	concerning	their	day-to-day	activity.	Theoretically,	the	study	attempts	
to	re-think	the	shop	steward	role	by	theorising	it	more	explicitly	within	the	dynamics	of	
workplace	relations;	a	dimension	insufficiently	developed	in	recent	accounts,	which	have	
commonly	focused	on	agency	and	subjective	factors,	such	as	workplace	traditions	or	union	
policy.		
	
The	argument	of	this	thesis	is	that	shop	steward	bargaining	is	not	dead.	While	the	overall	
weakening	of	workplace	union	organisation	is	beyond	doubt,	changes	in	workplace	relations	
and	management	practices	have	not	led	to	the	end	of	efforts	by	shop	stewards	to	influence	
the	decisions	of	managers	and	the	regulation	of	work.	Rather,	stewards	have	adopted	new	
methods	in	response	to	new	circumstances.	This	account	therefore	develops	from	a	critique	
of	the	current	standard	view,	which	wrongly	claims	that	shop	stewards	no	longer	bargain.	
This	is	not	to	deny	significant	changes	in	shop	steward	activity	since	the	era	of	the	classic	
studies.	For	instance,	the	decline	of	collective	action	suggests	that	shop	steward	activity	has	
moved	considerably	towards	individual	casework.	However,	the	lack	of	research	on	shop	
stewards	means	that	the	significance	of	individual	casework	has	been	missed.	As	will	be	
shown,	individual	casework	can	have	significant	collective	consequences	–	and	both	
managers	and	shop	stewards	recognise	this.	Likewise,	it	is	now	common	for	meetings	
between	shop	stewards	and	managers	to	be	designated	'consultation'	rather	than	
'negotiation'.	Once	more,	though,	these	processes	have	been	left	un-researched,	on	the	
faulty	assumption	that	'consultation'	is	simply	another	name	for	unilateral	management	
decision-making	(see	Section	2.1).	In	both	these	areas	–	collective	vs.	individual	and	
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negotiation	vs.	consultation	–	an	excessive	focus	on	formal	designation	has	been	highly	
misleading.	Starting	from	the	perspective	of	sociological	content	rather	than	institutional	
form,	this	research	will	show	that	contemporary	workplace	practices	can	and	do	result	in	
genuinely	bargained	outcomes,	and	should	therefore	be	considered	aspects	of	workplace	
bargaining	relations.		
	
However,	despite	the	persistence	of	bargaining	identified	by	this	research,	the	workplace	
bargainer	view	is	not	sufficient	for	understanding	contemporary	shop	stewards.	The	context	
in	which	stewards	operate	has	been	transformed	since	the	period	of	the	classic	studies.	
Workplace	relations	have	been	remodelled	under	the	impact	of	powerful	social	and	
economic	forces.	In	manufacturing,	hugely	increased	product	market	competition	has	
undermined	the	bargaining	position	of	unions.	In	the	public	sector,	repeated	waves	of	
'reform',	marketisation,	competitive	tendering,	outsourcing,	privatisation,	new	management	
methods,	and	the	impact	of	government	austerity	policies	have	transformed	the	experience	
of	employment.	Continuing	high	levels	of	unemployment	have	weakened	the	bargaining	
position	of	unions.	Changes	in	the	law	to	restrict	strikes	accompanied	a	decisive	shift	in	
state	policy	away	from	the	long-standing	encouragement	of	collective	bargaining.	Now,	
unions	face	hostility	from	the	state	and	employers	alike.	The	introduction	of	legally	
enforceable	employment	rights	has	contributed	to	a	huge	growth	in	the	pursuit	of	individual	
grievances	against	employers,	on	issues	that	might	previously	have	been	dealt	with	by	
collective	bargaining.	Given	the	scale	of	such	changes,	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	workplace	
bargainer	view	no	longer	gives	an	accurate	account	of	shop	steward	activity.		
	
Even	so,	some	aspects	of	the	workplace	bargainer	view	are	surprisingly	robust.	As	will	be	
shown,	some	of	the	central	issues	dealt	with	by	shop	stewards	in	the	classic	studies	can	be	
clearly	identified	in	the	activities	of	contemporary	shop	stewards.	In	particular,	the	effort	
bargain	and	frontier	of	control	continue	to	account	for	a	significant	proportion	of	shop	
steward	activity.	A	further	motivation	for	the	present	study	was	to	show	that	the	methods	
of	the	classic	studies	can	still	generate	rich	insights	into	workplace	relations,	and	it	will	be	
argued	that	such	methods	remain	crucial	for	understanding	shop	steward	activity.		
	
This	thesis	will	argue	that	shop	steward	activity	is	best	understood	in	terms	of	the	
continuing	dynamics	of	conflict	and	exploitation	within	the	employment	relationship	under	
capitalist	relations	of	production.	This	might	seem	an	obvious	point:	don't	we	already	know	
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that	conflict	and	exploitation	run	through	the	employment	relationship?	Isn't	this	bound	to	
be	a	feature	of	workplace	union	representation?	Yet,	as	will	be	shown,	previous	accounts	
have	not	sufficiently	developed	this	basic	insight.	Mainstream	industrial	relations	continues	
to	sacrifice	theoretical	development	in	favour	of	empirical	description	(Howell	2005:	8;	Kelly	
1998:	16-17).	Accounts	influenced	by	labour	process	theory	too	often	reduce	complex	
workplace	processes	to	expressions	of	simple	categories,	such	as	'control'	or	'resistance'	
(Thompson	and	Smith	2010:	13).	Even	Marxist	accounts	posit	'a	largely	abstract	and	
ahistorical	capitalism'	(Howell	2005:	12).	Instead,	the	present	account	integrates	a	number	
of	conceptual	elements	into	a	theoretical	framework	that	can	trace	(non-deterministic)	
linkages	between	a	historically	concrete	understanding	of	capitalism	and	the	activity	of	shop	
stewards	in	particular	workplaces.	Elements	will	be	drawn	from	Marxist	accounts	of	
exploitation,	interests,	and	conflict;	from	critical	realist	conceptions	of	structure	and	agency;	
and	from	game-theoretic	treatments	of	bargaining.	In	so	doing,	this	study	develops	a	
generally	applicable	framework	for	understanding	shop	stewards	and	their	role	in	workplace	
bargaining.	By	combining	considerable	new	empirical	evidence	with	theoretical	and	
conceptual	clarification,	this	thesis	aims	to	provide	fresh	answers	to	that	motivating	
question	–	What	do	shop	stewards	do?		
	
A	note	on	terminology		
The	term	‘shop	steward’	might	be	seen	as	outdated,	having	been	widely	replaced	by	‘union	
representative’	(usually	abbreviated	to	‘union	rep’).	Nevertheless,	the	old	title	will	be	used	
here	for	three	reasons.	First,	this	is	the	term	used	in	a	large	proportion	of	the	literature	in	
the	field,	especially	the	classic	studies.	Second,	the	union	reps	in	both	case	studies	referred	
to	themselves	as	shop	stewards.	And	third,	it	distinguishes	the	role	from	other	union	
representatives,	such	as	the	well-established	safety	rep,	the	union	learning	rep,	and	more	
recent	innovations	such	as	specialist	reps	dealing	with	equality,	disability,	and	green	issues	
(Moore	2010;	Terry	2010:	290-91).	The	term	shop	steward	will	be	used	here	to	denote	the	
lowest	level	of	lay	workplace	union	representative,	commonly	(though	not	always)	
representing	union	members	at	section	level,	and	dealing	with	general	employment	issues,	
such	as	terms	and	conditions	of	employment,	grievance	and	disciplinary	issues,	and	work	
organisation	and	intensity.		
	
	
These	introductory	comments	have	indicated	the	broad	empirical	and	theoretical	concerns	
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of	the	present	research.	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	sets	out	the	rationale	for	undertaking	
the	research,	and	outlines	its	main	features.	First,	the	case	for	renewed	research	on	shop	
stewards	is	set	out,	after	which	the	research	questions	that	framed	the	empirical	
investigation	are	introduced.	Next,	the	research	design	is	outlined,	followed	by	a	summary	
of	the	main	argument.	Finally,	an	overview	of	the	rest	of	the	thesis	introduces	the	principal	
conceptual	elements	for	re-thinking	the	shop	steward	role	in	relation	to	the	dynamics	of	
workplace	relations.		
	
Why	study	shop	stewards?		
Prior	to	1980,	the	central	place	of	shop	stewards	in	industrial	relations	research	seemed	
secure.	Reasons	for	this	interest	are	not	hard	to	discern.	During	the	long	post-war	boom,	
dealing	with	shop	stewards	became	a	pressing	fact	of	life	for	managers	in	many	sectors	of	
employment,	and	management	problems	quickly	became	research	topics	for	the	
mainstream	pluralist	industrial	relations	of	the	time	(Hyman	2009:	36).	When,	in	the	1970s,	
pluralist	orthodoxy	was	challenged	by	a	new	generation	of	radical	and	Marxist	researchers,	
who	started	from	a	sympathy	with	workers	rather	than	with	managers,	the	focus	on	
workplace	union	organisation	only	strengthened.	Indeed,	for	much	radical	research,	the	
workplace	was	the	sine	qua	non	of	industrial	relations.	The	prominence	of	shop	stewards	in	
all	these	accounts	reflected	an	unusual	feature	of	industrial	relations	in	Britain;	namely,	the	
primacy	of	workplace	union	organisation,	and	the	consequent	importance	of	bargaining	at	
workplace	level	and	below	(Terry	2003:	257).	Unlike	much	of	Europe,	the	growth	of	multi-
employer	bargaining	in	Britain	had	not	seen	the	workplace	'excluded	from	hostilities’	(Sisson	
1987:	13).	In	the	1960s	and	1970s	especially,	vigorous	bargaining	was	an	obvious	feature	of	
workplace	relations.		
	
During	this	period,	the	diverse	currents	of	British	industrial	relations	shared	a	common	view	
of	the	shop	steward	role,	as	tied	to	workplace	bargaining.	Opinions	varied,	though,	about	
the	consequences	of	shop	stewards'	bargaining	role.	For	many	employers,	shop	steward	
bargaining	was	an	unwelcome	interference	with	managerial	prerogatives	(Hyman	2003:	43).	
For	governments,	it	was	the	cause	of	wages	drift	and	balance	of	payment	difficulties	(ibid.:	
48-51).	For	Flanders	(1968),	it	was	the	unruly	force	undermining	formal	bargaining	
structures.	For	Donovan	(1968:	56),	shop	steward	bargaining	was	'more	of	a	lubricant	than	
an	irritant'.	Others	emphasised	the	irritant	aspect	(Brown	1973:	127-32;	Turner,	Clack	and	
Roberts	1967:	214).	For	some	radical	commentators,	bargaining	was	potentially	a	source	of	
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shop	steward	weakness,	leading	to	accommodations	with	managers,	with	the	interests	of	
rank-and-file	workers	taking	second	place	to	maintaining	'good	bargaining	relations'	(e.g.	
Beynon	1984:	116;	Nichols	and	Beynon	1977:	156;	Lane:	222).	Despite	these	important	
differences	of	interpretation,	though,	industrial	relations	scholars	and	practitioners	from	
across	the	field	saw	shop	stewards	as,	first	and	foremost,	workplace	bargainers.		
	
Dramatic	changes	since	1980	have	transformed	workplace	relations.	An	obvious	question	
follows:	what	effect	have	these	changes	had	on	the	role	of	shop	stewards?	Union	
membership	has	fallen	by	more	than	half,	but	shop	steward	numbers	have	declined	even	
faster,	from	a	high	point	of	some	335,000	in	1984	(Darlington	2010:	127),	to	around	150,000	
today	(Charlwood	and	Angrave	2014:	5).	The	decline	of	multi-employer	bargaining	has,	if	
anything,	increased	the	importance	of	workplace	union	organisation	(Fairbrother	1994;	
2000),	despite	a	range	of	difficulties	faced	at	that	level	(Gall	1998).	Shop	stewards	continue	
to	be	the	first	point	of	call	for	many	thousands	of	union	members	who	have	problems	at	
work	(van	Wanrooy	et	al.	2013:	191).	For	many	union	members,	it	remains	the	case	that	
‘the	steward	is	the	union’	(Marsh	1963,	cited	in	Terry	1995:	209,	original	emphasis).	
Academic	commentators	continue	to	refer	to	shop	stewards	as	'the	dynamic	heart	of	the	
British	union	movement'	(Terry	2003:	257),	or	'the	lieutenants	of	the	rank-and-file'	(Gall	
2005,	cited	in	Darlington	2010:	126).	Moreover,	unions	still	have	over	six	million	members	
(BIS	2014),	and	around	one	third	of	unionised	workplaces	have	a	union	representative	on	
site	(van	Wanrooy	et	al.	2013:	58-59).	So,	what	are	shop	stewards	doing	in	workplaces	
where	unions	continue	to	organise?		
	
Although	shop	stewards	appear	in	studies	of	workplace	union	organisation	(Darlington	
1994;	2009a;	2009b;	2010;	Dundon	1998;	Gall	2003a;	McBride	2004;	2006;	2011),	and	
sometimes	in	research	on	union	organising	(for	an	overview,	see	Gall	2009;	Simms	et	al.	
2013),	the	shortage	of	direct	research	on	shop	stewards	poses	serious	difficulties	for	
understanding	how	the	role	has	changed.	Accounts	underpinning	the	current	standard	view	
rely	heavily	on	data	from	WIRS/WERS	management	surveys.	Yet,	large-scale	surveys	are	not	
well	suited	to	investigating	the	detail	of	workplace	relations.	Furthermore,	the	resurgence	
among	managers	of	unitarist	views	(Edwards	2003:	10),	which	are	commonly	opposed	to	
the	representation	of	employees	by	trade	unions,	means	that	management	statements	
must	be	considered	problematic	sources	of	evidence	about	the	activities	and	influence	of	
workplace	union	representatives.	Yet,	when	findings	from	managers	and	union	
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representatives	are	at	odds,	there	has	been	a	tendency	to	give	greater	credence	to	the	
management	version	(e.g.	Brown	and	Nash	2008;	see	Chapter	2).	Empirically,	these	
accounts	rest	on	questionable	evidence	drawn	from	problematic	sources	using	unsuitable	
methods.	These	accounts	also	suffer	from	an	over-reliance	on	formal	distinctions	derived	
from	pluralist	analyses	of	collective	bargaining	(see	Chapter	2),	seemingly	forgetting	the	
importance	of	informality	in	workplace	relations	established	by	those	same	studies.	The	
continuing	importance	of	workplace	union	representation	in	Britain,	combined	with	the	
problematic	nature	of	many	recent	accounts,	strongly	suggest	that	a	resumption	of	research	
on	shop	stewards	would	be	beneficial.		
	
	
This	section	has	established	the	need	for	renewed	research	on	shop	stewards.	As	noted,	this	
research	was	motivated	by	a	very	general	question	–	What	do	shop	stewards	do?	However,	
this	question	is	too	broad	to	form	the	basis	of	rigorous	research.	Therefore,	more	specific	
research	questions	were	devised.	These	are	presented	and	discussed	next.		
	
	
1.1	Research	questions	
	
The	purpose	of	research	questions	is	to	position	empirical	investigation	in	relation	to	theory,	
and	to	inform	the	selection	of	data-gathering	methods.	This	section	outlines	the	research	
questions	used	in	the	present	enquiry.		
	
Q1.	To	what	extent	do	shop	stewards	seek	to	influence	the	regulation	of	employment	
relations?		
This	question	directly	addresses	the	issue	of	shop	steward	efforts	to	influence	management	
decisions,	on	the	assumption	that	the	free	exercise	of	managerial	prerogatives	would	
indicate	no	such	influence.	The	regulation	of	employment	relations	was	for	decades	at	the	
centre	of	industrial	relations	research	in	Britain;	regulation,	that	is,	in	the	sense	of	the	
nature,	origin	and	enforcement	(or	not)	of	the	various	sets	of	rules	surrounding	day-to-day	
practices	in	employment.	The	literature	features	a	familiar	typology	of	unilateral	controls	
(by	workers	or	management)	and	joint	controls	(Flanders	1975:	83-128).	In	recent	years,	
formal	mechanisms	of	joint	control	have	receded	(Blyton,	et	al.	2011:	7).	Some	care	is	
needed,	however,	because	formal	appearance	and	actual	content	may	not	coincide.	For	
	18	
instance,	seemingly	unilateral	worker	controls	often	originate	in	working	practices	shaped	
by	management	decisions	over	technology	and	investment,	while	apparently	joint	controls	
can	emerge	when	one	party	is	under	duress	(Batstone	1988:	168-71).	Consequently,	
research	in	this	area	must	be	sensitive	to	potential	divergences	between	formal	
arrangements	and	actual	workplace	practices.		
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	this	research	question	concerns	the	extent	to	which	stewards	
seek	to	influence,	not	the	extent	to	which	they	succeed	in	influencing.	The	degree	of	actual	
influence	is	important,	not	least	because	repeated	failure	may	discourage	subsequent	
efforts.	Nevertheless,	this	research	aimed	to	understand	the	social	process	of	bargaining,	
rather	than	measure	its	outcomes.	While	shop	stewards	undoubtedly	have	less	influence	in	
the	workplace	than	they	did	thirty	years	ago,	it	matters	for	the	analysis	whether	they	are	
seeking	to	influence	management	decisions	and	finding	it	difficult,	or	whether,	as	in	the	
current	standard	view,	their	attention	is	directed	elsewhere.		
	
Q2.	What	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources,	if	any,	are	shop	stewards	using?	
As	will	be	shown	below,	the	literature	contains	numerous	examples	of	bargaining	
opportunities	and	bargaining	resources	that	shop	stewards	have	used	to	pressure	
management	(Section	3.1).	Therefore,	it	was	important	to	establish	empirically	whether	any	
such	features	were	present,	even	if	covertly.	It	is	well	known	that	shop	stewards	in	the	
classic	period	commonly	used	brief	work	stoppages	to	pressure	managers,	and	equally	well	
known	that	these	small	sectional	strikes	are	now	rare.	Therefore,	the	research	had	to	be	
sufficiently	sensitive	to	register	the	presence	of	less	obvious	bargaining	opportunities	and	
resources,	including	any	novel	or	unexpected	forms.		
	
Q3.	What	bargaining	activity,	if	any,	are	shop	stewards	engaged	in?		
This	question	was	the	crux	of	the	research.	If	no	bargaining	could	be	found,	then	the	current	
standard	view	would	be	secure;	if	bargaining	processes	were	present,	then	an	alternative	
account	would	be	possible.	However,	gathering	evidence	that	might	answer	this	question	
faced	two	difficulties.	The	first	difficulty	was	empirical.	Contemporary	forms	of	bargaining	
may	be	novel	and/or	covert	(Edwards	et	al.	1995:	287),	and	data	‘elusive’	(Armstrong	et	al.	
1981:	27).	The	second	difficulty	was	theoretical:	how	could	bargaining	be	defined?	
Surprisingly,	no	systematic	attempt	to	define	bargaining	could	be	found	in	the	previous	
literature	(Section	3.2);	perhaps	because	no	definition	was	required	when	bargaining	was	an	
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open	feature	in	many	workplaces.	Now,	however,	when	the	continued	existence	of	
workplace	bargaining	is	denied,	such	a	definition	is	indispensable.	Therefore,	a	definition	of	
bargaining	was	developed	(Section	3.2),	and	used	throughout	this	study.		
	
	
So	far,	this	chapter	has	outlined	the	rationale	for	the	present	research,	set	out	the	broad	
historical	and	intellectual	context,	and	introduced	the	research	questions.	The	next	section	
gives	an	overview	of	the	project,	introduces	the	methods	adopted	for	gathering	data,	
summarises	the	main	argument,	and	outlines	the	thesis	structure.		
	
	
1.2	Overview	of	the	research		
	
This	section	outlines	the	overall	structure	of	the	study.	It	starts	with	a	brief	sketch	of	the	
research	design,	followed	by	a	summary	of	the	argument.	Finally,	this	section	presents	the	
structure	of	the	thesis	as	developed	in	the	following	chapters.		
	
Research	design		
The	classic	period	of	shop	steward	research	coincided	with	a	series	of	ground-breaking	
workplace	studies;	part	of	a	long	and	important	tradition	in	British	industrial	relations	
(Brown	and	Wright	1994).	Celebrated	studies	include	Lane	and	Roberts	(1971),	Brown	
(1973),	Beynon	(1984	[1973]),	Hill	(1976),	Nichols	and	Armstrong	(1976),	Nichols	and	
Beynon	(1977),	Batstone	et	al.	(1977;	1978),	Armstrong	et	al.	(1981),	Pollert	(1981),	and	
Edwards	and	Scullion	(1982).	Cumulatively,	these	studies	achieved	a	high	point	of	empirical	
detail	and	analytical	sophistication	(Kelly	1998:	6-7).	The	intention	of	the	present	research	
was	to	revisit	this	tradition	by	assembling	really	detailed	evidence	concerning	the	activities	
of	contemporary	shop	stewards.	An	exploratory	case	study	research	design	was	adopted,	
using	qualitative	methods	to	investigate	social	interactions,	processes	and	meanings.	
Workplace	observation	was	selected	as	the	principal	research	method,	a	decision	influenced	
in	good	measure	by	the	classic	studies.	Additional	methods	included	in-depth	interviews	and	
an	innovative	use	of	diaries.	Two	case	studies	were	selected:	shop	stewards	in	a	London	
Borough	council	(hereafter,	London	Borough),	and	shop	stewards	in	a	UK	auto	plant	
(hereafter,	Big	Car).	Each	case	study	lasted	six	months.	Findings	were	contextualised	by	
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documentary	sources,	and	data	were	analysed	thematically	with	the	aid	of	NVivo	software.	
Thus,	the	account	below	is	based	on	the	type	of	detailed	evidence	that	is	unavailable	to	the	
large-scale	surveys	that	have	recently	dominated	industrial	relations	research.		
	
Of	course,	the	advantages	of	qualitative	research	must	be	balanced	against	its	
disadvantages.	Whereas	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards	is	based	on	a	
representative	sample	of	thousands	of	workplaces,	the	present	research	is	based	on	only	
two	case	studies.	This	difference	poses	a	familiar	question:	how	can	case	study	research	
challenge	evidence	from	a	representative	sample?	The	answer	starts	by	recognising	that	
while	findings	of	case	studies	cannot	be	generalised	statistically	to	a	population,	they	can	be	
generalised	in	relation	to	theoretical	claims	(Yin	2009:	38).	Therefore,	it	will	not	be	claimed	
that	the	stewards	in	this	study	were	representative	of	the	whole	UK	population;	indeed,	the	
cases	investigated	were	atypical	in	important	respects	(see	Chapter	4).	However,	knowledge	
is	never	based	on	empirical	findings	alone;	it	requires	a	conceptual	and	theoretical	
framework	to	order	and	interpret	evidence.	As	will	be	shown	in	Chapter	2,	the	claims	of	the	
current	standard	view	are	not	only	empirical,	but	also	involve	conceptual	distinctions	and	
assumptions	that	are	highly	questionable.	An	important	part	of	the	argument	is	therefore	a	
conceptual	critique	of	the	current	standard	view,	which	is	then	supported	by	detailed	
evidence	from	the	case	studies.		
	
Generalisation	from	this	research	is	consequently	in	two	parts.	The	first	is	the	critique	of	the	
current	standard	view	that	shop	stewards	no	longer	bargain;	a	view	which	has	become	very	
widespread	in	industrial	relations	(Section	2.1).	Undermining	such	claims	is	therefore	a	
theoretically	generalisable	conclusion	of	considerable	importance.	The	second	aspect	of	
generalisation	concerns	the	extent	to	which	similar	processes	to	those	identified	by	this	
research	might	be	found	elsewhere.	While	it	will	not	be	claimed	that	shop	stewards	
everywhere	are	doing	what	the	shop	stewards	in	this	study	were	doing,	it	will	be	argued	
that	the	role	of	shop	stewards	is	best	understood	in	terms	of	the	overall	social	dynamics	of	
the	workplace;	the	complex	of	conflict	and	cooperation,	formal	procedures,	informal	
arrangements,	and	hidden	practices	that	continue	to	characterise	workplace	relations	under	
capitalist	relations	of	production.	While	these	issues	are	often	acknowledged	in	industrial	
relations	literature,	they	are	seldom	developed	at	any	length,	being	more	usually	passed	
over	briefly	prior	to	the	presentation	of	empirical	results.	By	contrast,	this	account	discusses	
theoretical	and	conceptual	issues	at	some	length	(Chapter	3),	to	establish	a	firmer	
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conceptualisation	of	workplace	relations,	as	the	basis	for	generalisation.	That	is,	to	the	
extent	that	the	social	dynamics	which	explain	the	findings	of	the	present	research	are	
common	to	other	workplaces,	by	inference,	it	is	therefore	likely	that	shop	stewards	
elsewhere	may	be	involved	in	similar	processes	to	those	discussed	here.	Of	course,	such	
claims	require	the	support	of	further	empirical	evidence	to	become	firmly	established.	
Fortunately,	the	production	of	knowledge	is	an	incremental	process:	the	critique	of	an	
established	view	and	the	presentation	of	a	plausible	alternative	amount	to	a	worthwhile	
contribution.	Therefore,	the	discussion	now	turns	to	a	summary	of	the	overall	argument	of	
the	thesis.		
	
Summary	of	the	argument		
The	argument	of	this	thesis	starts	from	a	critique	of	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	
stewards,	which,	despite	its	widespread	currency,	is	significantly	problematic.	Conceptually,	
it	relies	upon	a	series	of	questionable	distinctions;	in	particular,	between	negotiation	and	
consultation,	and	between	collective	and	individual	issues.	This	thesis	will	demonstrate	that	
these	sharp	distinctions	are	unsustainable.	Methodologically,	the	current	standard	view	is	
dependent	on	large-scale	management	surveys,	and	this	thesis	will	show	that	the	evidence	
generated	by	these	methods	is	insufficient	for	grasping	shop	steward	activity.	These	
conceptual	and	methodological	difficulties	point	to	the	need	for	different	conceptual	and	
empirical	approaches.		
	
Empirically,	this	research	found	that	shop	stewards	in	the	case	studies	were	significantly	
engaged	in	efforts	to	influence	management	decisions,	and	thereby	to	influence	the	
regulation	of	employment	relations.	These	findings	contradict	claims	that	shop	stewards	are	
no	longer	involved	in	workplace	bargaining	and	no	longer	deal	with	collective	issues.	Thus,	
the	empirical	findings	of	this	study	strongly	support	the	conceptual	critique	of	the	current	
standard	view,	which	is	therefore	significantly	undermined.	In	particular,	shop	stewards	
were	considerably	engaged	with	issues	related	to	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control.	
Furthermore,	patterns	of	shop	steward	activity	had	shifted	with	changing	management	
methods.	In	the	absence	of	traditional,	strong	bargaining	sanctions,	especially	the	sectional	
strike,	shop	stewards	had	developed	alternative	bargaining	resources,	some	of	which	were	
novel	and	unexpected.		
	
Theoretically,	the	(re)definition	of	bargaining	developed	below	permitted	the	identification	
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of	bargained	outcomes	in	a	number	of	workplace	practices,	and	therefore	of	the	persistence	
of	bargaining	in	the	day-to-day	activities	of	shop	stewards.	These	findings	are	best	explained	
in	terms	of	the	underlying	dynamic	of	exploitation	within	the	employment	relationship,	
which	tends	to	generate	and	re-generate	conflict	in	workplace	relations.	Detailed	
theoretical	discussion	(Chapter	3)	shows	that	these	processes	are	robust	features	of	
employment	under	capitalist	relations	of	production,	which	will	therefore	be	common	to	
other	workplaces.	This	suggests	that	similar	processes	are	likely	to	be	found	elsewhere,	and	
that	shop	stewards	are	likely	to	be	engaged	in	similar	practices.		
	
The	general	tendency	towards	conflict	at	work	is	mediated	by	management	practices,	which	
vary	over	time	and	across	different	sectors	of	employment	and	workplaces.	Particular	
management	methods	generate	characteristic	patterns	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	
resources.	Shop	steward	activity	tends	to	cluster	in	these	areas,	creating	clusters	of	
contestation	and	bargaining.	This	is	not	to	pre-judge	the	precise	nature,	extent,	or	content	
of	actual	bargaining	processes,	which	must	be	determined	empirically.	Nevertheless,	the	
empirical	findings	and	theoretical	arguments	of	this	research	suggest	that	shop	steward	
bargaining	is	likely	to	be	far	more	common	than	has	been	recognised	in	recent	industrial	
relations	research.	Although	in	considerably	modified	forms,	shop	stewards	continue	to	
occupy	a	significant	place	in	workplace	bargaining	processes.		
	
Structure	of	the	thesis	
The	argument	outlined	above	will	be	developed	over	six	main	chapters,	following	a	
straightforward	structure.	Next,	Chapter	2	presents	a	critical	overview	of	previous	literature	
on	shop	stewards.	The	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards	is	outlined	in	detail,	and	a	
number	of	conceptual	and	methodological	problems	discussed.	Then,	the	contrasting	
workplace	bargainer	view	of	shop	stewards	is	presented,	followed	by	a	discussion	of	shop	
stewards	typologies	from	previous	accounts.	Chapter	3	begins	the	theoretical	work	of	
developing	an	alternative	approach	to	thinking	about	shop	stewards,	locating	their	role	in	
the	social	relations	of	the	workplace.	This	work	provided	conceptual	clarity	in	the	
interpretation	of	research	findings,	and	set	out	a	basis	for	subsequent	generalisation.	
Chapter	3	also	develops	the	definition	of	bargaining	missing	from	previous	accounts.		
	
Chapter	4	discusses	the	research	design	and	methods	adopted	for	the	fieldwork,	
emphasising	the	importance	of	ethnographic	research	for	investigating	workplace	relations.	
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Chapter	4	also	introduces	the	diary-based	method	developed	for	this	study.	Finally,	Chapter	
4	presents	background	material	on	the	two	case	studies;	providing	contextualisation,	
outlining	formal	collective	bargaining	arrangements,	union	structures,	and	so	on.	The	main	
research	findings	are	presented	in	two	chapters.	Chapter	5	presents	the	case	study	in	local	
government,	looking	at	shop	steward	organisation,	the	principal	collective	issues,	patterns	
of	individual	representation,	and	relations	between	shop	stewards	and	managers.	Chapter	6	
adopts	a	similar	structure	in	presenting	findings	from	the	car	plant	case	study.		
	
Following	the	presentation	of	findings,	Chapter	7	discusses	their	implications	for	theory.	
First,	answers	to	the	research	questions	are	presented,	strengths	and	limitations	of	the	
research	assessed,	and	a	basis	for	generalisation	outlined.	Next,	it	is	argued	that	the	findings	
of	this	research	significantly	support	the	critique	of	the	current	standard	view	outlined	in	
Chapter	2,	that	elements	of	the	workplace	bargainer	view	remain	valid,	and	that	distinctive	
patterns	of	shop	steward	contestation	suggest	the	influence	of	underlying	dynamics.	Then,	
an	assessment	is	made	of	attempts	to	understand	shop	steward	activity	by	using	typologies,	
which,	it	is	argued,	are	problematic.	Finally,	an	alternative	account	of	shop	steward	activity	
is	presented,	which	argues	that	shop	steward	activity	is	best	understood	in	terms	of	
persistent	dynamics	of	exploitation	and	conflict	within	workplace	relations,	mediated	
through	changing	patterns	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources.	A	brief	concluding	
chapter	rounds	up	the	main	contributions	of	the	research.		
	
Two	assumptions		
Two	important	assumptions	are	made	in	the	account	that	follows.	The	first	concerns	the	
experience	of	employment	under	capitalism,	as	lived	by	workers.	In	a	telling	phrase,	Connell	
(1983:	31)	refers	to	‘the	life-long	wrestling	match	with	the	experience	of	wage-labour’.	It	
will	be	assumed,	here,	that	this	is	what	it	feels	like	to	be	a	worker	under	capitalism.	In	
technical	terms,	the	phrase	encapsulates	important	features	of	workplace	relations;	
exploitation,	conflict	and	cooperation,	effort	bargain,	frontier	of	control,	and	so	on.	More	
importantly,	though,	it	captures	the	feeling	that	the	struggle	at	work	is	not	necessarily	
focussed	on	the	employer:	very	often	the	struggle	is	with	the	job	itself,	just	getting	it	done	
and	getting	home.	Yet,	it	is	the	struggle	with	the	job	that	often	leads	to	the	struggle	with	the	
employer.	Of	course,	there	are	many	coping	mechanisms	or	‘survival	strategies’	(Noon	and	
Blyton	2002:	Ch.9)	for	dealing	with	the	life-long	wrestling	match.	These	include	a	variety	of	
workplace	practices:	fiddles,	‘making	out’,	joking,	sabotage,	whistle-blowing,	or	escaping	
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(summary	overview	in	ibid.);	and	all	manner	of	things	that	workers	do	to	distract	and	
console	themselves	when	they	are	not	at	work,	such	as	escapism,	football,	music,	hobbies,	
consumerism.	But	the	unrelenting	nature	of	capitalism	means	that	every	time	they	go	to	
work,	workers	face	the	same	wrestling	match,	and	another	method	for	dealing	with	it	will	
also	always	be	there;	the	option	of	challenging	(individually	or	collectively)	the	effort	
bargain,	the	frontier	of	control,	and	the	employer.	For	this	reason,	capitalism	is	never	able	
to	do	away	with	the	tendency	towards	workplace	conflict.	As	a	result,	one	of	the	options	for	
dealing	with	the	experience	of	work,	one	of	the	potential	coping	strategies,	is	union	
organisation	and	representation.	This	research	explores	contemporary	forms	of	dealing	with	
the	wrestling	match	by	such	means.		
	
The	second	assumption	concerns	the	character	of	the	individuals	who	put	themselves	
forward	as	shop	stewards.	In	another	memorable	phrase,	Hyman	(1997:	318),	when	
discussing	the	emergence	of	European	Works	Councils	and	information	and	consultation	
committees,	says:	‘intelligent	trade	unionists	should	have	little	difficulty	in	turning	these	
facilities	to	their	advantage’.	While	the	actual	degree	of	difficulty	might	be	disputed,	
‘intelligent	trade	unionist’	captures	the	spirit	and	character	of	shop	stewards	in	the	account	
below.	Of	course,	there	are	no	guarantees	of	successful	outcomes,	which	would	depend	
upon	many	factors	outside	the	control	of	those	individuals.	Nevertheless,	an	assumption	of	
this	research	is	that	shop	stewards	are	indeed	intelligent	trade	unionists,	capable	of	
surveying	the	circumstances	in	which	they	find	themselves,	and	identifying	features	that	
might	be	turned	to	advantage.		
	
	
Conclusion		
	
The	problem	that	this	research	set	out	to	investigate	can	be	viewed	in	a	number	of	ways.	
Marx	and	Engels	(1984:	482)	famously	commented	that	the	class	struggle	is	'now	hidden,	
now	open'.	If	the	classic	studies	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	examined	the	open	variety,	this	
research	investigated	the	hidden;	the	unseen	arm-wrestling	between	managers	and	shop	
stewards	that	is	not	registered	in	strike	figures	or	other	official	statistics.	Alternatively,	from	
an	orthodox	industrial	relations	perspective,	this	study	examines	an	important	area	of	
workplace	union	representation	that	has	become	significantly	under-researched.	
Consequently,	renewed	investigation	would	be	timely	and	worthwhile,	in	order	to	assess	
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the	impact	of	wider	changes	in	employment	on	day-to-day	workplace	relations	and	the	role	
of	shop	stewards.	More	metaphorically,	it	could	be	said	that	shop	stewards	used	to	carry	a	
big	stick	–	the	strike	weapon	–	which	they	could	use	to	threaten	management.	Since	they	no	
longer	carry	the	big	stick,	the	question	arises:	what	are	they	doing	instead?	Have	they	given	
up	trying	to	influence	management,	as	the	current	standard	view	claims?	Or	have	they	
found	other	means	by	which	to	press	their	claims?	However	these	questions	are	conceived,	
providing	answers	required	considerable	efforts	of	fieldwork,	analysis,	and	theoretical	
clarification;	which	are	detailed	in	the	following	chapters.	Throughout	these	necessary	
detours,	though,	it	should	be	born	in	mind	that	this	research	set	out	to	answer	one	basic	
question	–	What	do	shop	stewards	do?		
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Chapter	2:	Two	views	of	shop	stewards		
	
	
The	extensive	industrial	relations	literature	on	workplace	union	organisation	and	bargaining	
presented	a	number	of	challenges	for	the	current	research,	of	which	this	chapter	will	
address	one	in	particular:	the	presence	of	two	strongly	contrasting	views	of	shop	stewards;	
the	current	standard	view	and	the	workplace	bargainer	view.	Consequently,	this	project	
starts	with	an	examination	of	these	views,	and	an	assessment	of	their	strengths	and	
weaknesses.	Previous	accounts	have	also	attempted	to	classify	shop	stewards	according	to	
various	typologies,	some	of	which,	especially	that	of	Batstone	et	al.	(1977;	1978),	have	
become	well	known	and	influential,	and	therefore	warrant	examination.	In	view	of	these	
considerations,	this	chapter	begins	with	an	exposition	of	the	current	standard	view,	
followed	by	a	critique	that	focuses	on	conceptual	and	methodological	issues.	The	chapter	
then	discusses	the	workplace	bargainer	view	of	shop	stewards,	before	finally	reviewing	the	
typological	approach	to	understanding	shop	steward	activity.	First,	though,	a	brief	historical	
overview	of	shop	steward	research	is	presented	to	contextualise	the	subsequent	discussion.		
	
Setting	the	scene		
It	is	almost	one	hundred	years	since	shop	stewards	first	became	a	subject	of	interest	for	
industrial	relations	researchers.	Although	shop	steward	organisation	had	emerged	in	
industries	such	as	engineering	in	the	later	nineteenth	century,	it	was	the	explosion	of	
militant	steward	organisation	around	the	time	of	the	First	World	War	that	led	to	the	first	
serious	research	and	pioneering	studies	from	Cole	(1973	[1923])	and	Goodrich	(1975	
[1920]).	Tough	economic	conditions	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	saw	the	retreat	of	steward	
organisation	(Clegg	1979:	23)	and	a	decline	in	research.	Shop	steward	organisation	began	to	
recover	in	some	industries	–	especially	those	related	to	rearmament	–	from	the	late	1930s,	
but	it	was	after	1945,	with	conditions	of	full	employment,	that	unions	more	generally	were	
able	gradually,	if	unevenly,	to	regain	strength	(Campbell	et	al.	2007:	81-88).	The	growth	of	
strong	workplace	union	organisation	(ibid.:	94-98)	saw	the	return	of	research	interest	in	
shop	stewards.	By	the	1960s,	concern	about	the	balance	of	payments	led	governments	to	
consider	incomes	policies,	and	an	accompanying	public	debate	developed	about	the	causes	
of	wages	drift;	for	which	shop	stewards	received	significant	blame	(Marsh	1963;	McCarthy	
1966;	Donovan	1968).	Industrial	relations	research	of	this	period	established	the	view	of	
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shop	stewards	as	fundamentally	tied	to	bargaining	within	the	workplace	(Terry	1978).	This	
view	received	official	endorsement	when	it	was	adopted	as	a	central	component	of	the	
Donovan	Commission's	analysis	(Donovan	1968).	Over	the	next	decade,	shop	stewards	and	
workplace	bargaining	featured	in	a	blossoming	of	industrial	relations	research	that	remains	
unequalled	(Kelly	1998:	6-7).	By	1979,	Clegg’s	(1979)	overview	gave	shop	stewards	pride	of	
place	as	the	subject	of	his	first	substantive	chapter.		
	
Since	then,	however,	shop	steward	organisation	has	been	drastically	reduced.	During	the	
prolonged	period	of	union	decline	after	1980,	steward	numbers	fell	dramatically.	This	
decline	followed	a	period	of	extraordinary	growth,	from	an	estimated	175,000	in	the	mid-
1960s	to	around	200,000	in	the	early	1970s,	reaching	an	estimated	328,000	by	1980	
(Charlwood	and	Forth	2008:	3-6).	Shop	steward	numbers	in	manufacturing	were	reduced	by	
the	effects	of	recession	in	the	early	1980s,	but	the	growth	of	shop	steward	organisation	in	
the	public	sector	saw	the	total	number	rise	to	an	estimated	peak	of	335,000	in	1984	
(Darlington	2010:	127).	The	mid-1980s	proved	a	turning	point,	however,	and	by	1990	the	
number	of	shop	stewards	had	fallen	precipitately	to	178,000	(Charlwood	and	Forth	2008:	7).	
The	decline	continued,	if	more	slowly.	In	2004	WERS	estimated	that	only	128,000	stewards	
remained,	a	decline	of	some	60	per	cent	since	the	mid-1980s	(ibid.:	6).	In	the	same	period,	
union	membership	fell	by	around	40	per	cent,	so	the	ratio	of	union	members	to	shop	
stewards	rose	sharply,	from	around	1:25	to	1:37	(Darlington	2010:	129).	By	2004,	there	was	
a	renewed	‘thinning	out’	of	shop	stewards	(Kersley	et	al.	2006:	124).	Only	34	per	cent	of	
workplaces	with	a	recognised	union	had	a	union	rep	on	site	in	2004;	a	figure	which	more	or	
less	stabilised	at	32	per	cent	by	2011	(van	Wanrooy,	et	al.	2013:	58-59).	Nevertheless,	in	
2004,	some	80	per	cent	of	union	members	were	employed	in	a	workplace	where	a	shop	
steward	was	present	(Charlwood	and	Forth	2008:	8).	Other	estimates	put	the	total	number	
of	shop	stewards	somewhat	higher;	for	instance,	the	DTI	estimated	146,000	in	2007	
(Darlington	2010:	127).	The	TUC	claim	that	the	total	number	of	union	reps	of	all	kinds	is	
around	200,000	(Simms	et	al.	2013:	55).	Estimates	based	on	WERS	2011	suggest	an	increase	
in	steward	numbers	to	some	150,000	(Charlwood	and	Angrave	2014:	5).	Strangely,	the	
authors	describe	the	increase	from	2004	(128,000)	to	2011	(150,000)	as	'broad	stability'	
(ibid.:	11).	Overall,	though,	there	can	be	no	doubt	that	‘[t]he	shop	steward	network	was	...	
considerably	less	extensive	by	the	turn	of	the	twenty-first	century	than	it	had	been	some	
twenty	years	earlier’	(Charlwood	and	Forth	2008:	11).	The	question	for	this	research,	then,	
is	what	qualitative	changes	have	accompanied	this	significant	quantitative	reduction?		
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2.1	The	current	standard	view	assessed		
	
In	recent	years,	a	number	of	influential	accounts	have	established	the	current	standard	view	
of	shop	stewards	across	industrial	relations	and	related	fields.	Despite	its	widespread	
acceptance,	the	starting	point	for	the	present	research	is	that	this	view	is	significantly	
problematic.	Therefore,	this	section	presents	a	critique.	First,	the	current	standard	view	is	
outlined,	after	which	conceptual	and	methodological	problems	are	examined.	This	critique	
also	indicates	directions	for	the	alternative	account	developed	in	subsequent	chapters.		
	
The	current	standard	view		
According	to	the	current	standard	view,	the	decline	of	trade	union	strength	led	to	particular	
changes	in	shop	steward	activity.	Specifically,	the	current	standard	view	claims	that	shop	
stewards	have	lost	their	previous	role	in	workplace	bargaining.	Terry	(2004:	205)	reaches	
‘the	inescapable	conclusion	that	workplace	trade	unions	no	longer	negotiate	to	any	
significant	extent	on	behalf	of	their	members’.	McIlroy	and	Daniels	(2009:	141)	agree:	
’overall	[shop	stewards]	no	longer	negotiate	to	any	significant	extent’.	For	Brown	(2010:	
263),	‘negotiation	over	work	organisation	is	no	longer	commonplace’.	Commentators	also	
note	a	decline	in	the	range	of	issues	subject	to	negotiation	(Charlwood	and	Angrave	2014:	
30-33;	van	Wanrooy	et	al.	2013:	80-82).	Having	lost	their	traditional	role,	it	is	claimed,	shop	
stewards	are	restricted	to	consultation,	at	best;	failing	that,	stewards	'simply	received	
information'	(Charlwood	and	Angrave	2014:	30).	Terry	(2003:	263)	claims	that	‘consultation	
rather	than	negotiation	is	now	the	dominant	collective	workplace	relationship.’	Similarly,	
Brown	(2010:	263)	states,	'collective	bargaining	has	tended	to	be[come]	more	consultative’	
(see	also	Brown	and	Nash	2008:	101).		
	
Instead	of	bargaining,	for	Brown	et	al.	(1998:	73-5),	the	main	function	of	workplace	unions	is	
now	to	help	employers	through	painful	adjustments	to	increased	competition	(presumably,	
similar	arguments	would	apply	in	the	public	sector).	Likewise,	Millward	et	al.	(2000:	179)	see	
workplace	unions	‘reduced	to	the	role	of	legitimizing	to	the	workforce	the	changes	that	
management	wanted	to	make’.	Numerous	accounts	detect	‘the	growth	of	“hollow	shell”	
trade	unionism’	(Charlwood	and	Forth	2008:	14-15;	Heery	et	al.	2004:	1;	Mcllroy	and	Daniels	
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2009:	99),	whereby	collective	bargaining	arrangements	continue	to	exist	despite	‘exerting	
negligible	influence	over	managers’	(Heery	et	al.	2004:	1;	see	also	Blanchflower	et	al.	2007:	
289;	Millward	et	al.	2000:	138-83).	In	conclusion,	Charlwood	and	Forth	(2009:	89-90)	state,	
'Steward	organisation	can	indeed	be	caricatured	as	a	shell	of	facilities	from	which	their	
procedural	role	and	substantive	achievement	have	been	hollowed	out.'	Overall,	then,	in	the	
current	standard	view,	shop	stewards	are	now	peripheral	figures	in	workplace	relations	in	
Britain.		
	
Furthermore,	according	to	these	accounts,	shop	stewards	have	shifted	from	dealing	with	
collective	issues	to	individual	representation	and	casework.	Charlwood	and	Forth	(2008:	15)	
claim	‘the	balance	of	stewards’	activities...	[is]	tilted	less	towards	the	determination	of	the	
wage-effort	bargain	and	more	towards	individual	casework’	(see	also	van	Wanrooy	et	al.	
2013:	147-56).	The	growth	of	individual	employment	rights	is	often	seen	as	encouraging	
moves	away	from	collectivism	(Dickens	2012;	Dickens	and	Hall	2003).	The	huge	influence	of	
the	WIRS/WERS	analysis	(Colvin	2011;	Milward	et	al.	2006),	to	which	the	distinction	
between	individual	and	collective	issues	is	integral,	means	that	this	view	appears	very	
widely.	For	example,	from	the	Marxist	left,	Darlington	(2010:	128)	says	that	shop	stewards	
today	‘spend	less	time	than	previously	on	collective	bargaining	issues	such	as	wages	and	
conditions	and	more	time	on	representing	individual	members	in	relation	to	welfare	work,	
grievances	and	disciplinary	cases’.	Similarly,	a	study	of	new	forms	of	workplace	activism	
assumes	‘an	increasing	tension	between	collective	organisation	and	individual	
representation’	(Moore	2010:	30;	see	also	McKay	and	Moore	2007).	For	the	current	
standard	view,	this	distinction	between	collective	and	individual	issues	underpins	the	
perceived	shift	in	shop	steward	activity	away	from	the	workplace	bargainer	role.	All	in	all,	
the	current	standard	view	paints	a	bleak	picture	of	shop	stewards	unable	to	influence	
management	over	collective	issues,	reduced	to	helping	out	union	members	when	they	
experience	individual	difficulties.		
	
Conceptually,	the	current	standard	view	is	built	around	a	series	of	distinctions.	Besides	
distinguishing	sharply	between	collective	issues	and	individual	representation,	the	current	
standard	view	also	sees	a	clear	distinction	between	negotiation	and	consultation.	For	Terry	
(2010:	280),	in	negotiation,		
	
‘Eventual	agreement	represents	acceptance	by	both	parties	and	hence	can	be	
characterized	as	a	shared	decision	or	…	“joint	regulation”.	In	this	sense	therefore	
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negotiation	constitutes	a	replacement	of	managerial	prerogative	by	a	commitment	to	
joint	regulation	of	the	employment	relationship.’	
	
By	contrast,	
	
‘Consultation	differs	from	negotiation	in	several	important	respects.	First,	it	is	a	
process	that	retains	the	managerial	right	to	take	the	final	decision.	Thus	...	it	is	
ultimately	a	process	of	unilateral	regulation’	(ibid.:	281).	
	
Similarly,	for	Charlwood	and	Terry	(2007:	322),	negotiation	is	defined	as	joint	regulation,	
while	consultation	is:		
	
‘a	fig	leaf	cover	for	management	unilateralism	...	[which]	does	not	require	the	
deployment	of	bargaining	power	[by	unions]	and	leaves	final	decision-taking	rights	
with	employers’.		
	
Thus,	consultation	is	seen	as	a	form	of	unilateral	management	decision-making.	
Furthermore,	it	is	argued,	genuine	negotiation	requires	the	use	or	threat	of	sanctions	as	
'bargaining	power'	(ibid.).	The	marked	decline	of	strike	activity	shows	that	stewards	are	not	
using	bargaining	sanctions	to	any	significant	extent:	therefore	shop	stewards	cannot	be	
bargaining,	by	definition	(Terry	2010:	281).		
	
These	sharp	conceptual	distinctions	enable	the	current	standard	view	to	construct	a	
hierarchy	of	discrete	bargaining	forms:	negotiation	implies	joint	regulation;	consultation	
leaves	decisions	in	the	hands	of	management;	provision	of	information	implies	a	union	with	
no	real	influence	over	management;	finally,	management	increasingly	acts	entirely	without	
reference	to	the	union	(Kersley	et	al.	2006:	152-3;	Terry	2010).	Although	Gospel	and	
Willman	(2003:	145)	describe	the	'rising	hierarchy'	view	as	'increasingly	questionable',	the	
point	is	not	developed,	and	these	categories	have	not	been	significantly	challenged.	Yet,	
these	conceptual	distinctions	are	highly	questionable,	and	without	them	the	whole	edifice	
of	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards	is	severely	weakened.	A	conceptual	critique	is	
presented	next.		
	
Negotiation	and	consultation		
The	current	standard	view	relies	upon	a	sharp	conceptual	distinction	between	negotiation	
and	consultation.	Yet,	although	this	distinction	is	found	in	legal	and	regulatory	contexts	
(Acas	2014a:	19-28)	and	in	textbooks	(Hyman	1997:	316),	it	is	doubtful	that	it	can	be	
maintained	in	the	messy	reality	of	workplace	relations,	where	‘consultation	inevitably	
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overlaps	with	negotiation’	(Burchill	2008:	85;	see	also	Marginson	2014).	Definitions	of	
workplace	phenomena	are	not	fixed,	but	emerge	within	complex	social	processes.	As	
Batstone	et	al.	(1978:	13)	showed,	even	a	feature	as	apparently	robust	as	a	strike	is	subject	
to	‘social	processes	of	strike	definition’,	which	determine	whether	a	work	stoppage	is	seen	
as	a	strike,	or	merely	‘a	pause	for	discussion’	(Turner	et	al.	1967:	53).	There	seems	little	
reason	to	assume	that	similar	processes	may	not	also	apply	to	how	particular	workplace	
practices	become	defined	as	negotiation	or	consultation.	Indeed,	Hyman	(1997:	316)	has	
argued	that	the	erosion	of	formal	bargaining	arrangements	means	that	‘in	practice	the	
distinction	[between	collective	bargaining	and	consultation]	has	become	increasingly	
blurred	over	the	years	and	will	continue	to	be	so’.	This	notion	of	blurring	is	appealing,	and	
can	be	applied	to	other	categories	of	workplace	relations,	as	will	be	seen	in	what	follows.	
Conceptually,	then,	the	distinction	between	negotiation	and	consultation	appears	more	
problematic	than	the	current	standard	view	allows.		
	
The	distinction	drawn	by	the	current	standard	view	between	negotiation	and	consultation	
draws	on	an	older	literature	on	joint	consultation;	a	form	of	collective	arrangements	which	
first	came	to	prominence	at	the	time	of	the	First	World	War	and	the	Whitley	process	
(Lyddon	2007).	Joint	consultation	was	strengthened	considerably	during	the	Second	World	
War,	with	the	establishment	of	'joint	consultation	committees',	intended	to	increase	
production	by	encouraging	an	exchange	of	information	between	management	and	unions.	
In	many	large	workplaces,	joint	consultation	committees	continued	into	the	1950s	
(McCarthy	1966:	32).	Meanwhile	terms	and	conditions	remained	subject	to	formal	
negotiations,	under	separate	collective	bargaining	arrangements.	On	paper,	then,	the	
separation	between	collective	bargaining	and	joint	consultation	was	the	fore-runner	of	the	
distinction	between	negotiation	and	consultation	claimed	by	the	current	standard	view.		
	
However,	when	researchers	looked	at	joint	consultation	in	practice	things	were	not	nearly	
so	straightforward.	Researchers	found	it	was	often	difficult	to	distinguish	the	outcomes	of	
joint	consultation	from	those	of	collective	bargaining,	because	consultation	could	lead	to	
genuine	agreements	between	managers	and	union	representatives	(McCarthy	1966:	34).	
For	Clegg	and	Chester	(1954:	326),	the	distinction	between	joint	consultation	and	
negotiation	could	become	‘blurred’.	Furthermore,	joint	consultation	was	a	genuine	and	
significant	increase	in	the	scope	of	collective	bargaining,	which	was	largely	limited	to	rates	
of	pay,	hours	of	work,	and	working	conditions	(ibid.:	331).	By	contrast,	joint	consultation	
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saw	union	representatives	in	discussions	with	employers	on	issues	such	as	company	
finances,	plans	for	investment,	new	machinery,	production	schedules,	changes	to	work	
organisation.	Thus,	far	from	being	sharply	separated,	negotiation	and	consultation	comprise	
a	‘double	helix’	(Wedderburn	1997:	30)	running	through	the	history	of	British	industrial	
relations.		
	
Although	research	in	this	area	is	limited,	there	is	more	recent	evidence	of	the	blurring	of	
negotiation	and	consultation.	For	instance,	WERS	has	shown	that	in	workplaces	without	
trade	unions,	‘a	surprising	amount	of	negotiation	is	reported	on	health	and	safety	and	on	
pay	and	conditions’	(Gospel	and	Willman	2003:	150).	Where	unions	are	present,	less	
negotiation	is	reported	on	pay,	but	more	on	health	and	safety	(ibid.).	The	finding	that	
employers	negotiate	over	pay	where	no	unions	are	present	poses	difficulties	for	the	current	
standard	view:	if	negotiation	requires	the	use	or	threat	of	sanctions,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	
non-unionised	workplaces	conduct	more	negotiations	than	unionised	ones.	The	figures	for	
health	and	safety	are	particularly	important,	though,	because	in	this	area	the	law	is	well-
known:	employers	are	required	to	consult	(Acas	2014a).	Thus,	in	an	area	where	there	is	a	
clear	legal	framework	of	consultation,	almost	a	fifth	of	employers	report	that	they	negotiate	
with	union	representatives	(Gospel	and	Willman	2003:	150).	This	suggests	that	managers’	
definitions	of	negotiation	and	consultation	are	less	clear	than	the	current	standard	view	
assumes;	that	is,	a	‘blurring’	of	negotiation	and	consultation	rather	than	sharp	separation.	
Furthermore,	research	has	found	that	formal	arrangements	need	not	coincide	with	
workplace	reality.	For	instance,	in	a	shipyard	with	a	single-union	recognition	agreement,	
managers	regularly	bargained	with	several	unions	(McBride	2004:	128-30).	At	Royal	Mail,	
management	policy	designed	to	exclude	union	representatives	from	formal	bargaining	
resulted	in	widespread	informal	bargaining	(Beale	2003:	84).	Findlay	et	al.	(2009:	236)	found	
that	even	when	managers	did	not	deal	with	stewards	directly,	they	were	‘ever-present	
ghosts	at	the	management	table’,	influencing	management	decisions.	Once	more,	this	
evidence	undermines	the	sharp	distinctions	of	the	current	standard	view.	
	
Further	evidence	of	the	blurring	of	negotiation	and	consultation	can	be	found	in	WERS	data	
from	union	representatives,	who	consistently	report	higher	levels	of	negotiation	than	do	
managers	(Brown	and	Nash	2008).	Although	WERS	data	from	union	representatives	is	
somewhat	limited,	in	1998	and	2004,	they	reported	roughly	twice	as	much	negotiation	as	
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did	managers.1	Unfortunately,	the	authors	effectively	dismiss	these	findings	in	preference	
for	managers’	statements.	The	authors	comment	on	the	union	representatives’	responses:		
	
‘We	might	speculate	that	this	does	not	reflect	actual	behaviour,	so	much	as	the	fading	
of	memories	of	what	constituted	negotiation	in	a	past	era	when	collective	bargaining	
was	more	robust’	(ibid.:	100).		
	
It	would	be	preferable,	though,	to	replace	speculation	with	investigation.		
	
While	most	recent	accounts	have	neglected	such	complexity,	Hyman	(1997:	318)	has	been	
more	astute,	arguing	that	as	traditional	bargaining	arrangements	become	less	influential,		
	
‘collective	bargaining	may	at	times	constitute	a	hollow	shell	...	Other	processes	of	
representation	may	at	times	provide	resources	that	strengthen	the	potential	for	
effective	negotiation.’		
	
Hyman’s	use	of	the	term	‘effective	negotiation’	introduces	a	point	that	will	become	a	
recurring	theme	of	this	research;	namely,	an	emphasis	on	the	social	content	of	the	process,	
not	simply	the	institutional	form.	Thus,	Hyman	(ibid.:	318)	foresees	that	trade	unionists	may	
take	up	the	formally	very	limited	opportunities	presented	by	European	Works	Councils	and	
Information	and	Consultation	regulations,	‘turning	these	facilities	to	advantage	in	their	
handling	of	collective	bargaining’.	Subsequently,	Waddington	(2011:	159)	documents	exactly	
this	development,	showing	that	European	Works	Councils	have	at	times	‘assumed	a	
negotiation	function’.	The	insight	that	trade	unionists	might	pursue	bargaining	via	novel	
institutional	arrangements	again	supports	the	argument	that	negotiation	and	consultation	
may	become	blurred	and	difficult	to	separate.		
	
Altogether,	then,	both	historical	and	contemporary	evidence	suggests	that	the	sharp	
distinction	made	by	the	current	standard	view	between	negotiation	and	consultation	is	
highly	questionable.	Next,	discussion	moves	to	a	second	conceptual	distinction	central	to	
the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards;	that	between	collective	issues	and	individual	
representation.		
	
																																								 																				
1	WERS	2011	reports	little	change	in	management	responses,	but	does	not	report	responses	
from	union	representatives	(van	Wanrooy	et	al.	2013:	85).		
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Collective	issues	and	individual	representation	
The	current	standard	view	makes	a	second	sharp	distinction	between	collective	issues	and	
individual	representation.	Unfortunately,	the	relationship	between	collective	and	individual	
issues	is	seldom	explored	in	industrial	relations	and	related	literatures.	While	the	classic	
literature	commonly	focussed	on	collective	bargaining	(Flanders	1975),	recent	accounts	
have	stressed	the	‘individualisation’	of	employment	(Blyton	et	al.	2011;	Dickens	2012;	
Dickens	and	Hall	2003).	In	reality,	though,	employment	exhibits	both	collective	and	
individual	aspects.	Notably,	the	Webbs	(1902:	178-9)	tie	together	individual	interests	and	
collective	representation	in	their	definition	of	collective	bargaining	as	a	process	which	sets	
terms	and	conditions	for	individual	workers	by	a	process	'in	which	their	interests	have	been	
dealt	with	by	representatives’.	Locating	the	role	of	shop	stewards	in	the	nexus	of	these	
issues	therefore	requires	conceptual	clarification	and	empirical	investigation,	rather	than	a	
priori	judgements	(cf.	Townsend	and	Richards	2011).		
	
It	is	important	not	to	start	with	a	stereotypical	view	of	shop	stewards	in	previous	eras.	
McCarthy	(1966)	and	McCarthy	and	Parker	(1968)	explored	the	question	‘What	do	shop	
stewards	bargain	about?’,	and	listed	issues	including	incentive	schemes,	special	payments,	
allowances	and	grading,	job	evaluation	and	merit	money,	conditions,	clothing,	hours	of	
work,	discipline,	and	other	grievances	and	claims	(McCarthy	1966:	10-14).	Many	of	these	
remain	familiar	today,	and	plainly	entail	a	mix	of	both	individual	and	collective	issues.	
Furthermore:	
	
‘in	every	workplace	with	shop	stewards	they	acted	as	spokesmen	[sic.]	for	those	
facing	disciplinary	charges,	and	here	the	aim	was	to	secure	removal	or	reduction	of	
the	sanctions	proposed.	Thus	examples	were	given	where	dismissals	were	changed	to	
suspensions,	suspensions	to	admonitions,	and	admonitions	to	apologies	–	all	
following	the	intervention	of	a	steward.	Naturally,	they	were	not	always	successful’	
(ibid.:	12-13).		
	
The	importance	of	individual	representation	even	during	the	heyday	of	workplace	
bargaining	suggests	important	continuities	with	contemporary	steward	activity.	
Furthermore,	as	Kelly	(1998:	Ch.4)	has	shown,	lack	of	collective	action	cannot	be	taken	as	
evidence	of	lack	of	collectivism.	It	does	seem	likely,	though,	that	the	widespread	
introduction	of	formal	procedures	for	many	workplace	issues	has	had	an	impact	on	shop	
steward	activity.	Procedures	for	grievance	and	disciplinary	issues,	for	capability	and	
performance	(McKay	and	Moore	2007;	Taylor	2013)	now	feature	significantly	in	shop	
stewards'	workloads.	Consequently,	the	relative	proportion	of	individual	casework	in	shop	
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steward	activity	is	more	significant	(Kersley	et	al.	2006:	215).		
	
Unfortunately,	the	literature	on	individual	workplace	conflict	is	underdeveloped	(Saundry	
and	Wibberley	2014).	Nevertheless,	what	research	there	is	suggests	that	a	complex	
interweaving	of	collective	and	individual	aspects	continues.	For	instance,	in	unionised	
workplaces,	informal	contacts	between	managers	and	union	representatives	are	important	
for	resolving	individual	cases	(Saundry	and	Dix	2014;	Saundry	et	al.	2011;	Saundry	and	
Wibberley	2014).	Kelly	(1998:	136,	n.3)	introduces	the	category	of	'semi-collective'	issues,	
defined	as	individual	issues	pursued	by	collective	means.	Conversely,	other	evidence	
suggests	that	collective	issues	may	be	pursued	by	individual	means.	Although	the	
Employment	Tribunal	(ET)	system	has	been	criticised	for	weakness	in	protecting	workers	
from	unfair	treatment	at	work	(Dickens	2012;	Dickens	and	Hall	2003),	individual	cases	in	the	
form	of	ET	rulings	can	and	do	have	significant	impacts	upon	collective	conditions	of	
employment.	In	2004,	WERS	(Kersley	et	al.	2006:	227-8)	found	that	for	workplaces	with	
more	than	500	employees,	some	60	per	cent	had	faced	an	ET	case	in	the	preceding	12	
months,	and	around	half	had	changed	workplace	procedures	as	a	consequence.	Clearly,	
some	individual	cases	have	significant	collective	impacts.	The	huge	increase	in	ET	claims	
since	around	1990	(Renton	2012:	1)	suggests	that	shop	steward	may	have	developed	
alternative	means	for	pressuring	management	following	the	decline	of	strikes.	Although	this	
shift	has	generated	considerable	debate	(Colling	2012;	Dix	et	al.	2009;	Drinkwater	and	
Ingram	2005;	Kersley	et	al.	2006:	Ch.8;	Knight	and	Latreille	2000;	Latreille	et	al.	2007),	it	is	
clear	evidence	for	the	co-mingling	of	individual	and	collective	issues,	not	sharp	separation.	
Again,	this	undermines	the	conceptual	framework	of	the	current	standard	view.		
	
Problems	of	methodology		
The	current	standard	view	is	built	almost	entirely	on	evidence	from	the	WIRS/WERS	series	
of	surveys,	but	this	heavy	reliance	on	quantitative	research	presents	further	difficulties.	In	
part,	this	is	because	large-scale	surveys	are	generally	ill-suited	to	exploring	micro-level	
processes	in	the	workplace	(Greene	2001:	5;	Strauss	and	Whitfield	1998:	15).	However,	
there	are	particular	problem	with	WIRS/WERS	data	regarding	shop	stewards,	because	it	is	
mainly	based	on	responses	from	managers	(Terry	2010;	Brown	2010;	Brown	and	Nash,	
2008;	Brown	et	al.	2009).	Yet,	WERS	treats	managers'	responses	unproblematically.	That	is,	
when	a	manager	reports	no	negotiation	with	union	representatives,	that	is	taken	as	
evidence	that	in	fact	no	negotiation	is	taking	place.	Although	WERS	includes	evidence	from	
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senior	union	representatives,	it	is	relatively	limited	and	often	downplayed	in	favour	of	
management	statements	(for	instance,	Brown	and	Nash	2008,	discussed	above).	However,	
this	unquestioning	methodology	is	‘sociologically	naive’	(Hill	1974:	213),	because	social	
actors’	statements	reflect	not	only	their	experiences	but	also	their	values	and	norms	(ibid.:	
226-35).	WERS	fails	to	take	this	into	account.	This	matters	because	it	is	well	documented	
that	unitary	views	have	become	widespread	among	managers	in	recent	years,	and	unitarism	
is	normatively	strongly	opposed	to	bargaining	(Edwards	2003:	10).	Indeed,	management	has	
been	active	in	‘seeking	to	redefine	the	workplace	ideology	of	collective	relations’	(Terry	
2004:	214).	Consequently,	given	that	large	parts	of	British	management	wish	to	see	shop	
stewards	excluded	from	management	decisions,	manager	statements	on	this	issue	should	
not	be	taken	at	face	value.		
	
A	similar	point	is	made	by	Marchington	and	Parker	(1990:	224):		
	
‘One	of	the	problems	with	research	based	on	questionnaires	sent	to	senior	managers	
is	that	it	is	better	at	identifying	intentions	and	aspirations	than	establishing	the	
precise	nature	of	employee	relations	in	practice.’	
	
As	a	result,	‘the	practice	of	employee	relations	on	the	shop	floor	rarely	conforms	with	policy	
pronouncements	or	intentions	espoused	at	corporate	headquarters’	(ibid.:	258).	This	is	not	
to	say	that	management	statements	on	workplace	relations	should	be	ignored;	rather,	they	
should	be	considered	part	of	the	phenomenon	under	examination.	The	informality	of	
workplace	relations	can	involve	managers	in	a	shifting	complex	of	deals,	accommodations,	
and	hidden	practices	(Edwards	1989).	Indeed,	previous	research	has	identified	managers	
who	denied	bargaining	in	principle,	but	bargained	regularly	in	practice	(Goodrich	1975:	62;	
Turner	et	al.	1967:	92).	Yet,	this	possibility	remains	unexplored	in	WERS-based	research.	
Overall,	the	reliance	of	the	current	standard	view	on	management	surveys	must	be	
considered	problematic.		
	
Further	methodological	difficulty	with	WERS	data	derives	from	the	construction	of	the	
questionnaire.	Where	a	union	is	recognised,	WERS	asks	managers	a	series	of	questions	
about	bargaining	arrangements,	including:		
	
'Are	there	any	committees	of	managers	and	employees	at	this	workplace,	primarily	
concerned	with	consultation,	rather	than	negotiation?	These	committees	may	be	
called	joint	consultative	committees,	works	councils	or	representative	forums'	(WERS	
2011:	40).	
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Subsequently,	managers	are	asked	about	a	list	of	potential	bargaining	issues.	In	2004,	these	
included	pay,	hours	of	work,	holiday	entitlement,	recruitment,	training,	grievance	and	
disciplinary	procedures,	performance	appraisals,	and	health	and	safety	(WERS	2004:	63-65;	
Brown	and	Nash	2008:	101;	this	list	was	reduced	in	2011,	see	WERS	2011:	52-54).	Managers	
were	asked:		
	
'For	each	of	these	issues	I'd	like	to	know	whether	management	normally	negotiates,	
consults,	informs,	or	does	not	involve	unions	at	all	over	these	matters'	(WERS	2011:	
52).	
	
Managers’	responses	are	then	compiled	as	quantitative	data	for	subsequent	analysis.	
Besides	the	difficulties	discussed	above	concerning	managers'	responses,	a	further	
significant	problem	arises;	namely,	that	the	distinction	between	negotiation	and	
consultation	does	not	emerge	from	the	data,	but	is	built	into	the	survey	a	priori.	The	WERS	
questionnaire	assumes	the	existence	of	these	distinctions	and	places	them	in	a	hierarchy.	
That	is,	the	WERS	methodology	assumes	what	it	claims	to	find.	As	a	result,	WERS	findings	in	
this	area	must	be	considered	significantly	problematic.		
	
	
This	section	has	outlined	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards,	and	presented	a	
critique	of	its	conceptual	and	methodological	shortcomings.	This	critique	also	points	
towards	an	alternative	approach.	Methodologically,	it	underlines	the	need	for	‘a	more	
rigorous	empirical	analysis	of	the	workplace’	(Hill	1974:	226)	if	the	contemporary	role	of	
shop	stewards	is	to	be	properly	understood.	Conceptually,	it	indicates	the	need	to	
reappraise	older	frameworks	for	understanding	shop	stewards	–	as	presented	in	the	next	
section.		
	
	
2.2	The	classic	accounts	
	
So	far,	this	chapter	has	outlined	problems	in	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards,	
and	suggested	that	an	alternative	approach	is	both	necessary	and	possible.	As	a	first	step	
towards	this	end,	this	section	gives	a	critical	overview	of	accounts	of	shop	stewards	
produced	during	the	classic	period	of	workplace	research,	the	1960s	and	1970s.	It	will	be	
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argued	that	the	contribution	of	these	studies	remains	relevant	to	the	study	of	shop	
stewards,	despite	significant	changes	in	employment	relations	and	workplace	practices.	
First,	the	workplace	bargainer	view	of	shop	stewards	is	outlined,	after	which	discussion	
moves	to	the	various	typologies	developed	to	account	for	variation	in	steward	behaviour.			
	
The	shop	steward	as	workplace	bargainer	
During	the	long	post-war	boom,	informal	workplace	bargaining	became	widespread,	and	the	
profile	of	shop	stewards	in	industrial	relations	research	rose	steadily.	From	the	point	of	view	
of	the	present	study,	the	principal	conceptual	contribution	of	the	resulting	wave	of	classic	
studies	was	the	notion	of	the	shop	steward	as	workplace	bargainer.	Accounts	from	this	
period	‘define	shop	stewards	as	negotiators	first	and	foremost,	and	this	definition	has	been	
largely	adopted	ever	since’	(Terry	1978:	17,	n.62,	citing	Clegg	et	al.	1961).	This	conception	of	
the	shop	steward	underlies	the	Donovan	Commission	conclusions	regarding	‘two	systems	of	
industrial	relations’,	the	formal	and	the	informal:	‘The	bargaining	which	takes	place	within	
factories	…	usually	takes	place	piece-meal	...	Unwritten	understandings	and	“custom	and	
practice”	predominate’	(Donovan	1968:	261).	McCarthy	and	Parker	(1968:	53-56)	found	that	
while	the	scope	of	shop	steward	bargaining	varied,	it	was	more	widespread	and	established	
than	was	previously	thought,	and	was	generally	accepted	by	managers.	Famously,	Donovan	
(1968:	56)	concluded:		
	
‘For	the	most	part,	the	steward	is	viewed	by	others,	and	views	himself	[sic.],	as	an	
accepted,	reasonable	and	even	moderating	influence;	more	of	a	lubricant	than	an	
irritant.’	
	
Flanders	(1968:	552)	characterised	shop	steward	bargaining	as	‘largely	informal,	largely	
fragmented	and	largely	autonomous’.	Overall,	Donovan	consolidated	what	became	the	
accepted	view	of	shop	stewards,	as	‘essentially	shopfloor	bargainers’	(McCarthy	1966:	70;	
McCarthy	and	Parker	1968:	65).		
	
The	analysis	of	the	role	of	shop	stewards	in	workplace	bargaining	was	further	developed	by	
Brown	(1973).	Although	his	study	focuses	on	the	‘hot-house	conditions’	of	piecework	
bargaining,	Brown	(ibid.:	23)	argues,	’the	analysis	should	have	a	relevance	beyond	the	
confines	of	piecework	payment	systems’.	The	study	centres	on	informal	bargaining,	and	a	
central	feature	is	‘custom	and	practice’	(C&P).	Brown	develops	Flanders’	notion	of	shop	
stewards	as	the	‘principal	guardians’	of	C&P	(cited	ibid.:	131).	Brown	(ibid.:	127-32)	also	
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challenges	Donovan’s	description	of	the	steward	as	‘more	a	lubricant	than	an	irritant’	(see	
above),	finding	that	in	some	circumstances	shop	stewards	deliberately	foster	disputes	in	
pursuit	of	particular	aims.	Moreover,	Brown	was	not	the	only	researcher	to	take	this	view	
(Darlington	1994:	38;	Terry	1977;	1978;	Turner	et	al.	1967:	214).		
	
Brown	(1973:	136)	develops	a	model	of	'shop-stewardliness',	which	is	seen	as	comprising	
‘four	implicit	principles	of	shop	steward	behaviour’	(ibid.:	133).	These	principles	are:	‘the	
pursuit	of	unity	…	among	his	[sic]	constituents’	(ibid.:	133);	‘the	pursuit	of	…	equity	among	
his	[sic]	constituents’	(ibid.:	133);	‘maintaining	a	good	bargaining	relationship	with	
management’,	with	trust	identified	as	particularly	important	(ibid.:	134);	and,	‘the	reduction	
of	uncertainty’	for	constituency	members,	which	is	‘a	very	broad	heading’	(ibid.:	136).	
Brown	(ibid.:	135)	found	that	stewards	gained	a	number	of	benefits	from	good	bargaining	
relations	with	managers,	including	reducing	uncertainty	and	’speeding	up	the	bargaining	
process’;	indeed,	for	Brown,	‘trust	appears	to	be	an	unmixed	asset	in	negotiations’	(Walton	
and	McKersie	1991,	cited	ibid.:	135).		
	
For	Brown	(1973),	stewards	were	centrally	involved	in	maintaining	frameworks	of	informal	
rules	and	understandings	governing	bargaining	over	piece-rates.	Bargaining	might	be	
collective	but	equally	might	take	place	between	rate-fixers	and	individual	workers	(ibid.:	
131).	By	linking	collectively	established	custom	and	practice	with	individual	bargaining,	
Brown's	account	bridges	the	conceptual	gap	between	collective	and	individual	issues	(see	
also,	Partridge	1978).	Brown	(1973:	6,	n.6,	et	passim)	also	makes	significant	use	of	the	
notion	of	‘effort	bargain’.	Unlike	elements	of	shop	steward	typologies	such	as	‘union	
principles’	(see	below),	the	effort	bargain	is	a	continuing	feature	of	workplace	relations,	
even	though	the	terms	of	the	bargain	have	shifted	markedly	in	recent	years.	Furthermore,	
while	Brown’s	research	centres	around	effort	bargaining,	aspects	of	shop	steward	behaviour	
such	as	‘the	pursuit	of	equity’	and	‘the	reduction	of	uncertainty’	correspond	closely	to	
‘frontier	of	control’	issues.	Consequently,	Brown’s	model	is	potentially	applicable	to	a	
variety	of	workplace	practices.		
	
Significantly,	by	the	close	of	the	classic	period	of	workplace	studies	it	was	becoming	clear	
that	shop	steward	activity	could	change	its	focus.	Edwards	and	Scullion	(1982:	Ch.7)	showed	
that	with	the	shift	from	piecework	to	measured	day	work,	rather	than	the	decline	in	
workplace	bargaining	that	many	had	predicted,	stewards	shifted	the	focus	of	their	activities	
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within	the	wage-effort	bargain	from	bargaining	over	wages	towards	bargaining	over	effort.	
Furthermore,	stewards’	organisation	and	activities	were	found	to	be	significantly	influenced	
by	historical	development	and	workplace	traditions	(Terry	and	Edwards	1988).	Increasingly,	
it	became	clear	that	steward	responses	could	not	simply	be	inferred	from	structural	factors	
(ibid.:	216).	Rather,	similar	structural	determinants	can	and	do	produce	varied	outcomes.	
	
It	is	important	to	remember	that	the	bargaining	practices	described	in	many	of	the	classic	
studies	were	far	from	evenly	spread	across	employment	(cf.	Edwards	and	Scullion	1982).	It	
is	well	established,	though	often	forgotten,	that	these	studies	were	heavily	concentrated	in	
a	small	number	of	the	most	strongly	unionised	industries;	what	Terry	(1978:	3)	called	'the	
engineering	paradigm'	(see	also,	Terry	1988).	Other	industries,	and	earlier	periods,	such	as	
the	1930s,	had	seen	much	weaker	shop	steward	organisation	(Clegg	1979:	23).	In	one	of	the	
few	studies	of	less	strongly	organised	workplaces	during	the	classic	period,	Armstrong	et	al.	
(1981)	found	far	less	evidence	of	firmly	established	workplace	bargaining	practices;	in	
particular,	an	absence	of	the	custom	and	practice	traditions	of	the	engineering	industry.	
Similarly,	studies	of	more	quiescent	workforces	in	the	1970s	(Nichols	and	Armstrong	1976;	
Nichols	and	Beynon	1977)	appear	closer	to	contemporary	workplaces	than	do	the	auto	
factories	of	Batstone	et	al.	(1977;	1978)	or	Beynon	(1984).	Consequently,	the	shift	in	
workplace	relations	since	the	1970s	might	be	less	than	it	appears	when	judged	against	the	
most	strongly	organised	examples.	Moreover,	insofar	as	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	
control	are	continuing	features	of	workplace	relations,	it	is	possible	that	elements	from	the	
workplace	bargainer	view	might	still	be	recognisable	in	contemporary	shop	steward	activity.		
	
Shop	steward	typologies	
The	classic	studies	also	proposed	various	typologies	for	categorising	different	approaches	to	
the	shop	steward	role,	of	which	the	best	known	was	developed	by	Batstone	et	al.	(1977).	
Batstone	et	al.	(ibid.:	34)	distinguished	among	shop	stewards	on	the	basis	of	variations	in	
the	way	they	dealt	with	workplace	issues,	most	notably	contrasting	‘leaders’	and	‘populists’.	
The	typology	has	two	dimensions:	degree	of	attachment	to	‘union	principles’	(ibid.:	24-29),	
and	relationship	with	union	members	(ibid.:	29-32).	According	to	this	typology,	leader	
stewards	had	stronger	attachment	to	‘union	principles’	and	sought	a	representative	
relationship	with	members,	attempting	to	influence	which	issues	were	pursued.	By	contrast,	
populist	stewards	had	less	attachment	to	union	principles	and	tended	to	have	a	delegate	
relationship	with	members,	acting	as	a	mouthpiece	for	members’	grievances.	Within	the	
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factory	studied	it	was	found	that	the	well-organised	shopfloor	had	a	higher	proportion	of	
leader	stewards,	whereas	the	more	recently	organised	and	less	strong	staff	side	had	
relatively	more	populist	stewards	(ibid.:	36).	Leader	stewards	tended	to	foster	‘good	
bargaining	relations’	(ibid.:	Ch.7)	with	managers,	which	they	valued	as	a	source	of	
information	and	influence.	Significantly,	leader	stewards	secured	better	outcomes	for	the	
members	they	represented	than	did	populist	stewards	(ibid.:	Ch.10).	Batstone	et	al.	(ibid.:	
45-52)	also	identified	a	‘quasi-elite’	(QE)	of	senior	(leader)	stewards	who	were	influential	in	
decision-making	processes	within	the	shop	steward	body.		
	
Despite	an	enduring	influence,	this	typology	has	drawn	criticism,	particularly	over	the	
conception	of	leaders	and	populists.	Darlington	(1994)	develops	a	sustained	critique,	in	
particular	taking	exception	to	the	evident	preference	for	leader	stewards	over	populists,	and	
for	‘good	bargaining	relations’	over	consistent	opposition	to	management	(ibid.:	14-26).	
Willman	(1980)	takes	a	similar	view,	seeing	in	the	close	relationship	with	managers	signs	of	
‘management	sponsorship’,	though	Marchington	and	Parker	(1990)	found	little	difference	in	
practice	between	supposedly	‘management-sponsored’	and	more	‘independent’	union	
organisation.	Another	line	of	criticism	argued	that	shop	stewards	cannot	be	categorised	
according	to	leadership	style,	because	individual	stewards	adopt	different	styles	according	
to	the	issue	and	circumstances	(Broad	1983;	Pedler	1973;	Partridge	1978;	Willman	1980).	
But,	as	Marchington	and	Armstrong	(1983:	34)	point	out,	it	is	insufficient	to	note	variation;	
the	point	is	to	explain	it,	which	the	Batstone	typology	attempts	to	do.	Overall,	though,	these	
accounts	agree	that	Batstone	et	al.’s	first	dimension	is	the	more	secure;	that	is,	how	much	
stewards	attempt	to	shape	the	issues	raised	by	members.		
	
The	second	dimension,	‘union	principles’,	presents	greater	difficulties.	While	it	has	been	
criticised	as	vague	and	‘too	generalised’	(Willman	1980:	41,	48),	the	real	difficulty	is	that	it	is	
too	specific.	Batstone	et	al.	(1977:	11)	acknowledge	the	difficulty	of	defining	‘union	
principles’,	yet	pick	ones	that	suit	their	purpose,	such	as	‘collective	unity’	and	‘fairness’.	
However,	no	firm	grounds	are	provided	for	this	choice.	Empirically,	Marchington	and	
Armstrong	(1983:	37)	found	that	stewards	commonly	expressed	strong	support	for	‘union	
principles’,	but	with	little	agreement	as	to	what	those	principles	might	be.	An	alternative	
approach	is	offered	by	the	Webbs	(1902:	595)	who	comment,		
	
‘As	soon	as	it	is	realised	that	Trade	Unionists	are	inspired,	not	by	any	single	doctrine	
...	we	no	longer	look	to	them	for	any	one	consistent	or	uniform	policy’.		
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This	recognition	of	the	varied	arguments	and	rationales	used	by	trade	unionists	offers	a	far	
more	flexible	approach	for	research	in	this	area.	Such	an	approach	can	also	accommodate	a	
notion	of	strategy	on	the	part	of	shop	stewards	(Marchington	and	Armstrong	1983:	3).	For	
instance,	looking	again	at	Batstone’s	two	groups	of	shop	stewards,	on	the	shopfloor	and	in	
the	offices,	it	is	plausible	that	stewards	in	different	circumstances	might	emphasise	different	
principles.	A	strong,	well-established	shopfloor	organisation	might	see	stewards	stress	
collective	unity	principles	against	excessive	sectionalism;	meanwhile,	stewards	among	newly	
organised	workers	might	stress	principles	of	social	justice	and	the	right	to	organise	
(Batstone	et	al.	1977:	27-28).	It	is	difficult	to	see	why	some	of	these	principle	should	be	
considered	more	‘trade	union’	in	nature	than	others,	in	the	way	Batstone	et	al.	propose.	The	
difficulty	of	defining	‘union	principles’	led	Marchington	and	Armstrong	to	dispense	with	this	
dimension	altogether,	replacing	it	with	‘integration	into	the	steward	network’	(ibid.:	37,	40)	
to	generate	a	modified	typology	(ibid.:	42-46).	Today,	however,	the	dilapidation	of	steward	
networks	suggests	this	dimension	is	less	likely	to	be	helpful.	Overall,	difficulties	in	this	area	
suggest	that	the	dimension	of	‘trade	union	principles’	is	unlikely	be	helpful	in	analysing	the	
activity	of	contemporary	shop	stewards.		
	
Darlington	(1994)	proposes	an	alternative	model	based	on	three	dimensions:	the	
relationship	of	stewards	to	management,	characterised	by	‘a	tension	between	resistance	
and	accommodation’;	the	relationship	of	stewards	to	members,	characterised	by	‘a	tension	
between	democracy	and	bureaucracy’;	and,	the	relationship	of	stewards	to	union	full-time	
officers,	characterised	by	‘a	tension	between	independence	and	dependence’	(ibid.:	28-31,	
original	emphasis).	In	a	useful	counter	to	Batstone’s	more	fixed	categories,	Darlington	
provides	considerable	evidence	to	show	that	shop	steward	activity	can	be	charted	on	these	
dimensions,	and	that	steward	organisation	shifts	between	approaches,	even	adopting	
divergent	styles	simultaneously	when	dealing	with	differing	issues	(ibid.:	20-22).	However,	
Darlington’s	conceptualisation	of	the	three	dimensions	of	his	model	as	dynamic	
contradictions	(ibid.:	33)	is	problematic.	Although	there	certainly	are	tensions	in	the	
relations	of	shop	stewards	along	the	dimensions	that	Darlington	identifies,	it	is	not	clear	
that	they	form	dynamic	internal	contradictions	in	the	Marxist	sense.	Indeed,	the	motive	
forces	that	Darlington	identifies	as	driving	the	three	dimensions	remain	largely	outside	the	
three-dimensional		model,	in	factors	as	diverse	as	'product	market	crises',	'hostile	economic	
and	political	climate',	defeats	of	major	unions	during	the	1980s,	the	influence	of	'new	
	44	
realism',	fear	of	plant	closures	and	unemployment,	and	weakness	of	a	left	alternative	within	
the	labour	movement	(ibid.:	260-261).	In	theoretical	terms,	then,	Darlington's	model	
appears	more	as	a	useful	heuristic	device	for	charting	and	categorising	shop	steward	
activity,	rather	than	a	theoretical	explanation	of	that	activity	(see	further	discussion,	Section	
7.3).		
	
Unusually,	Darlington	(1994:	72)	also	considers	the	political	beliefs	of	shop	stewards,	which	
were	found	to	be	influential	in	steward	leadership	styles	(see	also,	Marchington	and	
Armstrong	1983:	46).	More	recently,	Darlington	(2009a;	2009b)	has	re-emphasised	the	role	
that	socialist	militants	often	play	in	developing	robust	workplace	union	organisation.	
Although	it	remains	rare	for	industrial	relations	research	to	take	up	the	issue	of	politics,	a	
number	of	studies	have	pointed	to	links	between	socialist	militancy	and	trade	union	
activism	(Cohen	2011;	Darlington	2013;	Gall	2003a;	Hinton	1973;	Kelly	1988;	McIlroy	2007a;	
2007b).		
	
In	summary,	while	the	analytical	framework	can	be	questioned,	the	lasting	insight	of	
Batstone	et	al.	(1977)	is	the	identification	of	differentiation	among	shop	stewards,	who	
approached	their	role	in	different	ways.	Critics	of	the	leader/populist	typology	have	
proposed	alternative	models,	but	these	generally	remain	descriptive,	and	important	
questions	regarding	underlying	causes	and	dynamics	remain	unanswered.	Underlying	all	
these	typologies	is	the	workplace	bargainer	view	of	shop	stewards.	Despite	many	changes	
since	the	classic	studies	were	carried	out,	insofar	as	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	
control	continue	to	be	features	of	workplace	relations,	the	possibility	remains	that	shop	
steward	activity	may	display	elements	of	continuity	with	those	studies.	An	advantage	of	
Brown's	(1973)	approach	is	that	it	leaves	open	the	question	of	what	methods	shop	stewards	
adopt	to	pursue	the	ends	of	'shop-stewardliness'.	This	conceptual	flexibility	would	allow	for	
the	purposeful	adoption	of	different	methods	on	the	part	of	shop	stewards,	according	to	
different	issues	and	circumstances,	and	according	to	subjective	influences	such	as	political	
commitment.	However,	before	such	factors	can	be	considered,	it	is	necessary	to	establish	a	
theoretical	basis	for	claiming	some	degree	of	continuity	in	workplace	relations	from	the	
time	of	the	classic	studies	to	the	present.	The	next	chapter	will	commence	this	task.		
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Conclusion	
	
As	this	chapter	has	made	clear,	previous	literature	in	this	area	contains	two	contrasting	
views	of	shop	stewards.	In	the	classic	studies,	shop	stewards	are	seen	primarily	as	
workplace	bargainers.	By	contrast,	the	current	standard	view	sees	shop	stewards	as	no	
longer	significantly	involved	in	bargaining,	restricted	to	dealing	with	individual	issues,	with	
no	significant	bargaining	sanctions	at	their	disposal.	Despite	its	widespread	diffusion	
through	industrial	relations	and	related	fields,	the	above	discussion	has	shown	that	the	
current	standard	view	contains	significant	conceptual	and	methodological	difficulties.	In	
particular,	the	sharp	conceptual	distinctions	of	the	current	standard	view,	between	
negotiation	and	consultation,	and	between	collective	issues	and	individual	representation,	
must	be	considered	problematic.	It	does	not	follow,	though,	that	the	workplace	bargainer	
view	of	shop	stewards	is	adequate.	Too	much	has	changed	in	workplace	relations	for	the	
classic	accounts	still	to	be	sufficient.	Consequently,	an	alternative	approach	is	required.		
	
The	argument	presented	in	this	chapter	therefore	poses	the	question	as	to	what	alternative	
approach	might	provide	a	better	framework	for	grasping	the	activity	of	contemporary	shop	
stewards.	One	important	conclusion	is	the	need	to	adopt	different	research	methods	if	the	
methodological	problems	of	the	current	standard	view	are	to	be	avoided.	Consequently,	an	
alternative	methodological	approach	is	presented	in	Chapter	4.	The	second	conclusion	of	
this	chapter	is	that	an	alternative	conceptual	framework	must	avoid	the	sharp	distinctions	
and	formalism	of	the	current	standard	view.	Therefore,	the	next	chapter	develops	a	firm	
theorisation	of	the	underlying	structure	and	dynamics	of	workplace	relations,	within	which	
shop	steward	activity	and	workplace	bargaining	processes	can	be	(re)conceptualised.		
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Chapter	3:	Bargaining	and	workplace	relations		
	
	
Industrial	relations	research	has	a	long-standing	insecurity	about	theory	(Kelly	1998:	15).	
Famously,	the	once	dominant	Oxford	school	thought	an	ounce	of	theory	for	every	pound	of	
facts	was	the	correct	proportion	(Cappelli	1985,	cited	in	Friedman	and	McDaniel	1998:	
122).1	Not	surprisingly,	then,	empirical	research	is	the	'most	potent	tradition'	(Brown	and	
Wright	1994:	153)	in	industrial	relations.	Descriptive	accounts,	both	qualitative	and	
quantitative,	predominate	(Kelly	1998:	16).	Typologies	are	numerous	but	general	
frameworks	for	understanding	workplace	relations	are	far	less	developed	(ibid.:	18-21).	
Dunlop's	(1958)	'system'	continues	to	make	appearances	in	textbooks	almost	60	years	after	
publication	(e.g.	Williams	2014:	8),	despite	its	obvious	encumbrance	of	Parsonian	
functionalism.	Even	the	wave	of	Marxist	critiques	during	the	1970s	left	little	in	the	way	of	
lasting	theoretical	contribution.	While	other	areas	of	social	science	witnessed	an	'explosion'	
of	Marxist	theory	during	the	1970s	(Callinicos	2007:	261),	the	leading	Marxist	in	industrial	
relations	saw	Marxism	not	in	terms	of	developed	theory,	but	as	'a	particular	perspective	to	
the	understanding	of	this	world',	which	'could	be	summed	up	without	too	much	distortion	
in	just	four	words:	totality,	change,	contradiction,	and	practice'	(Hyman	1975a:	4,	original	
emphasis).	Although	Hyman	(ibid.:	4-7)	expands	a	little	on	these	four	words,	no	attempt	is	
made	to	link	industrial	relations	theoretically	to	an	account	of	the	political	economy	of	
capitalism.	No	wonder,	then,	that	it	took	a	historian,	not	an	industrial	relations	specialist,	to	
note	the	poverty	of	Marxism	in	industrial	relations	research	(Howell	2005:	12).		
	
Unfortunately,	Hyman's	(1975a:	x)	hope	that	'this	book	[may]	soon	become	redundant	...	by	
stimulating	more,	and	better,	Marxist	scholarship'	was	never	fulfilled.	Subsequently,	
Marxism	went	into	full	decline	in	industrial	relations,	as	elsewhere.	In	the	related	field	of	
labour	process	theory	(LPT),	which	originated	in	the	Marxist	resurgence	of	the	1970s,	the	
labour	theory	of	value	was	placed	firmly	outside	its	'core'	framework	(Thompson	1990:	99).	
Before	long,	the	race	towards	Foucault	was	in	full	flow	(Thompson	and	Smith	2010:	18).	The	
return	of	LPT	from	those	further	shores	has	not,	though,	seen	much	by	way	of	fresh	
theorisation,	and	analysis	is	still	dominated	by	familiar	dichotomies	of	control	and	
																																								 																				
1	Ackers	(2007:	79)	has	Clegg	saying,	'an	ounce	of	fact	is	worth	a	pound	of	theory'.		
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resistance,	or	the	control–resistance–consent	triad	(Thompson	and	Smith	2010:	11).	In	
industrial	relations,	the	break	from	Marxism	was	systematised	by	Edwards	(1986),	and	has	
since	been	reinforced	by	Hyman's	(1999)	rejection	of	the	'imagined	solidarities'	of	class.	The	
now	dominant	'radical	pluralism'	(Ackers	2014:	2608)	has	generated	little	systematic	
theorisation.	Compared	with	other	areas	of	social	science,	industrial	relations	theory	
remains	significantly	underdeveloped.		
	
The	theoretical	weakness	of	industrial	relations	matters	because	adequate	explanation	
requires	theory	as	a	framework	for	the	analysis	and	interpretation	of	empirical	findings.	
More	particularly,	for	the	present	research,	any	attempt	to	generalise	from	case	study	
research	depends	upon	theoretical	clarity	(Section	4.1).	Consequently,	an	important	priority	
of	the	present	research	was	to	establish	a	firm	theoretical	basis	for	understanding	the	
dynamics	of	workplace	relations	and	bargaining	processes,	and	therefore	for	grasping	the	
role	of	shop	stewards	within	those	relations	and	processes.	Given	the	weaknesses	outlined	
above,	considerable	conceptual	and	theoretical	preparation	was	required	to	resolve	some	
of	the	difficulties,	and	to	assemble	a	more	adequate	framework	for	theorising	shop	
stewards	within	an	overall	account	of	employment	under	capitalist	relations	of	production.	
This	chapter	presents	that	work	and	the	solutions	proposed.		
	
The	chapter	starts	from	the	same	place	as	much	recent	scholarship	in	the	field,	with	a	
discussion	of	the	employment	relationship;	which	has	correctly	been	seen	as	a	fundamental	
concept	of	industrial	relations	(Ackers	2014;	Edwards	1986;	2003).	Unlike	other	recent	
accounts,	though,	the	employment	relationship	is	then	linked	theoretically	to	two	central	
features	of	workplace	relations;	namely,	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control.	Next,	the	
chapter	presents	a	framework	for	understanding	workplace	bargaining	processes,	based	on	
a	two	part	conception	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	resources.	The	remainder	
of	the	chapter	develops	a	theoretical	discussion	of	other	aspects	of	workplace	relations.	
First,	features	of	day-to-day	workplace	relations;	specifically,	conflict,	cooperation	and	
managerial	relations.	Then,	discussion	turns	to	interests;	a	notion	which	has	been	largely	
discarded	from	industrial	relations,	but	which	offers	the	potential	for	theorising	non-
deterministic	links	between	structure	and	agency.	Finally,	the	chapter	develops	a	definition	
of	bargaining,	and	explores	some	of	its	implications.	Incorporating	elements	from	bargaining	
theory,	this	definition	was	indispensible	for	the	present	study,	and	represents	a	genuine	
contribution	to	industrial	relations	theory.		
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3.1	Towards	an	alternative	account	
	
This	section	develops	a	theoretical	approach	to	understanding	shop	steward	activity	that	
avoids	difficulties	encountered	by	the	current	standard	view,	by	starting	from	the	dynamics	
of	workplace	relations	rather	than	from	formal	bargaining	arrangements.	Analysis	starts	
from	the	nature	of	the	employment	relationship,	and	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	
control	to	which	it	gives	rise,	which	emerge	as	relatively	robust	features	of	workplace	
relations.	The	discussion	then	considers	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	resources	
as	influences	upon	patterns	of	shop	steward	activity.	Although	little	recent	research	has	
focussed	directly	on	shop	stewards,	they	have	made	appearances	in	a	range	of	other	
studies,	which	are	drawn	upon	here.	The	discussion	brings	together	concepts	that	will	be	
familiar	from	previous	industrial	relations	scholarship,	but	linked	in	a	more	theoretically	
explicit	manner	than	is	usual.		
	
The	employment	relationship,	effort	bargain,	and	frontier	of	control	
In	common	with	much	recent	industrial	relations	research,	this	account	takes	as	its	starting	
point	the	nature	of	the	employment	relationship	(Blyton	et	al.	2011;	Edwards	1986;	2003),	
which	has	important	implications	for	the	study	of	shop	stewards.	As	Brown	(2010:	255)	
states:		
	
‘negotiation	permeates	the	relationship	between	employer	and	workers	...	
Employment	is,	by	its	nature,	an	open	and	unusually	long-term	relationship	…	
Bargaining	is	central	to	how	employers	and	workers	cope	with	this	transactional	
uncertainty’.2		
	
That	is,	the	nature	of	the	employment	relationship	means	that	some	form	of	bargaining	will	
be	a	continuing	characteristic	of	relations	between	employers	and	employees.	This	is	not	to	
pre-judge	the	form	or	content	of	such	bargaining,	still	less	its	outcomes,	which	must	be	
determined	by	empirical	investigation.	Nevertheless,	the	employment	relationship	
structures	the	context	within	which	shop	stewards	are	active	(Section	3.2).		
	
Two	features	of	workplace	relations	root	shop	steward	activity	in	the	dynamic	of	the	
employment	relationship:	the	effort	bargain	(Baldamus	1961;	Edwards	1986)	and	the	
																																								 																				
2	This	initial	insight	is	seemingly	lost	in	Brown's	subsequent	analysis	of	shop	stewards	and	
workplace	bargaining.		
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frontier	of	control	(Goodrich	1975;	Hyman	1975b;	Edwards	1986).	The	effort	bargain	
(Baldamus	1961;	Edwards	1986)	refers	to	the	amount	of	effort	that	workers	expend	in	the	
course	of	their	employment.	Since	effort	is	exchanged	for	wages,	an	alternative	term	is	the	
wage-effort	bargain,	though	the	two	terms	have	essentially	the	same	meaning:	here,	effort	
bargain	will	be	preferred,	except	where	the	wage	aspect	is	specifically	emphasised.	
Although	Baldamus	sees	effort	in	physical	terms,	there	seems	to	be	no	reason	not	to	include	
the	mental	effort	of	non-manual	workers	in	this	category.	
	
The	widespread	intensification	of	work	in	recent	decades	(Brown	et	al.	2006)	can	be	seen	as	
a	shift	in	the	effort	bargain	in	favour	of	employers	and	to	the	detriment	of	labour.	In	Marxist	
terms,	this	shift	reflects	a	drive	by	capital	to	restore	profitability	by	increasing	the	rate	of	
exploitation	of	labour.	In	this	way,	the	effort	bargain	can	be	conceptually	linked	to	wider	
political	economy.	Although	Baldamus	was	not	a	Marxist,	there	is	a	clear	compatibility	of	
the	two	approaches	(Eldridge	1998).	Theoretically,	the	combination	is	productive:	the	
political	economy	of	capitalism	(Marx)	drives	a	requirement	for	employers	to	revisit	the	
intensity	of	labour	and	the	effort	bargain	(Baldamus).	Thus,	wider	dynamics	of	political	
economy	drive	workplace	processes	that	disturb	previously	established	work	relations,	
threatening	perpetually	to	generate	and	re-generate	conflict	between	workers	and	
managers	(cf.	Hyman	1975a).		
	
The	frontier	of	control	concerns	‘issues	of	discipline	and	management’	(Goodrich	1975:	20)	
and	‘the	moral	aspect	of	subordination	to	discipline’	(Clay,	cited	in	ibid.:	27).	Typically,	
frontier	of	control	issues	include	‘the	demand	not	to	be	controlled	disagreeably,	the	
demand	not	to	be	controlled	at	all,	and	the	demand	to	take	a	hand	in	controlling’,	and	‘the	
demand	for	the	right	make	suggestions	about	the	conduct	of	work’	(ibid.:	37,	43).	Goodrich	
(ibid.:	56-62)	emphasises	that	the	frontier	of	control	is	subject	to	continuous	adjustment,	
moving	back	and	forth	as	the	balance	of	power	shifts	between	workers	and	management.	
Discussions	of	power	in	industrial	relations	are	often	fraught	with	difficulties,	particularly	in	
relation	to	how	it	might	be	specified	and	measured	(Kelly	2011).	While	it	seems	obvious	that	
the	conduct	of	bargaining	must	reflect	relative	power	resources,	the	problem	so	far	has	
resisted	solution.	Fortunately,	Bacharach	and	Lawler	(1981:	44)	offer	a	conceptual	refuge:		
	
‘Repeated	attempts	to	conceptualize	power	are	based	on	the	assumption	that	it	can	
and	should	be	a	precise	term	—	a	term	subject	to	unambiguous	definition	and	
measurement.	In	contrast,	we	argue	that	power	is	inherently	a	sensitizing	concept	…	
[that]	points	to	a	series	or	range	of	phenomena	but	not	in	a	manner	that	allows	
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precise	definition	or	measurement.’	
	
This	approach	will	be	taken	here:	power	will	be	treated	as	a	'sensitising	concept'	and	no	
attempt	will	be	made	at	'precise	definition	or	measurement'.	One	general	distinction	will	be	
utilised,	however:	following	Silver	(2003)	and	Wright	(2000)	this	study	will	distinguish	
between	workers'	structural	power	and	associational	power.	Structural	power	derives	from	
the	position	of	workers	in	the	division	of	labour;	associational	power	is	based	on	the	
organisational	strength	of	workers.	Both	forms	are	likely	to	carry	implications	for	shop	
steward	activity.		
	
As	Edwards	and	Scullion	(1982:	167)	put	it,	the	frontier	of	control	and	the	effort	bargain	
'cannot	be	divorced'.	How	might	shop	stewards	fit	into	these	workplace	bargaining	
processes?	Obviously,	stewards	may	have	a	role	in	formal	negotiation	or	consultation.	
Stewards	may	also	deal	with	issues	informally.	It	is	important	to	note,	though,	that	stewards	
can	play	an	important	role	even	when	not	directly	involved.	For	instance,	under	piecework	
systems,	workshop	bargaining	commonly	involved	only	individual	workers	and	rate-fixers,	
without	the	direct	participation	of	a	shop	steward	(Roy	1952;	Lupton	1963).	Instead,	the	
steward’s	role	often	lay	in	enforcing	the	bargaining	space	within	which	individual	workers	
were	able	contest	and	constrain	management	freedoms	(Brown	1973).	Thus,	the	freedom	of	
individual	workers	to	bargain	over	effort	depended	upon	shop	stewards	maintaining	a	
frontier	of	control	restricting	management’s	ability	to	unilaterally	decide	the	pace	and	
distribution	of	work.	These	complex	linkages	between	individual	and	collective	aspects	of	
the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control	warn	against	simplistic	approaches	to	
conceptualising	the	place	of	shop	stewards	in	workplace	relations,	raising	the	possibility	that	
stewards	may	still	play	some	role	as	guardians	of	workers’	individual	rights,	despite	other	
changes.	The	discussion	turns	next	to	a	proposed	framework	for	mapping	variation	in	
workplace	bargaining	processes.		
	
Bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	resources	
A	conceptual	difficulty	of	the	current	standard	view	not	discussed	previouly	lies	in	its	
definition	of	bargaining	sanctions	as	industrial	action:	‘muscle’,	as	Terry	(2010:	281)	calls	it,	
in	a	remarkably	gendered	turn	of	phrase.	This	definition	is	excessively	narrow.	As	McCarthy	
(1966:	21)	warned,	an	absence	of	strikes	‘should	not	lead	one	to	conclude	that	no	sanctions	
are	being	employed’.	Non-strike	sanctions	can	include	withdrawal	of	co-operation,	
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overloading	the	grievance	procedure,	and	restriction	of	output	(ibid.:	19-25).	There	seems	
little	reason	to	assume	such	practices	no	longer	take	place.	Indeed,	it	is	well	known	that	
shop	stewards	today	are	considerably	engaged	with	grievance	procedures.	Consequently,	
the	possibility	of	contemporary	non-strike	sanctions	cannot	be	dismissed	without	more	
careful	research.	Moreover,	a	reconsideration	of	bargaining	sanctions	is	in	order,	to	move	
beyond	the	narrow	conception	of	the	current	standard	view.	As	a	first	step,	workplace	
bargaining	will	be	analysed	in	terms	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	resources.		
	
It	has	been	known	at	least	since	the	Webbs	(1902)	that	trade	unions	deploy	a	variety	of	
means	in	attempting	to	deal	with	employers:	‘the	Methods	and	Regulations	actually	used	by	
British	Trade	Unionism	…	[comprise]	three	distinct	instruments	or	levers,	which	we	
distinguish	as	the	Method	of	Mutual	Insurance,	the	Method	of	Collective	Bargaining,	and	
the	Method	of	Legal	Enactment’	(ibid.:	150).	The	present	research	is	similarly	concerned	
with	methods	‘actually	used’.	The	argument,	here,	is	that	these	methods	vary.	For	instance,	
Edwards	and	Scullion	(1982:	181-199)	established	that	the	change	from	piece-work	to	
measured	day	work	in	the	engineering	industry	saw	shop	stewards	shift	from	bargaining	
over	pay	to	bargaining	over	effort,	while	workplaces	in	the	garment	industry	exhibited	little	
overt	bargaining	over	effort	or	pay.	If,	as	McCarthy	(1966:	70;	McCarthy	and	Parker	1968:	
65)	found,	shop	stewards	use	‘all	the	opportunities	presented	to	them’,	then	one	approach	
to	understanding	shifts	in	shop	steward	activity	would	be	to	examine	shifts	in	available	
bargaining	opportunities.		
	
The	notion	of	opportunity	has	seldom	been	explored	in	industrial	relations	research.	One	
exception	is	Kelly	(1998),	who	sees	patterns	of	collective	action	as	related	to	changing	
opportunities	(ibid.:	25,	27,	37),	influenced	by	‘the	policies	and	actions	of	employers	and	the	
state,	and	the	balance	of	forces	between	rulers	and	subordinates’	(ibid.:	37).	This	view	
derives	from	Tilly	(1978:	98-142),	where	opportunity	is	seen	as	conditioned	by	factors	such	
as	repression	(or	facilitation),	which	can	increase	(or	decrease)	the	costs	of	collective	action	
(ibid.:	100-106).	According	to	this	view,	an	opportunity	for	collective	action	occurs	when	the	
balance	of	forces	is	such	that,	for	members	of	the	mobilising	group,	the	potential	
(perceived)	costs	of	action	are	lower	than	the	expected	benefits.	By	breaking	down	the	
process	of	mobilisation	into	a	number	of	constituent	elements,	including	opportunity,	Kelly	
(1998)	is	able	to	develop	an	analysis	of	periodic	waves	of	workers’	struggles;	both	in	Britain	
since	1979	(ibid.:	39-65),	and	in	the	longer	history	of	industrial	capitalism	(ibid.:	83-107).	
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Despite	the	sophistication	of	Kelly's	analysis,	however,	this	view	of	opportunity	is	linked	to	
collective	action	rather	than	bargaining,	which	may	involve	little	or	no	collective	action.	
Consequently,	this	approach	is	less	suited	to	the	present	research.		
	
An	alternative	approach,	which	does	link	opportunity	to	bargaining,	can	be	found	in	studies	
of	piecework	(e.g.	Brown	1973;	Lupton	1963;	Roy	1952).	Although	under-theorised,	these	
studies	show	bargaining	clustered	around	rate-setting,	the	process	whereby	a	rate	of	pay	
was	agreed	at	the	commencement	of	each	new	job.	In	a	detailed	study	of	wages	drift	in	the	
engineering	industry,	Lerner	and	Marquand	(1962)	conceptualised	the	place	of	bargaining	in	
piecework,	noting	that	some	piece-workers	negotiated	pay-rates	several	times	each	day:		
	
‘The	same	machine	may	be	re-set	or	readjusted	three	or	four	times	a	day	to	enable	
the	machinist	to	work	on	three	or	four	different	batches	of	work	…	Yet	it	is	a	
concomitant	of	such	changes	that	the	opportunity	arises	for	pieceworkers	to	
negotiate	new	rates’	(ibid.:	52).	
	
Thus,	‘occasions	when	the	bulk	of	the	[wage]	increases	are	awarded	are	occasions	when	
there	are	discontinuities	of	production’	(ibid.:	53).	The	study	also	noted,	‘opportunities	
which	pieceworkers	have	to	negotiate	new	rates	when	there	are	discontinuities	of	
production’	(ibid.:	54).	The	key	insight,	here,	is	that	discontinuities	of	production	offer	an	
opportunity	to	re-negotiate	the	wage-effort	bargain.	In	1962,	under	conditions	of	full	
employment,	pieceworkers	were	able	to	negotiate	more	pay	for	no	increase	in	effort	(ibid.:	
32).	More	recently,	in	conditions	of	much	less	secure	employment,	employers	have	secured	
more	effort	for	no	increase	in	pay,	resulting	in	the	widely	recognised	intensification	of	
labour.	Nevertheless,	Lerner	and	Marquand’s	(1962)	insight	suggests	that	a	clustering	of	
bargaining	processes	around	discontinuities	in	production	may	remain	a	feature	of	
workplace	relations.		
	
Although	this	area	has	not	been	studied	systematically,	there	is	recent	evidence	from	a	
variety	of	sources	that	new	management	practices	can	lead	to	new	bargaining	
opportunities.	For	instance,	at	Royal	Mail,	the	introduction	of	management	briefings	saw	
the	rise	of	‘wrecking	practices’,	as	described	by	Beale	(2003:	87):		
	
‘Reading	newspapers,	falling	asleep,	unit	reps	hijacking	briefing	sessions	to	address	
their	members,	and	particularly	the	exploitation	of	briefings	as	paid	rest	periods	were	
commonly	reported’.		
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Other	studies	found	similar	examples	of	management	initiatives	becoming	rudimentary	
means	for	workers	to	pressure	management.	Marchington	and	Parker	(1990:	221)	found	
that	briefing	sessions,	intended	to	pass	information	one-way	from	management	to	
workforce,	had	instead	developed	into	two-way	channels	of	communication	where	
grievances	could	be	raised	by	employees	and	resolved	by	line	managers.	Similarly,	in	a	large	
supermarket	chain,	a	management	initiative	intended	to	improve	customer	service	had	an	
‘unanticipated	consequence	…	that	employees	used	its	language	and	concepts	to	try	to	
bring	managers	into	line	with	worker	expectations’	(Rosenthal	et	al.	1997:	498-9),	especially	
over	increased	worker	autonomy	and	the	respectful	treatment	of	staff	by	managers.		
	
The	spread	of	formal	partnership	agreements,	though	limited,	has	seen	union	reps	
apparently	adapt	older	bargaining	practices	to	new	conditions;	for	instance,	emphasising	
legitimacy	over	cooperation	(Terry	2004),	or	representing	over	partnering	(Harrisson	et	al.	
2011),	or	continuing	to	police	management	(Cook	and	MacKenzie	2015),	or	attempting	to	
gain	greater	influence	in	the	workplace	(Oxenbridge	and	Brown	2004:	195).	There	is	no	
reason	to	expect	that	similar	adaptive	processes	might	not	be	found	elsewhere.	Where	
formal	collective	agreements	remain	in	place	it	is	likely	that	they	would	continue	to	offer	
shop	stewards	and	other	union	reps	opportunities	for	bargaining.	Furthermore,	if	changing	
management	methods	can	lead	to	shifts	in	bargaining	opportunities,	then	similar	reasoning	
can	be	applied	to	sanctions	and	other	bargaining	resources.		
	
Bargaining	sanctions	are	sources	of	leverage	used	by	one	party	to	place	the	other	party	
under	pressure.	It	used	to	be	common	for	shop	stewards	to	use	small	and	short	strikes	to	
pressure	managers,	in	pursuit	of	demands	or	grievances	(Edwards	1983),	particularly	over	
'perishable'	issues	(Hyman	1989:	24).	The	decline	of	strikes	means	that	this	previously	
important	sanction	is	now	rarely	used,	which	has	been	taken	by	proponents	of	the	current	
standard	view	as	evidence	that	shop	stewards	no	longer	bargain	(Terry	2010).	Considered	
from	the	point	of	view	of	leverage,	however,	the	category	of	sanctions	can	be	broadened	to	
include	other	ways	of	pressuring	managers.	This	wider	category	of	potential	methods	for	
pressuring	managers	will	be	termed	bargaining	resources.	On	this	view,	sanctions	are	a	sub-
set	of	the	larger	group	of	bargaining	resources	that	shop	stewards	may	use	to	pressure	
managers.		
	
Bargaining	resources	that	do	not	involve	strikes	are	highly	varied.	As	noted	above,	McCarthy	
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(1966:	19-25)	found	non-strike	sanctions	including	the	restriction	of	output	and	withdrawal	
of	cooperation.	When	examining	the	‘methods	and	effects	of	shop	steward	bargaining’	
(ibid.:	16)	McCarthy	also	identified	the	use	of	comparisons,	informal	arrangements	and	
unwritten	agreements,	and	‘the	short	circuiting	of	supervision’	by	taking	issues	directly	to	
higher	management	over	the	heads	of	local	managers	and	foremen	(ibid.:	16-28).	A	number	
of	these	methods	would	be	familiar	in	workplaces	today,	and	all	can	be	included	in	the	
category	of	bargaining	resources.	Other	documented	examples	include	political	exchange	
(Korpi	and	Shalev	1979);	legal	and	quasi-legal	employment	regulations	(Heery	2011a);	
European	Works	Councils	(Waddington	2011);	national	agreements,	especially	in	the	public	
sector	(Ironside	and	Seifert	2000:	50-55);	professional	standards	and/or	statutory	
professional	status	(Burchil	and	Seifert	1993);	supply-chain	pressure	and	adverse	publicity	
(Graham	2013);	forms	of	organisational	misbehaviour	(Ackroyd	and	Thompson	1999);	or	
‘resistance	through	persistence’	(Collinson	1994:	45).		
	
The	literature	also	contains	examples	of	less	visible	means	of	pressuring	managers.	
Goodrich	(1975:	143)	noted	‘nagging	and	sulkiness’.	Edwards	and	Scullion	(1982:	174)	
document	a	group	of	women	garment	workers	who	regulated	piecework	by	means	of	
pressure	on	the	man	responsible	for	distributing	work,	who	confided,	‘it	was	more	than	his	
life	was	worth	to	be	seen	to	be	unfair’.	Surprisingly,	the	authors	(ibid.:	169)	conclude,	‘no	...	
control	[over	the	effort	bargain]	was	present	here’.	While	it	can	be	argued	that	such	action	
represents	little	real	challenge	to	the	overall	effort	bargain	(ibid.:	168)	it	does	nevertheless	
represent	effective	interference	by	workers	in	management	relations.	Contemporary	
shopfloor	relations,	in	a	context	of	little	industrial	action	and	a	significantly	more	female	
workforce,	may	well	exhibit	other	unexpected	bargaining	resources.	However,	restrictive	a	
priori	definitions,	as	found	in	the	current	standard	view,	will	limit	the	sensitivity	of	research	
to	any	such	'weapons	of	the	weak'	(Scott	2008).		
	
Other	bargaining	resources	appear	similarly	insubstantial	and	difficult	to	assess.	For	
instance,	Armstrong	et	al.	(1981)	found,	in	three	less-strongly	organised	factories,	that	
legitimacy	and	de-legitimisation	was	used	by	shop	stewards	in	efforts	to	undermine	
managers,	a	process	which	also	involved	the	‘mobilisation	of	bias’	(ibid.:44-45;	Batstone	
1977:	10-11;	Lukes	2005:	6-7).	The	classic	era	of	bargaining	research	established	the	
importance	of	comparison	as	a	method	of	establishing	legitimacy	for	demands	or	grievances	
(Brown	1973;	Brown	and	Sisson	1975;	McCarthy	1966),	and	even	‘coercive	comparisons’	
	56	
(Ross	1948:	53).	Outside	of	formal	pay	negotiations,	Brown’s	(1973)	appreciation	of	the	
importance,	for	shop	stewards,	of	pursuing	the	‘equitable	treatment’	(Section	2.2)	seems	to	
imply	the	use	of	comparative	measures	of	fairness.	In	the	absence	of	stronger	bargaining	
resources,	use	of	legitimacy	and	comparison	may	be	a	feature	in	contemporary	workplaces.		
	
Research	continues	to	find	examples	of	informal	bargaining.	In	one	of	the	very	few	recent	
case	studies	of	workplace	union	organisation,	Stevenson	(2005)	looked	at	the	role	of	
workplace	union	representatives	among	school	teachers	during	bargaining	over	proposed	
redundancies.	Alongside	a	formal	process	involving	senior	lay	officers,	school	level	reps	held	
informal	meetings	with	local	managers,	and	with	members,	acting	in	concert	with	the	senior	
officers	involved	in	negotiations.	Although	they	played	no	part	in	the	formal	process,	the	
school	reps’	informal	activity	was	found	to	be	a	key	influence	on	outcomes	(ibid.:	228-9).	
Similarly,	Mulholland’s	(2004)	study	of	unionised	workers	in	an	Irish	call	centre	found	
informal	bargaining	processes	and	a	variety	of	informal	sanctions.	These	examples	indicate	
the	ability	of	workers	and	their	representatives	to	innovate	means	to	influence	
management	decisions,	using	novel	and	informal	methods	outside	formal	arrangements	for	
negotiation	or	consultation.	Of	course,	informal	approaches	also	lie	outside	the	conceptual	
framework	of	the	current	standard	view,	again	suggesting	an	alternative	approach	would	be	
fruitful.	
	
Sometimes,	bargaining	opportunities	are	more	directly	tied	to	the	availability	of	bargaining	
resources.	The	growth	of	individual	employment	rights	is	one	important	example.	Despite	
the	weak	and	limited	nature	of	these	rights,	grievance	and	ET	procedures	have	real	impacts	
on	employer	practices	(Section	2.1).	Moreover,	research	has	found	shop	stewards	using	
grievance	procedures	in	a	targeted	way.	For	instance,	a	union	organising	campaign	saw	shop	
stewards	organise	a	campaign	of	45	formal	grievances	in	three	months	against	arbitrary	and	
authoritarian	management	(Findlay	and	McKinlay	2003).	More	generally,	Heery	(2011a:	80)	
has	discussed	‘the	strength	of	weak	law’,	arguing	that	unions	have	integrated	employment	
rights	into	bargaining,	creating	‘a	new	hybrid	in	which	legal	regulation	is	fused	with	
collective	bargaining	and	trade	unions	use	the	law	as	a	resource'	(ibid.:	73).	Heery	(ibid.:	89)	
concludes	that	‘substantive	law	has	not	displaced	collective	bargaining	but	has	been	
incorporated	within	it	as	a	precedent,	sanction	and	standard’.	Again,	these	accounts	tie	
together	collective	and	individual	issues	in	a	way	that	challenges	the	sharp	distinctions	of	
the	current	standard	view.		
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Traditionally,	studies	of	workplace	conflict	have	focused	on	strikes,	an	indicator	easily	
measured	by	quantitative	methods	(Edwards	et	al.	1995).	The	decline	of	strikes	therefore	
poses	significant	problems	for	researchers,	because	attention	must	turn	towards	‘other,	
more	covert,	forms	of	conflict’	and	‘small-scale	and	informal	means	through	which	workers	
counter	managerial	control	of	the	workplace’	(ibid.:	283).	Unfortunately,	this	type	of	
resistance	‘tends	to	be	covert	and	difficult	to	discover’	(ibid.:	287).	Edwards	(2010)	makes	a	
convincing	case	for	seeing	forms	of	workplace	misbehaviour	in	terms	of	attempts	to	
influence	the	effort	bargain,	which	are	often	to	a	degree	successful.	Studies	of	worker	
recalcitrance	and	organisational	misbehaviour	(Ackroyd	and	Thompson	1999;	Martinez	
Lucio	and	Stewart	1997;	Richards	2008;	Thompson	and	Ackroyd	1995)	show	that	worker	
resistance	has	not	disappeared,	but	has	changed	and	adapted	to	new	circumstances.	This	
raises	the	possibility	that	shop	steward	activity	may	also	have	adapted,	developing	new	
bargaining	resources	in	response	to	changing	bargaining	opportunities.	As	Edwards	et	al.	
(1995:	310)	conclude,	‘the	detailed	examination	of	the	conditions,	processes	and	
consequences	of	workplace	resistance	has	the	potential	to	develop	new	understandings’.	
Again,	this	indicates	a	need	for	detailed	research,	specifically	focussed	upon	shop	stewards.	
Positioning	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources	within	workplace	relations	also	requires	
theoretical	development;	the	following	section	attempts	to	do	this.		
	
	
3.2	Theoretical	considerations		
	
As	argued	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	theory	is	essential	if	this	research	is	to	make	
claims	to	generalisability.	Consequently,	this	section	addresses	theoretical	issues	in	the	
analysis	of	workplace	relations.	Usually,	the	shop	steward	role	is	seen	in	terms	of	agency,	
with	an	emphasis	on	the	steward	as	social	actor.	In	one	version	of	this	approach,	the	
steward	is	seen	in	terms	of	a	set	of	simple	relations	between	groups;	whereby	the	steward	
has	relations,	on	the	one	hand,	to	ordinary	workers,	and	on	the	other,	to	managers.	This	is	
the	familiar	'man	with	two	masters'	(Lane	1974:	195)	view	of	the	classic	studies,	with	
stewards	seen	as	occupying	an	intermediate	bargaining	position	between	the	two	groups	
(see	also	Darlington	and	Upchurch	2012:	88-90;	Hyman	2012:	155-157).	A	second	version	of	
the	agency	approach	to	stewards	emphasises	their	subjective	qualities;	such	as,	'trade	union	
principles'	(Batstone	et	al.	1977),	political	commitment	(Darlington	2009a,	2009b),	
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workplace	traditions	(Terry	and	Edwards	1988),	or	'militancy'	(Gall	2003a).	The	focus	on	
agency	in	radical	accounts	of	the	1970s	(e.g.	Beynon	1984;	Hinton	1973;	Hyman	1975a;	Lane	
and	Roberts	1971)	represented	a	welcome	corrective	to	the	institutionalist	approach	of	
much	that	preceded.	Emphasis	on	agency	as	an	analytical	category	in	industrial	relations	
strengthened	considerably	during	the	1980s,	with	growing	interest	in	management	strategy	
(Hyman	1987:	27).	In	the	1990s,	influential	studies	sought	to	redress	the	balance	by	
reinstating	a	notion	of	worker	agency	(Ackroyd	and	Thompson	1999;	Martinez	Lucio	and	
Stewart	1997;	Thompson	and	Ackroyd	1995).	Emphasis	on	agency	has	continued	up	to	the	
present,	especially	in	radical	and	Marxist-influenced	accounts	(e.g.	Atzeni	2014;3	Taylor	et	
al.	2015).	Of	course,	these	considerations	are	important	and	must	form	part	of	a	full	
account.	Nevertheless,	the	preoccupation	with	agency	has	led	these	accounts	to	
significantly	downplay	the	importance	of	structure.		
	
This	study	adopts	a	different	approach,	starting	not	from	social	actors	but	from	the	
structure	and	dynamics	of	social	relations.	Here,	shop	stewards	will	be	seen	not	in	terms	of	
simple,	untheorised	relations	to	other	groups	of	actors	–	upwards	to	managers	and	
downwards	to	workers,	as	it	were.	Rather,	the	role	of	shop	stewards	will	be	seen	in	relation	
to	the	dynamic	social	relations	of	the	workplace,	of	which	the	employment	relationship	is	
the	defining	structural	feature,	and	exploitation	the	crucial	dynamic.	By	theoretically	
situating	the	activity	of	shop	stewards	in	terms	of	workplace	relations	that	exist	more	
widely,	a	basis	can	be	provided	for	generalising	from	the	case	studies.	Consequently,	this	
section	will	deal	at	some	length	with	theoretical	issues	in	conceptualising	workplace	
relations	under	capitalism.	First,	the	discussion	examines	aspects	of	the	employment	
relationship	that	are	usually	passed	over	briefly:	conflict,	cooperation,	and	managerial	
relations.	In	particular,	cooperation	is	given	significantly	more	consideration	than	is	usual.	
Next,	the	notion	of	interests	is	discussed	at	length,	in	an	effort	to	reinstate	this	important	
concept	in	the	analysis	of	industrial	relations.	Finally,	a	definition	of	bargaining	is	presented	
and	discussed,	which	represents	a	genuine	contribution	to	debates	in	this	area.		
	
Conflict,	cooperation,	and	managerial	relations		
The	notion	of	conflict	is	frequently	invoked	in	industrial	relations	and	related	research,	but	it	
seldom	receives	the	consideration	it	deserves	as	a	central	aspect	of	workplace	relations.	
																																								 																				
3	Atzeni	(2014:	10)	uses	the	term	'self-activity',	but	the	focus	is	clearly	on	agency.			
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Here,	a	more	thorough	treatment	will	be	presented.	Initially,	it	is	useful	to	distinguish	‘two	
distinct	senses	[of	conflict],	namely	underlying	antagonisms	or	clashes	of	interests,	and	
concrete	actions	such	as	strikes’	(Bélanger	and	Edwards	2013:	7).	It	is	the	latter	sense	which	
commanded	the	attention	of	the	classic	studies	of	workplace	bargaining,	and	which	
continues	to	attract	interest	from	industrial	relations	researchers	(for	instance,	Gall	2013;	
Gall	and	Cohen	2013;	Godard	2011;	Hebdon	and	Noh	2013;	Kelly	1998;	Moody	2013).	
However,	for	the	most	part	it	is	the	former,	analytical	sense	which	will	be	employed	here.	
The	following	account	is	drawn	mainly	from	Marx,	though	important	elements	are	shared	by	
mainstream	industrial	relations	(Ackers	2011;	2014;	Edwards	1986;	McGovern	2014a)	and	
‘core’	labour	process	theory	(Thompson	1990).		
	
Industrial	relations	scholars	have	considered	conflict	at	work	from	a	number	of	well-known	
perspectives,	which	are	usually	treated	cursorily	(Edwards	1986:	19).	The	un-favoured	
unitarist	view	sees	conflict	at	work	as	a	non-legitimate	intrusion	into	essentially	cooperative	
workplace	relations;	a	view	usually	seen	as	reflecting	management	perspectives	(ibid.:	19-
21;	Fox	1966).	By	contrast,	the	pluralist	approach,	versions	of	which	have	dominated	
industrial	relations,	sees	conflict	at	work	as	legitimate	and	even	inevitable,	although	there	
have	been	variations	in	the	degree	of	legitimacy	which	conflict	is	permitted	(for	instance,	
Edwards	2014a	vs.	Flanders	1975).	Pluralism	also	often	entails	a	normative	aspect,	so	that	
although	conflict	may	be	legitimate,	it	is	seen	as	something	best	avoided	–	or	dealt	with	in	a	
civilised	way	if	it	cannot	be	avoided.	Thus,	Clegg	(1979:	452)	states:	‘the	record	of	industrial	
conflict	in	Britain	goes	back	for	two	centuries	or	more,	but	so	far	it	has	been	contained’.	For	
many	pluralists,	the	method	by	which	such	conflict	could	be	contained	is	collective	
bargaining,	which	Burchill	(2008:	4,	76)	described	as	‘the	pluralist	concept	par	excellence	...	
[and]	something	encouraged	by	those	who	take	a	pluralist	viewpoint’.	Thus,	while	conflict	is	
seen	as	potentially	pathological	to	society,	collective	bargaining,	especially	in	its	
institutionalised	forms,	is	‘a	means	to	social	stability	…	a	process	of	concession	and	
compromise	which	helps	bind	society	together’	(Clegg	1979:	455).	By	accepting	that	conflict	
was	‘endemic’	(Fox	1966:	399)	in	industrial	relations,	pluralist	scholars	produced	a	series	of	
detailed	and	insightful	accounts,	particularly	of	collective	bargaining	arrangements	and	the	
regulation	of	employment	relations.		
	
In	the	1970s,	pluralist	accounts	were	subject	to	searching	criticism	from	more	radical	
scholars,	who,	though	varied,	commonly	shared	a	starting	point	in	the	sociology	of	work,	
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often	influenced	by	radical	political	ideology	(Ackers	2011;	Edwards	1986:	24-26).	These	
writers	emphasised	conflict	in	industrial	relations,	against	the	institutional	approach	of	
pluralism	(esp.	Hyman	1975a).	Pluralism	was	criticised	for	failing	to	grasp	workplace	conflict	
and	change,	despite	important	institutional	insights	(Edwards	1986).	Many	of	these	critiques	
were	informed	by	Marxist	ideas	(Hyman	1975a;	see	Ackers	2014).	Indeed,	the	1970s	have	
been	called	'golden	days'	for	Marxism	in	industrial	relations	(Gall	2003b:	321;	see	also,	
Hyman	2006).	Although,	as	Clegg	(1979:	456)	notes,	differences	among	Marxists	and	
pluralists	can	be	greater	than	the	differences	between	them,	nevertheless,	Marxists	
generally	see	conflict	not	as	a	potentially	pathological	threat	to	society,	but	as	constitutive	
of	the	social	relations	of	capitalism.	Whereas	classic	pluralism	(usually)	sees	conflict	as	
inevitable	between	interest	groups,	Marxism	(usually)	sees	conflict	as	inherent	in	the	social	
relations	of	capitalism	(cf.	Edwards	1986;	Hyman	1975a).		
	
It	is	helpful	to	distinguish	between	pluralism	before	and	after	the	encounter	with	radical	
and	Marxist	critiques.	One	important	theoretical	consequence	of	the	encounter	between	
pluralism	and	Marxism,	as	Ackers	(2014)	has	pointed	out,	was	that	many	essentially	Marxist	
categories	were	imported	into	the	emerging	‘radical	pluralism’	which	subsequently	became	
the	mainstream	approach	in	British	industrial	relations;	an	approach	systematised	by	
Edwards	(1986),	whose	notion	of	'structured	antagonism'	(ibid.:	5)	shows	the	clear	influence	
of	Marx	(see	also	Edwards	2014a;	McGovern	2014a;	and	see	below).	Since	then,	though,	
there	has	been	a	tendency	to	eschew	further	theoretical	development	in	this	area:	in	
industrial	relations,	theorisation	of	conflict	usually	stops	with	mention	of	‘structured	
antagonism’	(Frege	and	Kelly	2013:	8).	This	continuing	theoretical	weakness	has	resulted	in	
a	number	of	difficulties	(discussed	below).		
	
For	Marx,	conflict	between	workers	and	managers	is	rooted	in	the	wider	category	of	the	
relations	of	production,	whereby	capital	and	labour	are	conceived	as	two	poles	of	a	social	
relation	driven	by	exploitation.	Capitalist	employers	extract	surplus	labour	from	workers	
through	ownership	and	control	of	the	means	of	production,	which	means	that	workers	have	
no	means	for	making	a	living	other	than	to	sell	their	ability	to	labour	–	their	‘labour	power’	–	
to	capitalists	in	return	for	wages.	Employers	set	the	terms	of	employment,	ensuring	that	
workers	produce	greater	value	than	they	receive	in	the	form	of	wages.	Marx	sees	conflict	
with	wage	labour	as	a	fundamental	aspect	of	capital:	‘Capital	is	productive	of	value	only	as	a	
relation,	in	so	far	as	it	is	a	coercive	force	on	wage-labour,	compelling	it	to	perform	surplus-
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labour'	(cited	in	Callinicos	2014:	200,	original	emphasis).	Moreover,	the	same	essential	
relation	exists	between	employers	and	workers,	even	when,	as	with	local	government	
workers,	no	surplus	value	is	produced:	as	Fine	and	Saad-Filho	(2010:	47)	put	it,	‘being	
unproductive	[of	surplus	value]	is	no	obstacle	against	capitalist	exploitation’.	Inside	the	
workplace,	the	requirement	of	the	employer	to	secure	the	transformation	of	the	purchased	
labour-power	into	a	certain	amount	of	concrete	labour	structures	the	labour	process	
(Braverman	1974;	Edwards	1986;	2003;	Marx	1976:	283-306).	This	process	takes	place	
within	a	fundamentally	unequal	relationship	(Marx	1976:	439-454;	Edwards	2003).	As	
employers	use	their	economic	power	to	organise	production,	including	the	direction	of	
labour,	conflict	is	generated	between	capital	and	labour,	managers	and	workers.	
Consequently,	the	relationship	of	capital	and	labour	will	be	a	recurring	source	of	
antagonism.	In	this	sense,	conflict	in	the	workplace	is	not	just	a	question	of	what	workers	
do;	it	is	fundamentally	a	question	of	what	employers	do.	
	
Contra	Burawoy	(1979),	then,	the	factory	is	not	principally	the	site	of	the	manufacture	of	
consent:	capitalist	workplaces	generate	conflict.	Capitalist	relations	of	production	mean	that	
workplace	relations	will	be	a	recurring	source	of	conflict.	This	does	not	entail,	though,	that	
such	conflict	will	necessarily	be	expressed	in	consistent	ways;	indeed,	expressions	of	conflict	
are	likely	to	vary	(Gall	2013).	Nor	does	it	prejudge	the	outcome	of	that	conflict.	Nor	does	it	
mean,	contra	Ackers	(2014:	2609),	that	a	commitment	to	conflict	as	a	theoretical	category	
for	the	analysis	of	workplace	relations	obviates	the	need	for	empirical	investigation	of	actual	
workplaces;	any	more	than	using	the	theory	of	gravity	to	understand	the	motion	of	planets	
means	that	astronomers	no	longer	look	into	telescopes.	What	it	does	mean	is	that	the	
continuing,	underlying	dynamic	of	exploitation	generates	conflict	which	forms	'a	central,	
ever-present	and	ongoing	dynamic	of	contemporary	employment'	(Gall	and	Hebdon	2008:	
589).	Moreover,	the	process	of	exploitation	provides	a	dynamic	that	drives	other	features	of	
employment	relations	and	the	organisation	of	work	(Gall	2003b).	In	the	present	research,	
then,	conflict	will	be	seen	as	a	structural	tendency	(Callinicos	2009:	Ch.2),	driven	by	the	
exploitation	at	the	heart	of	the	employment	relationship,	which	continually	threatens	to	
upset	previously	established	work	relations	(Hyman	1975a:	Ch.1).		
	
Besides	the	generation	of	conflict,	it	is	important	to	appreciate	that	workplace	relations	are	
also	characterised	by	cooperation.	Unfortunately,	the	literature	on	cooperation	in	the	
workplace	is	significantly	underdeveloped	in	comparison	with	the	literature	on	conflict.	
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Edwards	(1986:	21)	argues	that	unitarism	has	correctly	recognised	the	cooperative	side	of	
employment.	However,	as	unitarist	accounts	deny	conflict	(Fox	1969)	they	are	unhelpful	for	
present	purposes.	Accounts	that	focus	on	conflict	commonly	treat	non-conflictual	elements	
as	anomalous	or	requiring	special	explanation.	For	instance,	labour	process	theory	has	been	
criticised	for	making	excessive	use	of	the	simple	dichotomy	of	control	versus	resistance	
(Edwards	2007).	In	these	account,	employers	appear	as	only	interested	in	control	(which	in	
reality	is	not	their	only	concern),	while	an	absence	of	resistance	by	workers	is	too	often	
treated	as	aberrant.	Thus,	Burawoy’s	(1979)	influential	explanation	for	an	absence	of	
conflict	posits	consent	as	an	outcome	of	management	strategy	(Clawson	and	Fantasia	1983:	
673).	Here,	the	employment	relationship	is	theorised	only	in	terms	of	conflict,	while	
elements	of	cooperation	require	additional	explanation	(management	strategy).	A	similar	
limitation	can	be	discerned	in	Edwards’	(1989)	spectrum	of	‘conflict	and	accommodation’.	
Edwards’	perspective	has	the	advantage	of	recognising	the	importance	of	non-conflictual	
elements	within	employment	(1986:	Ch.1,	Ch.2),	an	insight	that	informs	some	of	the	most	
perceptive	accounts	of	workplace	relations	(e.g.	ibid.:	Ch.6;	Edwards	and	Scullion	1982;	
Terry	and	Edwards	1988).	However,	even	here	the	conflictual	aspects	are	theorised	as	the	
foundation	of	employment	(‘structured	antagonism’),	while	non-conflict	is	treated	as	the	
aspect	that	requires	additional	explanation.	Thus,	Edwards	(1989)	sees	non-conflictual	
relations	as	‘accommodation’;	that	is,	conflict	placed	under	limitations.	Similarly,	Bélanger	
and	Edwards	(2007:	713)	see	’workplace	co-operation’	in	terms	of	‘conditions	promoting	
compromise’.	The	shared	starting	point	of	these	approaches	is	to	theorise	the	employment	
relationship	in	terms	of	conflict	only,	consequently	treating	non-conflict	as	the	aspect	
requiring	special	explanation.	Not	surprisingly,	then,	despite	a	number	of	studies	that	have	
looked	at	workplace	cooperation	empirically,	Edwards	et	al.	(2006:	125)	claim	that	'a	
theoretical	framework	to	grasp	workplace	co-operation	is	lacking’.		
	
Yet,	the	essential	elements	of	a	framework	for	grasping	workplace	cooperation	are	not	
lacking:	they	can	be	found	in	Marx’s	writings.	For	Marx,	production	under	capitalist	relations	
has	a	dual	nature:	it	is	irreducibly	social	and	cooperative,	as	well	as	exploitative	(Adler	2007;	
2009;	Harvey	2006;	Marx	1976;	Rattansi	1982).	Indeed,	Marx’s	account	of	the	division	of	
labour	in	Capital	includes	a	chapter	entitled	‘Cooperation’	(Marx	1976:	439-454).	This	aspect	
of	Marx’s	writing	has	attracted	little	attention	in	the	field	of	industrial	relations,	even	from	
Marxists;	for	instance,	Darlington	(1994:	35)	mentions	the	cooperative	aspect	of	production,	
but	Marx's	writings	are	not	discussed,	and	the	concept	is	not	integrated	into	Darlington's	
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overall	analysis.	More	recently,	Atzeni	(2010:	27)	has	discussed	Marx's	analysis,	arguing	that	
cooperation	in	the	labour	process	is	the	source	of	solidarity	between	workers,	and	of	
collective	action.	The	difficulty	with	this	reading,	however,	is	that	it	focuses	only	on	relations	
among	workers,	ignoring	Marx's	understanding	that	the	division	of	labour	also	entails	
cooperation	between	workers	and	managers.	For	Marx,	(1996:	335-6)	capitalists	play	an	
active	role	in	the	coordination	of	production:		
	
‘All	combined	labour	on	a	large	scale	requires,	more	or	less,	a	directing	authority,	in	
order	to	secure	the	harmonious	working	of	the	individual	activities	…	The	work	of	
directing,	superintending,	and	adjusting,	becomes	one	of	the	functions	of	capital,	
from	the	moment	that	the	labour	under	the	control	of	capital,	becomes	cooperative.’		
	
Formulations	that	see	relations	between	workers	and	managers	only	in	terms	conflict	miss	
this	important	aspect.	In	reality,	researchers	can	expect	to	find	both	conflict	and	
cooperation	in	workplace	relations,	not	only	among	workers,	but	also	between	workers	and	
employers;	although	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	that	both	aspects	will	appear	in	similar	
measure	or	in	common	forms	across	different	sectors	of	employment	or	workplaces.	
Furthermore,	workplace	conflict	and	cooperation	are	not	simple	binary	opposites	that	vary	
in	an	either/or	fashion;	rather,	they	exist	concurrently.		
	
Marx's	insight	that	the	coordination	of	production	is	'one	of	the	functions	of	capital'	has	
important	implications	for	understanding	the	role	of	management.	As	the	scale	of	
production	increases,	individual	capitalists	are	unable	to	play	this	role	themselves:		
	
‘An	industrial	army	of	workmen,	under	the	command	of	a	capitalist,	requires,	just	like	
a	real	army,	officers	(managers),	and	sergeants	(foremen,	overlookers),	who,	while	
the	work	is	being	done,	command	in	the	name	of	the	capitalist.	The	work	of	
supervision	becomes	their	established	and	exclusive	function’	(Marx	1996:	337).		
	
As	Adler	(2009:	66)	has	put	it:		
	
‘To	emphasize	conflict	is	not	to	deny	the	simultaneous	need	for	cooperation	in	
production.	Indeed,	the	large-scale	capitalist	enterprise	depends	crucially	on	
cooperation	to	coordinate	its	complex	division	of	labor,	and	managers	play	a	key	
productive	role	in	that	coordination.’			
	
Thus,	the	dual	role	of	management	combines	both	the	control	of	labour	for	the	extraction	of	
surplus	labour	(generating	conflict),	and	the	coordination	of	production	(cooperative	
aspect).	Developing	Marx's	approach,	Carchedi	(1977:	61-65)	emphasised	that	this	dual	
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function	is	embodied	in	individual	managers.	That	is,	individual	managers	are	constrained	by	
both	imperatives;	by	the	need	to	control	labour	and	the	need	to	coordinate	production.		
	
In	turn,	the	dual	role	of	management	influences	the	nature	of	managerial	relations;	that	is,	
‘the	relationships	that	define	how	this	process	[work]	takes	place’	(Edwards	2003:8;	see	
Flanders	1975:	88-89).	As	Edwards	(2003:	8)	continues,	once	market	relations	have	
established	the	rate	of	pay	and	hours	of	work,		
	
‘managerial	relations	determine	how	much	work	is	performed	in	that	time,	at	what	
specific	task	or	tasks,	who	has	the	right	to	define	the	tasks	and	change	a	particular	
mix	of	tasks	and	what	penalties	will	be	deployed	for	any	failure	to	meet	these	
obligations’.		
	
The	frontier	of	control	and	the	effort	bargain	are	established	within	this	process,	and	reflect	
the	degree	to	which	managerial	prerogatives	are	constrained	and	managerial	relations	
interfered	with	(Goodrich	1975;	Hyman	1975a:	Ch.1;	Hyman	1975b).	For	the	present	
research,	the	ability	(or	otherwise)	of	shop	stewards	to	interfere	with	managerial	relations	is	
central	to	determining	whether	stewards	continue	to	have	any	role	in	bargaining.	Relations	
between	shop	stewards	and	managers	will	be	influenced	by	the	dual	role	of	management,	
which	is	structured	by	tendencies	towards	both	conflict	and	cooperation.	This	is	important	
because	it	means	that	each	manager	has	to	bridge	both	aspects,	opening	the	possibility	that	
bargaining	leverage	might	be	applied	to	particular	managers	according	to	whichever	aspect	
is	under	most	pressure	in	the	concrete	circumstances	of	a	workplace.	Thus,	an	
understanding	of	conflict	and	cooperation	as	dual	aspects	of	workplace	relations	opens	the	
possibility	of	a	wider	grasp	of	shop	steward	activity	than	does	a	more	narrow	focus	on	
conflict	alone.		
	
This	discussion	has	linked	important	aspects	of	workplace	relations	to	the	underlying	nature	
and	dynamic	of	the	employment	relationship	under	capitalist	relations	of	production,	
thereby	providing	a	theoretical	framework	for	the	analysis	and	interpretation	of	research	
findings.	Generalisation	from	those	findings	will	depend	in	part	on	showing	that	similar	
processes	might	be	found	elsewhere.	Therefore,	discussion	turns	next	to	the	notion	of	
interests,	which	can	provide	a	link	between	the	structure	of	workplace	relations	and	actions	
of	social	agents.		
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Interests		
In	recent	years,	the	notion	of	workers’	interests	has	fallen	into	disfavour	in	the	field	of	
industrial	relations.	This	is	important	because	the	concept	of	interests	offers	a	way	to	link	
structure	and	agency	(Callinicos	2009:	139-151).	If,	as	has	been	argued	above,	the	nature	of	
the	employment	relationship	gives	important	elements	of	structure	to	workplace	relations,	
especially	in	the	form	of	an	underlying	dynamic	of	exploitation,	how	does	this	structure	
relate	to	the	agency	of	social	actors	within	the	workplace?	A	concept	of	interests	can	bridge	
this	analytical	gap.	For	many	years,	though,	'rigorous	analytical	treatment	of	this	crucial	
topic	[was]	quite	simply	non-existent',	being	replaced	by	'casual	empiricism'	(Kelly	1998:	6).	
More	recently,	the	concept	of	interests	–	particularly,	class	interests	–	has	been	the	subject	
of	more	explicit	rejection.	The	purpose	of	the	following	discussion	is	to	present	a	critique	of	
accounts	that	have	sought	to	excise	the	concept	of	class	interests	from	industrial	relations,	
and	to	propose	its	rehabilitation,	based	on	a	non-determinist	Marxism	informed	by	a	critical	
realist	view	of	stratified	social	structure.		
	
Theoretical	attempts	to	jettison	class	interests	take	two	main	forms.	The	first	is	the	
disappearance	of	workers’	interests	into	a	problematic	version	of	social	constructionism,	
which	starts	from	increased	workforce	diversity	(for	instance,	Blyton	et	al.	2011;	Heery	
2011b),	a	view	which	has	come	into	industrial	relations	from	mainstream	sociology	(for	a	
critical	overview,	see	Crompton	2008).	Thus,	Simms	and	Charlwood	(2010:	133)	argue:	
	
‘shared	geography,	lifestyle	and	community	was	challenged	by	social	change	and	
economic	restructuring	in	the	latter	part	of	the	20th	century	…	Together	these	
[changes]	…	mean	that	an	increasing	diversity	of	interests	compete	for	attention’.	
	
Similarly,	Hyman	(1999:	98,	94)	sees	‘increasing	heterogeneity	within	the	labour	force’	inter	
alia	causing	problems	of	‘interest	aggregation’,	and	calls	for	a	rejection	of	Marx’s	
understanding	of	‘working-class	interests’	as	‘imagined	solidarities’.	Likewise,	Simms	et	al.	
(2013:	24)	see	‘an	increasing	diversity	of	workers’	interests’,	undermining	‘the	processes	[by	
which]	solidarities	and	collectivism	are	socially	constructed’	(ibid.:	28).	For	Simms	and	
Charlwood	(2010:	127),		
	
‘Worker	interests	are	socially	constructed	…	What	workers	think	and	feel	about	their	
employment	reflects	their	norms	and	expectations,	acquired	through,	amongst	other	
things,	education,	family,	friends,	community,	the	media,	managers	and	co-workers.’	
	
That	is,	for	these	accounts,	‘socially	constructed’	workers’	interests	have	been	significantly	
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undermined	by	‘social	change	and	economic	restructuring’.		
	
Unfortunately,	this	is	not	good	sociology.	The	term	‘socially	constructed’	invokes	Berger	and	
Luckman's	(1991	[1966])	classic	work,	but	these	accounts	carry	none	of	their	radical	not-
taken-for-granted-ness	towards	the	social	world.	Instead,	this	version	of	‘socially	
constructed’	is	partial,	and	applies	only	to	some	aspects	of	social	reality:	‘workers’	interests’	
are	‘socially	constructed’	and	therefore	vulnerable,	while	‘social	change	and	economic	
restructuring’	suffer	no	such	difficulties.	Yet,	there	are	numerous	accounts	which	show	how	
recent	economic	and	social	change	were	constructed	by	neoliberalism	(for	an	overview	of	a	
very	considerable	literature,	see	Davidson	2013).	Moreover,	as	critical	realism	has	shown,	
social	reality	certainly	is	socially	constructed;	but	it	is	no	less	real	for	all	that	(Archer	et	al.	
1998;	Bhaskar	1998).			
	
A	serious	problem	with	this	(selective)	application	of	social	constructionism	is	that	it	
undermines	any	notion	of	structure	in	the	employment	relationship.	Yet,	the	experiences	of	
people	at	work	do	not	simply	‘reflect	their	norms	and	expectations’.	They	are	also	
significantly	shaped	by	forces	that	are	part	of	a	structured	social	system	(however	that	is	
defined).	Indeed,	a	recent	overview	of	the	sociological	debates	on	class	has	called	for	the	
restoration	of	structure	as	an	indispensible	element	of	analysis	(Crompton	2008:	25-26).	
While	trade	union	activity,	interest	representation,	and	solidarity	certainly	cannot	be	
reduced	to	a	mechanical	expression	of	class	structure,	the	exploitative	nature	of	the	
employment	relationship	means	that	the	capital-labour	relation	is	structured	–	and	this	
structure	must	be	incorporated	into	the	analysis.	Accounts	that	neglect	this	feature	are	
fundamentally	weakened.		
	
A	second	challenge	to	the	notion	of	workers’	interests	derives	from	Edwards	(1986:	28),	
where	the	Marxist	account	based	on	‘conflict	of	interest’	is	rejected.	Edwards’	argument	is	
that	a	simplistic	notion	of	class	interests	is	inadequate	for	explaining	the	complexity	of	
workplace	relations;	because	in	practice	workers	can	have	numerous	interests,	which	may	
or	may	not	coincide	with	the	interests	of	other	workers	(Edwards	2003).	In	place	of	‘conflict	
of	interests’	Edwards	(1986:	5,	et	passim)	proposes	‘structured	antagonism’,	a	formulation	
which	has	been	taken	up	widely,	though	less	often	credited	to	its	source	(Bélanger	and	
Edwards	2013:	8).	There	are,	however,	a	number	of	problems	with	Edwards'	approach.		
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First,	although	Edwards	is	concerned	to	reject	Marxism,	its	influence	on	his	account	is	
obvious.	Thus,	Edwards’	(1986:	Ch.2)	‘theory	of	conflict’	starts	from	the	premise	that	‘the	
capitalist	can	exploit	the	worker	because	the	latter	lacks	the	means	of	production	and	must	
sell	his	or	her	labour	power	in	order	to	live’	(ibid.:	65).	Edwards	makes	considerable	use	of	
concepts	such	as	‘mode	of	production’	(ibid.:	66,	65),	‘exploitation’	(ibid.:	65),	‘necessary	
and	surplus	labour’	(ibid.:	66),	‘circuit	of	capital’	(ibid.:	67),	‘use	value’	(ibid.:	67),	‘exchange	
value’	(ibid.:	67),	and	even	‘law	of	value’	(ibid.:	67).	Yet,	none	of	these	concepts	are	
referenced	to	their	source,	Marx’s	Capital.	Nor	does	Edwards	mention	that	many	of	the	
authors	he	cites	in	support	of	his	rejection	of	Marxism	are	in	fact	Marxists	themselves;	for	
instance,	G.A	Cohen	(61,	et	passim.),	Maurice	Dobb	(ibid.:	61),	Michael	Burawoy	(ibid.:	62),	
and	Sam	Aaronovitch	(ibid.:	67).	This	is	indeed	a	strange	rejection	of	Marxism.		
	
Secondly,	the	Marxism	rejected	by	Edwards	seems	an	infirm	specimen.	While	Edwards	is	on	
firm	ground	when	rejecting	crude	and	mechanical	accounts	of	class	interest,	his	claim	(ibid.:	
28)	that	in	Marxism	'all	interests	are	supposedly	reducible	to,	or	at	least	based	on,	class	
position	and	…	the	interest	of	the	working	class	is	held	to	be	the	overthrow	of	capitalism’,	is	
both	imprecise	and	entirely	unsupported	by	references.	The	view	presented	for	criticism	is,	
in	the	words	of	Collier	(1998:	273-4),	‘a	certain	simplistic	Marxism,	which	has	occasionally	
existed	and	more	often	been	imagined	by	anti-Marxists’.	It	is	not	the	case	that	any	
sophisticated	version	of	Marxism	sees	all	workers	as	only	having	a	singular	and	essential	
class	interest	and	no	other	interests	beyond	that	one.	For	instance,	many	Marxist	accounts	
have	shown	great	sensitivity	and	insight	regarding	tensions	between	workers’	general	
interests	and	the	narrow	sectional	interests	of	particular	groups	(Darlington	1994;	Hyman	
1975a;	Gall	2003a).		
	
Of	course,	it	is	necessary	to	reconcile	at	a	theoretical	level	the	potential	for	cross-cutting	
sectional	interests	and	underlying	class-based	interests.	The	issue	can	be	clarified	somewhat	
by	considering	the	interests	of	capital.	While	notions	of	workers'	interests	are	commonly	
disputed,	the	idea	of	capitalist	class	interests	seems	more	secure.	Indeed,	what	Miliband	
(1985:	16)	calls	the	‘class	struggle	from	above’	has	been	well-documented;	a	process	
whereby	representatives	of	capital	have	pursued	a	major	political	project	in	support	of	their	
class	interests	(Chibber	2009:	364-366).	Furthermore,	the	claim	that	underlying	common	
class	interests	may	exist	alongside	more	superficial	(though	still	important)	sectional	
differences	appears	less	mysterious	when	applied	to	the	well-known	conflict	between	
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industrial	capital	and	finance	capital.		
	
Here,	critical	realism	is	useful.	Importantly,	critical	realism	conceives	of	social	reality	as	not	
only	structured,	but	as	stratified	(Bhaskar	2008;	Collier	1998),	in	the	sense	of	levels	of	
determination.	This	allows	for	an	account	of	a	basic	conflict	of	material	(class)	interests,	
overlain	by	other	levels	of	conflict,	such	as	sectional	ones.	Overlaying	levels	of	conflict	are	
not,	in	this	view,	reducible	to	underlying	conflicts	or	interests;	but	nor	do	they	escape	the	
influence	of	those	underlying	structures	(Callinicos	2009:	Ch.2;	Collier	1998).	Thus,	the	
capitalist	class	has	an	interest	in	preserving	and	(at	times)	increasing	exploitation;	
conversely,	the	working	class	has	an	interest	in	resisting	and	(at	times)	reducing	the	rate	of	
exploitation.	Class	interest	seen	in	this	way	does	not	rely	on	a	shared	conscious	awareness	
by	actors	of	common	interests,	and	nor	are	underlying	class	relations	done	away	with	
because	agents	are	unaware	of	them.		
	
For	instance,	a	group	of	workers	might	have	a	(vigorously	expressed)	narrow	sectional	
interest,	alongside	an	underlying	class	interest	(which	might	be	completely	unrecognised).	
The	underlying	class	interest,	rooted	in	exploitative	relations	of	production,	is	not	negated	
by	the	overlying	narrow	sectional	interest.	Consider,	for	example,	sectional	demands	for	the	
maintenance	of	pay	differentials	in	the	1970s,	or	efforts	by	groups	of	white	male	workers	to	
exclude	women	or	black	workers.	Such	demands	had	real	and	important	effects.	Yet,	the	
sectional	strength	of	those	workers	to	pursue	their	demands	has	since	been	significantly	
undermined	(if	not	entirely	destroyed)	by	underlying	class	interests,	as	capitalists	closed	
factories	and	reorganised	production	in	order	to	increase	the	rate	of	exploitation.	The	
narrow	sectional	demands	of	some	group	of	workers	were	no	match	for	the	class	interests	
of	capital.	A	stratified	conception	of	social	structure	facilitates	an	understanding	of	both	
immediate	sectional	demands,	as	well	as	the	underlying	dynamic	of	class	interests,	without	
reducing	one	to	the	other.		
	
This	understanding	of	interests	is	quite	different	from	that	found	in	pluralist	accounts.	For	
pluralism,	conflict	emerges	from	the	activities	of	interest	groups	(usually	termed	work	
groups),	who	press	claims	for	and	on	behalf	of	their	members,	and	who	may	thereby	come	
into	conflict	with	other	interest	groups	(Brown	1973:	132-133;	Clegg	1972:	Ch1;	1979:	53-
55,	455;	for	a	critique	of	such	treatments	of	work	groups,	see	Hill	1974).	This	view	is	drawn	
from	political	pluralism,	and	sees	interests	in	terms	of	expressed	wants,	or	‘revealed	
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preferences’	(Callinicos	2009:	140).	It	is	this	definition	of	interests,	which	focuses	(more	or	
less)	on	what	people	say	they	want,	that	has	led	to	the	foundering	of	the	notion	of	
structured	workers'	interests	on	the	rocks	of	diversity.		
	
Fortunately,	an	alternative	approach	is	available	which	does	not	rely	upon	the	conscious	
formation	of	groups	around	declared	interests	or	expressed	wants.	Marxism	identifies	an	
underlying	antagonism,	based	on	exploitation,	which	tends	to	generate	and	re-generate	
conflict	between	capital	and	labour,	employers	and	workers.	Such	conflicts	may	or	may	not	
be	consciously	expressed,	and	any	expressions	may	be	partial	and/or	contradictory	(see	
discussion	in	Callinicos	2009).	This	approach	incorporates	an	alternative	understanding	of	
interests	which	sees	them	as	based	not	on	social	agents’	expressed	wants,	but	on	their	
structural	capacities	(ibid.:	85-102)	to	pursue	and	satisfy	those	wants:		
	
‘To	be	aware	of	one’s	interests,	therefore,	is	more	than	to	be	aware	of	a	want	or	
wants;	it	is	to	know	how	to	go	about	trying	to	realise	them’	(Giddens,	cited	in	ibid.:	
146).		
	
Thus,	‘a	worker	and	a	capitalist	have	very	different	ways	open	to	them	of	realising	their	
respective	wants’	(ibid.:	147);	and	this	applies	even	if	those	wants,	such	as	a	Chelsea	season	
ticket,	coincide.	Crucially,	the	structural	capacities	available	to	any	individual	to	satisfy	their	
wants	are	significantly	determined	by	overall	class	structure.	That	is,	relatively	enduring	
social	structures	of	employment	will	continue	to	present	certain	options	to	particular	
agents,	based	on	their	position	in	the	relations	of	production;	which	is	not	to	say	that	other	
factors,	such	as	race	or	gender	inequalities,	do	not	also	affect	individuals'	ability	to	satisfy	
their	wants.	Nevertheless,	in	relation	to	potential	conflicts	between	particular	groups	of	
workers,	the	underlying	dynamic	of	exploitation	constitutes	a	recurring	class-based	interest,	
regardless	of	any	overlaid	(perceived)	divergence	of	immediate	interests.	Moreover,	this	
underlying	class-based	interest,	this	structural	capacity,	continually	presents	workers	with	
particular	ways	'to	go	about	trying	to	realise'	their	wants.		
	
For	instance,	a	capitalist	may	express	his	wants	for	a	holiday	villa	in	Marbella	and	a	new	
Ferrari,	and	seek	to	realise	those	wants	by	increasing	the	rate	of	exploitation	of	workers	in	
his	factory,	thereby	acting	in	accordance	with	his	class	interests.	By	contrast,	a	worker	in	the	
factory	may	express	her	wants	to	pay	the	rent	this	month	and	to	purchase	insurance	for	her	
second-hand	Ford	Fiesta,	and	seek	to	realise	those	wants	by	securing	a	pay-day	loan.	This	
would	be	to	act	against	her	class	interests,	by	introducing	yet	another	capitalist	to	profit	
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from	her	labour,	increasing	her	rate	of	exploitation.	Or,	she	might	attempt	to	realise	her	
wants	by	joining	a	union	to	seek	a	pay	rise	through	acting	collectively	with	her	fellow	
workers,	in	which	case	she	would	be	acting	in	accordance	with	her	class	interest	by	seeking	
to	reduce	her	rate	of	exploitation.		
	
The	question	of	whether	the	union	is	able	to	successfully	represent	her	class	interest	and	
secure	a	pay	rise	is	another	matter,	which,	though	clearly	related	and	very	important	for	the	
new	member,	should	nevertheless	be	treated	separately	for	theoretical	purposes.	The	
important	point	about	class	interests,	in	relation	to	union	organisation,	is	that	the	
underlying	reality	of	class	as	social	structure	will	keep	posing	this	collective	response	as	an	
option	for	workers.	Therefore,	it	is	likely	that	collective	responses	based	on	class	interests	
will	recur;	in	critical	realist	terms,	there	is	a	tendency,	an	underlying	casual	generative	
mechanism	(see	discussion	in	Section	4.1).		
	
It	is	not	the	intention,	here,	to	privilege	class-based	relations	between	capital	and	labour	in	
the	workplace	above	other	potential	sites	of	resistance	by	subordinate	groups.	Yet,	as	
Bélanger	and	Edwards	(2013:	8)	note,	it	is	possible	to	retain	a	conception	of	the	
employment	relationship	as	‘distinct’.	It	might	also	be	added,	given	the	importance	of	work	
in	society,	that	the	employment	relationship	is	in	any	case	a	worthwhile	object	of	
investigation	for	social	science.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	experiences	of	all	workers	are	
identical;	nor	is	it	to	suggest	that	there	are	no	other	systemic	social	relationships	or	
structures	influencing	the	experience	of	individual	workers	(Collier	1998).	Nor	does	the	
structured	nature	of	the	employment	relationship	automatically	translate	into	a	shared	
awareness	of	that	structure	in	the	minds	of	workers,	much	less	a	uniform	consciousness	of	
common	class	interests.	Nevertheless,	while	social	structure	needs	careful	research	and	
theorising,	as	do	interests	consequent	upon	that	structure,	there	are	no	grounds	for	
dismissing	such	notions	altogether.		
	
The	approach	outlined	here	entails	a	defensible	notion	of	interests,	seen	as	conceptually	
distinct	from	expressed	wants	(though	these	may	coincide	in	practice).	In	critical	realist	
terms,	class	interests	are	real	generative	mechanisms,	operating	at	a	lower	level	of	social	
reality	than	expressions	of	needs	and	wants.	This	view	can	encompass	diversity	among	
workers	while	maintaining	a	notion	of	underlying	common	interests	based	on	structural	
capacities.	Put	concretely,	individual	workers	may	wish	to	spend	their	wages	on	many	
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different	things,	influenced	by	varied	and	diverse	'norms	and	expectations’;	nevertheless,	
these	workers	share	a	common	interest	in	decreasing	the	rate	of	exploitation	to	which	they	
are	subjected	by	employers.	This	approach	thus	situates	the	role	of	the	unions	in	terms	of	
interests	representation,	not	of	interest	formation.	The	former	is	quite	a	big	enough	job.		
	
Next,	the	discussion	addresses	a	startling	absence	in	the	literature	on	shop	stewards	and	
workplace	relations:	the	lack	of	a	definition	of	bargaining.		
	
The	missing	concept:	what	is	bargaining?	
A	surprising	feature	of	the	considerable	literature	on	workplace	bargaining	is	that	it	does	
not	appear	to	contain	any	systematic	attempt	to	define	bargaining.	Yet,	for	the	present	
research	a	definition	is	essential,	and	therefore	the	following	discussion	develops	one.	This	
definition	incorporates	elements	from	bargaining	theory	but	is	also	compatible	with	the	
conception	of	workplace	relations	outlined	above,	centred	on	the	employment	relationship	
conceived	as	a	relationship	of	exploitation,	and	characterised	by	both	conflict	and	
cooperation.		
	
The	field	of	bargaining	theory	employs	a	definition	of	bargaining	that	is	broadly	shared	
across	an	extensive	literature	(Bacharach	and	Lawler	1981:	4).	Muthoo	(1999:	1,	original	
emphasis)	gives	a	typical	account:		
	
‘Any	exchange	situation	…	in	which	a	pair	of	individuals	(or,	organizations)	can	engage	
in	mutually	beneficial	trade	but	have	conflicting	interests	over	the	terms	of	trade	is	a	
bargaining	situation	…	Stated	in	general	and	broad	terms,	a	bargaining	situation	is	a	
situation	in	which	two	players	have	a	common	interest	to	co-operate,	but	have	
conflicting	interests	over	exactly	how	to	co-operate’.		
	
Similarly,	Bacharach	and	Lawler	(1981:	ix):	
	
'When	two	or	more	individuals,	groups,	or	organizations	experience	a	conflict	of	
interest,	and	when	they	wish	to	resolve	their	differences	because	it	would	be	
mutually	beneficial	to	do	so,	they	decide	to	bargain	…	whether	the	conflicting	parties	
are	nations,	corporations,	or	unions’.	
	
Likewise,	Fisher	et	al.	(2012:	xxv)	define	a	bargaining	situation	as,	‘when	you	and	the	other	
side	have	some	interests	that	are	shared	and	others	that	are	opposed	(as	well	as	some	that	
may	simply	be	different)’.	Furthermore,	game	theory	specifies	that:	
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‘the	outcome	of	bargaining	depends	on	both	players'	bargaining	strategies:	whether	
or	not	an	agreement	is	struck,	and	the	terms	of	the	agreement	(if	one	is	struck),	
depends	on	both	players'	actions	during	the	bargaining	process'	(Mutthoo	1999:	6,	
original	emphasis).		
	
Again,	this	aspect	is	widely	accepted	(Bacharach	and	Lawler	1981:	4-6).	The	advantages	of	
this	definition	of	bargaining	lie	in	its	simplicity	and	flexibility,	and	in	its	wide	acceptance	
across	the	bargaining	theory	literature.		
	
Unfortunately,	bargaining	theory	also	presents	significant	difficulties.	Commonly,	bargaining	
theory	adopts	a	game-theoretic	approach,	using	applied	mathematics	in	analyses	which	
bear	little	resemblance	to	real-life	bargaining	situations.	Largely,	this	is	because	the	concern	
is	not	to	understand	the	process	of	bargaining	but	to	calculate	its	outcomes,	in	order	to	
address	a	technical	problem	in	marginal	economics	concerning	how	prices	are	fixed	in	
exchange.	Consequently,	bargaining	theory	makes	significant	assumptions	that	remove	key	
aspects	of	real-life	bargaining.	Muthoo	(1999:	333-41)	notes	a	number	of	consequent	
‘omissions’,	including	assumptions	that	the	same	issue	is	not	bargained	over	repeatedly;	
that	bargaining	circumstances,	such	as	market	conditions,	do	not	change;	that	parties	do	
not	form	coalitions;	that	no	mediation	takes	place;	that	all	agreements	are	enforced	fully;	
and	that	only	one	issue	is	bargained	over	at	a	time.	Other	assumptions	derive	from	rational	
choice	theory	and	marginal	economics	(classically,	Nash	1950;	see	Bacharach	and	Lawler	
1981;	Bacharach	et	al.:	1981).	In	particular,	
	
'The	assumption	that	bargainers	will	accept	a	common	definition	of	their	situation,	
and	hence,	a	common	set	of	rules	governing	their	behaviour	in	that	situation,	is	the	
most	fundamental	assumption	in	game	theory’	(ibid.:	15).	
	
Even	the	apparently	reasonable	assumption	that	parties	act	rationally	actually	assumes	that	
‘both	parties	are	aware	of	the	logic	or	rules	that	purportedly	dictate	their	choice	of	
strategies,	and	are	prepared	to	accept	them’	(Bacharach	et	al.:	8).	Game	theory	also	
assumes	that	parties	‘have	complete	and	perfect	information	on	their	own	and	the	other's	
situations	and	on	possible	outcomes	of	the	bargaining’	(ibid.:	6),	and	that,		
	
‘the	parties	have	no	opportunity	to	influence	each	other's	choice	of	strategies	by	the	
information	they	control,	and	they	have	all	the	information	they	need	to	anticipate	
each	other's	choices	…	[and]	that	the	parties	have	no	opportunity	to	create	new	
outcome	combinations,	for	example,	by	suggesting	that	the	outcomes	in	the	game	be	
linked	with	outcomes	in	another	game’	(ibid.:	8).		
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Any	familiarity	with	actual	bargaining	demonstrates	the	inadequacy	of	these	assumptions.	
As	Heap	and	Varoufakis	(2004:	31)	put	it,	this	is	bargaining	without	'blundering'	or	
'creativity'.	In	reality,	‘bargaining,	like	any	conflict	situation,	is	riddled	with	uncertainty	and	
ambiguity’	(Bacharach	and	Lawler	1981:	50).	Indeed,	Bacharach	and	Lawler	(1981:	ix)	go	
further,	arguing	that	‘bargaining	arises	from	conflict’.	What	is	excluded	by	the	assumptions	
of	bargaining	theory	is	the	importance	of	'social	location'	(Heap	and	Varoufakis	2004:	302)	
in	explaining	complexity	in	human	interactions.	Consequently,	the	auxiliary	assumptions	of	
games	theory	must	be	set	aside,	in	order	to	end	'the	strict	separation	of	action	from	
structure'	(ibid.:	32).	Once	this	is	done,	a	workable	definition	of	bargaining	emerges.		
	
On	this	basis,	a	definition	of	bargaining	suitable	for	industrial	relations	research	can	be	
offered,	as	follows.	Bargaining	may	be	defined	as	a	process	involving	three	components.	
First,	parties:	bargaining	requires	two	(or	more)	parties.	Second,	interests:	the	parties	must	
have	interests	at	stake,	some	of	which	are	shared	and	others	that	are	opposed.	Third,	
outcomes:	the	outcome(s)	of	bargaining	are	determined	by	the	actions	of	both	parties.	
When	all	these	three	components	are	present,	there	is	a	bargaining	situation,	and	the	social	
interaction	taking	place	can	be	characterised	as	a	bargaining	process.	This	three-part	
definition	was	used	in	the	present	study.		
	
A	number	of	implications	follow	from	this	definition,	and	are	dealt	with	below;	but	it	is	
worth	making	two	points	immediately.	First,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	games	theory	has	
far	less	difficulty	with	the	notion	of	interests	than	recent	accounts	from	industrial	relations	
and	related	fields	(see	above).	The	definition	of	bargaining	derived	from	games	theory	can	
easily	incorporate	employers	and	workers	as	parties	with	interests,	some	of	which	are	
shared	and	some	of	which	are	at	odds.	For	bargaining	theory,	the	shared	interest	lies	in	the	
trade	(Muthoo	1999:	1).	That	is,	workers	and	employers	have	a	shared	interest	in	the	
exchange	of	labour	power	for	wages;	not,	as	in	many	accounts	from	industrial	relations,	a	
shared	interest	in	the	continued	profitability	of	the	company	(e.g.	Edwards	2003:	17).	
Although	profitability	might	be	a	consideration	for	workers	in	an	actual	bargaining	situation,	
on	this	view,	the	shared	interest	lies	in	the	exchange	of	work	for	pay.	This	does	not	
represent	a	shared	interest	in	the	making	of	profits,	which	continue	to	accrue	to	the	
capitalist.	The	opposed	interests	of	capital	and	labour,	of	workers	and	employers,	lie	in	the	
terms	of	the	trade.	That	is,	workers	have	an	interest	in	trying	to	secure	favourable	terms	for	
the	sale	of	labour	power;	in	Marxist	terms,	a	reduction	in	the	rate	of	exploitation.	This	
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conception	of	interests	therefore	refocuses	attention	on	the	importance	of	the	cash	nexus	
(Westergaard	1970).		
	
The	second	point	returns	to	the	criticism	of	the	current	standard	view	presented	above.	The	
definition	of	bargaining	developed	here	gives	a	firm	theoretical	foundation	for	the	critique	
of	any	sharp	conceptual	distinction	between	'negotiation'	and	'consultation'.	Despite	
differing	formal	designations,	a	common	feature	of	these	forms	is	that	management	may,	as	
a	consequence,	adjust	its	decisions	in	the	light	of	actual	or	perceived	response(s)	of	workers	
and/or	union.	That	is,	both	forms	may	entail	genuine	bargaining.	By	the	same	token,	real	
bargaining	content	may	be	entirely	absent,	regardless	of	formal	designation.	Consequently,	
empirical	investigation	is	needed	to	determine	actual	bargaining	content,	which	cannot	be	
deduced	from	a	priori	definitions,	as	the	current	standard	view	attempts	to	do	(Section	2.1).		
	
Some	implication	of	the	definition	
The	definition	of	bargaining	outlined	here	carries	a	number	of	further	implications	for	
research	on	shop	stewards	and	workplace	bargaining.	To	begin	with,	it	means	that	some	
phenomena	cannot	be	considered	as	bargaining.	Here,	bargaining	is	defined	more	narrowly	
than	in	some	misbehaviour	studies,	where	‘negotiation’	has	been	reduced	more	or	less	to	
the	meaning	of	finding	a	way	to	get	through	the	experience	of	work,	but	without	altering	it	
at	all	(cf.	Kelly	1998:	132).	Furthermore,	situations	where	management	prerogatives	are	
constrained	by	technical,	or	economic,	or	other	factors	external	to	the	parties	to	the	
employment	relationship	cannot	be	considered	as	bargaining	–	although	such	factors	might	
be	used	as	bargaining	resources	by	the	parties.		
	
The	definition	proposed	here	can	encompass	a	considerable	variety	of	bargaining	forms.	On	
this	definition,	bargaining	may	be	hidden	or	open,	formal	or	informal.	Processes	formally	
designated	as	negotiation,	consultation,	or	provision	of	information,	may	all	appear	on	a	
continuum	of	bargaining	forms,	from	stronger	to	weaker.	This	continuum	does	not,	though,	
consist	simply	of	formal	designations	laid	side	by	side.	Nor,	as	argued	above	(Section	2.1),	is	
there	a	hierarchy	of	discrete	forms.	Rather,	the	bargaining	continuum	should	be	seen	in	
terms	of	variation	in	the	third	term	of	the	definition;	that	is,	the	extent	to	which	shop	
stewards	influence	management	decisions	and	actions.	This	research	investigated	whether,	
and	how	much,	bargaining	content,	thus	defined,	could	be	identified	in	the	activities	of	shop	
stewards	in	relation	to	managers.		
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An	appreciation	of	potential	variation	on	the	bargaining	continuum	can	be	gained	from	
Clegg's	(1972:	248-50)	overview,	which	emphasises	the	variety	of	forms	that	workplace	
bargaining	can	take.	At	one	end	of	the	spectrum,	bargaining	may	involve	written	
agreements.	Alternatively,	‘there	need	be	neither	signed	agreements	nor	recognised	
procedures’	(ibid.:	248).	Instead,	bargaining	may	comprise	verbal	agreements	between	a	
manager	and	a	shop	steward.	Or,	there	may	be	several	informal	agreements	over	time	that	
result	in	a	particular	way	of	working,	but	about	which	no	clear	agreement	can	be	said	to	
exist.	Moreover,	‘there	is	no	clear	line	between	bargaining	of	this	sort	and	consultation’	
(ibid.:	249).	Understandings	can	emerge	‘without	any	conscious	decision	by	management’,	
or	even	‘without	any	conscious	decision	at	all’	(ibid.:	249).	Ways	of	working	can	be	
established	even	though	‘no	one	can	remember	why’	(ibid.:	249).	Summarising,	Clegg	(ibid.:	
250)	states:		
	
‘It	is	therefore	common	for	domestic	bargaining	to	regulate	industrial	relations	in	a	
plant	by	a	mixture	of	written	agreements,	written	understandings,	unwritten	
understandings,	informal	arrangements	and	customs	and	practices	(some	of	which	
might	not	be	accepted	as	binding	by	the	management).’		
	
It	is	notable	that	Clegg	habitually	uses	the	term	‘bargaining’,	and	clearly	sees	a	spectrum	
rather	than	a	series	of	sharply	defined	forms	(similarly,	Clegg	1979:	232-244).	Although	
Clegg	does	not	specify	the	bargaining	spectrum	in	terms	of	a	clear	conceptual	framework,	
on	the	definition	developed	above	all	his	examples	can	be	considered	as	forms	of	
bargaining,	since	the	outcomes	are	determined	by	the	actions	of	both	parties.		
	
This	definition	may	also	apply	to	workplace	processes	that	superficially	have	nothing	to	do	
with	bargaining.	For	instance,	Kuhn's	(1961)	US	study	found	bargaining	embedded	in	
grievance	procedures	that	were	formally	not	part	of	collective	bargaining.	The	terms	of	
collective	contracts	specifically	removed	many	issues	from	bargaining	during	the	life	of	the	
contract,	but	Kuhn	found	many	such	issues	raised	and	effectively	bargained	over	under	the	
formally	entirely	separate	grievance	procedure.	Kuhn	(ibid.:	78)	concluded	that,	in	practice,	
grievance	procedures	had	been	transformed	by	workplace	union	representatives	into	‘year	
round,	continuous	collective	bargaining'.	Elsewhere,	Batstone	(2015)	identified	‘arms-length	
bargaining’,	in	which	employers	and	unions	did	not	even	meet;	rather,	employers	estimated	
what	would	be	acceptable	to	the	workforce	and	unions,	and	then	made	an	offer	in	the	
knowledge	that	it	would	probably	be	accepted.	In	a	similar	process,	Evans	(1973:	100)	noted	
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managers	taking	soundings	from	shop	stewards	prior	to	deciding	a	course	of	action.	Though	
quite	different	in	institutional	forms,	these	examples	entail	processes	that	conform	to	the	
three-part	definition	outlined	above:	two	parties;	interests,	in	common	and	opposed;	and,	
outcomes	determined	by	the	actions	of	both	parties.	Furthermore,	since	the	first	two	parts	
of	this	definition	are	common	to	all	employment	relationships,	variation	of	bargaining	forms	
can	be	seen	in	terms	of	differences	in	the	degree	to	which	the	outcomes	are	influenced	by	
the	parties.		
	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	discussed	theoretical	issues	that	are	usually	treated	briefly,	if	at	all,	in	
industrial	relations	research.	The	lengthy	detour	has,	however,	established	related	
conceptualisations	of	a	number	of	key	features	of	workplace	relations.	This	is	not	to	claim	
that	the	discussion	in	this	chapter	exhausts	all	the	possibilities	for	social	relations	in	
workplaces.	Nevertheless,	the	argument	here	is	that,	whatever	else	is	going	on,	the	
structured	dynamics	discussed	in	this	chapter	will	be	present	very	widely.	Consequently,	a	
firm	theoretical	basis	has	been	established	that	may	permit	careful	generalisation	from	the	
case	studies	presented	in	later	chapters.		
	
The	understanding	of	shop	stewards	proposed	in	this	study	is	thus	rooted	in	the	
employment	relationship,	seen	as	a	defining	feature	structuring	workplace	relations.	This	
chapter	has	made	a	significant	effort	to	develop	a	strong	theoretical	account	of	this	
relationship,	as	one	which	is	driven	by	a	dynamic	of	exploitation,	which	gives	rise	to	
relations	of	both	conflict	and	cooperation	between	workers	and	managers,	and	in	which	
class-based	conflicts	of	interest	are	a	central	feature.	Conflict	in	the	workplace	is	therefore	
not	just	a	question	of	workers’	interests;	it	is	fundamentally	driven	by	employers’	interests.	
The	notion	of	interests,	seen	as	structural	capacities,	has	been	used	to	link	the	structured	
dynamic	of	exploitation	within	the	employment	relationship	to	the	agency	of	social	actors	in	
the	workplace,	in	a	non-deterministic	connection.	Furthermore,	the	dynamic	of	exploitation	
means	that	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control	will	be	common	features	of	workplace	
relations	cross	capitalist	employment,	and	will	continue	to	confront	shop	stewards.	Thus,	
central	aspects	of	workplace	relations	and	the	issues	that	shop	stewards	deal	with	have	
been	shown	to	be	rooted	in	the	nature	of	the	employment	relationship.		
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It	can	therefore	be	expected	that	the	role	of	shop	stewards	in	any	given	workplace	is	likely	
to	reflect	this	underlying	reality	to	some	extent.	This	is	not	to	prejudge	the	forms	or	
outcome	of	actual	workplace	processes.	Questions	for	empirical	research,	then,	concern	the	
extent	to	which	such	dynamics	can	be	identified	in	the	observed	activity	of	shop	stewards.	If	
shop	steward	activity	is	found	to	reflect	the	dynamics	theorised	in	this	chapter,	that	would	
suggest	that	such	processes	might	be	taking	place	more	generally,	since	these	dynamics	are	
rooted	in	the	employment	relationship	that	is	a	common	feature	of	workplace	relations	
under	capitalism.		
	
This	chapter	also	developed	a	definition	of	bargaining,	missing	from	previous	accounts,	that	
is	similarly	rooted	in	the	nature	of	the	employment	relationship.	This	definition	implies	a	
continuum	of	bargaining	processes,	rather	than	a	hierarchy	of	forms.	Furthermore,	it	was	
shown	that	patterns	bargaining	can	be	mapped	in	terms	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	
bargaining	resources.	Therefore,	a	further	empirical	issue	for	the	present	research	was	the	
investigation	of	the	location,	nature,	and	extent	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	
resources	in	the	two	case	studies.	This	leads	the	discussion	to	a	consideration	of	the	
empirical	research.	It	was	argued	previously	that	the	almost	lost	tradition	of	workplace	
ethnography	is	particularly	well	suited	to	investigating	the	workplace	relations	and	
processes	discussed	in	this	chapter	and	the	previous	one,	which	are	crucial	to	understanding	
the	role	of	shop	stewards.	Therefore,	the	next	chapter	will	deal	in	detail	with	the	issues	
involved	in	a	return	to	those	methods.		
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Chapter	4:	Methodology,	research	design,	and	case	studies		
	
	
Some	twenty	years	ago,	Terry	(1995:	215)	noted	that	detailed	case	studies	of	shop	stewards,	
once	well-established	in	industrial	relations	research,	had	declined	significantly.	Since	that	
time,	Terry’s	regular	surveys	(2003;	2010)	have	found	no	revival	of	research	in	this	area.	As	a	
result,	the	empirical	evidence	on	shop	stewards	is	currently	severely	under-developed.	One	
of	the	main	motivations	of	the	present	study	was	to	contribute	to	filling	this	gap	in	the	
empirical	research,	and	to	do	so	by	reviving	the	methods	of	detailed	workplace	study.	
Therefore	the	challenge	was	to	devise	a	project	for	a	single	researcher,	with	a	very	small	
budget,	which	was	nevertheless	capable	of	producing	a	sufficient	quantity	and	quality	of	
evidence	to	support	a	re-conceptualisation	of	the	role	of	shop	stewards	in	workplace	
relations.	This	chapter	outlines	the	methodological	issues	raised	by	these	considerations,	
and	examines	how	they	influenced	the	selection	of	research	design,	data-gathering	
methods,	and	data-analysis.		
	
Designing	research	involves	a	series	of	choices,	and	this	chapter	is	structured	by	the	choices	
made	in	the	course	of	this	study.	The	chapter	particularly	emphasises	three	issues:	a	
defence	of	small	sample	case	studies;	the	diary-based	method	developed	for	the	present	
study;	and	reliability,	validity,	and	generalisation	in	qualitative	case	study	research.	The	
chapter	begins	with	a	discussion	of	the	critical	realist	approach	to	theory-building,	and	a	
defence	of	inductivism.	The	discussion	then	outlines	the	research	design	and	methods	
adopted.	First,	the	choice	of	qualitative	case	study	is	explained,	followed	by	data	collection	
methods.	Next,	operational	issues	are	outlined,	including	case	study	selection,	access,	
research	ethics,	and	data	analysis.	A	final	section	gives	background	information	to	
contextualise	the	two	case	studies.			
	
	
4.1	Theory	to	research,	and	back:	principal	methodological	considerations		
	
The	fundamental	methodological	difficulty	for	the	current	research	was	how	to	gather	data	
in	a	theoretically	ill-defined	context.	Theory	is	crucial	to	human	perception	of	the	world,	
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even	at	the	everyday	level,	and	is	absolutely	essential	for	systematic,	scientific	research	
(Chalmers	1999).	Consequently,	the	weakness	of	theory	concerning	shop	stewards	
presented	serious	difficulties	for	the	present	research	in	deciding	what	to	look	for,	and	even	
where	to	look.	Questionable	theory	rendered	any	attempt	to	derive	clear	research	
hypotheses	problematic.	Therefore,	a	deductive	approach	was	rejected.		
	
One	response	to	theoretical	weakness	is	to	develop	new	theory	using	an	inductive	
approach.	However,	inductivism	presents	problems	of	its	own;	specifically,	the	difficulty	of	
verification	(Chalmers	1999:	Ch.4).	That	is,	logically,	even	a	very	large	(or	infinite)	number	of	
events	cannot	prove	a	generalisation	to	be	true,	while	only	a	single	counter-event	is	
sufficient	to	falsify	it.	This	argument	has	commonly	been	used	in	favour	of	deductive	
research.	Unfortunately,	in	the	field	of	industrial	relations,	attachment	to	deductivism	has	
often	had	negative	effects;	in	particular,	leading	to	ad	hoc	‘hypotheses’	only	weakly	related	
to	theory,	or	based	on	common	sense	assumptions	(Kelly	1998:	21-23).	The	standard	
critique	of	inductivism,	though,	is	based	on	a	problematic	empiricist	understanding	of	
scientific	knowledge,	which	has	been	subject	to	serious	criticism	from	a	critical	realist	
perspective,	particularly	in	the	work	of	Bhaskar	(1998;	2008).	Therefore,	this	section	
outlines	an	alternative	approach	to	theory-building	that	includes	a	defensible	version	of	
inductivism.		
	
For	Bhaskar	(2008),	the	widely	accepted	empiricist	conception	of	scientific	laws	is	
fundamentally	flawed.	On	the	empiricist	view,	a	law-like	generalisation	is	a	statement	about	
the	'constant	conjunction'	of	observed	events,	such	as	'When	A,	then	B'	(ibid.:	33-35,	et	
passim).	Bhaskar	counters	this	view	of	scientific	laws	by	pointing	out	that	in	nature	constant	
conjunctions	are	extremely	rare;	therefore,	the	real	basis	of	scientific	knowledge	must	lie	
elsewhere.	In	place	of	constant	conjunction,	Bhaskar	(ibid.:	47,	et	passim)	sees	scientific	
laws	as	comprising	the	identification	of	‘generative	mechanisms’,	or	tendencies,	which	are	
not	observed	directly,	but	which	have	real	causal	effects	in	generating	events	which	can	be	
observed	(ibid.:	48-50).	Generative	mechanisms	may	result	in	observable	constant	
conjunctions,	but	these	are	rare	because	the	natural	world	is	an	‘open	system’	(Collier	
1998),	where	many	generative	mechanisms	operate	simultaneously,	mutually	modifying	the	
outcomes	of	each	other.	As	a	result,	the	causal	effects	of	one	generative	mechanism	may	be	
completely	obscured	by	the	effects	of	others.	Hence,	for	Bhaskar,	it	is	logically	impossible	
that	observed	constant	conjunction	can	be	the	basis	of	laws	in	natural	science.	
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Rather,	in	the	natural	sciences,	constant	conjunctions	are	produced	by	human	intervention,	
through	the	application	of	the	experimental	method.	By	excluding	all	other	influences	
except	the	one	that	is	of	interest	to	the	researcher,	experiment	constructs	an	artificial	
‘closed	system’,	in	which	events	caused	by	only	one	generative	mechanism	may	be	
observed	(Bhaskar	2008:	Ch.2).	Consequently,	the	constant	conjunctions	which	empiricism	
claims	as	the	stuff	of	natural	laws	are,	in	an	important	sense,	the	products	of	human	activity	
rather	than	naturally	existing	events	waiting	to	be	observed	(ibid.:	33-36).	The	experimental	
method	has	been	crucial	to	the	progress	of	science	because	it	permits	the	identification	of	
underlying	causal	mechanisms,	in	a	way	that	is	not	possible	in	natural	settings.		
	
In	the	social	sciences,	these	issues	are	particularly	acute,	because	society	is	a	fundamentally	
open	system	where	constant	conjunctions	are	absent,	and	experimentation	is	not	possible	
in	any	significant	sense.	Therefore,	constant	conjunction	cannot	form	the	basis	of	theory-
building	or	theory-testing	in	social	science	(Bhaskar	1998),	and	the	relationship	of	
observation	to	theory	must	be	viewed	differently.	Since	it	is	empiricism's	focus	on	constant	
conjunction	that	underlies	the	standard	critique	of	induction,	Bhaskar’s	undermining	of	
empiricism	therefore	also	undermines	the	empiricist	critique	of	induction.	Once	the	
definition	of	scientific	laws	as	constant	conjunction	is	rejected,	then	induction	appears	in	a	
new	light	(Bhaskar	2008:	214-228).		
	
For	critical	realism,	the	key	issue	for	knowledge-claims	based	on	induction	is	not	the	
impossible	task	of	assembling	an	infinite	number	of	examples	of	constant	conjunction,	but	
the	achievable	task	of	carefully	documenting	sufficient	examples	of	a	phenomenon	to	
suggest	the	existence	of	some	underlying,	if	unseen,	causal	generative	mechanism	(ibid.:	
219-220).	Consequently,	a	broadly	inductive	approach	becomes	defensible:	careful	
observation	produces	evidence	suggesting	the	existence	of	an	underlying	generative	
mechanism,	and	such	observations	inform	and	direct	further	investigation,	in	a	series	of	
(hopefully)	ever-closer	approximations	to	a	description	of	the	underlying	generative	
mechanism.	Here,	the	task	of	social	science	becomes	explanation,	rather	than	prediction	
(Sayer	2010).	The	notion	of	‘demi-regs’,	i.e.	semi-regularities,	has	emerged	in	critical	realism	
as	a	useful	operational	concept	to	describe	the	partial	regularities	that	often	occur	in	social	
science,	and	which	may	indicate	the	existence	of	an	underlying	generative	mechanism	
(Lawson	1998:	149-153).	Various	terms	have	been	used	to	describe	the	social	scientific	
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process	(e.g.	'retroduction',	'retrodiction',	etc.;	see	Edwards	et	al.	2014),	but	essentially	the	
approach	is	iterative;	that	is,	the	familiar	movement	back	and	forth	between	data	and	
theory.	This	theoretically	informed,	iterative,	version	of	inductivism	was	adopted	for	the	
present	study.		
	
Implicit	in	this	argument	is	a	rejection	of	the	grounded	theory	approach	to	theory-building,	
which	is	often	associated	with	ethnographic	and	case	study	research.	In	practice,	grounded	
theory	too	often	neglects	previous	theory,	producing	accounts	that	are	‘theory	"lite"’	(Braun	
and	Clarke	2006:	8).	Although	existing	theory	around	shop	stewards	has	numerous	
problems,	it	is	not	the	case	that	there	is	no	theory	at	all	(Chapters	2	and	3).	Consequently,	
existing	theory	was	not	dispensed	with,	even	though	it	could	not	provide	a	secure	basis	for	
deductive	hypotheses.	Instead,	elements	from	existing	theory	were	used	to	guide	the	design	
and	conduct	of	the	research	—	what	Malinowski	memorably	called	‘foreshadowed	
problems’	(cited	in	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	21;	see	also	Yin	2009:	18).	Here,	
previous	accounts	supplied	a	number	of	‘foreshadowed	problems’,	including	conflict	and	
cooperation,	frontier	of	control,	effort	bargain,	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources,	
bargaining	relations,	leaders	and	populists,	shop-stewardliness,	formal	and	informal	
bargaining,	intra-organisational	bargaining,	mobilisation,	and	legitimacy	(Chapters	2	and	3).	
This	non-exhaustive	list	includes	concepts	that	may	be	useful	for,	a)	assessing	the	current	
standard	view	of	shop	stewards	and,	b)	the	development	of	new	theory.	As	will	be	shown	
below,	despite	a	number	of	difficulties	with	the	overall	theorisation	of	shop	stewards,	these	
concepts	did	nevertheless	provide	useful	components	for	re-thinking	shop	stewards	and	
workplace	bargaining,	and	it	would	have	been	significantly	counter-productive	to	abandon	
them.		
	
This	section	has	established	the	principal	methodological	bases	for	the	present	research.	
The	next	section	discusses	the	design	of	research	suitable	for	gathering	data	with	which	to	
answer	the	research	questions	outlined	in	Chapter	1,	with	due	sensitivity	to	'foreshadowed	
problems'.		
	
	
4.2	Research	design:	qualitative	case	study		
	
This	section	sets	out	the	research	design	and	the	reasons	for	adopting	it.	Since	this	project	
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intended	to	assess	the	overall	character	of	contemporary	shop	steward	activity,	the	
research	was	designed	to	capture	the	broad	range	of	issues	that	shop	stewards	dealt	with,	
and	the	means	used	to	deal	with	them.	Happily,	the	research	design	and	methods	adopted	
here	produced	a	wealth	of	rich	data,	and	may	therefore	be	of	interest	to	other	researchers.	
This	section	attempts	to	set	out	those	methods	sufficiently	clearly	that	others	might	adopt	
them	directly	or	adapt	them	flexibly	to	meet	their	own	requirements.		
	
Qualitative		
Given	the	research	questions	this	project	set	out	to	answer	(Section	1.1),	it	was	decided	that	
qualitative	methods	would	be	required.	The	reason	for	this	choice	lies	in	the	difference	
between	qualitative	and	quantitative	methods	in	social	science.	Whereas	quantitative	
research	seeks	to	attach	numerical	values	to	phenomena,	and	therefore	pre-supposes	a	
knowledge	of	what	is	to	be	counted,	qualitative	research	is	useful	for	‘contextual’	research,	
where	the	aim	is	‘identifying	what	exists	in	the	social	world	and	the	way	it	manifests	itself’,	
including	‘the	range	of	elements,	[or]	dimensions	…	of	a	social	phenomenon	(Ritchie	2003:	
27,	original	emphasis).	Since	detailed	knowledge	of	contemporary	shop	steward	activity	was	
lacking,	and	conceptualisation	problematic,	any	attempt	to	attach	numbers	to	aspects	of	
shop	stewards'	activity	would	almost	certainly	have	misled.	Therefore,	a	quantitative	
approach	was	rejected	in	favour	of	qualitative,	precisely	to	explore	the	elements	and	
dimensions	of	shop	steward	activity.		
	
Qualitative	methods	are	recognised	as	well-suited	to	exploring	the	nature,	parameters,	and	
meanings	of	social	activities,	including	relatively	unexplored	areas	of	workplace	relations	
(Greene	2001:	119).	Qualitative	research	is	also	used	to	‘understand	the	dynamics	of	a	
relationship’	(Strauss	and	Whitfield,	1998:	15).	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	use	of	
qualitative	methods	in	this	study	does	not	imply	a	commitment	to	a	social	constructionist	
view	of	society,	as	is	often	the	case	for	qualitative	research	(for	instance,	Whipp	1998).	
Neither	is	it	assumed	that	qualitative	methods	are	privileged	in	their	ability	to	understand	
social	reality,	nor	that	quantitative	methods	are	incapable	of	so	doing.	Rather,	quantitative	
and	qualitative	are	regarded	as	methods	for	investigating	different	aspects	of	social	reality	
(Snape	and	Spencer	2003:	15).	Qualitative	methods	are	suited	to:		
	
‘research	questions	that	require	explanation	or	understanding	of	social	phenomena	in	
their	contexts.	They	are	particularly	well-suited	to	exploring	issues	that	hold	some	
complexity	and	to	studying	processes	that	occur	over	time’	(ibid.:	5).	
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In	terms	of	theory-building,	qualitative	methods	are	suited	to	‘generative’	research,	which	
aims	at	‘producing	new	ideas	…	as	a	contribution	to	the	development	of	social	theory’,	
including	‘new	conceptions	or	understandings	of	social	phenomena’	(Ritchie	2003:	30).	
Plainly,	such	considerations	applied	for	the	present	research.		
	
Case	study		
Next,	it	was	decided	to	adopt	a	case	study	design.	Although	qualitative	methods	and	a	case	
study	are	often	treated	as	synonyms	(Lewis	2003:	51),	more	explicit	reasoning	was	adopted	
here.	Recently,	Yin	(2009:	21)	has	championed	case	study	as	a	research	method,	alongside	
other	methods,	such	as	experiment,	survey,	or	historical	research	(ibid.:	8).	However,	this	
definition	seems	unnecessarily	rigid.	It	is	not	clear	why	various	methods	might	not	be	
utilised	within	a	case	study	format;	for	instance,	the	historical	case	study	is	well	established	
in	industrial	relations	research	(for	instance,	Joyce	2013;	Terry	and	Edwards	1988).	
Therefore,	case	study	will	be	used	here	in	the	sense	of	‘research	design’	or	‘research	
strategy	…	[which]	can	serve	a	variety	of	purposes	and	make	use	of	a	range	of	techniques’	
(Kitay	and	Callus	1998:	101,	102).		
	
There	is	broad	agreement	on	the	circumstances	in	which	a	case	study	approach	is	suitable.	
For	Kitay	and	Callus	(1998:	101),	case	studies	are	‘particularly	well	suited’	to	studying	
‘complex	social	phenomena’:	
	
‘The	great	strength	of	case	study	design	is	not	simply	that	it	…	allows	the	researcher	
to	place	information	in	a	wider	context	...	it	[also]	helps	us	understand	complex	social	
situations	and	processes’	(ibid.:	104;	see	also	Ritchie	2003).	
	
Case	studies	are	especially	useful	where	‘the	distinction	between	a	phenomenon	and	its	
context	is	unclear’	(Kitay	and	Callus	1998:	104).	Similarly,	for	Yin	(2009:	18),	case	studies	are	
suitable	when	‘the	boundaries	between	phenomenon	and	context	are	not	clearly	evident’,	
especially	when	the	context	is	important	for	understanding	the	phenomenon.	Certainly,	the	
classic	studies	of	shop	stewards	underline	the	importance	of	context.	Yin	(2009:	9)	identifies	
the	‘exploratory	case	study’	as	particularly	suited	to	research	that	aims	to	establish	not	the	
‘incidence	or	prevalence	of	a	phenomenon’,	but	which	aims	instead	to	explore	the	nature	of	
a	phenomenon.	Given	the	conceptual	challenges	arising	from	recent	accounts	of	shop	
stewards,	and	the	lack	of	direct	empirical	research,	the	designation	exploratory	seemed	
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particularly	appropriate	for	the	current	research.		
	
Case	studies	have	a	long	history	in	industrial	relations,	stretching	back	to	the	Webbs.	
However,	case	study	research	has	recently	drawn	criticism	for	a	claimed	tendency	to	lack	
rigour.	McGovern	(2014b;	2014c)	sets	out	20	criteria1	that	are	commonly	associated	with	
rigour	in	research	methods,2	and	conducts	a	meta-analysis	of	workplace	studies	published	
as	journal	articles,	to	assess	their	reliability	and	validity	against	those	criteria.	McGovern	
(2014b)	concludes	that	commonly	there	is	‘no	discussion	of	method’,	and	that	case	study	
research	is	‘an	unexamined	tradition’	or	‘unquestioned	faith’.	While	some	of	these	criticisms	
reflect	a	rather	narrow	empiricist	view	of	rigour,	McGovern’s	starting	point	is	valid;	case	
study	research	must	consider	carefully	its	choice	of	research	design,	research	methods,	data	
analysis,	and	presentation	of	results.		
	
However,	it	is	less	clear	that	the	evidence	presented	supports	McGovern’s	conclusions.	In	
particular,	it	does	not	follow	from	the	limited	discussion	of	methods	in	journal	articles	that	
the	field	does	not	take	methodological	issues	seriously.	Indeed,	the	present	research	meets	
15	of	McGovern’s	20	criteria,3	even	though	the	fieldwork	was	completed	prior	to	
McGovern's	(2014b)	critique;	which	suggests	that	an	appreciation	of	these	issues	is	in	fact	
current	within	the	field.	Furthermore,	McGovern’s	five	remaining	criteria	are	highly	
questionable.	Indeed,	adherence	to	these	criteria,	far	from	enhancing	rigour,	would	have	
seriously	undermined	the	present	research.	Of	these,	three	were	excluded	for	practical	and	
																																								 																				
1	In	a	personal	communication	(McGovern	2014c),	McGovern	explains	that	a	forthcoming	
journal	article,	based	on	the	research	presented	at	a	plenary	session	of	BUIRA	Conference	
2014	(McGovern	2014b),	will	use	a	slightly	different	selection	of	criteria.	Since	that	research	
was	incomplete	at	the	time	of	the	personal	communication,	McGovern's	advice	was	to	
proceed	on	the	basis	of	the	criteria	selected	for	the	original	presentation	(as	described	in	
the	following	footnote).		
2	McGovern's	(2014b)	20	criteria	are:	'Describe	the	case	study	context',	'Engage	in	pattern	
matching	(with	other	research)',	'Explain	why	the	cases	studies	were	selected',	'Draw	
analytical	generalizations	only',	'Draw	on	at	least	10	interviews	(obs)	per	case',	'Present	
evidence	from	both	sides	(of	industry)',	'Set	out	the	amount	of	evidence	for	each	case',	
'Explain	what	the	cases	are	cases	of',	'Attribute	quotes	to	individuals',	'Acknowledge	the	
limitations	of	the	study',	'Use	the	organization’s	own	name',	'Describe	the	data	recording	
procedure',	'Draw	on	multiple	cases	(4	or	more)',	'Discuss	the	researcher’s	influence	on	the	
subjects',	'Describe	the	data	coding	procedure',	'Explain	why	qualitative	research	was	
appropriate',	'Discuss	the	amount	of	access',	'Explain	why	case	studies	were	appropriate',	
'Explain	how	the	evidence	was	analyzed',	'Explain	the	selection	of	individuals	for	interview'.		
3	The	exceptions	being:	'Engage	in	pattern	matching	(with	other	research)',	'Present	
evidence	from	both	sides	(of	industry)',	'Attribute	quotes	to	individuals',	'Use	the	
organization’s	own	name',	'Draw	on	multiple	cases	(4	or	more)'.		
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ethical	reasons:	‘present	evidence	from	both	sides	(of	industry)’	was	unavoidably	breached	
in	one	case	study	due	to	hostility	from	management,	while	‘use	the	organisation’s	own	
name’	and	‘attribute	quotes	to	individuals’	were	set	aside	in	order	to	protect	participants	
from	harm	and	to	comply	with	undertakings	given	to	participants	and	employing	
organisations	(Section	4.4).	The	remaining	two	criteria	were	not	used	in	the	present	
research	for	clear	methodological	reasons.	The	first,	‘engage	in	pattern	matching	(with	
other	research)’	is	not	obviously	applicable	to	exploratory	ethnographic	research.	The	
second,	‘draw	on	multiple	cases	(4	or	more)’	warrants	further	discussion.	
	
McGovern’s	claim	that	at	least	four	case	studies	are	required	for	rigour	reflects	an	overly	
empiricist	approach	to	research.	Specifically,	McGovern	(2014b)	claims	that	studies	should	
include	more	cases	than	‘variables’,	in	an	argument	derived	from	discussions	of	the	‘small-
N’	problem;	that	is,	the	problem	of	how	to	draw	theoretical	conclusions	from	a	small	
number	of	cases.	However,	there	are	a	number	of	reasons	for	rejecting	McGovern's	
approach.	In	the	first	place,	writers	such	as	Reuschmeyer	(2003)	and	Flyvberg	(2006)	have	
argued	convincingly	that	theoretical	conclusions	can	be	reached	from	even	single	cases,	
provided	they	are	chosen	carefully.	Furthermore,	even	purely	descriptive	accounts	can	
represent	genuine	advances	in	knowledge,	because	all	science	requires	a	large	number	of	
empirical	examples	to	support	generalisation	and	theoretical	advance	(Flyvberg	2006).	Case	
studies	are	particularly	useful	for	investigating	phenomena	with	many	‘variables	of	interest’	
(Yin	2009:	18).	For	the	present	research,	not	only	was	the	number	of	variables	expected	to	
be	large,	but	it	was	not	possible	to	know	beforehand	how	many	would	be	involved.	As	
exploratory	research,	it	was	important	to	identify	variables.	Consequently,	an	application	of	
this	'criterion	of	rigour'	would	have	required	either	a	very	large	number	of	cases,	each	
studied	in	far	less	depth,	or	an	artificial	restriction	of	the	number	of	variables	examined.	
Either	option	would	have	significantly	limited	the	research,	in	both	its	empirical	findings	and	
its	theoretical	conclusions.	The	research	would	have	been	seriously	undermined	by	reducing	
the	depth	of	the	case	studies	in	favour	of	a	breadth	of	coverage;	that	is,	the	application	of	
this	'criterion	of	rigour'	would	in	practice	have	significantly	reduced	the	quality	of	this	study.		
	
Consequently,	it	was	decided	that	the	investigation	of	two	case	studies	could	be	justified	
strongly	on	theoretical	and	methodological	grounds.	The	choice	of	two	case	studies	gave	
scope	for	some	comparison,	as	evidence	from	each	could	be	used	to	interrogate	the	other.	
Although	single-case	qualitative	studies	can	produce	theoretically	significant	results,	the	
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introduction	of	a	comparative	element	is	beneficial	(Reuschmeyer	2003:	324).	At	the	same	
time,	restricting	the	number	of	cases	to	two	meant	that	each	could	be	studied	in	depth.	An	
important	influence	on	this	aspect	of	the	research	design	was	Batstone	et	al.	(1977;	1978),	
where	each	case	study	lasted	four	months.	However,	there	was	concern	that,	given	the	
weakening	of	shop	steward	organisation,	four	months	might	not	provide	sufficient	data.	
Therefore,	it	was	decided	to	investigate	each	case	study	for	six	months.	In	the	event,	such	
concern	proved	misplaced,	and	the	research	yielded	abundant	data.	The	combination	of	two	
studies	for	six	months	each	proved	extremely	productive.		
	
	
4.3	Data	collection	methods			
	
Once	a	case	study	design	had	been	selected,	the	next	choice	concerned	research	methods.	
Qualitative	methods	are	varied,	including	observation	and	participant	observation,	in-depth	
and	semi-structured	interviews,	focus	groups,	and	various	biographical	methods	(Lewis	
2003:	56-61;	Ritchie	2003:	34-8).	Method	selection	was	guided	by	the	research	questions,	
the	‘foreshadowed	problems’,	and	the	importance	of	gaining	deep	insight	into	the	lived	
experience	of	shop	stewards.	Consequently,	the	first	decision	was	that	the	research	should	
collect	‘naturally	occurring	data’	(Lewis	2003:	56),	due	to	the	likelihood	that	context	would	
be	crucial,	and	the	need	for	very	detailed	and	accurate	data	(ibid:	56-57),	which	it	might	not	
be	captured	by	elicited	accounts.	Perhaps	more	important	was	the	issue	of	interpretation	
(ibid.:	57).	Specifically,	it	was	important	to	collect	data	independently	of	the	interpretations	
of	participants,	because	social	actors’	statements	reflect	their	norms	and	values,	hopes	and	
aspirations,	as	well	as	their	experiences	(Section	2.1).	With	naturally	occurring	data,	the	
interpretation	of	the	researcher	generates	theoretically	informed	observation	alongside	the	
qualitative	meanings	and	understandings	of	the	actors	themselves	(Lewis	2003:	57).	For	
these	reasons	it	was	decided	that	direct	observation,	of	a	broadly	ethnographic	type,	would	
be	the	preferred	data-gathering	method.	For	purposes	of	triangulation,	it	was	further	
decided	that	a	mix	of	qualitative	methods	would	be	adopted.	This	section	outlines	its	
principal	components.		
	
Ethnographic	observation		
Ethnography	is	well-known	for	generating	large	quantities	of	rich,	detailed,	and	‘thick’	data	
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(Friedman	and	McDaniel	1998:	113-4;	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	1-19;	O’Reilly	2012:	
1-27).	The	ethnographic	study	of	work	and	workplaces	is	a	long-established	tradition	(for	an	
overview,	see	Friedman	and	McDaniel	1998).	Many	classic	workplace	studies	used	some	
version	of	ethnographic	observation	(Kelly	1998:	7).	Consequently,	it	was	appropriate	that	
an	effort	to	revive	the	tradition	of	workplace	studies	should	adopt	similar	methods.	The	
main	method	adopted	was	what	is	commonly	known	as	non-participant	observation4	(Kelly	
1998:	7);	that	is,	the	observer	is	present	but	does	not	participate	in	the	activities	under	
observation	(for	a	fuller	description	of	the	fieldwork,	see	Appendix	1).	This	approach	
combined	‘the	benefits	of	being	there’	(Tope	et	al.	2005)	with	flexibility	to	move	around	the	
research	site.	Freedom	for	the	researcher	to	move	around	was	essential	because,	in	both	
case	studies,	most	shop	stewards	were	relatively	restricted	in	their	movement	around	the	
workplace.	Consequently,	full	participant	observation	would	have	unnecessarily	limited	the	
number	of	shop	stewards	included	in	the	research.		
	
Key	advantages	of	ethnography	include	its	‘immersive’	nature	(O'Reilly	2012;	108-9),	though	
this	is	also	one	of	its	challenges.	While	immersion	in	the	research	setting	provides	
unparalleled	access	to	the	detail	of	social	interaction,	context,	and	dynamics,	the	experience	
can	be	overwhelming	for	the	researcher	confronted	with	a	mass	of	social	interactions,	
struggling	to	decide	what	to	record	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	141-7;	O'Reilly	2012:	
101-4),	while	at	the	same	time	working	to	establish	field	relations	(Hammersley	and	
Atkinson	2007:	63-96).	Certainly,	the	start	of	each	period	of	fieldwork	was	challenging	(see	
Appendix	1).	Fortunately,	attention	to	the	research	questions	and	‘foreshadowed	problems’	
provided	a	sound	framework	for	orientation,	and	for	selecting	events	to	record.	
Furthermore,	the	‘relatively	open-ended	approach’	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	3)	of	
ethnography	permitted	flexibility	to	explore	unexpected	findings	during	fieldwork;	that	is,	
the	ability	to	ask	different	questions	of	different	participants	(Edwards	2014b).	As	Batstone	
et	al.	(1977:	275)	note,	‘observation	in	practice	involves	a	number	of	research	techniques,	
not	least	informal	interviewing’,	and	this	view	was	born	out	during	the	present	research.		
	
It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	ethnographic	research	methods	are	compatible	with	a	
																																								 																				
4	Contemporary	ethnography	has	rightly	identified	considerable	complexity	in	the	
parameters	and	dynamics	of	'participation'	and	'observation',	and	different	authors	use	
different	terms	for	characterising	the	balance	between	the	two.	Nevertheless,	outside	of	
specialist	discussions,	'non-participant	observation'	is	as	good	a	term	as	any.	For	detailed	
and	useful	discussion	of	the	issues	involved,	see	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	(2007:	79-86),	
and	O'Reilly	(2012:	Ch.4).		
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realist	approach	to	the	production	of	knowledge	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	5-18).	
Ethnography	is	often	associated	with	radical	interpretivist	or	constructionist	approaches	to	
social	theory	(ibid.:	7).	For	example,	Friedman	and	McDaniel	(1998:	116)	argue	that	‘[i]n	
ethnographic	research,	subjects’	experiences	are	considered	…	absolutely	primary	to	
understanding	social	action’.	Put	like	that,	ethnography	appears	more	like	a	theory	of	
society	than	a	research	method.	By	contrast,	the	broadly	Marxist	and	realist	approach	
adopted	here	seeks	to	retain	an	important	notion	of	structure	alongside	subjective	
experience	and	agency.	Fortunately,	other	ethnographers	have	adopted	a	similar	approach	
to	structure	and	agency	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	188-9).	Indeed,	O’Reilly	(2012:	6)	
explicitly	stresses	the	importance	of	‘a	theoretical	perspective	that	…	understands	social	life	
as	the	outcome	of	the	interaction	of	structure	and	agency	through	the	practice	of	everyday	
life’.	Consequently,	ethnographic	observation	was	adopted	as	a	data-gathering	method,	
within	an	overall	Marxist	theoretical	framework,	realist	ontology,	and	'sociological	
imagination'	(Mills	2000).		
	
Criticisms	of	ethnography	include	lack	of	rigour,	and	the	difficulties	of	generalisation	from	
small	samples	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	32-3).	These	issues	are	dealt	with	below	in	
the	discussion	of	reliability,	validity,	and	generalisation.	Before	that,	the	discussion	
examines	other	methods	adopted	alongside	ethnography.		
	
Diaries		
Dairies	offered	the	potential	for	gathering	data	from	a	wider	layer	of	shop	stewards	than	
could	be	observed	directly	by	one	person,	and	therefore	the	use	of	some	type	of	diary-
based	method	for	data	collection	was	considered	from	an	early	stage	in	the	research.	
However,	difficulties	with	access	in	one	case	study	made	the	method	much	more	important	
than	was	originally	envisaged	(see	below),	and	therefore	the	method	deserves	a	fuller	
discussion.		
	
Diary-based	methods	have	not	often	featured	in	industrial	relations	research	but	there	are	a	
few	examples,	which	yielded	mixed	results.	Schuller	and	Robertson	(1983)	had	reasonable	
success	from	asking	shop	stewards	to	keep	a	weekly	log	of	time	spent	interacting	with	union	
members	and	managers,	and	Broad	(1983)	successfully	used	diaries	to	track	shop	steward	
issue-handling	over	a	period	of	twelve	weeks.	By	contrast,	Partridge	(1977;	1978)	asked	a	
group	of	shop	stewards	to	complete	a	diary	of	activities	one	day	per	week	for	ten	weeks,	
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which	yielded	enough	data	for	a	broad	estimate	of	stewards’	range	of	activities	(Partridge	
1977),	but	‘[u]nfortunately,	not	enough	incidents	occurred	during	the	course	of	study	to	test	
any	overall	pattern'	(Partridge	1978:	193).	Consequently,	in	order	to	develop	a	suitable	
method,	it	was	necessary	to	look	beyond	industrial	relations	research:	fortunately,	there	is	a	
considerable	literature	in	other	fields,5	which	proved	most	useful.	
	
Diaries	present	researchers	with	both	a	‘unique	window’	and	‘dilemmas,	irritations	and	
problems’	(Bolger	et	al.	2003:	610).	An	important	advantage	is	that,	by	utilising	more	or	less	
contemporaneous	recording,	diaries	offer	a	way	of	overcoming	the	‘perils	of	recollection’	
which	is	‘often	plagued	by	biases’	(ibid.:	581,	585;	see	also	Alaszewski	2006).	Research	
diaries	take	a	wide	variety	of	forms,	from	the	highly	structured	and	quantitative	event-log	
used	in	psychology	(Stone	et	al.	1991)	and	health	research	(Clayton	and	Thorne	2000),	to	
the	reflective	and	autobiographical	journals	of	feminist	research	(Bell	1998),	or	integrated	
with	photography	in	urban	geography	(Latham	2003).		
	
Diary	methods	also	present	researchers	with	a	number	of	challenges	(see	Bolger	et	al.	2003	
for	a	useful	discussion).	First,	they	are	very	demanding	of	time	and	effort	for	researchers	
and	especially	for	participants.	Consequently,	some	participants	can	be	expected	to	drop	
out.	Second,	it	is	known	that	diaries	provide	incomplete	records,	because	no	participant	fills	
in	their	diary	every	day	(Johnson	and	Bytheway	2001:	193).	Nevertheless,	for	the	purposes	
of	qualitative	research,	incomplete	records	from	a	larger	number	of	participants	are	
considered	more	useful	than	complete	sets	from	a	smaller	sample,	providing	data	that	could	
not	be	collected	in	any	other	way	(ibid.:	200,	et	passim).	In	this	study,	the	disadvantages	
were	more	than	made	up	for	by	the	wealth	of	data	collected	concerning	everyday	shop	
steward	activity.	Furthermore,	diary	accounts	were	triangulated	with	evidence	from	other	
sources,	providing	a	good	level	of	reliability.	
	
The	specific	form	of	diary	method	adopted	was	a	version	of	the	hybrid	‘diary:diary-
interview’	method	developed	by	Zimmerman	and	Wieder	(1977a;	Johnson	and	Bytheway	
2001:	184-5;	Latham	2003:	2001-2;	Spowart	and	Nairn	2014;	Toms	and	Duff	2002).	This	
method	was	developed	as	an	alternative	to	more	conventional	ethnographic	methods,	in	
order	to	produce	similarly	rich	data	in	circumstances	where	the	researcher	cannot	be	
																																								 																				
5	Thanks	are	due	to	Dr.	Saira	Lee	of	Stirling	University,	who	used	event-log	style	diaries	as	
part	of	her	PhD	research	on	workload	in	the	IT	industry,	and	who	very	helpfully	introduced	
me	to	the	non-industrial	relations	literature	on	diary	methods.		
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present;	that	is,	‘those	situations	where	the	problems	of	direct	observation	resist	solution’	
(Zimmerman	and	Wieder	1977a:	481;	Alaszewski	2006:	112-5).	In	the	case	of	Zimmerman	
and	Wieder	(1977b),	the	research	was	an	investigation	into	student	sub-culture.	The	
researchers	decided	that	they	would	not	fit	in	easily	for	the	purposes	of	standard	participant	
observation,	and	sought	an	alternative	approach.	Interestingly,	the	questions	Zimmerman	
and	Wieder	(1977a:	483)	wanted	to	answer	were	strikingly	similar	to	the	questions	of	the	
present	research:		
	
‘What	do	these	people	do	all	day?	What	varieties	of	activities	do	they	engage	in?	How	
many	people	do	they	interact	with?	What	kinds	of	relationships	obtain	between	
people?	What	is	the	typical	temporal	sequence	of	events?	And	so	on.	Interviewing	by	
itself	was	inadequate	for	the	purpose	of	establishing	a	clear	picture	of	such	activities,	
in	part	because	we	were	uncertain	of	the	right	questions	to	ask.’		
	
Described	in	this	way,	the	diary:diary-interview	method	seemed	especially	suited	to	the	
present	research.		
	
Unsurprisingly,	the	diary:diary-interview	method	combines	diaries	with	interviews.	
Participants	in	Zimmerman	and	Wieder	(ibid.:	486)	kept	diaries	for	one	week,	after	which	
lengthy	interviews	(up	to	five	hours	each)	were	conducted,	based	on	the	diary	entries	(ibid.:	
491;	for	a	critical	view,	see	Spowart	and	Nairn	2013:	329-30).	However,	the	method	needed	
some	adjustment	to	suit	present	requirements.	First,	the	experience	of	Partridge	(1978)	
suggested	that	the	period	of	diary-keeping	would	need	to	be	longer.	It	was	anticipated	that	
shop	stewards	might	be	less	active	than	in	the	1970s,	and	that	issues	might	take	longer	to	
resolve.	Therefore,	stewards	were	asked	to	keep	diaries	for	as	long	as	they	could	manage	
within	the	six	month	time-frame	(further	details	in	Appendix	2).	The	second	adjustment	
concerned	the	diary-interview.	Instead	of	conducting	a	single	long	interview	at	the	end	of	
the	period	of	diary-keeping,	it	was	decided	to	keep	in	contact	with	participants	through	a	
series	of	short	diary-interviews.	Arrangements	were	made	to	meet	with	diarists	from	time	
to	time	during	the	fieldwork,	in	order	to	review	diary	entries,	to	record	entries	digitally	
(using	the	camera	on	a	mobile	phone),	and	to	talk	over	the	entries	with	the	diarist.	
Generally,	diary-interviews	lasted	between	15	and	30	minutes.	Again,	this	combination	
proved	highly	productive	(Appendix	2).		
	
The	use	of	diaries	alongside	observation	raises	the	question	of	whether	diary	evidence	
should	be	seen	as	naturally	occurring	or	generated	data	(Ritchie	2003:	34-7).	Alaszewski	
  92	
(2006)	concludes	that	diary	methods	produce	data	that	shares	some	characteristics	with	
naturally	occurring	data,	but	also	has	aspects	in	common	with	generated	data,	because	
‘[d]iary	keeping	is	a	sophisticated	activity	involving	a	set	of	social	conventions	and	requiring	
access	to	specific	resources'	(ibid.:116).	One	of	the	‘specific	resources’	required	for	keeping	
diaries	is	literacy,	which	can	be	a	serious	issue	in	some	circumstances	(e.g.	Meth	2003:	202-
3).	However,	for	the	present	research,	it	was	considered	that	lack	of	literacy	was	unlikely	to	
be	a	major	issue,	because	contemporary	shop	steward	activity	in	the	UK	is	significantly	
concerned	with	written	policies	and	procedures,	and	therefore	any	sample	of	shop	stewards	
is	likely	to	have	a	high	literacy	rate.	Consequently,	it	was	concluded	that	potential	benefits	
significantly	outweighed	potential	difficulties,	and	therefore	diary-based	data	collection	was	
included.		
	
This	innovative	use	of	diaries	and	diary-interviews	produced	very	rich	and	detailed	data,	as	
will	become	clear	in	the	following	chapters.	Together	with	ethnographic	observation,	
diary:diary-interview	also	contributed	to	the	third	research	method	adopted;	namely,	in-
depth	interviews.		
	
In-depth	interviews		
In	qualitative	research	in	employment	and	workplace	studies,	interviews	are	‘the	primary	
means	of	accessing	the	experiences	and	subjective	views	of	actors’	(Whipp	1998:	54).	
Indeed,	the	use	of	interviews	has	increased	in	recent	years;	partly	due	to	difficulties	gaining	
access	to	workplaces	for	observation,	but	also	due	to	a	perceived	unwillingness	on	the	part	
of	university	ethics	committees	to	approve	such	research	(Tope	et	al.	2005:	473).	While	the	
use	of	interviews	can	also	be	justified	on	the	grounds	of	efficiency	and	practicality	(ibid.:	
472),	other	considerations	were	influential	here.		
	
Interview	methods	vary	greatly,	and	researchers	face	choices	about	what	form	to	use.	The	
most	commonly	recognised	issue	is	the	degree	to	which	the	interviews	are	structured	
(O’Reilly	2012:	119-22).	For	instance,	the	highly	structured	format	used	in	WERS	is	described	
as	an	interview	by	its	exponents	(Kersley	et	al.	2006:	7-8).	At	the	other	extreme,	
ethnographic	interviews	may	be	entirely	un-structured	(Legard	et	al.	2003).	Somewhere	in	
between,	the	Webbs	described	their	preferred	approach	as	‘a	conversation	with	a	purpose’	
(cited	in	ibid.:	138).	In	the	face	of	these	choices,	the	usual	compromise	solution	is	the	‘semi-
structured’	interview.	Unfortunately,	‘terms	are	not	necessarily	used	consistently’	(Arthur	
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and	Nazroo	2003:	111),	so	what	is	meant	by	‘semi-structured’	varies	significantly.	In	reality,	
the	notion	of	a	completely	unstructured	interview	makes	little	sense	(Legard	et	al.	2003:	
141).	Helpfully,	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	(2007:	101)	prefer	to	see	the	interview	not	in	
terms	of	structure,	but	the	degree	to	which	it	is	‘directive’.	This	approach	makes	explicit	the	
parameters	of	interviews	in	a	way	seldom	found	in	accounts	utilising	the	catch-all	‘semi-
structured’:	in	reality,	almost	all	interviews	are	semi-structured.		
	
In	keeping	with	ethnographic	tradition,	interviews	conducted	for	this	research	will	be	
termed	in-depth.	These	interviews	comprised	a	mixture	of	directive	and	non-directive	
elements:	an	open	and	discursive	approach	for	most	areas	of	interest	was	combined	with	a	
small	number	of	clearly	defined	directive	questions	(Legard	et	al.	2003:	153-4).	Interviews	
schedules	(Appendix	6)	were	designed	mainly	around	themes	that	emerged	from	the	
fieldwork,	and	questions	used	by	Batstone	et	al	(1977),	and	by	WERS	(2004,	2011).	Some	
actual	WERS	questions	were	included	in	interviews	with	senior	HR	managers	(Appendix	6;	
Chapter	6).	In-depth	interviews	were	carried	out	towards	the	end	of	each	period	of	
fieldwork,	with	shop	stewards	who	had	kept	diaries,	senior	union	representatives	(who	had	
not	kept	diaries),	and	a	small	number	of	managers.	Placing	interviews	at	the	end	of	each	
case	study	permitted	participants	to	reflect	upon	themes	that	had	emerged	during	the	
research.		
	
Documentary	sources		
Documentary	sources	did	not	form	a	large	part	of	the	research	but	were	used	to	provide	
background	information	concerning	the	case	studies	and	organisational	context.	Primary	
documentary	sources	included	records	of	the	union	organisations	in	each	case	study,	from	
which	it	was	possible	to	gain	an	understanding	of	the	historical	development	of	the	shop	
steward	organisation,	and	broad	changes	in	the	types	of	issues	that	were	dealt	with.	While	
union	records	were	very	numerous	and	substantial	in	one	case	study	(London	Borough),	
they	were	far	more	limited	in	the	other	(Big	Car).	Other	primary	documentary	evidence	
came	from	employers.	Unfortunately,	these	sources	provided	far	less	information	than	
initially	hoped.	Management	at	London	Borough	proved	quite	hostile	to	the	research	(see	
below),	and	did	not	provide	any	documentary	sources	directly.	At	Big	Car,	although	
management's	stance	was	far	more	helpful	and	constructive,	requests	yielded	very	little.	
Consequently,	primary	documentary	evidence	from	employers	was	mainly	provided	by	
senior	union	representatives;	including	information	on	workforce	numbers	and	
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composition,	(approximate)	rates	of	pay,	internal	policies,	and	procedures	for	handling	
grievance	and	disciplinary	matters.		
	
Secondary	documentary	sources	included	a	number	of	published	works	concerning	the	
broader	context	of	each	industry,	and	the	basic	features	of	collective	bargaining	(see	
below).	Fortunately,	there	is	an	extensive	literature	on	both	the	auto	industry	and	local	
government.	Consequently,	although	some	detailed	information	is	missing	from	each	case	
study,	it	was	nevertheless	possible	to	assemble	sufficient	background	to	contextualise	
research	findings.		
	
	
4.4	Further	issues	in	case	study	research		
	
This	section	outlines	a	number	of	further	considerations	in	carrying	out	the	case	studies	
described	above.	First,	case	study	selection	and	sampling	are	discussed,	followed	by	
problems	of	access.	Next,	discussion	turns	to	ethical	issues	raised	by	research	that	might	
reveal	recalcitrant	behaviour,	and	how	these	were	handled.	Then,	data-analysis	methods	
are	described.	Finally,	there	is	a	discussion	of	reliability,	validity,	and	generalisation.		
	
Case	study	selection	and	sampling		
There	are	significant	advantages	for	research	if	case	studies	can	be	selected	on	clear	
theoretical	grounds	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	28-35).	Here,	the	crucial	additional	
consideration	was	to	select	sites	with	enough	shop	stewards	to	make	data-collection	
practicable	within	the	immovable	constraints	of	doctoral	research:	a	fixed	timetable,	a	lone	
researcher,	and	a	very	small	budget.	Consequently,	it	was	decided	to	seek	case	study	sites	
with	functioning	shop	stewards'	committees,	so	that	one	researcher	could	observe	a	
number	of	stewards	gathered	together,	on	a	reasonably	regular	basis.	Although	the	relative	
decline	of	shop	steward	organisation	meant	that	such	cases	would	in	some	respects	be	
unrepresentative,	the	priority	of	the	study	had	to	be	to	gather	sufficient	data.	Furthermore,	
it	was	recognised	that	case-study	research	can	never	proceed	on	the	basis	of	
representativeness,	and	that	any	generalisation	would	necessarily	be	on	theoretical	grounds	
(see	below).	Consequently,	the	selection	of	atypical	case	studies	was	justified	on	purposive	
and	theoretical	grounds	(Ritchie	et	al.	2003:	78-82).		
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It	was	decided	to	select	one	case	study	from	the	private	sector	and	one	from	the	public,	also	
for	purposive	and	theoretical	reasons.	Public	and	private	sectors	offer	contrasting	
conditions	for	union	organisation,	and,	as	Reuschmeyer	(2003:	232)	argues,	'Considerable	
increases	in	the	plausibility	of	theoretical	claims	can	be	gained	if	the	second	case	is	in	light	
of	theory	and	for	specified	reasons	least	likely	to	confirm	it'.	That	is,	theoretical	claims	are	
strengthened	if	similar	results	are	found	in	dissimilar	cases.	However,	as	is	often	the	case	
with	ethnographic	research,	the	selection	of	case	studies	was	also	influenced	by	access	
(ibid.;	O'Reilly	2012:	86-91;	see	below).		
	
Once	case	studies	were	selected,	and	fieldwork	commenced,	further	sampling	issues	arose.	
The	immersive	nature	of	ethnographic	fieldwork	presents	considerable	challenges	over	
what	should	be	recorded,	and	when.	It	is	not	possible	to	record	everything,	and	choices	
must	be	made	from	the	very	start.	Sampling	within	each	case	study	was	therefore,	once	
more,	guided	by	purposive	and	theoretical	considerations	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	
35-40).	The	intention	in	both	case	studies	was	twofold:	to	capture	the	activities	of	a	range	of	
shop	stewards,	and	to	gather	enough	data	to	provide	a	basis	for	later	analysis.	In	both	case	
studies,	efforts	were	made	to	select	a	broad	qualitative	spread	of	stewards	as	diarists,	in	
order	to	gather	data	from	across	the	range	of	steward	activities.	Similar	considerations	
guided	the	selection	of	stewards	for	in-depth	interviews.	Mainly,	participant	for	these	
interviews	were	selected	from	among	the	diarists,	although	in	a	small	number	(2-3)	of	
instances	at	London	Borough,	difficulties	in	contacting	stewards	(see	Appendix	1)	narrowed	
slightly	the	range	of	participants	at	this	stage.	Differences	in	access	meant	that	similar	
problems	did	not	arise	at	Big	Car	(see	below	and	Appendix	1).		
	
Initially,	it	had	been	expected	that	one	stewards'	committee	at	London	Borough	would	
provide	a	sufficiently	large	sample	of	stewards,	but	this	proved	not	to	be	the	case.	
Consequently,	while	this	committee,	having	the	largest	membership	and	meeting	more	
regularly,	provided	the	greatest	proportion	of	research	data,	additional	material	came	from	
a	mix	of	the	other	stewards'	committees	in	the	case	study	(Section	5.1).	In	the	case	study	at	
Big	Car,	stewards	from	one	area	similarly	predominated	in	the	sample,	simply	because	they	
were	the	most	readily	accessible	(Section	6.1).	Differences	in	access	at	each	case	study	site,	
and	differences	in	shop	steward	organisation,	meant	that	the	process	of	recruiting	diarists	
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was	different	in	each	case,	as	were	patterns	of	participation	and	withdrawal6	(see	Appendix	
2).	Nevertheless,	in	both	cases,	the	lengthy	period	of	fieldwork	permitted	insight	into	the	
activities	of	less	accessible	stewards,	as	well	as	observation	of	stewards	who	were	not	
diarists,	or	who	had	dropped	out	of	diary-keeping.	While	less	detail	was	collected	on	the	
activities	of	some	stewards	than	others,	it	was	nevertheless	concluded	that	the	qualitative	
range	of	their	activities	was	not	significantly	different	from	the	stewards	who	participated	
more	fully.	Consequently,	by	the	end	of	the	fieldwork	it	was	confidently	felt	that	the	
research	had	succeeded	in	capturing	the	broad	spread	of	shop	steward	activities	in	each	
case	study.	The	experience	did	underline,	though,	that	for	ethnographic	research,	sampling	
considerations	are	often	balanced	against	access	difficulties	–	which	are	discussed	next.		
	
Access		
From	the	start	of	this	research,	it	was	recognised	that	access	might	be	a	significant	problem.	
Ethnographic	observation	would	require	entry	to	workplaces	for	significant	lengths	of	time.	
A	list	was	drawn	up	of	trade	union	contacts,	and	advice	sought	from	other	researchers	and	
union	officers.	A	number	of	shop	steward	organisations	were	approached,	with	mixed	
results.	Finally,	senior	union	representatives	at	two	employing	organisations	suggested	that	
shop	stewards	at	their	workplaces	might	be	interested	in	taking	part	in	the	study.	From	
these	contacts,	further	discussions	ensued,	and,	once	the	steward	organisations	had	
indicated	a	willingness	to	participate,	approaches	were	made	to	employers.		
	
Contact	with	senior	management	at	London	Borough	was	initiated	through	informal	
approaches	by	union	branch	officers,	and	first	responses	were	encouraging.	Negotiations	for	
access	were	conducted	over	several	months,	but,	only	two	weeks	prior	to	starting	the	
fieldwork,	senior	management	suddenly	refused	access	to	any	council	premises	except	the	
union	office.	As	a	result,	access	to	shop	stewards	in	the	workplace	became	impossible,	and	
observation	at	London	Borough	was	restricted	to	shop	stewards’	meetings	(though	these	
were	quite	numerous	and	lengthy),	and	time	spent	in	the	office	with	senior	stewards	on	
facility	time.	Consequently,	the	diary-based	element	of	the	research	became	significantly	
more	important.		
	
By	contrast,	management	at	Big	Car	agreed	access	for	the	research	with	few	restrictions.	
																																								 																				
6	This	unevenness	of	participation	also	carried	implications	for	the	presentation	of	findings,	
which	is	discussed	further	below.		
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Access	was	granted	more	or	less	throughout	the	site,	with	the	proviso	that,	for	health	and	
safety	reasons,	the	researcher	had	to	be	accompanied	at	all	times	by	an	employee	of	the	
company.	In	practice,	this	meant	some	limits	on	movement	around	the	plant,	though	this	
caused	less	inconvenience	than	might	have	been	expected.	Most	of	the	time,	most	of	the	
stewards	at	Big	Car	had	their	movements	restricted	by	their	work	duties	on	the	production	
line.	Consequently,	even	totally	free	movement	at	Big	Car	would,	in	practice,	have	produced	
little	evidence	that	was	not	available	through	other	means.	Again,	restricted	access	at	Big	
Car,	though	of	a	different	order	to	London	Borough,	meant	that	diary-based	research	
became	more	important	than	originally	anticipated.	As	will	be	seen	below,	the	diary:diary-
interview	combination	proved	most	useful	in	both	case	studies.		
	
Ethical	considerations		
The	chief	ethical	concern	in	conducting	the	present	research	was	the	risk	of	harm	to	
participants	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	213-17;	O'Reilly	2012:	62-85).	It	was	
recognised	that	documenting	shop	steward	practices	might	reveal	activity	that	was	in	
breach	of	employer	policies,	union	policies,	or	even	the	law.	Any	individuals	identified	by	
the	research	might	therefore	be	at	risk	of	disciplinary	sanctions	by	the	employer.	Moreover,	
breaches	of	employer	policy	might	be	found	not	only	among	shop	stewards:	managers	
might	also	engage	in	covert	practices.	For	these	reasons,	it	was	decided	that	individuals	who	
participated	in	the	research	would	be	given	a	guarantee	of	anonymity.	Consequently,	none	
of	the	participants	are	named	in	the	account	below.	In	order	to	address	potential	employer	
sensitivities,	the	same	guarantee	was	given	to	the	employing	organisations.	Furthermore,	
considerations	of	anonymity	necessarily	limited	the	background	information	given	about	
each	organisation,	so	that	readers	would	not	be	able	to	identify	employers	or	participants.	
As	a	result,	less	information	is	provided	concerning	the	two	case	studies	than	some	readers	
may	have	preferred.	Nevertheless,	it	will	hopefully	become	clear	that	the	findings	presented	
below	are	sufficiently	contextualised.		
	
A	second	guarantee,	of	confidentiality,	was	also	given.	Participants	were	assured	that	
nothing	they	disclosed	to	the	researcher	would	be	repeated	to	other	participants.	In	part,	
this	guarantee	was	given	to	further	reinforce	anonymity.	But	it	was	also	anticipated	that	
intra-organisational	bargaining	might	be	an	issue	among	the	two	groups	of	shop	stewards	
(which	proved	to	be	the	case).	Since	differences	of	opinion	concerning	union	policy	and	
practice	can	be	sources	of	considerable	conflict,	it	was	important	that	participating	shop	
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stewards	felt	comfortable	in	disclosing	their	personal	opinions	and	beliefs,	without	fear	that	
this	might	cause	tension	with	other	members	of	the	union.	In	both	cases,	it	was	clear	during	
the	fieldwork	that	a	number	of	participants	would	have	been	much	less	forthcoming	had	
they	not	received	this	undertaking,	and	the	research	clearly	benefited	from	this	guarantee	
being	given.		
	
The	issue	of	maintaining	anonymity	and	confidentiality	affected	not	only	the	conduct	of	the	
research,	but	also	the	presentation	of	the	findings.	Not	only	are	participants	not	named,	and	
quotes	not	attributed,	but	considerable	efforts	were	made	to	conceal	the	sources	of	quotes	
and,	in	some	cases,	to	deliberately	disguise	the	identity	of	the	speaker.	For	this	reason,	
pseudonyms	or	other	identifiers	have	not	been	used,	because	participants	might	recognise	
one	another	from	known	incidents	reported	in	the	findings,	and	on	that	basis	might	then	
discover	other	information	concerning	that	individual,	with	potential	repercussions	in	terms	
of	conflict	or	exposure	to	harm.	Consequently,	two	of	McGovern's	(2014a)	'criteria	of	rigour'	
–	that	participating	organisations	and	individuals	should	be	named	(Section	4.2)	–	were	set	
aside.	Complying	with	these	strictures	would	have	had	a	devastating	impact	on	the	research	
by	narrowing	dramatically	the	findings	that	could	be	presented;	a	case	of	'the	annoying	
disregard	of	methodological	discussions	for	the	real	world'	(Reuschmeyer	2003:	322).	The	
results	presented	in	following	chapters	demonstrate	that	guarantees	of	anonymity	and	
confidentiality	contributed	significantly	to	the	quality	of	evidence,	and	therefore	also	to	the	
theoretical	generalisation	that	was	possible.		
	
Data	analysis		
The	research	at	London	Borough	produced	some	150	hours	of	observation	and	diary-
interviews,	22	shop	steward	diaries,	18	in-depth	interviews	(14	shop	stewards,	3	shop	
stewards/convenors	(see	Section	5.1),	Branch	Secretary),	and	a	significant	amount	of	
documentary	evidence.	Research	at	Big	Car	produced	around	450	hours	of	observation,	18	
shop	steward	diaries,	25	in-depth	interviews	(15	stewards,	four	senior	stewards,	two	
convenors	(see	Section	6.1),	and	four	managers),	and	a	lesser	amount	of	documentary	
evidence.	Altogether,	this	amounted	to	a	very	considerable	quantity	of	data	to	analyse	(for	
further	details,	see	Appendices	1,	3,	4,	and	7).		
	
Data	were	analysed	thematically,	with	the	aid	of	NVivo	9	software.	The	reasons	for	this	
choice	of	software	were	twofold.	First,	the	internal	architecture	of	NVivo	means	that	the	
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project	is	held	in	a	single	file,	making	it	easy	to	transport	and	store	securely.	Second,	and	
more	significantly,	this	was	the	only	qualitative	data	analysis	software	available	at	my	
university,	and	cost	prohibited	the	exploration	of	alternatives.	It	is	important	to	appreciate,	
though,	that	computer	software	cannot	substitute	for	researchers'	analytical	skills.	Here,	
software	was	treated	as	an	'electronic	filing	cabinet'	(Spencer	2012)	for	data-management,	
coding,	cross-referencing	of	themes,	etc.,	but	not	as	a	substitute	for	analysis	by	the	
researcher	(Spencer	et	al.	2003:	208).	Fortunately,	good	quality	practical	advice,	guidance	
and	training	for	NVivo	is	readily	available,7	and	specialist	training	was	undertaken	to	develop	
the	necessary	skills	in	thematic	analysis.		
	
Fieldnotes	formed	the	great	bulk	of	the	data	analysed.	These	covered	observation	in	various	
contexts	and	notes	from	diary-interviews	(Appendix	2).	Fieldnotes	were	straightforward	to	
work	with	in	the	software	package.	In-depth	interviews	were	not	transcribed	because	the	
software	permitted	coding	of	digital	audio	recordings.	In	addition	to	saving	time,	this	
method	retained	the	rich	variety	of	participant	voices,	including	tone	and	emphasis,	which	
would	have	been	lost	had	the	interviews	been	transcribed.	Digital	photographs	of	diaries	
entries	were	utilised	far	less	than	other	types	of	data,	because	the	main	role	of	these	had	
been	in	informing	diary-interviews,	and	consequently	evidence	from	diaries	was	recorded	
elsewhere.		
	
The	large	quantity	of	rich	and	detailed	data	produced	by	the	fieldwork	was	undoubtedly	one	
of	the	main	achievements	of	this	research,	and	represents	a	real	contribution	to	knowledge.	
However,	the	sheer	volume	of	data	created	significant	difficulties	for	analysis.	To	avoid	bias,	
an	effort	was	made	to	code	as	much	of	each	day's	fieldnotes	as	possible,	minimising	if	not	
eliminating	uncoded	content	because,	as	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	(2007:	155)	warn,	'data	
...	need	to	be	coded	densely'.	Unfortunately,	NVivo	is	poorly	suited	to	analysing	data	of	this	
type	and	quantity.	The	user-interface	is	rather	cumbersome,	and	does	not	facilitate	quick	
and	easy	navigation	once	analysis	extends	beyond	the	first	few	themes.	As	increasing	
amounts	of	data	were	coded,	individual	themes	became	very	large	and	difficult	to	work	
with.	Consequently,	once	key	themes	were	established,	a	word-search	approach	was	
adopted	to	speed	up	analysis.	Inevitably,	this	meant	that	some	parts	of	the	data	were	
analysed	less	intensively	than	others.	Although	it	would	be	preferable	to	analyse	all	data	in	
																																								 																				
7	This	research	made	particular	use	of	McDonnell	(n.d.),	and	resources	available	via	the	
Surrey	University	Caqdas	Networking	Project:	
http://www.surrey.ac.uk/sociology/research/researchcentres/caqdas/		
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exactly	the	same	way,	logistics	made	this	impossible,	given	the	resources	available.	To	
minimise	potential	distortions,	diary-interview	data	were	given	precedence	for	coding.	
Diary-interviews	ran	throughout	each	case	study	and	provided	a	framework	of	data	from	
ordinary	shop	stewards.	Themes	derived	from	the	diary-interviews	were	then	used	to	
analyse	more	quickly	data	in	which	the	voices	of	senior	reps	were	more	prominent,	such	as	
observation	in	union	offices.	In	this	way,	activities	of	senior	reps	are	seen	from	the	point	of	
view	of	ordinary	shop	stewards,	rather	than	the	other	way	around	(for	detail	of	themes,	see	
Appendix	7).		
	
Themes	were	established	using	most	of	the	common	techniques	(for	discussion	and	
overview,	see	Ryan	and	Bernard	2003).	Several	important	themes	came	from	previous	
theory	as	'foreshadowed	problems'	(Section	4.1).	Others	emerged	from	the	data,	through	
the	use	of	'scrutiny	techniques'	(ibid.:	88).	These	included	scrutinising	data	for	'repetitions',	
'indigenous	typologies	or	categories',	'similarities	and	differences',	'linguistic	connectors',	
and	'missing	data'	(ibid.:	89-93).	Much	less	use	was	made	of	'processing	techniques'	(ibid.:	
94),	although	'cutting	and	sorting'	did	lead	to	both	the	linking	together	of	some	themes	and	
greater	differentiation	within	others	(ibid.:	94-96).		
	
It	is	important	to	understand,	though,	that	it	is	in	the	nature	of	ethnographic	research	for	
themes	to	emerge	in	the	field,	during	data	collection.	The	process	of	writing	fieldnotes	is	
inherently	selective	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	142)	and	involves	the	researcher	in	a	
more	or	less	continuous	series	of	choices	about	what	is	to	be	recorded.	Consequently,	
questions	of	analysis	are	posed	from	the	earliest	stages;	what	O'Reilly	(2012:	29)	calls	an	
'iterative-inductive'	process	(see	also	Ryan	and	Bernard	2003:	100).	As	Hammersley	and	
Atkinson	(2007:	158)	write:		
	
'In	ethnography	the	analysis	of	data	is	not	a	distinct	stage	of	the	research.	In	many	
ways,	it	begins	in	the	pre-fieldwork	phase,	in	the	formulation	and	clarification	of	
research	problems,	and	continues	through	the	process	of	writing	reports,	articles,	and	
books.	Formally,	it	starts	to	take	shape	in	the	analytic	notes	and	memoranda;	
informally,	it	is	embodied	in	the	ethnographer's	ideas	and	hunches.'		
	
Consequently,	a	number	of	important	themes	were	identified	before	the	fieldwork	was	
finished,	and	before	any	computer	was	switched	on.	Broad	analytical	dispositions	were	
integral	to	the	data	collection	process	itself;	for	instance,	curiosity	about	the	relations	and	
attitudes	of	stewards	towards	management,	a	sensitivity	to	elements	of	contestation,	a	
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basic	distinction	between	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	resources.		
	
The	post-fieldwork	stage	of	analysis	deepened	and	developed	these	themes.	It	became	
clear,	for	instance,	that	a	theme	'attitudes	towards	managers'	was	too	general,	and	as	the	
analysis	progressed	this	theme	was	further	subdivided	as	nuances	of	attitude	emerged	from	
the	data.	This	theme-family	expanded	and	differentiated,	with	sub-themes	including:	
management	accused	of	lying;	management,	arguments	used;	management	challenged;	
management	don't	know	job;	management,	motive	attribution;	management	renege;	
management	seen	as	helpful;	management	shifted;	management,	stewards	helping.	Thus,	
while	major	themes	were	significantly	shaped	by	the	research	questions	and	'foreshadowed	
problems',	further	development	emerged	from	the	data	through	use	of	the	'scrutiny	
techniques'	outlined	above.	In	this	way,	themes	coalesced	around	a	mix	of	'foreshadowed	
problems'	and	'demi-regs'	in	the	data.	Themes	were	not	formally	listed	due	to	the	
difficulties	of	assigning	particular	parts	of	the	data	to	a	single	area	of	concern.	Instead,	
nodes	were	grouped	together	flexibly,	in	different	ways	for	different	aspects	of	analysis,	
discussion,	and	conclusions.	In	practice,	the	main	themes	utilised	were	those	that	shape	the	
structures	of	Chapters	5-8	(further	detail	on	nodes	and	themes	is	provided	in	Appendix	7).		
	
The	final	challenge	for	data	analysis	concerned	the	presentation	of	findings.	There	has	
recently	been	considerable	discussion	within	ethnography	about	problems	of	rhetoric	and	
representation	in	written	accounts	(for	an	overview,	see	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	
203-206).	One	response	to	such	concerns	has	been	to	increase	transparency	by,	for	
instance,	naming	participants	(McGovern	2014b);	an	option	which,	as	discussed	above,	was	
not	suitable	for	this	study.	An	alternative	approach	has	been	to	provide	a	count	of	the	
number	of	participants	quoted.	However,	for	this	research,	such	an	approach	would	have	
been	significantly	misleading,	because	the	nature	of	the	fieldwork	meant	that	quantity	of	
data	gathered	from	individual	participants	was	extremely	varied;	moreover,	this	variation	
did	not	straightforwardly	reflect	the	analytical	importance	of	the	evidence	provided.	Thus,	
some	participants	gave	only	very	small	amounts	of	data,	but	this	was	sometimes	(on	two	or	
three	occasions)	very	important	for	overall	understanding.	The	unevenness	of	participation	
by	stewards	–	stewards	participated	in	the	study	as	casual	encounters	in	the	workplace,	
participants	in	meetings,	diary-keepers,	and	in-depth	interviewees	–	meant	that	a	simple	
count	would	misrepresent	the	status	of	participants.	Therefore,	the	account	below	should	
be	taken	as	based	analytically	on	the	fieldnotes,	with	all	the	rich	unevenness	that	they	
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contain,	including	diary-interviews;	together	with	in-depth	interviews,	and	some	use	of	
documentary	sources	(Section	4.3).	Quotations	used	in	the	account	below	are	illustrative	
(White	et	al.	2003:	312),	and	due	care	has	been	taken	to	ensure	that	quotes	reflect	the	
diversity	(ibid.:	313)	of	stewards'	experiences	and	activities.		
	
Reliability,	validity,	and	generalisation		
The	reliability	of	research	data	is	a	key	concern	in	qualitative	research	of	all	types	(Lewis	and	
Ritchie	2003:	270-273).	The	lengthy	and	immersive	nature	of	ethnography	is	known	for	
producing	rich	and	detailed	data,	and	that	was	certainly	the	experience	here	(Appendices	1	
and	3).	In	both	case	studies,	a	point	was	reached	about	four	months	in	when	the	fieldwork	
was	producing	little	new	data;	only	more	examples	of	what	had	been	seen	before.	That	is,	
the	areas	under	investigation	had	become	'saturated'	(Spencer	et	al.	2003:	201).	Further	
data	collection	seemed	unlikely	to	reveal	new	insights,	but	it	was	decided	to	continue	for	
the	planned	six	months,	in	accordance	with	the	research	design.	This	strategy	proved	
valuable.	First,	it	confirmed	that	saturation	was	close	to	being	achieved	in	most	areas,	giving	
confidence	in	the	reliability	of	the	findings;	that	is,	confidence	that	another	researcher,	
pursuing	the	same	methods	in	the	same	setting,	would	have	found	broadly	the	same	data	
(Lewis	and	Ritchie	2003:	270).		
	
Secondly,	extended	immersion	in	the	fieldwork	setting	continued	to	deepen	understanding	
of	issues	that	were	already	familiar.	In	one	striking	example,	a	few	days	before	the	end	of	
the	fieldwork	at	Big	Car,	a	brief	comment	from	one	shop	steward	transformed	previous	
understanding	of	an	important	aspect	of	lean	production	and	team-working,	leading	to	
significant	re-evaluation	of	previous	evidence.	Later,	during	data	analysis,	it	was	discovered	
that	another	steward	had	given	the	same	information	within	a	few	days	of	the	research	
commencing,	some	six	months	previously.	On	that	occasion	the	fieldnotes	record	no	sense	
of	revelation,	and	the	point	was	passed	over	quickly	and	forgotten.	The	difference	in	the	
impact	of	the	two	conversations	reflected	the	huge	development	of	understanding	in	the	
intervening	months.	Clearly,	this	example	underlines	the	benefit	of	lengthy	ethnographic	
immersion	for	researching	workplace	relations	(cf.	Tope	et	al.	2005).	Again,	the	very	
considerable	informational	yield	(ibid.)	of	the	present	research	suggests	that	a	good	level	of	
reliability	was	achieved.		
	
The	issue	of	validity	has	a	somewhat	different	place	in	qualitative	research	as	compared	
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with	quantitative,	and	this	is	especially	the	case	with	ethnography	(Hammersley	and	
Atkinson	2007:	183;	O'Reilly	2012:	226-228).	While	quantitative	research	is	often	concerned	
to	establish	the	validity	of	individual	constructs,	for	qualitative	research,	especially	for	
ethnography,	validity	hinges	on	the	overall	account.	Here,	validity	is	deployed	in	this	broad	
sense;	whether	the	evidence,	taken	together,	'can	bear	the	weight	of	the	interpretation	that	
is	put	on	it'	(Sapsford	and	Jupp	1996:	1,	cited	in	Bell	2010:	120).	A	number	of	the	principal	
concepts	deployed	in	this	research	have	a	long	history	in	the	field,	and	can	generally	be	
considered	trustworthy;	for	instance,	conflict,	cooperation,	effort	bargain,	frontier	of	
control.	The	meaning	of	these	concepts	was	further	clarified	by	the	discussion	in	Chapter	3.	
In	addition,	the	lengthy	period	of	fieldwork	enabled	what	might	be	called	rolling	
triangulation,	in	that	issues	and	events	could	be	tracked	back	and	forth	between	various	
participants	(cf.	'data-source	triangulation',	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	183).	
Consequently,	reliance	on	single	informants	was	largely	eliminated.	Stewards’	accounts	
were	tested	and	re-tested	against	the	accounts	of	other	stewards,	thereby	adding	to	
confidence	that	the	final	account	was	non-misleading,	and	that	interpretations	were	valid.		
	
As	noted	above,	the	issue	of	generalisation	has	long	exercised	qualitative	and	case-study	
researchers.	One	response	has	been	to	forego	generalisation,	in	favour	of	sophisticated	
description	(Flyvberg	2006).	However,	the	problematic	nature	of	previous	theory	around	
shop	stewards	meant	that	a	non-theoretical	account	would	be	unsatisfactory.	Therefore,	
the	present	study	adopted	a	different	approach,	and	sought	to	generalise	by	placing	the	
research	carefully	in	relation	to	theory	(Yin	2009:	38).	Specifically,	the	research	questions	
(Section	1.1)	were	designed	to	facilitate	critical	evaluation	of	the	conceptual	underpinnings	
of	the	current	standard	view,	rather	than	simple	empirical	refutation.	The	combination	of	
conceptual	critique	and	detailed	evidence	permitted	the	development	of	an	alternative	
framework	for	understanding	shop	steward	activity	(Chapter	7).	Of	course,	confirmation	or	
refutation	of	that	framework	requires	further	research.	Nevertheless,	it	is	the	claim	of	the	
present	research	that	the	methods	adopted	here	have	contributed	significantly	towards	a	
valid	re-theorisation	of	this	important	area	of	workplace	relations.	Naturally,	readers	must	
make	up	their	own	minds	as	to	whether	this	claim	is	justified.		
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4.5	Background		
	
To	contextualise	the	research,	this	section	provides	factual	background	on	the	two	case	
studies,	covering	employment	figures,	union	membership	and	density,	collective	bargaining	
arrangements,	and	union	development.		
	
Case	study	1:	London	Borough		
The	first	case	study	consisted	of	Unison	shop	stewards	in	a	London	local	authority,	which	
will	be	referred	to	as	London	Borough.	At	the	time	of	the	research,	the	Unison	branch	had	
just	over	3,000	members,	and	London	Borough	directly	employed	around	4,200	Full	Time	
Equivalent	(FTE)	staff,	plus	an	unknown	but	significant	number	of	agency	staff	(union	branch	
officers	faced	persistent	difficulties	in	obtaining	figures	for	agency	staff	from	management).	
However,	determining	membership	density	proved	problematic	for	a	number	of	reasons.		
	
The	uncooperative	stance	of	senior	management	restricted	access	to	figures	on	overall	
employment.	While	union	branch	officers	made	efforts	to	keep	up	to	date	figures	for	
membership	and	density,	their	task	was	made	considerably	more	complex	by	the	combined	
impacts	of	new	public	management	and	government	austerity	policies,	which	had	led	to	
successive	waves	of	reorganisation,	privatisation,	contracting-out,	local	management	of	
schools	(LMS),	and	a	growing	programme	of	redundancies.	As	a	result,	the	directly	
employed	workforce	was	undergoing	a	significant	size-reduction,	while	the	union	
membership	overall	was	being	fragmented	among	a	large	number	of	employers.	At	the	time	
of	the	fieldwork,	this	'local	government'	Unison	branch	represented	members	at	more	than	
80	employers.	Even	so,	some	76%	of	branch	members	were	employed	directly	by	the	
council;	that	is,	some	2280	individuals.	During	the	fieldwork,	the	branch	received	figures	
from	Unison	head	office	which	put	membership	density	at	49%,	though	this	figure	was	
disputed	by	senior	union	reps	on	the	basis	that	those	figures	assumed	wider	eligibility	for	
membership	than	was	in	fact	the	case	(due	to	dispersed	employment).	A	further	
complication	lay	in	the	figures	provided	to	the	branch	by	borough	management,	which	
expressed	employment	in	terms	of	'full-time	equivalent'	staff.	Consequently,	the	total	
number	of	employees	was	somewhat	higher	than	4,200,	due	to	the	number	of	part-time	
employees.	As	a	result	of	these	difficulties,	the	best	estimate	of	Unison	membership	density	
among	London	Borough	employees	was	around	50-60%.	This	figure	is	somewhat	lower	than	
the	65%	national	average	for	local	government	(Gill-McClure	2014:	381),	though	this	figure	
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also	includes	members	of	other	unions.	A	few	hundred	of	the	workforce	were	members	of	
the	GMB,8	and	there	were	a	handful	of	UCATT	members	in	the	direct	works	section;	but	
Unison	organised	the	great	majority	of	union	members	at	London	Borough.	This	study	
focused	mainly	on	Unison	shop	stewards	who	were	directly	employed	by	London	Borough,	
together	with	a	few	Unison	stewards	employed	by	schools.		
	
Collective	bargaining	arrangements	at	London	Borough	reflected	the	general	situation	in	
local	government	in	England	and	Wales.	The	most	recently	introduced	structure	of	terms	
and	conditions,	the	'single-status'	agreement	set	out	'a	single	national	pay	scale,	but	allows	
for	local	determination	of	grading	structures'	(Gill-McClure	et	al.	2003:	269).	As	a	result,	
while	the	main	terms	and	conditions	were	not	bargained	over	by	London	Borough	union	
representatives,	they	had	plenty	of	experience	of	collective	bargaining	over	pay	and	
conditions,	as	well	as	dealing	with	issues	such	as	service	reorganisation,	redundancies,	out-
sourcing,	and	TUPE	arrangements.	At	the	highest	level,	the	Corporate	Joint	Consultation	
Committee	met	approximately	every	three	months,	where	the	union	was	represented	by	
senior	branch	officers	(for	lower-level	union-management	forums,	see	Chapter	5).	Branch	
officers	also	had	experience	of	dealing	with	private	sector	employers,	though	that	was	not	a	
focus	for	the	current	research.		
	
From	the	time	of	its	formation	in	1993	Unison	was	the	largest	trade	union	in	the	UK	(Lyddon	
n.d.)	until	it	was	overtaken	in	2007	by	the	formation	of	Unite	(see	below).	At	the	time	of	the	
fieldwork,	Unison's	membership	stood	at	some	1,301,500	(Certification	Officer	2013a).	
Unison	was	formed	during	a	wave	of	mergers,	as	British	trade	unions	struggled	to	find	ways	
of	coping	with	significantly	declining	memberships	and	influence	during	the	1980s	(Terry	
2000;	Undy	2008).	The	three	public	sector	unions	that	merged	to	form	Unison	were:	
National	and	Local	Government	Officers	(Nalgo),	with	membership	mainly	among	white	
collar	local	government	workers	(the	'officer'	grades	–	administrative,	professional,	technical	
and	clerical,	or	APT&C),	and	also	among	administrative	staff	in	public	education	and	the	
NHS;	National	Union	of	Public	Employees	(Nupe),	mainly	made	up	of	public	service	manual	
workers	in	local	government	and	the	NHS;	and	the	Confederation	of	Health	Service	
Employees	(COHSE),	most	of	whose	members	were	nursing	and	allied	staff	in	the	NHS.	In	
local	government,	this	merger	brought	together	Nalgo	and	Nupe;	two	unions	with	a	long	
																																								 																				
8	The	GMB	organisation	at	London	Borough	was	considered	for	inclusion	in	the	research	as	a	
case	study,	but	was	decided	against	on	the	basis	that	it	had	few	stewards	and	lacked	
functioning	shop	stewards	committees.		
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history	of	rivalry,	and	somewhat	different	traditions	of	organising.	Whereas	Nalgo	had	long	
seen	itself	as	'member-led',	Nupe's	tradition	was	characterised	as	'officer-led'	(Terry	2000:	
4).	In	part,	this	difference	reflected	important	differences	between	the	two	unions'	
memberships;	Nupe	members	tended	to	be	in	lower	grade	jobs,	and	were	often	
geographically	dispersed	in	small	workplaces	(Fryer	et	al.	1974:	21),	while	Nalgo	members	
were	in	higher	grade	jobs	in	town	halls	and	larger	office	facilities	(Ironside	and	Siefert	2000:	
48).	During	the	1970s	and	especially	the	1980s,	however,	membership	of	Nalgo	underwent	
a	process	of	change	which	considerably	shifted	the	nature	of	the	union	away	from	a	model	
with	a	significant	aspect	of	professional	association,	towards	a	more	typically	trade	unionist	
outlook	(Ironside	and	Siefert	2000:	30).	In	Nupe,	the	1970s	saw	something	of	a	shift	away	
from	its	traditional	centralised	model	of	organisation	(Williams	and	Fryer	2011:	133),	with	
an	increase	in	rank-and-file	activism	and	independent	shop	steward	organisation	(Branney	
2014),	often	under	the	sponsorship	of	left-wing	full-time	officers	(Williams	and	Fryer	2011:	
302;	a	description	of	Nupe	shop	steward	organisation	during	the	1979	'winter	of	discontent'	
strikes	can	found	in	Suddaby	1979).		
	
These	processes	were	certainly	reflected	in	the	character	of	the	Unison	branch	at	London	
Borough.	Shop	steward	organisation	within	the	Nalgo	branch	started	to	develop	in	the	
1970s	and	grew	strongly	in	the	1980s	(Section	5.1),	under	the	impetus	of	the	repeated	
conflicts	between	local	government	workers	and	the	Thatcher	government	(Ironside	and	
Siefert	2000).	Consequently,	although	Nalgo	shop	stewards	at	London	Borough	witnessed	
defeats	of	major	unions	during	the	'coercive	pacification'	(Hyman	1989:	199)	of	the	1980s,	
steward	organisation	emerged	relatively	strong	and	intact.	By	contrast,	the	Nupe	branch,	
which	had	developed	shop	steward	organisation	during	the	1970s,	was	decimated	by	the	
imposition	of	1980s	Conservative	policies,	such	as	privatisation	and	Compulsory	Competitive	
Tendering,	which	cut	swathes	through	Nupe's	membership	in	local	government,	destroying	
large	parts	of	its	activist	base	(Branney	2014).	The	relative	weakness	of	shop	steward	
organisation	in	Nupe,	as	compared	with	Nalgo,	combined	with	the	shift	in	local	government	
employment	in	the	1980s,	meant	that	in	London	Borough	the	merger	of	Nupe	and	Nalgo	
essentially	resulted	in	the	extension	of	Nalgo-style	organisation	across	the	new	Unison	
branch.	Evidence	of	that	tradition,	including	what	were	in	1993	quite	novel	aspects	of	union	
organisation,	such	as	'proportionality'	and	'fair	representation'	(Terry	2000:	5),	was	still	
clearly	in	evidence	in	London	Borough	during	the	fieldwork	(Chapter	5).	Overall,	the	Unison	
branch	at	London	Borough	maintained	a	good	level	of	shop	steward	organisation	and	
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activism,	which	stood	comparison	with	any	of	the	stronger	branches	of	the	union	(cf.	Kerr	et	
al.	2002;	Waddington	and	Kerr	2009).		
	
Case	study	2:	Big	Car		
The	state	of	union	organisation	at	the	second	case	study	was	far	easier	to	ascertain.	The	Big	
Car	plant	was	part	of	a	foreign-owned	multi-national	motor	vehicle	manufacturing	
company.	At	the	time	of	the	research,	the	workforce	comprised	around	1,800	directly	
employed	hourly-paid	workers	and	staff,	plus	some	1,600	workers	employed	by	several	
contractors.	Union	membership	among	the	directly	employed	workforce,	where	this	study	
focused,	was	high;	in	some	areas	approaching	100%.		
	
The	Big	Car	plant	had	operated	a	lean	production	regime	for	some	20	years.	Early	accounts	
of	lean	production	(e.g.	Womack	et	al.	1990)	adopted	a	supportive,	pro-management	
approach.	More	recently,	the	'dark	side'	(Thompson	and	Smith	2010:	16)	of	lean	production	
has	been	emphasised,	with	research	focused	on	the	intensification	of	labour	under	lean	in	
manufacturing	(Delbridge	1998;	Garrahan	and	Stewart	1992;	Stewart	et	al.	2009).	Research	
has	also	been	critical	of	the	recent	introduction	of	lean	management	techniques	into	clerical	
work	(Carter	et	al.	2013a)	and	the	public	sector	(Carter	et	al.	2013b).	In	these	accounts,	
workers	are	seen	as	increasingly	subordinated	to	the	demands	of	rationalising	management,	
with	consequences	manifest	in	ever-increasing	pace	and	pressure	of	work,	routinisation	of	
tasks,	‘management	by	stress’,	and	increased	physical	and	mental	work	pressure,	leading	to	
workers	reporting	significant	levels	of	physical	and	mental	ill-health	(Carter	et	al.	2013a).	
Moody	(2007:	106)	argues	that	the	acceptance	of	lean	production	by	US	unions	signalled	
the	‘surrender	of	the	workplace’	to	management,	and	Stewart	et	al.	(2009:	22)	argue	that	
‘lean	was	designed	to	deal	with	[shop]	steward	power	once	and	for	all’.	Overall,	these	
accounts	present	a	bleak	view	of	the	impact	of	new	management	methods	upon	shop	
steward	organisation.	However,	some	accounts	caution	against	taking	the	claims	of	lean	at	
face	value.	Freysennet	(2009)	argues	that	even	in	the	auto	industry	genuine	lean	production	
is	rare;	more	usually,	aspects	of	lean	are	mixed	with	other	management	methods.	A	recent	
study	of	lean	in	the	civil	service	characterises	it	as	‘post	hoc	rationalisation’	(Martin	2013:	
11)	rather	than	a	coherent	package.	At	Big	Car,	features	of	lean	production	management	
included:	team-working,	just	in	time	(JIT)	supply	of	components,	detailed	job	design	and	
time-sheets,	‘continuous	improvement	process’	(CIP)	or	Kaizen	work-reorganisation,	
continual	efforts	by	management	to	reduce	labour,	and	the	encouragement	by	
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management	of	‘suggestions’	from	the	workforce	to	improve	production	efficiency.		
	
In	common	with	other	car	plants,	there	had	been	a	significant	reduction	in	employee	
numbers	over	recent	years,	which	had	been	exacerbated	by	the	impact	of	severe	recession	
in	the	European	market	for	automobiles	after	2008.	Shortly	before	the	fieldwork	started,	
union	and	management	had	concluded	an	agreement	for	the	introduction	of	a	new	model	
at	the	plant,	and	planning	for	this	was	a	background	theme	during	the	fieldwork.	While	this	
deal	involved	a	number	of	concessions	(full	details	of	which	were	secret),	it	also	guaranteed	
continued	production	at	the	plant,	including	several	hundred	new	jobs	from	the	recruitment	
of	a	third	shift;	generally	the	deal	was	considered	a	successful	outcome.	While	exact	figures	
on	pay	could	not	be	obtained,	the	consensus	among	stewards	was	that,	even	after	
concessions,	jobs	at	the	plant	were	still	among	the	best	in	the	area,	with	pay	and	conditions	
significantly	in	advance	of	most	employers	in	the	locality.		
	
A	further	effect	of	recession	in	the	motor	trade	was	short-time	working	at	Big	Car	during	the	
fieldwork.	In	recent	years,	the	union	had	agreed	to	an	annualised	hours	arrangement,	
whereby	workers	would	remain	at	home	during	periods	when	production	was	not	required,	
but	still	be	paid	as	normal,	while	at	times	when	greater	production	was	required	longer	
shifts	and	Saturdays	would	be	worked	for	no	extra	pay.	Although	such	agreements	have	
drawn	criticism	from	some	sections	of	the	union	movement	(Gall	and	Allsop	2007:	809-811),	
the	agreement	at	Big	Car	was	generally	popular.	Recessionary	conditions	meant	that	one	or	
two	'down-days'	per	week	was	common,	and	had	been	for	quite	some	time.	Many	workers	
had	accumulated	200-300	hours	'owed'	to	the	company,	with	no	sign	that	pay-back	would	
be	any	time	soon.	Furthermore,	the	agreement	limited	how	often	workers	could	be	
required	to	work	extra	hours,	even	if	demand	revived	significantly.	Consequently,	during	the	
fieldwork,	down-days	were	viewed	more	or	less	as	extra	paid	time	off.		
	
Collective	bargaining	at	Big	Car	was	carried	out	through	a	fairly	simple	structure.	At	UK	level,	
a	National	Joint	Negotiation	Committee	(NJNC)	dealt	with	terms	and	conditions	for	hourly	
paid	workers	at	all	the	company's	UK	plants.	Stewards	in	this	study	all	represented	hourly	
paid	workers,	who	made	up	the	great	majority	of	employees	at	the	plant.	At	plant	level,	a	
series	of	union-management	forums	dealt	with	local	aspects	of	those	agreements,	as	well	as	
plant-specific	issues	(Section	6.4).	At	European	level,	a	company-wide	forum	operated	along	
European	Works	Council	(EWC)	lines.	For	senior	union	reps	at	Big	Car,	this	provided	an	
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important	source	of	information	about	company	intentions.	The	agreement	for	investment	
in	the	new	model	had	taken	place	at	this	European	level,	in	negotiations	that	included	plant	
union	representatives	but	excluded	plant	management.		
	
The	history	of	trade	unionism	at	the	plant	shared	features	found	across	the	industry	(cf.	
Cohen	2013;	Thornett	2011).	The	relative	militancy	of	the	1970s	had	long	since	receded,	
under	the	tough	reality	of	increased	product	market	competition,	recently	exacerbated	by	
recession.	Plant	closures	elsewhere	in	Europe	during	the	previous	decade	had	met	little	
effective	opposition,	and	the	plant	union,	with	some	influence	from	Unite	head	office,	had	
agreed	to	concessions	on	terms	and	conditions	to	keep	the	plant	open	(Section	6.1).	Unlike	
the	experience	of	the	auto	industry	in	the	US,	however,	the	union	organisation	at	Big	Car	
had	not	made	a	virtue	of	concession	bargaining	(cf.	Moody	2007).	Instead,	the	union	had	
adopted	a	policy	towards	new	management	practices,	in	general,	that	could	be	broadly	
characterised	as	'engage	and	change',	whereby	changes	'were	implemented	through	a	
process	of	local	bargaining	which	resulted	in	joint	controls	over	outcomes	in	many	areas'	
(Stewart	et	al.	2009:	39).	
	
Since	its	formation	in	2007,	Unite	has	been	Britain's	largest	union.	As	with	Unison,	Unite	
emerged	from	a	period	of	union	mergers,	triggered	by	huge	membership	declines	in	the	
1980s,	which	continued	in	some	sectors	throughout	the	1990s	(Lyddon	n.d.).	Based	
predominantly	in	the	private	sector,	and	especially	in	manufacturing,	its	constituent	unions	
had	been	hit	particularly	hard	during	the	1980s	recessions.	At	the	time	of	the	fieldwork,	
Unite's	membership	stood	at	some	1,134,430	(Certification	Officer	2013b).	The	process	of	
Unite's	formation	was	spread	over	a	series	of	mergers,	lasting	several	years.	While	there	is	
not	space	here	to	discuss	these	in	detail,	the	key	previous	merger	brought	together	the	
main	engineering	union,	then	called	the	Amalgamated	Engineering	and	Electrical	Union	
(AEEU),	and	the	Manufacturing,	Science	and	Finance	union	(MSF),	to	form	Amicus	in	2001.	
The	AEEU	was	itself	a	result	of	the	1992	merger	of	the	Amalgamated	Engineering	Union	
(AEU)	and	the	electricians'	Electrical,	Electronic,	Telecommunications	and	Plumbing	Union	
(EETPU).	Amicus	subsequently	took	in	transferred	members	from	the	Graphical,	Paper	and	
Media	Union	(GPMU	–	itself	the	product	of	many	mergers)	and	the	banking	union	Unifi.	
Finally,	in	2007,	Amicus	merged	with	the	Transport	and	General	Workers'	Union,	to	form	
Unite;	then,	and	still,	the	largest	UK	union.	Unite	has	a	complex	internal	structure,	with,	at	
the	time	of	the	fieldwork,	some	24	'Industrial	Sectors'	organising	in	different	branches	of	
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industry,	reflecting	the	complex	history	of	mergers	of	which	the	abbreviated	account	above	
is	only	part	(for	details	of	the	current	22	sectors,	see	Unite	2016).		
	
At	its	formation,	Unite	was	seen	as	something	of	a	stalwart	of	the	right	wing	of	British	trade	
unionism.	However,	the	election	of	Len	McCluskey	as	general	secretary	in	2010	signalled	a	
repositioning	of	Unite	firmly	on	the	left	of	the	big	trade	unions	in	the	UK.	Recent	years	have	
seen	Unite	critical	not	only	of	Coalition	and	Conservative	government	austerity	policies,	but	
also	openly	critical	of	New	Labour's	record	in	office,	and	pressing	Labour	for	a	turn	towards	
social	democracy.	Moreover,	this	political	move	to	the	left	has	been	accompanied	by	efforts	
to	utilise	a	more	determined	version	of	the	'organising	model'	than	has	been	typical	of	UK	
trade	unions.	Developed	in	the	organising	department	of	the	TGWU,	this	model	had	
registered	some	significant	successes;	for	instance,	organising	some	18,000	workers	in	the	
meat	packaging	industry	(Cimorelli	2012;	Graham	2011).	Although	some	within	the	left	of	
Unite	have	been	critical	of	McCluskey's	leadership	for	timidity	in	practice	(Cimorelli	2012),	
there	seems	little	doubt	that	the	change	of	political	direction	at	the	top	of	the	union	has	
encouraged	many	workplace	activists.	
	
The	shop	steward	organisation	at	Big	Car	clearly	reflected	a	number	of	the	processes	
outlined	in	the	above	discussion.	In	particular,	the	merger	of	Amicus	and	the	TGWU	to	form	
Unite	had	forced	together	two	organisation	with	a	history	of	rivalry.	Due	to	the	balance	of	
membership	numbers	within	the	plant	the	formation	of	Unite	saw	the	former	TGWU	
stewards'	organisation	taking	the	leading	positions.	Furthermore,	both	politically	and	in	
terms	of	steward	organising,	strong	support	for	Len	McCluskey's	leadership	reinforced	the	
self-confidence	of	the	workplace	union	at	Big	Car,	which	had	been	built	up	out	of	its	own	
resources	over	previous	decades.	This	coincidence	of	internal	strength	and	external	
endorsement	combined	to	produce	a	shop	steward	organisation	of	considerable	strength	
and	confidence.		
	
A	note	on	fieldnote	notation		
	
In	the	account	which	follows,	considerable	use	is	made	of	excerpts	from	fieldnotes	made	
during	observation	and	diary-interviews.	In	these,	a	system	of	notation	was	devised	that	
needs	to	be	explained	for	the	benefit	of	readers.	The	main	concern	during	the	fieldwork	was	
to	capture	the	issues	under	discussion,	together	with	the	views,	motivations,	arguments,	
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and	rationales	of	shop	stewards.	The	system	of	note-taking	developed	to	reflect	those	
requirements.	Notation	styles	were	adopted	to	distinguish	between:	1)	direct	quotes	from	
participants;	2)	points	made	by	participants	during	discussions	(the	bulk	of	the	notes);	3)	
thoughts	or	comments	from	myself	as	observer.	In	addition	to	the	three	types	of	notation	
used	in	the	fieldnotes,	for	the	excerpts	reproduced	here	it	was	necessary	to	add	further	
material,	at	various	points,	to	make	the	notes	comprehensible	to	readers.	For	transparency,	
this	additional	material	was	also	distinguished.	Unfortunately,	the	outcome	of	this	process	
was	that	the	notation	became	increasingly	complex	and	cumbersome	to	read.	Therefore,	it	
was	decided	to	simplify	the	presentation	where	appropriate,	in	order	to	aid	comprehension.	
As	a	result,	the	excerpts	used	below	are	not	always	direct	copies	from	the	fieldnotes.	Great	
care	was	taken,	though,	to	ensure	that	excerpts	retain	the	sense	and	feel	of	the	originals.	
Despite	these	efforts,	however,	readers	may	well	find	the	fieldnote	extracts	unwieldy	and	
awkward	to	read	–	at	least,	at	first.	For	this	I	can	only	apologise,	and	rely	on	the	justification	
that	the	technical	complications	of	the	notation	system	were	designed	for	transparent	
recording	of	observations.	If,	as	a	consequence,	the	fieldnotes	are	difficult	for	others	to	
read,	that	seems	to	me	a	preferable	difficulty	to	the	alternative;	namely,	and	easy	read	at	
the	expense	of	accuracy.	The	following	account	explains	how	the	notation	system	works.		
	
In	the	account	below,	excerpts	from	the	fieldnotes	are	indented,	and	placed	within	single	
inverted	commas,	'like	these'.	The	layout	of	excerpts	is	the	same	as	in	the	original	
fieldnotes,	with	separate	lines	representing	the	succession	of	points	made	by	a	participant,	
indicated	by	a	dash	at	the	start	of	the	line,	-	like	this.	A	change	of	speaker	is	indicated	in	the	
original	fieldnotes	by	the	inclusion	of	a	name	at	the	start	of	a	line,	followed	by	a	dash	and	a	
summary	point,	e.g.	'Sheila	-	disciplinary	meeting	coming	up'.	In	the	reproductions	here,	
names	have	been	removed	(Section	4.4).	Word-for-word	quotes	from	participants	appear	in	
double	inverted	commas,	"like	this".	Original	verbatim	comments	from	myself	appear	in	
italics,	like	this.	During	the	fieldwork,	additions	to	the	notes	to	clarify	context	or	meaning	
were	added	in	square	brackets,	[like	these].	Recent	additions	to	the	notes,	for	reproduction	
here,	have	been	added	in	curly	brackets,	{like	these}.	As	will	be	clear,	this	device	was	mainly	
used	to	remove	the	names	of	participants,	which	appear	in	the	fieldnotes	but	not	in	this	
text,	where	shop	stewards	appear	as	{Steward},	convenors	as	{Convenor},	etc..	In	passages	
where	a	number	of	stewards	are	engaged	in	discussion,	individuals	are	designated	as	
{Steward	1},	{Steward	2},	{Steward	3},	etc..	It	should	be	noted,	though,	that	these	
designations	are	used	afresh	on	each	occasion,	so	that	there	is	no	individual	to	whom	
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{Steward	1}	applies	throughout	and	who	could	therefore	potentially	be	identified	(for	
ethical	considerations,	see	Section	4.4).		
	
Although	this	approach	gives	the	fieldnote	excerpts	a	somewhat	artificial	appearance,	it	
does	make	plain	the	provenance	of	the	various	parts	of	these	texts,	and	clarifies	the	process	
of	their	production.	Hopefully,	readers	will	find	the	benefits	of	clarity	outweigh	any	
drawbacks	of	style.			
	
	
Conclusion		
	
This	chapter	has	set	out	the	research	design	and	methods	adopted	for	the	present	study,	
and	the	reasoning	behind	the	choices	made.	Since	this	study	was	exploratory	in	nature,	a	
case	study	design	offered	significant	advantages.	Moreover,	for	attempting	to	understand	
the	dynamics	of	complex	social	relations,	which	could	not	easily	be	separated	from	their	
context,	case	study	was	doubly	appropriate.	Furthermore,	the	research	questions	required	
fundamentally	qualitative	answers,	and	detailed	evidence.	Consequently,	a	return	to	
ethnographic	case	study	was	strongly	justified.	Finally,	while	multiple-case	studies	carry	a	
number	of	advantages,	it	is	not	the	case	that	small-N	studies	cannot	achieve	rigour,	nor	that	
they	cannot	produce	theoretically	significant	finding.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	research	
design	and	methods	adopted	were	strongly	influenced	by	the	preceding	theoretical	
discussion.	That	is,	in	order	to	address	the	theoretical	issues	which	are	central	to	the	
present	research,	and	to	answer	the	research	questions	posed	at	the	start	of	this	account,	
the	ethnographic	case	study	approach	was	appropriate.		
	
Yet,	the	justification	for	this	research	design	and	these	methods	rests	not	only	upon	
theoretical	foundations.	It	is	an	important	argument	of	this	thesis	that	a	return	to	this	type	
of	research	is	overdue.	During	the	classic	era	of	industrial	relations	research,	detailed	
ethnographic	studies	provided	field-defining	accounts.	By	contrast,	recent	field-defining	
research	has	come	from	quantitative	methods	and	management	surveys.	Not	only	does	this	
represent	a	shift	in	methodology,	it	also	represents	a	shift	in	the	workplace	actors	whose	
voices	form	the	basis	of	those	accounts:	a	shift	from	the	voices	of	workers	to	the	voices	of	
managers.	While	it	is	of	course	the	case	that	managers	matter	in	workplace	relations,	
significant	advantages	accrue	to	research	that	investigates	directly	the	actors	themselves;	in	
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this	case,	shop	stewards.	The	next	two	chapters	present	the	results	of	the	research.	These	
chapters	give	a	central	place	to	the	voices	of	shop	stewards,	and	contribute	a	significantly	
greater	basis	of	empirical	findings	than	is	found	in	other	recent	accounts.	Although	the	
challenges	faced	by	this	research	were	considerable,	the	following	chapters	demonstrate	
that	the	effort	was	worthwhile.		
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Chapter	5:	London	Borough		
	
	
This	chapter	presents	the	main	findings	from	the	fieldwork	conducted	among	shop	stewards	
at	London	Borough.	These	findings	are	a	significant	contribution	to	research	in	this	area,	
detailing	stewards'	day-to-day	activities,	meanings	and	intentions,	arguments	and	
explanations,	in	a	way	that	has	not	been	done	for	some	30	years.	The	stewards	at	London	
Borough	dealt	with	a	wide	range	of	issues,	from	everyday	queries	about	council	procedures	
and	policies,	to	the	inevitable	workload	of	individual	representation,	the	effects	of	frequent	
work	reorganisations,	and	the	impact	of	central	government	austerity	policies	triggered	by	
severe	economic	recession.	The	fieldwork	produced	considerable	rich	and	detailed	evidence	
of	how	shop	stewards	handled	these	issues,	in	ways	that	were	sometimes	familiar	and	
sometimes	surprising.	The	account	which	follows	discusses	first	the	nature	of	shop	steward	
organisation	at	the	Borough,	followed	by	the	collective	issues	stewards	dealt	with,	then	the	
place	of	individual	representation	in	the	work	of	stewards,	and	finally	stewards'	relations	
with	managers.	Although	the	presentation	in	this	chapter	might	appear	narrowly	
descriptive,	the	selection	and	ordering	of	evidence	constitutes	the	first	stage	of	analysis,	
which	will	be	further	developed	and	deepened	in	subsequent	chapters.		
	
	
5.1	The	shop	steward	organisation			
	
In	the	Unison	branch	at	London	Borough	there	were	around	50	shop	stewards,	organised	
into	four	committees.	Three	of	these	committees	reflected	the	structure	of	council	
administration,	which	was	divided	into	‘Directorates’:	Housing	and	Adult	Social	Care	(HASC);	
Children,	Schools	and	Families	(CSF);	and,	Culture	and	Environment	(C&E).	The	fourth	
stewards’	committee,	Central	Services,	was	not	based	on	a	directorate	but	covered	various	
non-service	providing	departments,	including	finance,	ICT,	and	benefits	processing.	Each	
shop	stewards’	committee	was	made	up	of	the	stewards	elected	(usually	unopposed)	in	
each	of	these	four	areas.	In	turn,	the	shop	stewards'	committees	each	elected	either	a	
convenor	or	two	co-convenors,	depending	on	the	internal	structure	of	the	directorate	
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represented:	C&E	and	Central	Services	each	elected	a	single	convenor,	while	HASC	and	CSF	
both	elected	two	co-convenors.	The	co-convenor	arrangement	was	tailored	to	the	hybrid	
nature	of	these	two	directorates,	which	had	only	been	formed	in	recent	years	as	a	result	of	
the	seemingly	never-ending	process	of	council	reorganisation.	The	former	social	services	
department	had	been	split	into	two:	adult	social	care	had	been	joined	to	the	former	housing	
department,	to	form	HASC,	while	social	services	for	children	and	families	had	been	joined	to	
the	former	education	department,	forming	CSF.	In	HASC,	there	was	one	convenor	for	the	
housing	side	and	another	for	adult	social	care;	and	in	CSF,	there	was	one	convenor	for	
schools	and	education,	and	another	for	children’s	and	young	people’s	social	services.	Thus,	
the	management	structure	of	London	Borough	was	imprinted	on	shop	steward	organisation.		
	
By	agreement	with	council	management,	convenors	and	co-convenors	were	on	50%	facility	
time,	and	all	but	one	continued	to	work	in	regular	council	employment	for	half	the	working	
week.	The	exception	was	the	convenor	of	C&E	who	was	also	the	branch	health	and	safety	
officer,	a	position	which	also	attracted	50%	facility	time,	making	this	individual	in	practice	a	
full-time	union	representative.	The	only	other	union	representative	on	full-time	release	was	
the	branch	secretary.	A	small	number	of	other	branch	officers	qualified	for	facility	time,	
though	none	were	on	more	than	50%	release.	Altogether,	then,	some	4%	of	union	reps	at	
London	Borough	were	on	full-time	release.	The	ordinary	shop	stewards	were	officially	
allowed	two	hours	per	week	away	from	their	jobs	to	perform	trade	union	duties,	though	
this	arrangement	appeared	to	be	applied	flexibly	in	most	cases,	with	few	reported	disputes.	
Even	so,	stewards	reported	that	at	busy	times	two	hours	was	often	insufficient.		
	
The	distribution	of	shop	stewards	across	London	Borough	was	markedly	uneven;	largely,	but	
not	entirely,	reflecting	the	unevenness	of	union	membership	(cf.	Kersley	et	al	2006:	148).	
Broadly,	HASC	had	the	strongest	union	organisation	with	some	22	stewards.	However,	this	
figure	masked	considerable	unevenness;	of	the	HASC	stewards,	all	but	two	were	in	the	
housing	side,	reflecting	a	history	of	strong	union	organisation	within	the	former	housing	
department.	Indeed,	housing	was	generally	the	strongest	area	of	union	organisation	at	
London	Borough,	with	a	membership	density	around	75%.	As	one	housing	steward	proudly	
stated,	'We're	the	people	who	say	no'.	Yet,	even	within	housing,	there	were	significant	
sectional	variations	in	union	membership	and	steward	organisation.	Thus,	among	Estate	
Officers	(housing	management)	there	was	high	membership	and	good	steward	coverage,	
whereas	homeless	hostels	and	housing	estate	caretakers	had	high	union	membership	but	
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very	few	stewards.	One	consequence	of	the	shortage	of	shop	stewards	was	that	stewards	
from	housing	management	often	had	to	cover	other	areas	for	representation	purposes.	
Meanwhile,	the	adult	social	care	part	of	the	directorate,	which	included	mental	health	social	
workers	and	care	homes	for	the	elderly,	could	boast	only	two	shop	stewards	among	some	
500	union	members.	Indeed,	so	weak	was	shop	steward	organisation	in	adult	social	care	
that	the	convenor	was	actually	a	steward	from	housing,	representing	and	bargaining	on	
behalf	of	members	in	an	area	where	she	was	not	herself	employed.		
	
The	CSF	stewards’	committee	had	a	similarly	uneven	composition,	with	a	clear	contrast	
between	the	two	parts	of	the	hybrid	directorate.	The	great	majority	of	CSF	stewards	were	
from	the	education	side,	representing	members	in	school	administration	and	classroom	
assistants.	As	in	HASC,	social	workers	were	significantly	under-represented,	with	only	a	
single	shop	steward	despite	being	a	significant	part	of	the	workforce	and	having	
membership	density	above	40%,	and	strong	union	organisation	in	the	past.	More	uneven	
still,	the	C&E	stewards'	committee	reflected	a	highly	varied	directorate,	including	the	
transport	depot,	library	staff,	and	senior	town	hall	planning	departments.	Union	
membership	was	patchy,	below	10%	in	some	areas,	and	stewards	were	unevenly	spread	and	
few	in	number.	Central	Services	was	another	disparate	grouping,	with	weak	union	
membership	in	most	areas	and	few	stewards	apart	from	in	housing	benefits.	Overall,	the	
constantly	changing	structure	of	the	council	presented	significant	organisational	difficulties	
for	union	organisation	at	London	Borough.		
	
Shop	stewards’	committees	were	the	main	organising	forums	for	stewards	at	London	
Borough,	meeting	to	share	experiences,	discuss	issues,	and	devise	responses.	The	
composition	of	the	stewards'	committees	broadly	reflected	the	composition	of	the	council	
workforce;	more	than	half	the	stewards	were	women,	and	there	was	a	significant	minority	
of	BME	stewards,	though	not	as	high	a	proportion	as	in	the	overall	workforce.	Two	London	
Borough	diarists	self-identified	as	LGBT.	Most	committee	meetings	featured	a	round-up	of	
issues	to	be	taken	to	management	by	senior	stewards	and	convenors	at	their	regular	
directorate	and	corporate	level	meetings.	Generally,	issues	to	be	forwarded	to	management	
were	filtered	by	the	stewards,	to	ensure	that	matters	were	taken	in	the	first	instance	to	
local	managers,	and	only	promoted	upwards	in	the	formal	apparatus	if	problems	could	not	
be	resolved	at	the	lower	level.	The	HASC	stewards’	committee	met	monthly;	the	CSF	
committee	met	twice	in	each	school	term	(to	fit	the	working	arrangements	of	most	
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stewards	in	the	directorate);	and	both	the	C&E	and	Central	Services	committees	met	semi-
regularly.	Stewards’	committee	meetings	typically	lasted	two	to	three	hours,	and	provided	
an	opportunity	for	very	full	discussions	among	the	stewards,	although	with	varying	degrees	
of	dependence	on	the	convenor.	Besides	these	meetings,	stewards	also	met	regularly	on	
other	bodies	involved	in	the	running	of	the	Unison	branch.	The	Branch	Committee	met	
every	six	weeks	and	was	made	up	of	shop	stewards	elected	from	the	stewards’	committees,	
together	with	directly	elected	branch	officers.	A	more	informal	Branch	Officers	group,	
mainly	composed	of	stewards,	met	roughly	once	a	month,	in	between	Branch	Committee	
meetings.	Overall,	the	shop	steward	bodies	at	London	Borough	were	characterised	by	a	
highly	democratic	and	egalitarian	atmosphere,	with	open	and	lengthy	discussions.		
	
Evidence	from	union	branch	records	and	interviews	shows	that,	in	common	with	much	of	
local	government,	shop	steward	organisation	is	a	relatively	recent	development	at	London	
Borough.	From	the	mid-1970s,	there	was	unofficial	steward	organisation	in	some	areas	of	
the	former	Nalgo	branch,	such	as	social	services,	but	formal	recognition	of	stewards	
representing	officer	grades	did	not	take	place	until	1980.	Remarkably,	considering	the	
prominent	place	of	individual	representation	in	current	trade	union	activism,	records	of	the	
Nalgo	branch	report	that	1979	was	the	first	year	in	which	branch	officers	formally	
represented	a	member	at	a	disciplinary	hearing,	though	unofficial	shop	stewards	had	been	
carrying	out	this	function	since	the	mid-1970s.	One	longstanding	steward	recalled	‘the	
battle	to	set	up	stewards’	organisation	in	the	70s	and	80s’,	and	contrasted	the	current	
situation	with	her	own	experience	of	becoming	a	steward,	saying,		
	
“I	became	a	rep	because	we	had	a	dispute	as	soon	as	I	walked	through	the	door”.		
	
More	recently,	recruiting	new	stewards	had	become	more	difficult	in	many	areas,	as	
indicated	by	the	uneven	spread	of	shop	steward	coverage:	
	
‘-	you’re	just	not	getting	younger	people	who	are	coming	in	and	wanting	to	be	reps…	
in	the	80s	it	was	still	expanding	
“We	used	to	do	mad	things	…	Now	it’s	more	grown	up	and	sensible”’.		
	
Some	of	the	ways	shop	stewards	had	become	’more	grown	up	and	sensible’	will	be	clear	in	
the	following	account	of	their	activity	at	London	Borough;	an	account	which	contains	some	
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themes	familiar	from	the	literature,	alongside	others	that	were	more	novel	and	surprising.		
	
Findings	from	the	fieldwork	show	that	shop	stewards	at	London	Borough	dealt	with	a	wide	
variety	of	issues.	There	were	many	instances	of	stewards	giving	small	pieces	of	advice	to	
individual	members,	on	issues	such	as	new	workplace	procedures,	how	to	operate	the	latest	
IT	system,	or	how	to	apply	for	jobs	in	other	departments.	Other	areas	of	shop	steward	
activity	dealt	with	more	serious	aspects	of	the	employment	relationship,	including	terms	
and	conditions	of	employment,	the	rights	of	management	to	reorganise	work,	or	to	
discipline	or	even	dismiss	individual	employees.	Inevitably,	this	activity	included	a	significant	
amount	of	individual	casework,	though	the	nature	and	import	of	individual	representation	
was	not	uniform.	During	the	research	period	the	stewards	also	dealt	with	a	surprising	
number	and	variety	of	collective	issues.	This	is	an	important	point	because,	while	the	
current	standard	view,	that	shop	stewards	no	longer	deal	with	collective	issues,	has	been	
criticised,	it	was	expected	that	collective	issues	would	tend	to	arise	in	unexpected	ways,	in	
covert	forms,	through	novel	combinations	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources.	Yet,	in	
many	cases,	shop	stewards	were	dealing	very	directly	with	entirely	familiar	collective	issues,	
such	as	terms	and	conditions,	work	organisation,	the	effort	bargain,	and	frontier	of	control;	
as	described	in	the	next	section.		
	
	
5.2	Shop	stewards	and	collective	issues:	contracts	and	work	organisation		
	
Early	in	the	fieldwork	it	became	apparent	that	shop	stewards	in	London	Borough	were	
dealing	with	collective	issues	far	more	than	expected	from	a	reading	of	recent	literature.	
Two	issues	in	particular	presented	stewards	with	significant	challenges	and	took	up	a	
considerable	amount	of	their	time	and	effort.	The	first	of	these	was	the	proposal	by	council	
management	to	bring	in	new	contracts	for	staff,	with	what	the	stewards	saw	as	worse	terms	
and	conditions,	including	elements	of	performance-related	pay	(PRP).	The	second	was	
dealing	with	the	effects	of	repeated	re-organisations	of	council	services;	a	continuing	
feature	of	new	public	management	in	the	borough,	recently	exacerbated	by	the	impact	of	
government	austerity	policies.	The	distribution	of	these	two	issues	within	shop	steward	
activity,	and	the	ways	in	which	stewards	dealt	with	them,	were	patterned	in	distinctive	and	
unexpected	ways.	These	patterns	later	proved	significant	in	identifying	underlying	dynamics	
of	workplace	bargaining,	as	will	be	shown	in	following	chapters.	First,	though,	details	of	
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workplace	practices	are	set	out.		
	
New	contracts			
London	Borough	management	had	indicated	to	the	Unison	branch	its	intention	to	introduce	
new	contracts	some	18	months	prior	to	the	commencement	of	the	fieldwork;	if	possible,	
through	a	collective	agreement.	This	led	to	a	lengthy	period	of	negotiation,	which	was	still	
not	complete	by	the	end	of	the	study.	During	the	collective	bargaining	process,	the	Unison	
branch	raised	objections	to	a	number	of	proposed	changes,	and	on	some	of	these	council	
management	agreed	to	make	changes.	For	instance,	around	250	low-paid	workers	were	
eligible	for	additional	‘out	of	hours’	payments	for	working	evenings	and	weekends,	which	
made	a	significant	difference	to	their	take-home	pay.	When	the	council	proposed	to	remove	
these	bonus	payments	under	the	new	contracts,	union	representatives	from	the	branch	
objected	to	cuts	in	pay	for	these	workers;	in	response,	management	agreed	to	increase	
basic	pay	to	compensate.	The	council	also	signalled	that	it	was	willing	to	make	one-off	
payments	to	employees	as	an	inducement	to	switch	contracts,	and	that	it	was	willing	to	
discuss	figures	with	union	reps	on	this	issue.	On	other	matters,	the	council	refused	to	make	
changes.	By	the	time	that	the	fieldwork	took	place,	the	main	negotiations	were	over	and	
had	resulted	in	no	agreement	on	the	introduction	of	new	contracts,	which	stewards	
continued	to	oppose.		
	
At	this	point,	London	Borough	management	announced	that	the	new	contracts	would	be	
rolled	out	anyway,	on	a	voluntary	basis,	with	a	one-off	payment	of	£1000	for	any	member	of	
staff	who	signed	up.	The	council	also	indicated	that	new	starters	would	be	on	the	new	
contracts,	as	would	any	member	of	staff	starting	in	a	new	post,	either	voluntarily	or	as	the	
result	of	significant	job	reorganisation.	The	union	representatives	realised	that	this	
approach	by	the	council,	making	sign-up	voluntary,	made	it	virtually	impossible	to	have	a	
lawful	trade	dispute	on	the	issue;	one	convenor	described	the	strategy	as	‘very	clever’.	
Stewards	also	recognised	that	the	£1000	payment	would	be	attractive	to	a	significant	
proportion	of	borough	employees,	including	many	union	members,	especially	because	at	
the	time	of	the	research	a	national	pay	freeze	had	been	in	place	for	some	three	years,	
despite	relatively	high	inflation,	and	many	borough	employees	were	feeling	financial	strains.	
Nevertheless,	the	branch	launched	a	‘Don’t	Sign’	campaign,	prepared	publicity	material	
making	the	case	against	signing,	and	ran	a	series	of	departmental	union	meetings	on	the	
issue.		
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The	two	most	significant	issues	in	the	proposed	new	contracts,	in	the	view	of	the	stewards,	
were	the	proposal	to	introduce	PRP	for	staff	above	the	lowest	grades	(the	bulk	of	branch	
members),	and	a	proposal	to	break	the	contractual	link	between	rates	of	pay	in	the	council	
and	national	pay	awards.	Although,	at	the	time	of	the	study,	a	national	pay-freeze	had	been	
in	place	for	three	years,	stewards	identified	the	threat	to	nationally	pay	awards	as	a	
significant	issue	likely	to	undermine	future	pay	rises.	Other	detrimental	terms	included	
reduced	holiday	entitlement	and	an	increase	in	the	working	week	from	35	to	36	hours.		
	
London	Borough	stewards	were	strongly	opposed	to	the	introduction	of	PRP,	which	was	
seen	as	inappropriate	for	the	type	of	work	carried	out	by	council	employees	in	the	provision	
of	services.	One	convenor	contrasted	her	work	with	manufacturing:	
	
‘-	if	you	were	on	a	production	line,	making	light	bulbs…	{those	can	be	counted}	
-	but	it's	so	dangerous	because	it's	subjective	...	if	you're	doing	a	job	like	ours,	it's	hard	
to	see	how	you	can	measure	performance’.		
	
There	were	also	significant	concerns	at	the	prospect	of	having	future	pay	rises	linked	to	
annual	management	appraisals,	a	system	widely	seen	as	unreliable	and	open	to	
manipulation	by	managers.	As	one	steward	put	it,	
	
‘-	the	general	feeling	seems	to	be	its	just	an	excuse	to	cut	pay	
-	[management	are	making]	...a	lot	of	fuss	about	appraisals...	but	it's	subjective....	
there's	no	system	[for	doing	appraisals	consistently]...		
-	{There	is	a}	history	of	HR	playing	fast	and	loose...	So,	expect	them	to	turn	round	and	
say,	there's	a	limit	on	who	can	get	the	good	grades’.		
	
This	is,	of	course,	a	perception	which	is	familiar	from	the	literature	on	PRP	(Brown	et	al.	
2003:	197).	Scepticism	about	management	appraisal	was	widespread	among	stewards,	and	
was	commonly	reported	as	an	argument	used	with	members	to	encourage	them	not	to	sign.	
For	instance,	a	steward	in	a	section	with	a	particularly	difficult	manager	reported	asking	her	
co-workers,		
	
‘do	you	really	want	{named	manager}	sorting	out	your	pay?’.		
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The	undermining	of	management	legitimacy	by	shop	steward	was	apparent	across	this	case	
study	(cf.	Armstrong	et	al.	1981).		
	
The	issue	of	new	contracts	had	been	identified	by	stewards	as	being	significant	at	an	early	
stage.	It	figured	prominently	in	discussions	at	shop	stewards’	committee	meetings	long	
before	management	moved	to	introduce	them,	and	continued	to	be	a	major	topic	of	
discussion	among	stewards	at	their	meetings	during	the	fieldwork.	By	contrast,	this	issue	
arose	much	less	frequently	in	stewards'	diaries.	Fieldnotes	from	diary-interviews	show	that	
stewards’	comments	on	these	issues	usually	arose	as	a	result	of	questioning	from	the	
researcher,	rather	than	from	diary	entries.	Indeed,	only	around	one	in	four	mentions	of	PRP	
resulted	from	diary	entries.	When	questioned,	stewards	usually	reported	some	low-level	
activity	on	this	issue,	such	as	distributing	printed	information,	responding	to	member	
queries,	directing	members	to	other	sources	of	information,	or	initiating	discussions	with	
members	either	singly	or	in	small	groups.	Some	stewards	had	previously	organised	shop	
meetings	on	the	new	contract	issue,	though	these	had	generally	been	poorly	attended.	
Later,	as	the	roll-out	of	new	contracts	approached,	stewards	attended	management-
organised	briefings,	where	they	were	able	to	gather	information	on	management	proposals,	
and	where	they	commonly	disputed	management	claims	about	supposed	benefits	of	the	
new	contracts.	In	some	of	these	briefings,	stewards	were	able	to	put	managers	under	
considerable	pressure	in	front	of	a	large	number	of	workers,	and	stories	of	these	encounters	
passed	around	the	workforce,	often	promoted	by	other	stewards	in	order	to	undermine	
management	claims	about	the	contracts.		
	
However,	it	was	notable	that	stewards	were	generally	somewhat	downbeat	when	discussing	
their	activity	on	the	contract	issue.	Fieldnotes	record	that	when	asked	about	performance-
related	pay,	one	steward	groaned,	another	rolled	her	eyes,	and	another	laughed	
despondently.	Many	stewards	experienced	difficulties	when	trying	to	raise	the	issue	with	
members	in	the	workplace.	The	following	exchange	from	a	diary-interview	indicates	some	of	
the	difficulties	reported	by	stewards:	
	
‘What	about	{new	contracts}?	
{Steward}	-	I've	been	telling	everyone	not	to	sign	up,	putting	posters	up....	
Is	it	having	an	effect?	
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{Steward}	-	No	idea	-	I	never	get	a	response’.			
	
Another	stewards	said	of	the	issue,	
	
‘-	there	have	been	queries...	[and]	talking	around	the	team....		
-	but	no	one	has	sat	and	talked	to	me	about	it	
-	they're	all	a	bit	worried...	some	will	sign	but	maybe	don't	want	to	mention	it	to	a	
steward...’.		
	
Another	steward,	who	was	known	for	having	a	distinctly	jaded	view	of	union	members,	
found	further	evidence	for	his	opinions	in	the	low	level	of	responses	among	members	on	
this	issue:		
	
‘-	{I’ve}	already	had	one	member	saying	he	wants	to	take	the	money,	{saying}	'Why	
can't	we	have	Performance	Related	Pay?	Why	is	the	union	stopping	me	getting	
£1000?'	
-	...	I	was	so	angry,	I	just	walked	out.	...		
“We're	going	to	have	a	lot	of	people	taking	it.”	
-	I	know,	in	a	couple	of	years	time,	if	I'm	still	here...	there	will	be	a	lot	of	people	who	
will	be	moaning	that	they've	lost	money,	or	lost	holiday...	
“They	can	get	stuffed”’.		
	
Overall,	evidence	from	diaries	and	diary-interviews	suggests	that	stewards	had	difficulty	
raising	this	issue	with	constituents,	despite	having	identified	it	as	an	important	priority.		
	
As	events	developed,	however,	circumstances	changed	such	that	stewards	were	able	to	
raise	this	issue	more	effectively	with	members.	Stewards	reported	that	members	showed	
more	interest	in	the	contract	issue	when	management	started	to	roll	out	the	new	contracts,	
initially	in	the	CSF	directorate.	Stewards	in	other	areas,	especially	HASC,	thought	that	
management	had	chosen	this	course	of	action	because	CSF	was	one	of	the	less	strongly	
organised	parts	of	the	council	workforce,	and	that	management	would	therefore	face	less	
opposition.	(Most	CSF	stewards	were	employed	in	and	by	schools,	and	therefore	the	new	
contracts	did	not	apply	to	them;	the	Borough	employed	part	of	CSF	had	only	4-5	stewards).	
Stewards	thought	that	management	was	pursuing	a	strategy	of	trying	to	secure	high	levels	
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of	sign-up	to	the	new	contract	in	weaker	areas,	before	moving	on	to	stronger	sections.	This	
is	evidence	that	management	had	adjusted	their	actions	in	response	to	expected	union	
opposition.	Yet	one	of	the	effects	of	the	initiation	of	the	new	contracts	in	CSF	was	to	raise	
the	profile	of	the	issue	both	within	CSF	and	more	widely	across	the	council	workforce,	
thereby	opening	fresh	opportunities	for	stewards	to	raise	it	once	more	within	their	own	
constituencies.	As	one	HASC	steward	put	it:		
	
‘“it’s	only	just	starting	to	be	a	talking	point”	
Why	has	it	become	a	talking	point	now?	
{Steward}	-	because	they've	sent	out	information	to	CSF		
-	[management	are]	pushing	it	with	staff	there			
“people	work	with	people	in	CSF	-	word	gets	out.”	
-	we’ve	had	shop	meetings	{previously},	so	it's	kind	of	at	the	back	of	people's	minds	
“but	they've	had	team	meetings	and	briefings”,	so	it's	more	up	front…		
“They're	asking	people	...	to	sign”’.	
	
As	a	result,	stewards	reported	more	enquiries	from	union	members	regarding	PRP	and	
other	contractual	issues.	Another	steward	said,	
	
‘"Now,	the	realisation	is	hitting”’.	
	
As	a	result,	some	stewards	were	able	to	make	greater	headway	on	this	issue,	though	not	all	
reported	a	similar	experience.	Nevertheless,	union	meetings	on	the	subject	of	the	new	
contracts	were	held	at	this	time	in	the	larger	offices,	and	stewards	generally	reported	good	
attendances.		
	
By	the	end	of	the	fieldwork	at	London	Borough,	the	new	contracts	had	been	rolled	out	
across	the	workforce,	and	around	60%	had	signed.	Though	exact	figures	were	not	available,	
rates	of	sign-up	appeared	to	be	uneven	across	departments	and	sections,	in	part	reflecting	
union	membership	density	and	organisation;	for	instance,	sign-ups	were	lower	in	housing.	
As	predicted	by	stewards,	the	key	factor	in	encouraging	workers	to	sign	was	the	£1000	
inducement	at	a	time	of	pay	freeze	and	inflation.	A	sizeable	Unison	branch	meeting	voted	to	
ballot	on	industrial	action	over	the	threat	to	the	link	with	national	pay	bargaining,	but	this	
did	not	result	in	an	actual	ballot	taking	place,	after	the	intervention	of	Unison	regional	
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officials.	Significantly,	around	three	quarters	of	the	stewards	who	took	part	in	in-depth	
interviews	at	the	end	of	the	fieldwork	said	that	they	did	not	believe	the	union	branch	would	
have	been	able	to	stop	the	new	contracts	being	introduced.	This	contrasts	to	the	only	one	
or	two	stewards	who	expressed	such	a	view	openly	in	the	steward	committee	meetings.	
Although	the	interview	evidence	may	include	an	element	of	recollection	bias	(Section	4.3),	it	
may	also	partly	explain	the	reticence	with	which	stewards	pursued	this	issue	among	their	
constituents.	Certainly,	this	finding	raises	questions	concerning	intra-organisational	
bargaining	processes,	given	that	the	union	appears	to	have	embarked	on	a	course	of	action	
that	many	of	its	leading	activists	believed	would	end	in	failure.		
	
The	evidence	concerning	the	new	contract	issue	shows	that	the	attitude	of	union	members	
was	an	important	influence	on	the	issue-handling	activity	of	shop	stewards.	When	
members’	level	of	awareness	and	concern	over	the	new	contracts	was	low,	stewards	had	
difficulty	raising	the	issue,	and	were	unable	to	foster	a	widespread	sense	of	grievance,	
despite	having	identified	it	as	a	priority	for	campaigning.	As	the	new	contracts	were	rolled	
out	by	management	the	issue	became	more	prominent	in	the	awareness	of	union	members,	
and	most	stewards	found	it	easier	to	make	progress	in	terms	of	their	agitation	and	
propaganda	on	the	matter.	Even	so,	other	stewards	continued	to	experience	difficulties	(see	
discussion	in	Section	7.4).	However,	difficulties	encountered	on	this	issue	should	not	be	
taken	as	evidence	that	the	stewards	in	London	Borough	were	not	dealing	with	significant	
collective	issues.	In	fact,	diaries	and	diary-interviews	recorded	considerable	activity	around	
the	other	main	collective	issue;	namely,	service	reorganisation.		
	
Service	reorganisation		
Despite	its	much	lower	profile	in	committee	meetings,	the	main	area	of	activity	for	
collective	representation	by	stewards	at	London	Borough	was	the	continual	process	of	
service	reorganisation,	as	managers	sought	to	introduce	new	management	structures,	new	
procedures	and	ways	of	working,	and	to	reduce	the	workforce.	Dealing	with	reorganisation	
accounted	for	a	very	significant	amount	of	time	and	effort	on	the	part	of	stewards.	It	was	
also	an	area	where	the	influence	of	shop	steward	activity	upon	both	management	decisions	
and	outcomes	for	union	members	could	be	clearly	discerned.		
	
Given	the	relatively	low	priority	of	this	issue	in	stewards'	committee	meetings,	its	
prominence	in	diary:diary-interview	evidence	was	surprising	and	unexpected.	The	evidence	
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shows	that	stewards’	activity	in	this	area	was	largely	in	response	to	pressures	from	the	
membership	and	their	immediate	concerns	about	work	organisation	and	practices.	High	
levels	of	shop	steward	activity	in	this	area	reflected	their	willingness	to	respond	to	issues	
which	were	prioritised	by	members.	By	contrast,	the	same	stewards	had	much	more	
difficulty	raising	their	own	priorities	with	members.	A	common	experience	was	that	when	a	
reorganisation	was	announced,	it	quickly	became	a	main	focus	of	activity	for	the	relevant	
shop	steward,	diverting	attention	from	other	issues.	When	asked	if	his	members	had	shown	
much	interest	in	the	contracts	issue,	one	steward	reported:		
	
‘-	there	was	a	bit	...	Until	the	restructure	-	But	then	everyone	was	consumed	by	
whether	they	were	keeping	their	job	or	not	
How	long	has	the	restructure	taken?	
{Steward}	-	5	months,	ish’.		
	
Although	reorganisations	sometimes	involved	redundancies,	and	this	had	become	more	
common,	usually	jobs	were	lost	through	natural	wastage	and	‘ERVR’	(Early	Retirement	and	
Voluntary	Redundancy).	However,	reorganisations	generally	involved	changes	of	duties	and	
workload,	which	caused	considerable	anxiety:		
	
‘{Steward}	-	although	people	have	got	jobs,	still	an	immense	amount	of	worry	
-	new	job	descriptions…?		
-	workload	increases?	same	work	with	one	less	team	member	…		
-	more	and	more	being	asked	of	them…					
-	annual	appraisal…	mine’s	gone	down	from	4	to	3...	Can't	really	figure	out	why'.		
	
Departmental	reorganisations	usually	had	direct	impacts	upon	work	organisation,	working	
practices,	and	often	upon	work	intensity,	even	when	they	did	not	lead	to	job	losses.	
Consequently,	each	reorganisation	had	the	potential	to	shift	the	terms	of	the	effort	bargain,	
and	the	impact	of	these	changes	on	stewards’	constituents	meant	that	union	members	
prioritised	the	immediate	effects	of	the	reorganisation;	as	a	result,	these	figured	
prominently	in	stewards’	workload.	The	overall	impression	from	diaries	and	diary-interviews	
was	that	stewards	experienced	far	fewer	difficulties	raising	this	issue	than	when	dealing	
with	the	issue	of	new	contracts,	and	this	difference	seems	to	have	been	driven	
predominantly	by	the	differing	attitude	of	union	members	to	the	two	issues.		
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Reorganisations	varied	significantly.	Some	affected	only	one	team	of	six	or	seven	workers;	
others	affected	hundreds	and	involved	outsourcing,	privatisation	and	transfer	of	
employment	under	TUPE	regulations.	During	the	fieldwork,	the	convenor	in	adult	social	care	
was	dealing	with	the	outsourcing	of	care	homes	for	the	elderly	to	a	private	company	on	a	30	
year	contract.	This	involved	the	TUPE	transfer	of	a	significant	number	of	employees,	and	the	
convenor	had	been	involved	in	many	months	of	negotiations	with	the	private	care	company	
over	terms	and	conditions	for	the	transferred	workers.	In	fact,	the	decision	to	transfer	the	
workforce	(but	not	ownership	of	the	homes)	dated	back	some	four	years.	As	a	result	of	the	
negotiations,	the	convenor	had	succeeded	in	gaining	improved	terms	above	the	legal	
minimum	required	by	the	TUPE	regulations;	for	instance,	enhanced	redundancy	terms.	By	
the	time	of	the	research,	though,	the	collective	bargaining	process	had	almost	expired,	and	
the	transfer	date	approached	(though	it	had	previously	been	put	back	significantly).	The	
convenor	felt	she	was	running	out	of	options	for	further	bargaining:	
	
‘-	at	the	moment,	I'm	stuck	in	a	position		
-	people	say,	what's	the	union	going	to	do		
-	but	I	think,	without	industrial	action,	there's	not	much...	and	staff	in	care	homes	
have	never	taken	action	-	they	were	always	exempt’.		
	
Similarly,	
	
‘-	we're	never	going	to	get	a	major	campaign	of	action	from	people	in	the	residential	
care	service	
-	{…}	because	it's	a	service	that's	client	led...	
Do	the	staff	all	feel	that	commitment?	
{Convenor}	-	Oh	yeah,	definitely	-	you	couldn't	work	in	that	sort	of	environment	if	you	
didn't...	It's	demanding	work	and	crap	pay’.	
	
The	absence	of	collective	action	did	not	mean	that	the	convenor	had	no	bargaining	
resources	to	deploy,	however.	The	issue	was	raised	at	steward	committee	meetings	where	a	
number	of	approaches	were	discussed,	and	other	activity	was	outlined	in	diaries	and	diary	
interviews.	For	instance,	stewards	were	aware	that	borough	management	had	concerns	of	
its	own	over	the	transfer;	in	particular,	that	continuity	of	service	might	be	undermined	if	
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significant	numbers	of	staff	left	after	transfer	to	private	sector.	Stewards	considered	that	
continuity	of	service	was	an	issue	which	could	be	used	to	exert	pressure	on	management	
over	terms	and	conditions	of	employment.		
	
Elected	councillors	and	senior	management	were	also	sensitive	to	concerns	over	the	quality	
of	service	provision	by	private	sector	providers,	especially	in	relation	to	very	low	rates	of	
pay,	which	could	be	portrayed	as	undermining	standards	of	care.	During	the	fieldwork,	the	
care	company	announced	its	intention	to	cut	pay	by	around	half	for	transferred	staff,	
described	by	the	convenor	as	‘a	bombshell'.	The	company	proposed	to	buy	out	terms	and	
conditions	under	the	TUPE	transfer,	by	offering	£24,000	to	each	worker	to	give	up	the	
London	Borough	rates	of	pay.	The	standard	rate	of	pay	for	care-workers	would	drop	
dramatically	to	only	£7.46	per	hour,	well	below	the	London	Living	Wage	that	the	council	had	
recently	committed	itself	to	ensuring	was	the	minimum	for	outsourced	labour.	Branch	
officers	contacted	senior	elected	council	members,	pressing	them	to	secure	the	London	
Living	Wage	for	workers	on	these	contracts.	However,	the	union’s	political	efforts	achieved	
no	results,	as	councillors	expressed	concern	but	pleaded	that	this	contract	had	been	signed	
long	before	the	recent	policy	on	the	London	Living	Wage.	Nevertheless,	the	union	did	
attempt	to	initiate	a	publicity	campaign	intended	to	embarrass	the	council	and	the	
company.	Discussion	at	a	stewards’	committee	was	as	follows:	
	
‘{Steward	1}	-	we	need	to	get	this	in	the	press...	people	think	council	staff	get	the	
London	Living	Wage...!	
{Convenor}	-	I	spoke	to	[councillor	responsible]	last	night	-	she	was	not	aware	of	the	
wages...	
[Someone]	-	"She's	a	waste	of	space..."	
[Someone]	-	"They've	'committed'	to	the	London	Living	Wage"		
{Convenor}	-	no...	[they	haven’t]	
-	they	have	said,	new	contracts	[will	get	the	London	Living	Wage]…	
-	This	was	signed	three	years	ago...	
-	ok	-	we'll	have	a	meeting	-	some	embarrassment	factor...	
{Steward	2}	-	what	wages	are	the	top	managers	getting?	
{Steward	3}	-	do	comparisons...	put	the	comparison	out.	It	makes	people	think,	“Hold	
on!	that	pay	is	top	dollar	compared	to	what	the	workers	are	getting…"	
{Convenor}	-	in	fact,	one	member	has	come	to	me	and	said	she	won't	work	on	those	
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wages	-	she'll	quit	and	work	as	agency	-	as	agency	workers,	they	can	get	£10	an	hour	
in	other	industries...	
{Steward	4}	-	carers	and	relatives	will	be	outraged	at	the	treatment	of	elderly	rellies		
{Steward	2}	-	have	the	council	done	consultation?	
{Convenor}	-	three	[four]	years	ago...		
{Steward	2}	-	did	the	consultation	tell	relatives	that	carers	would	get	a	big	pay	cut?	
{Convenor}	-	we	raised	this	recently	[with	the	council]	-	when	are	you	going	to	tell	
people?	
-	they	said,	"we're	not	-	if	you	go	to	press,	it	will	just	scare	people"	-	obviously,	we	do	
have	to	be	careful...	
-	[summing	up]	...ok,	thanks...	that's	helpful...	and	I	will	pick	some	brains...	
{Steward	5}	-	do	any	of	the	big	wigs	have	people	in	care?’.	
	
The	conversation	referred	to	here,	between	convenor	and	councillor,	took	place	at	a	public	
meeting	campaigning	against	the	closure	of	a	local	hospital,	which	was	attended	by	a	
number	of	London	Borough	shop	stewards,	elected	councillors,	and	local	Labour	MPs.	This	
political	channel	of	contact	with	councillors	was	utilised	by	senior	stewards	on	a	number	of	
occasions	during	the	fieldwork.	This	time,	councillors	refused	to	take	action	on	care	home	
pay,	and	the	buy-out	offer	remained	in	place	as	the	deadline	for	transfer	approached.	The	
convenor	summed	up	the	situation	regarding	the	offer:	
	
‘-	they	say	its	voluntary,	but	the	threat	is,	if	you	don’t	{accept},	they	will	come	back	
later	and	give	less…	
-	I	think	{the	workers	are}	stuck	with	TUPE	regs	{…}	But	they	can	change	after	transfer	
[briefly	explains	ETO]1		
{…}	
-	we	have	got	{London	Borough}	redundancy	rates	transferred....	So	the	bottom	line	
is,	if	staff	are	transferred	over,	they	can	keep	the	terms	under	TUPE,	and	if	they	later	
get	reorganised,	they	can	get	{London	Borough}	redundancy’.		
	
In	this	case,	then,	in	a	context	where	stewards	could	see	no	possibility	of	collective	action,	
the	stewards	could	still	make	use	of	bargaining	resources	including:	the	framework	of	legal	
																																								 																				
1	'ETO'	stands	for	'economic,	technical	or	organisational'	reasons,	which	are	grounds	on	
which	it	is	permissible	to	alter	contractual	terms	after	a	transfer	of	employment	under	TUPE	
regulations	(Acas	2014b:	37-38).		
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regulation;	political	pressure	via	elected	councillors	and	the	link	of	unions	to	Labour;	
reputational	sensitivities	of	the	private	firm	and	borough	council.	As	a	result,	while	none	of	
the	union	reps	were	happy	with	the	outcome,	union	bargaining	expertise	did	have	an	
impact	on	the	course	of	events	and	improved	the	terms	of	the	transfer	above	legal	
minimums.		
	
Another	group	of	workers	who	were	unlikely	to	take	industrial	action	were	social	workers.	
Nevertheless,	here,	too,	there	were	alternative	bargaining	resources	available	to	union	reps.	
Among	social	workers	in	CSF,	dealing	often	with	child-protection	issues,	there	was	little	
enthusiasm	for	industrial	action	which	might	put	children	or	young	people	at	risk.	Among	
these	workers,	a	culture	of	long	hours	had	developed,	which	regularly	saw	significant	unpaid	
overtime	and	working	weeks	up	to	50	or	even	60	hours.	Furthermore,	there	was	only	one,	
relatively	inexperienced,	steward	in	this	group.	Nevertheless,	a	CSF	co-convenor	described	
the	influence	that	social	workers	were	able	to	have	over	local	managers	from	time	to	time.	
This	influence	stemmed	from	the	recognition	by	managers	that	the	service	depended	upon	
the	continuing	good	will	of	the	workforce;	specifically,	their	willingness	to	undertake	very	
large	workloads	and	a	great	deal	of	stress.	From	time	to	time,	management	announced	an	
intention	to	introduce	new	work	arrangements	of	some	kind,	to	which	the	workforce	were	
opposed.	In	these	circumstances,	if	feeling	among	the	workforce	was	sufficiently	strong,	the	
convenor	would	adopt	the	tactic	of	hinting	to	management	that	the	introduction	of	the	
proposed	measure	might	have	a	detrimental	effect	on	the	goodwill	of	the	social	workers.	
Although	the	convenor	could	recall	no	cases	of	the	social	workers	actually	withdrawing	good	
will,	and	was	skeptical	that	they	might	ever	actually	do	so,	he	nevertheless	maintained	that	
this	approach	had	been	successful	in	getting	management	to	change	decisions	in	the	past.	
Although	the	fieldwork	recorded	no	actual	instance	of	the	use	of	this	bargaining	resource	
among	these	social	workers,	credibility	is	added	to	these	claims	by	the	use	of	similar	
methods	by	social	workers	in	mental	health	teams.		
	
During	the	fieldwork,	social	workers	in	adult	social	care	were	engaged	in	a	protracted	
dispute	with	management	concerning	a	reorganisation	of	mental	health	teams	(further	
details	in	Section	5.3).	Once	more,	these	workers	were	unlikely	to	take	sustained	industrial	
action,	due	to	their	commitment	to	service-users.	Union	organisation	in	this	area	was	not	
especially	strong,	with	membership	around	50%	and	only	one	steward.	Branch	officers	
traced	the	weakness	of	union	organisation	among	social	workers	back	to	a	long,	bitter,	and	
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ultimately	defeated	strike	some	20	years	previously.	After	the	defeat,	many	activists	left	the	
council,	and	convenors	who	came	later	were	seen	as	having	undermined	union	membership	
and	steward	organisation	by	pursuing	an	excessively	legalistic	‘servicing	model’	of	trade	
unionism	(Simms	et	al.	2013:	7).	More	recent	efforts	had	seen	union	levels	maintained,	but	
few	new	stewards.		
	
Even	so,	social	workers	and	stewards	were	still	able	to	put	pressure	on	management.	When	
the	reorganisation	was	announced,	stewards	used	the	legal	requirement	on	mental	health	
trusts	to	consult	with	service-users,	in	order	to	temporarily	halt	the	reorganisation	pending	
consultation.	The	original	management	proposal	included	significant	down-grading	of	
workers,	but	these	plans	were	dropped	in	the	face	of	union	opposition.	Collective	
bargaining	then	agreed	a	new	grading	structure	and	team	organisation.	One	result	of	this	
reorganisation	was	that	the	new	division	of	labour,	whereby	teams	specialised	in	only	one	
type	of	case	instead	of	a	mixed	workload,	proved	so	unpopular	that	significant	numbers	of	
social	workers	left	the	service	to	go	and	work	elsewhere.	As	a	result,	staff	shortages	were	
undermining	service-provision,	and	social	workers	began	again	to	raise	their	opposition	to	
the	reorganisation	once	more.	As	the	convenor	expressed	it:	
	
‘“It's	a	mess”...	
-	they	{management}	did	acknowledge	yesterday	that	it's	a	mess...	
-	...people	have	lost	confidence’.	
	
The	steward	agreed:	
	
‘-	there's	a	system	that	works...	it's	not	very	good	but	it	does	work....		
-	now	they've	organised	a	meeting	on	Thursday.	They've	not	consulted	with	us	-	we've	
said	we're	not	going	to	go	to	the	meeting,	because	they've	not	consulted	
-	forty	social	workers	could	do	a	vote	of	no	confidence’.		
	
In	the	event,	this	staff	meeting	was	entirely	boycotted	by	social	workers,	which	drew	a	
response	from	management:		
	
‘{Convenor}	-	...the	boycott	of	the	open	day...	the	pressure	from	that	worked...	They	
came	to	us	saying	they	wanted	a	meeting’.		
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Collectively,	social	workers	composed	a	letter	to	management	stating	their	grievances:		
	
‘{Convenor}	-	the	letter	is	from	people	in	the	mental	health	teams	-	they	wrote	it,	but	
wanted	it	to	come	from	the	branch....	{Branch	Secretary}	has	amended	it...	
“There's	quite	a	good	bunch	in	the	mental	health	teams	...	they're	quite	stroppy	...	
keep	it	ticking	over,	really”	
{…}	
-	we're	sending	the	letter	to	the	Director,	Assistant	Director,	HR	senior	business	
partner	{…}	and	Head	of	Case	Management’.	
	
Significantly,	this	group	of	workers	had	an	additional	bargaining	resource	at	their	disposal.	
Because	of	their	legal	role	in	the	issuing	of	orders	under	the	Mental	Health	Act	(commonly	
known	as	‘sectioning’),	these	social	workers	were	registered	as	Approved	Mental	Health	
Professionals	(AMHPs)	and	carried	a	warrant	card.	As	a	result	of	the	dispute	over	
reorganisation	and	the	strength	of	feeling	generated,	social	workers	let	it	be	known	to	
management	that	they	were	considering	handing	in	their	warrant	cards.	Because	of	the	
legal	requirement	on	the	council	to	provide	the	AMHP	service,	this	was	a	significant	threat:				
	
‘{Convenor}	-	Social	workers	are	talking	about	handing	their	warrant	cards	in...	That	
would	put	the	Trust	under	a	lot	of	pressure....	We've	written	to	the	Head	of	Services,	
to	say	you've	got	this	bomb	coming...	And	they've	done	nothing	about	it...	
{…}		
{Steward}	-	a	couple	of	people	have	talked	about	it...	We	had	a	shop	meeting’.		
	
By	the	end	of	the	research,	this	issue	was	still	unresolved;	but	nevertheless	this	example	
shows	that	important	bargaining	resources	can	be	available	in	the	absence	of	strike	action.	
Using	a	combination	of	the	legal	regulatory	framework,	tacit	job	knowledge,	quitting	and	
labour	shortage,	collective	non-strike	action,	threats	of	collective	action	based	on	
occupational	factors,	and	pressure	on	individual	managers,	these	workers	and	their	shop	
steward	were	able	to	pursue	a	reasonably	effective	course	of	action	aimed	at	changing	
management	decisions	over	the	organisation	of	work.	Furthermore,	their	efforts	resulted	in	
clear	movement	from	management	on	the	issues	concerned.		
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A	similarly	broad	mix	of	bargaining	resources	was	used	by	stewards	in	housing	during	a	
lengthy	reorganisation.	Here,	Borough	management	were	closing	five	local	housing	offices	
and	centralising	services	in	one	large	office	facility,	which	was	already	used	by	a	number	of	
other	services.	To	accommodate	a	growing	concentration	of	workers	in	one	building,	a	hot-
desking	system	was	introduced,	whereby	Estate	Officers	worked	two	days	per	week	in	the	
central	office,	with	the	rest	of	their	week	spent	closer	to	the	estates	they	managed	(there	
was	also	an	option	of	working	from	home	one	day	per	week,	which	many	took	up).	Issues	of	
steward	contestation	in	this	reorganisation	included	the	provision	of	mobile	IT	equipment	
(which	was	resolved	relatively	quickly),	and	the	facilities	that	staff	would	be	using	on	days	
when	they	were	not	in	the	central	office,	which	developed	into	a	more	protracted	wrangle.	
Stewards	reported	somewhat	derisively	management	plans	for	'agile	working'	from	'touch-
down'	points.	In	two	neighbourhoods,	stewards	considered	the	facilities	on	offer	
significantly	sub-standard,	with	management	proposing	that	staff	should	work	from	cafes,	
community	centres,	and	libraries;	locations	that	stewards	felt	were	entirely	unsuitable	for	
housing	work,	which	involved	confidential	material	and	often	required	private	interview	
rooms.	Stewards	in	these	areas	conducted	a	campaign	lasting	several	months,	aimed	at	
securing	improved	facilities.	By	the	end	of	the	fieldwork,	these	stewards	reported	that	they	
had	gained	improvements.	Though	none	were	entirely	satisfied	with	the	outcome,	they	had	
pressed	Borough	management	to	make	other	council	premises	available	for	housing	
workers,	closer	to	the	estates	they	managed.	A	number	of	these	were	refitted	to	suit	the	
new	purpose,	though	stewards	had	to	continue	pressing	for	further	changes	even	after	the	
reorganisation	was	complete.	In	one	case,	a	steward	organised	an	informal	boycott	of	one	
outlying	office,	which	lasted	for	several	weeks	until	suitable	alterations	were	made.		
	
Housing	stewards	employed	a	number	of	means	for	pressuring	management	over	collective	
issues.	In	line	with	other	research	on	team	working	(Section	3.1),	stewards	reported	that	
work	organisation	issues	were	often	raised	in	team	meetings;	a	tactic	which	could	be	
sustained	over	lengthy	periods.	One	steward	described	their	usual	approach	to	taking	up	
issues	with	management:		
	
"We	moan	like	fuck	until	they	realise	there's	a	problem."	
	
Stewards	commonly	put	problems	and	proposed	solutions	to	management	in	terms	of	
maintaining	standards	of	service	provision.	Of	course,	these	efforts	were	not	always	
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successful.	Nevertheless,	stewards	recounted	numerous	instances	where	pressure	had	
resulted	in	modifications	to	management	decisions.	One	steward	recalled	that	shortly	prior	
to	the	fieldwork	period,	a	new	IT	system	for	logging	housing	management	casework	had	
been	brought	in,	leading	to	changes	to	established	ways	of	working	that	staff	and	stewards	
regarded	as	making	the	job	more	difficult.	In	particular,	exception	was	taken	to	fixed	admin	
procedures	built	into	the	software,	which	removed	autonomy	and	enforced	rigid	ways	of	
working;	for	instance,	requiring	the	production	of	pro	forma	letters	at	set	points.	Stewards	
felt	these	set	procedures	removed	professional	discretion	from	housing	workers,	reduced	
the	standard	of	service,	and	wasted	time.	Stewards	repeatedly	raised	these	issues	over	
several	months,	until	management	finally	agreed	a	modification	to	the	software:	the	
addition	of	a	"skip"	button,	so	that	workers	could	bypass	set	tasks,	thereby	returning	
flexible	control	of	the	labour	process	into	the	hands	of	housing	workers.		
	
In	a	further	example	of	bargaining	resource	innovation,	two	stewards	in	one	housing	office	
had	given	a	name	to	a	practice	that	was	reported	more	widely.	The	continual	flow	of	new	
management	initiatives	and	modifications	to	ways	of	working	–	some	large,	many	small	–	
meant	that	stewards	often	faced	questions	from	members	and	had	to	decide	which,	if	any,	
of	these	to	challenge.	Stewards	knew	from	experience	that	raising	strong	objections	to	a	
management	announcement	could	result	in	managers	becoming	more	determined	to	
enforce	a	new	way	of	working.	Stewards	had	also	noticed,	though,	that	management	
initiatives	often	fell	into	disuse	after	a	short	period,	as	attention	shifted	elsewhere.	
Therefore,	these	stewards	had	adopted	a	tactic	of	selectively	ignoring	management	
initiatives,	in	the	hope	and	expectation	that	these	would	simply	disappear.	The	two	
stewards	called	this	method	the	'body	swerve'.	These	stewards	reported	occasional	informal	
work	group	meetings	to	discuss	particularly	unpopular	new	management	instructions.	
When	the	result	of	discussion	was	that	shop	stewards	advised	a	'body	swerve',	staff	would	
resume	normal	working,	quietly	ignoring	the	instruction	until	it	fell	into	disuse.	Altogether,	
alongside	relative	numerical	strength	and	organisational	capacity,	stewards	in	housing	
displayed	considerable	ingenuity	in	devising	ways	to	influence	management	decisions.		
	
Bargaining	in	consultation		
The	term	‘consultation’	was	much	in	evidence	at	London	Borough.	Union-management	
forums	at	directorate	and	corporate	levels	were	designated	'Joint	Consultation	Committee’,	
service	reorganisation	involved	a	less	formalised	'consultation'	process,	and	stewards	
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referred	to	'consultation'	often	and	in	many	contexts.	However,	the	almost	ubiquitous	use	
of	this	term	disguises	important	complexity	in	relations	between	union	and	management,	
and	undermines	the	simple	conception	of	the	current	standard	view.	Notably,	the	
protracted	period	of	bargaining	prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	new	contracts	bore	little	
resemblance	to	the	current	standard	view’s	notion	of	consultation,	despite	the	fact	that	all	
formal	talks	took	place	under	the	auspices	of	the	Corporate	Joint	Consultation	Committee	
(CJCC).	First,	the	process	departed	from	the	standard	definition	of	consultation	in	that	
management	approached	the	union	with	clear	and	detailed	proposals,	worked	out	in	
advance	through	the	hiring	of	management	consultants.	Yet,	the	standard	definition	of	
consultation	states	that	it	should	take	place	when	proposals	are	at	an	early	stage	of	
development	(Acas	2014a).	The	approach	of	London	Borough	management	therefore	
departed	from	formal	consultation	in	this	important	respect.		
	
Secondly,	the	lengthy	period	of	talks	in	the	CJCC	very	much	resembled	old-fashioned	
collective	bargaining	negotiations:	management	sought	agreement	from	the	union	on	the	
new	contract	(proposal);	the	union	rejected	the	plans	and	raised	a	number	of	specific	
objections	(counter-proposal);	management	agreed	to	some	changes	(concessions);	the	
union	continued	with	other	objections	(further	counter-proposals);	finally,	the	talks	reached	
stalemate	with	no	agreement	(failure	to	agree).	In	the	face	of	continuing	union	opposition,	
management	announced	the	£1000	offer	for	any	employee	who	signed	the	new	contract;	
an	inducement	intended	to	overcome	union	resistance.	The	version	of	the	new	contracts	
that	management	rolled	out	included	(limited)	concessions	made	in	response	to	union	
opposition.	Despite	the	fact	that	this	process	took	place	entirely	under	the	official	auspices	
of	‘consultation’,	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	it	can	be	described	other	than	as	traditional	‘labor	
negotiations’	(Walton	and	McKersie	1991).	Stewards	were	also	able,	on	numerous	
occasions,	to	secure	modifications	to	management	decisions	and	actions	during	
'consultation'	accompanying	service	reorganisations.	Consequently,	stewards	were	
exercised	in	trying	to	secure	what	they	saw	as	proper	consultation,	in	a	role	similar	to	
Flanders'	notion	of	stewards	as	'guardians'	of	custom	and	practice	(Brown	1973:	131);	
though,	in	this	case,	stewards	were	concerned	to	uphold	other	standards	of	management	
conduct.	At	London	Borough,	consultation	entailed	frontier	of	control	issues,	and	stewards	
understood	it	as	offering	opportunities	for	them	to	influence	management	decisions.	This	
evidence	clearly	undermines	the	assumption	of	the	current	standard	view	that	bargaining	
content	can	be	read	straightforwardly	from	the	formal	designation	of	union-management	
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forums.		
	
Proponents	of	the	current	standard	view	might	object	at	this	point,	pointing	to	the	relative	
weakness	of	union	responses,	the	60%	sign-up	rate	for	the	new	contracts	(see	above),	and	
the	union’s	inability	to	decisively	see	off	management	plans.	Such	objections	conflate	two	
issues:	the	outcome	of	management	initiatives,	and	the	nature	of	the	process	taking	place.	
In	terms	of	outcomes,	it	is	not	the	claim	of	this	thesis	that	workplace	unions	have	retained	
their	previous	bargaining	power.	The	decline	of	union	strength	is	real	and	well	documented.	
It	is	therefore	no	surprise	that	union	organisation	at	London	Borough	encountered	serious	
difficulties	when	faced	with	a	sustained	attempt	by	management	to	undermine	terms	and	
conditions.	Nevertheless,	in	terms	of	the	overall	process,	despite	problems	with	
mobilisation,	and	intra-organisational	bargaining	difficulties,	shop	stewards	and	branch	
officers	gained	initial	concessions,	maintained	their	opposition,	ran	a	campaign	against	
signing	which	management	were	forced	repeatedly	to	respond	to,	and	achieved	further	
modifications	to	management’s	plans	through	political	exchange	via	links	with	the	elected	
council’s	Labour	administration.	In	terms	of	social	content,	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	this	
process	can	be	described	other	than	in	Walton	and	McKersie’s	(1991:	4)	terms,	as	
distributive	bargaining,	a	'subprocess'	of	labour	negotiation.	This	evidence	also	undermines	
the	assumption	of	the	current	standard	view	that	an	absence	of	traditional	industrial	action	
must	mean	that	no	negotiation	can	take	place.		
	
The	notion	that	consultation	is	essentially	unilateral	management	decision	making	is	further	
undermined	by	evidence	from	London	Borough	which	shows	stewards	approaching	JCCs	as	
a	forum	for	raising	issues	and	concerns	of	their	own.	This	aspect	is	entirely	missing	from	the	
conception	of	consultation	in	the	current	standard	view,	in	which	the	role	of	union	
representative	is	solely	to	comment	on	management	proposals.	Not	only	did	London	
Borough	stewards	actively	select	issues	to	take	to	management	at	JCCs,	they	were	often	
able	to	secure	modified	outcomes.	Thus,	in	this	case	study,	formally	designated	
‘consultation’	processes	operated	in	practice	as	a	two-way	channel	of	communication	and	
bargaining	between	shop	stewards	and	managers,	and	not	as	a	one-way	channel	for	shop	
stewards	to	comment	on	unilateral	management	decisions.		
	
Overall,	then,	evidence	from	London	Borough	significantly	undermines	the	sharp	separation	
of	negotiation	and	consultation	upon	which	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards	
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depends.	Next,	discussion	turns	to	another	distinction	of	the	current	standard	view;	that	
between	collective	issues	and	individual	representation.		
	
	
5.3	Shop	stewards	and	individual	representation		
	
As	expected,	individual	representation	and	casework	formed	a	significant	proportion	of	the	
activity	and	effort	of	shop	stewards	at	London	Borough.	Evidence	from	diaries,	diary-
interviews,	observation	of	shop	stewards’	meetings,	and	in-depth	interviews,	all	
demonstrated	the	importance	of	individual	representation	for	these	stewards,	and	for	the	
union	members	they	represented.	Precise	numbers	for	individual	cases	handled	by	stewards	
were	difficult	to	estimate	because	the	fieldwork	combined	several	data-gathering	methods	
over	an	extended	period,	which	made	accurate	counting	problematic.	For	instance,	
stewards	might	refer	to	a	single	case	in	different	ways,	using	tacit	knowledge,	so	that	its	
identity	was	unclear.	Some	cases	made	repeat	appearances	in	the	data,	as	stewards	
detailed	numerous	stages	in	the	development	of	a	single	case,	especially	the	more	complex	
or	stressful	ones;	a	source	of	repeat-reporting.	At	the	same	time,	evidence	from	diary-
interviews	showed	that	stewards	often	under-recorded	individual	casework	in	their	diary	
entries.	Despite	these	difficulties	in	providing	accurate	numbers,	however,	it	was	clear	that	
shop	stewards	at	London	Borough	dealt	with	a	large	amount	of	individual	representation	
and	casework.		
	
To	a	considerable	extent,	the	significance	of	individual	representation	for	these	shop	
stewards	was	a	direct	response	to	methods	employed	by	management.	During	the	fieldwork	
at	London	Borough,	the	branch	office	received	figures	for	the	number	of	case	hearings	
which	had	been	held	during	2012,	for	which	the	total	was	a	little	over	600	individual	
meetings	held	under	procedures	relating	to	sickness	absence,	disciplinary	matters,	
performance	and	capability,	and	grievance.	Bearing	in	mind	that	one	individual	case	could	
have	up	to	three	meetings	(investigation,	hearing,	appeal),	the	total	figure	does	not	equate	
to	600	individual	employees.	Furthermore,	some	individuals	would	not	have	been	union	
members,	thus	not	requiring	union	representation.	Even	so,	the	figure	of	600	hearings	
probably	represents	200-400	individuals,	or	between	5%	and	10%	of	the	entire	workforce.	
Generally,	stewards	felt	that	this	heavy	use	of	formal	procedures	was	driven	by	the	HR	
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department.	Moreover,	insofar	as	employers	pursue	a	policy	of	management	by	procedure,	
shop	stewards	will	not	be	able	to	avoid	considerable	activity	in	this	area.	What	the	present	
research	makes	clear,	however,	is	the	sophistication	of	shop	steward	responses;	at	least,	in	
this	case	study.	
	
Overall,	the	research	gathered	an	abundance	of	rich	and	detailed	evidence	concerning	the	
activity	of	London	Borough	shop	stewards	in	this	area,	revealing	a	far	more	complex	reality	
than	has	been	assumed	by	recent	accounts.	Shop	stewards	in	this	case	study	experienced	
individual	representation	as	a	responsibility	and	sometimes	a	burden,	but	often	also	as	an	
opportunity	to	contest	management	decisions	and	actions.	In	important	respects,	individual	
representation	by	shop	stewards	in	this	case	study	can	be	seen	as	an	encounter	between	
new	public	sector	management	and	the	‘intelligent	trade	unionist’	(Section	1.2),	in	a	context	
of	limited	opportunities	for	collective	action.	The	fieldwork	revealed	that	the	overall	picture	
was	considerably	more	complex	than	the	headline	number	of	cases	might	suggest.	The	next	
sub-section	examines	ways	in	which	cases	varied,	and	the	ways	in	which	stewards	
understood	and	responded	to	those	differences.		
	
Variation	in	individual	casework		
During	the	fieldwork	at	London	Borough,	it	became	clear	that	individual	representation	
could	not	be	treated	as	an	undifferentiated	whole.	Rather,	individual	casework	varied	in	
important	ways.	This	finding	is	important	because	the	current	standard	view	treats	
individual	representation	and	casework	uniformly	as	representing	a	departure	from	dealing	
with	collective	issues.	Moreover,	shop	stewards	at	London	Borough	were	well	aware	of	
variation	within	the	workload	of	individual	representation	they	undertook.	Casework	varied	
in	a	number	of	ways,	but	this	presentation	will	focus	on	two	broad	areas:	first,	differences	in	
the	amount	of	casework	carried	out	by	shop	stewards;	and,	second,	differences	in	the	
nature	of	the	cases	and	therefore	also	in	the	importance	that	shop	stewards	attached	to	
them.		
	
Concerning	the	first	aspect	of	variation	in	casework,	given	the	ubiquity	attached	to	
individual	representation	in	the	recent	literature,	an	unexpected	finding	of	the	present	
research	was	that	some	stewards	clearly	did	a	very	great	deal	of	individual	representation,	
while	others	did	comparatively	little	or	even	none	at	all.	Commonly,	convenors,	co-
convenors,	and	some	branch	officers	carried	the	greatest	burden	of	casework;	indeed,	it	
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was	fairly	common	for	some	to	report	attending	three	hearings	in	a	week.	In	part,	this	
reflected	the	level	of	shop	steward	organisation	within	a	department	or	directorate.	Thus,	
for	instance,	in	Adult	Social	Care	there	were	some	500	union	members	but	only	two	shop	
stewards;	not	surprisingly,	the	co-convenor	carried	a	very	considerable	workload	of	
individual	representation	in	this	department.	This	convenor	commented:	
	
‘-	All	you	do	...	most	of	the	time	...	is	representation.		
“I	hate	it”		
-	…	not	really	hate...	but	it's	tiring....	Management	tie	you	down.	It	keeps	you	busy,	
and	you	don't	get	time	to	organise’.			
	
Such	a	view	plainly	chimes	with	aspects	of	the	current	standard	view,	which	sees	the	growth	
of	individual	representation	as	restricting	shop	stewards’	ability	to	represent	workers	on	
collective	issues	(Section	2.1).	By	contrast,	housing	had	a	far	greater	number	of	experienced	
stewards,	who	did	the	majority	of	individual	representation;	consequently,	the	co-convenor	
here	did	much	less.	Thus,	it	was	in	areas	with	a	shortage	of	stewards	that	convenors	carried	
the	greatest	burden	of	individual	casework.		
	
In	some	areas,	variation	in	the	amount	of	individual	representation	reflected	a	rudimentary	
division	of	labour,	a	considered	strategy	by	stewards	for	dealing	with	this	workload.	For	
instance,	the	branch	secretary,	branch	chair,	and	one	other	experienced	steward	between	
them	carried	a	large	proportion	of	the	most	difficult	cases;	an	arrangement	based	mainly	on	
their	experience	and	expertise.	In	two	areas	–	housing	benefit,	and	libraries	–	stewards	had	
devised	their	own	informal	division	of	labour,	such	that	some	stewards	specialised	in	
individual	representation	while	others	concentrated	on	collective	issues.	Furthermore,	new	
and	inexperienced	stewards	conducted	no	individual	representation	at	all.	In	some	
instances,	this	was	because	they	were	awaiting	formal	union	training.	More	generally,	
handling	casework	was	considered	quite	onerous	and	demanding,	so	new	stewards	had	to	
learn	the	ropes	before	going	solo,	as	it	were;	often,	this	meant	shadowing	more	
experienced	stewards,	or	some	other	informal	mentoring	arrangement.		
	
The	research	also	found	evidence	that	the	amount	of	individual	representation	and	
casework	carried	out	by	shop	stewards	varied	over	time,	and	both	between	and	within	
departments	and	directorates.	This	aspect	of	variation	appeared	to	be	related	to	changing	
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management	practices,	whether	at	the	level	of	individual	managers'	behaviour	and	
preferences,	or	in	relation	to	changing	management	systems,	such	as	the	introduction	of	
new	HRM	policy.	One	longstanding	steward	contrasted	the	current	level	of	formal	
procedures	with	the	situation	when	she	had	first	become	a	union	rep:		
	
‘-	years	ago,	when	I	became	a	steward,	I	didn't	do	any	of	that	
-	we	had	a	few	stewards,	[and]	the	assistant	branch	sec,	{who}	would	do	that		
-	there	was	less	of	it	–	definitely...	less	disciplinaries,	less	sickness	{cases}		
-	we	had	reps	who	{did}	casework	and	quite	liked	it,	but	it	was	across	the	whole	
council	-	now	I	do	the	same	[amount]	for	half	a	department'.	
	
Thus,	the	long-term	shift	in	management	methods	appeared	to	be	one	influence	on	the	
increase	in	the	amount	of	individual	representation	that	shop	stewards	were	conducting.		
	
Stewards	also	reported	that	the	amount	of	individual	casework	could	vary	over	shorter	
timescales.	One	commented:		
	
‘-	Individual	cases	massively	goes	up	and	down	for	me	
-	a	year	ago	had	far	more	than	now	
-	I	hardly	ever	used	to	get	underperformance	...	Now,	I've	had	four	in	the	last	18	
months.....	I	reckon	I've	[pause	for	thought]	...	to	be	honest,	I	can	only	think	of	one	
before	then’.		
	
This	steward,	from	housing,	also	had	an	explanation	for	these	changes:		
	
‘-	Partly	...	one	of	our	new	managers	-	she's	mrs	climb-up-the-greasy-pole		
-	...	she's	been	through	6	estate	officers.	One,	she's	done	twice	on	underperformance,	
and	we	cut	a	deal	[for	early	retirement].	She's	had	three	temps	{...}	walk	out	on	her,	
saying	she's	impossible	to	work	with....		
-	All	the	others,	to	be	honest,	they	weren't	fuck-ups.	They	just	didn't	do	everything	
she	wanted'.	
	
While	this	instance	links	an	increase	in	individual	casework	to	the	conduct	of	one	manager,	
stewards	also	linked	changes	in	the	amount	of	individual	representation	to	shifts	in	wider	
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management	priorities.	One	convenor	saw	a	number	of	factors	behind	an	increase	in	
individual	casework	across	a	directorate:		
	
‘-	we	got	figures	recently	for	sackings	...	definitely	up	-	figures	for	the	worst	sanctions	
-	sackings,	capabilities	...	going	up....		
-	periodically	they	do	...	but	also,	the	new	contracts	...	trying	to	put	people	under	
pressure’.	
	
Questions	concerning	stewards'	attribution	of	motives	to	management	will	be	discussed	
further	below	(Section	5.4).	Suffice	to	note,	here,	that	stewards	commonly	linked	changing	
management	priorities	to	variations	in	the	amount	of	individual	representation	and	
casework	that	they	undertook.		
	
The	second	aspect	of	variation	in	stewards’	workload	of	individual	representation	and	
casework	concerned	the	nature	of	the	cases	themselves.	At	the	most	simple	level,	one	
steward	stated:		
	
'-	Some	cases	take	a	long	time,	but	some	are	over	quickly'.		
	
More	significantly	for	the	purposes	of	the	present	study,	there	was	significant	variation	in	
the	degree	to	which	individual	cases	entailed	issues	that	were	specific	to	one	employee,	as	
compared	with	cases	entailing	issues	that	were	more	widely	applicable	to	a	number	of	
employees.	That	is,	some	cases	could	be	considered	properly	individual,	while	others	carried	
collective	weight.	An	example	of	a	narrowly	individual	case	involved	a	worker	accused	of	
misusing	a	council	travel	card	to	the	amount	of	£13,	described	by	a	convenor	as:		
	
'He's	a	bloke	who's	been	naughty’.		
	
Other	examples	of	the	more	narrowly	individual	type	of	case	included:	two	former	friends	
who	had	fallen	out	badly,	leading	to	significant	inter-personal	conflict	and	a	formal	
grievance;	arrangements	for	a	member	who	returned	to	work	with	limited	mobility	after	a	
broken	ankle;	a	retired	caretaker	at	risk	of	losing	council	accommodation;	an	older	
employee	with	severe	arthritis	seeking	early	retirement	on	ill-health	grounds;	an	appeal	
over	a	job	evaluation;	a	member	being	bullied	by	team-mates;	a	member	overseas	during	a	
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sabbatical	year,	concerned	about	re-deployment;	an	application	to	the	Unison	hardship	
fund.	A	few	stewards	were	dealing	with	cases	of	long-term	sickness	absence,	which	usually	
revolved	around	the	unfortunate	circumstances	of	one	person.	Some	of	these	cases	could	
be	very	time-consuming	for	shop	stewards,	carrying	on	for	many	months,	and	often	
involving	very	distressing	circumstances.	In	the	most	serious	cases,	stewards	generally	had	
two	main	aims.	First,	stewards	were	keen	to	maintain	employment	wherever	possible.	
Second,	stewards	were	significantly	concerned	to	ensure	that	members	were	treated	
sympathetically	and	fairly	by	management;	in	particular,	by	the	fair	and	reasonable	
application	of	procedures.	
	
This	second	consideration	–	the	fair	and	reasonable	application	of	procedures	–	also	applied	
in	even	the	simplest	of	individual	misconduct	cases,	and	indicates	an	important	linkage	
between	individual	cases	and	the	wider	collective	issue	of	the	establishment	and	
maintenance	of	standards	of	management	behaviour.	As	one	steward	expressed	it:		
	
‘"One	thing	I	always	try	and	find	out	...	Does	the	manager	treat	everyone	the	same?”	
{…}		
Equal	treatment	-	why	is	that	important?	
{Steward}	-	“It's	a	good	defence”		
-	if	the	manager	is	not	being	fair,	it's	a	good	point	against	them	in	a	hearing	-	grounds	
for	a	grievance’.	
	
Similarly,	a	convenor	discussed	the	place	of	equal	treatment	in	the	wider	context	of	
bargaining	relations	between	union	reps	and	management:	
	
‘-	Management	are	supposed	to	treat	people	fairly	and	consistently...	
-	what	we’re	dealing	with	is	where	they	haven't	
-	they	apply	rules	differently	
-	that's	about	where	you	are	in	the	hierarchy	
-	also	about	who	you	are	
-	HR	are	supposed	to	be	the	moderating	factor,	but	they're	not	
{…}	
-	there’s	no	system	that	looks	at	comparators	properly,	“so	we	have	to	use	our	
cunning”…	
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{…}	
-	We	want	people	dealt	with	consistently		
-	consistent	application	of	procedures	
-	If	they’re	inconsistent,	you	can	often	make	an	individual	case	into	a	wider	
campaigning	case	
{…}	
-	the	whole	point	of	having	negotiated	procedures...	ultimately	it's	about	equality	
-	decent	trade	unionists	come	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	equalities	we've	fought	
for...	framework	of	equality	
{…}	
-	It	becomes	part	of	the	way	you	deal	with	things	
-	there's	enough	inequalities	
-	…class...	people	at	the	bottom	are	treated	like	shit	...	people	at	the	top...	nice	little	
earner…	
“My	indignation	gets	in	the	way.”’		
	
The	commitment	on	the	part	of	stewards	at	London	Borough	to	the	fair	and	equitable	
treatment	of	workers	by	managers	shows	a	clear	continuity	with	Brown’s	(1973)	notion	of	
‘shop-stewardlines’	(Section	2.2).	Thus,	even	quite	narrowly	individual	cases	shaded	into	
collective	representation	if	stewards	thought	management	had	applied	procedures	unfairly.		
	
Individual	cases	might	be	linked	to	collective	issues	in	other	ways.	One	steward	reported	an	
individual	case	of	work-related	stress	that	was	perceived	as	being	caused	by	work	
organisation.	The	steward	pressed	for	work	reorganisation	or	workload	reduction	in	order	
to	allow	the	member	to	return	to	work.	Of	course,	such	measures	might	then	apply	to	other	
workers,	thereby	developing	a	collective	aspect.	Even	where	work	reorganisation	applied	to	
one	member	only,	the	impact	of	shop	steward	activity	was	to	constrain	management	
decision-making.	Some	of	the	most	serious	individual	cases	led	to	senior	stewards	and	
convenors	becoming	involved	in	discussions	with	management	concerning	the	operation	of	
important	procedures,	such	as	the	safeguarding	of	adults	with	learning	difficulties,	and	
control	of	medication	in	care	homes.	These	examples	represent	a	considerable	extension	of	
the	scope	of	shop	steward	activity	–	certainly,	as	compared	with	the	issues	handled	by	
stewards	in	the	classic	studies.	Consequently,	evidence	from	the	fieldwork	showed	both	
that	collective	issues	could	and	did	arise	in	individual	cases,	and	also	that	the	significance	of	
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the	collective	aspect	varied.		
	
Furthermore,	shop	stewards	at	London	Borough	understood	that	individual	cases	could	
carry	significant	collective	implications.	Discussing	the	relationship	of	collective	issues	to	
individual	casework,	one	convenor	said:	
	
‘-	many	issues,	like	sickness,	or	disciplinary	cases	where	someone's	done	something	
stupid,	you	can't	generalise	it.	You	just	have	to	deal	with	the	case.	With	sickness,	
people	often	don't	want	the	details	known,	[they	want	to	keep	it	private].	
-	some	things	you	can't	make	collective	…	{for	instance}	if	someone's	had	a	lot	of	
sickness’.	
	
This	convenor	continued:	
	
‘"If	it’s	one	worker	you	might	try,	and	if	it's	a	group	of	workers	you	might	try	harder,	if	
it's	got	an	organisational	outcome”	
What	do	you	mean	by	'if	it's	got	an	organisational	outcome'?	
{Convenor}	-	“If	it's	something	you	think	there's	going	to	be	a	gain	in	extending	union	
organisation”	
-	but	that	would	involve	the	members	pushing	it	
How?	
{Convenor}	-	“I	suppose…	[pause]	You	might	see…	[pause]	If	people	were	unwilling	to	
perform	part	of	their	job”		
-	or	a	petition	
“Or	...	just	go	public	with	it,	really.”	
How	does	that	make	a	difference?	
{Convenor}	-	“It	means	that	if	you've	got	a	dispute	-	formal	or	not	-	that	makes	
management	nervous	-	and	therefore	they	get	more	inventive	about	finding	a	way	to	
agree	part	of	your	demands,	or	something”’.		
	
This	convenor	was	particularly	thoughtful	about	the	potential	of	individual	cases	to	carry	
collective	significance.	Evidence	from	in-depth	interviews	suggested	that	around	a	third	of	
the	stewards	who	participated	saw	individual	representation	explicitly	in	terms	of	collective	
relations	between	workers	and	management.	A	general	commitment	to	fair	treatment	of	
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individuals,	though,	was	almost	ubiquitous	in	stewards’	expressed	motivations	for	
conducting	individual	representation.	Moreover,	regardless	of	how	explicitly	they	linked	
individual	and	collective	issues,	it	was	clear	during	the	fieldwork	that	individual	casework	
often	involved	stewards	in	direct	challenges	to	managerial	prerogatives,	especially	in	
relation	to	frontier	of	control	issues.	Consequently,	the	next	sub-section	will	present	a	more	
detailed	consideration	of	the	manifestation	of	collective	issues	in	individual	casework.		
	
Collective	issues	in	individual	casework		
As	suggested	above,	some	of	the	individual	representation	carried	out	by	shop	stewards	at	
London	Borough	involved	dealing	with	issues	that	had	important	implications	for	collective	
relations	between	workers	and	management.	The	interpenetration	of	individual	and	
collective	issues	in	such	cases	can	be	illustrated	by	two	examples.	It	is	not	the	suggestion,	
here,	that	these	two	cases	were	typical	of	individual	casework	at	London	Borough.	Rather,	
these	examples	have	been	selected	for	detailed	discussion	because	they	show	most	clearly	
the	linkages	between	individual	and	collective	issues,	and	therefore	permit	the	exploration	
this	important	analytical	point.		
	
The	first	example	involved	the	mental	health	social	workers	discussed	above	(Section	5.2),	
who	worked	in	teams	alongside	NHS	staff	and	social	workers	from	a	neighbouring	borough.	
In	a	somewhat	complex	arrangement,	these	social	workers	were	employed	by	London	
Borough	but	the	service	was	managed	by	the	NHS	Trust	covering	the	two	boroughs.	Early	in	
2012,	NHS	management	undertook	a	major	reorganisation,	which	led	to	some	three	months	
of	negotiations	with	union	representatives	from	the	NHS	unions	and	from	both	local	
authorities.	The	outcome	of	these	negotiations	was	an	agreement	on	new	job	descriptions	
and	a	new	grading	structure	for	these	workers.	Up	to	this	point,	then,	stewards	and	
convenors	dealt	with	this	issue	via	traditional	collective	bargaining	methods.		
	
The	collective	bargaining	agreement	was	not	the	end	of	the	matter,	however.	The	convenor	
who	represented	the	social	workers	during	the	collective	bargaining	subsequently	
represented	twelve	members	in	individual	cases,	which	the	convenor	described	as	‘fallout’:		
	
“12	individual	cases,	out	of	70	ish	members	in	{London	Borough}.	That's	quite	a	high	
proportion.”		
-	mainly	over	reconfiguration	of	teams	and	change	of	duties:		
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“We	insisted	people	had	a	choice	-	first,	second,	third…"		
[i.e.	a	choice	over	where	they	were	redeployed	to.]		
I	ask	if	these	cases	were	basically	about	making	management	stick	to	the	agreement	
that	had	already	been	made?		
{Convenor}	-	yes.	Making	management	stick	to	an	agreement	already	made’.	
	
Many	of	these	cases	were	appeals	or	grievances	lodged	where	the	member	and	convenor	
believed	an	individual	had	been	wrongly	regraded.	The	convenor	ran	through	the	individual	
cases	(although	in	fact	only	eight	are	recorded	in	the	fieldnotes):	
	
'1.	another	reorganisation…	
2.	reasonable	adjustment	
3.	appeal		
4.	appeal	
5.	downgraded	worker	refusing	extra	duties,	which	are	thus	effectively	unpaid		
“She's	protected	on	pay,	so	basically	we've	got	3	years	to	have	this	argument...	And	
we	will”	
-	{Pay}	protection	negotiated	in	reorganisation	procedure	in	2010	(ish)	-	automatic	if	
downgraded	one	grade	
6.	{Employee}	not	paid	additional	increments	for	new	duties	and	promotion...		
“It	took	us	from	June	until	last	week	{October}	...	Backdated	now”.		
“They've	got	such	a	high	turnover	of	people	in	HR,	no	one	remembers	what	was	
agreed.”	
7.	protected	pay	
8.	appeal	of	relocation	to	team	with	night	and	weekend	working...	{on	grounds	of}	
health	and	reasonable	adjustment.	May	come	up	again’.		
	
Here,	then,	the	pursuit	of	individual	cases	was	clearly	and	explicitly	an	effort	by	union	
representatives	to	enforce	the	terms	of	a	collective	agreement.	This	evidence	is	plainly	a	
challenge	to	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards,	which	sees	individual	casework	as	
sharply	separate	from	collective	representation	and	bargaining.	Viewed	in	terms	of	
bargaining	opportunities	and	resources,	the	negotiation	of	a	new	grading	structure	
represented	a	fairly	traditional	bargaining	opportunity.	By	contrast,	the	use	of	a	series	of	
grievance	cases	to	press	management	over	the	interpretation	and	implementation	of	the	
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collective	agreement	represents	a	novel	and	unexpected	bargaining	resource,	which	was	
clearly	being	applied	to	constrain	management's	freedom	to	act	unilaterally.	It	is	difficult	to	
see	how	this	unfolding	process	could	be	described	other	than	as	the	pursuit	of	collective	
ends	by	individual	means.		
	
The	second	example	of	collective	issues	arising	in	individual	representation	involves	the	
dismissal	and	later	reinstatement	of	a	caretaker	on	a	council	housing	estate,	who	was	
sacked	for	gross	misconduct	–	‘bringing	the	council	into	disrepute’	–	after	an	altercation	
during	which	she	swore	at	a	member	of	the	public.	This	case	continued	for	some	weeks	and	
was	a	focus	of	considerable	attention	for	shop	stewards,	branch	officers,	and	managers,	as	
well	as	drawing	comment	from	other	workers,	elected	councillors	and	tenants'	
representatives.	This	case	will	be	examined	in	some	detail	to	draw	out	the	complexities	of	
individual	and	collective	issues	involved.	The	following	account	draws	on	several	diaries	and	
diary-interviews,	and	observation	in	three	stewards’	committee	meetings,	to	provide	a	
rounded	view	of	events	and	of	the	framework	of	understanding	applied	by	stewards.	
Although	not	a	run-of-the-mill	example,	this	case	illustrated	themes	in	individual	
representation	that	were	found	across	a	range	of	other	cases.		
	
It	should	be	noted	that	this	case	raised	issues	of	race	and	gender	that	might	be	considered	
from	the	perspective	of	intersectionality,	but	which	cannot	be	developed	here	for	lack	of	
space;	nevertheless,	they	should	be	made	explicit	(McBride	et	al.	2014).	The	complaint	
against	the	caretaker,	who	was	a	young	white	woman,	included	an	allegation	that	she	had	
made	a	racist	comment	towards	the	complainant,	an	older	Asian	man.	The	caretaker	denied	
the	allegation	of	racism,	and	made	a	counter-claim	that	she	had	been	subject	to	obscene	
sexual	comments	and	gestures	by	the	complainant.	The	shop	steward	who	represented	the	
caretaker	during	the	formal	process,	including	denying	the	charge	of	racism,	was	a	middle-
aged	Black	British	woman.	A	second,	very	experienced,	steward	closely	involved	in	the	case	
was	a	middle-aged	white	woman.	These	two	stewards	both	worked	as	frontline	housing	
workers	in	the	nearby	housing	office,	and	representation	in	this	case	fell	to	them	due	to	the	
lack	of	stewards	among	the	caretakers	(Section	5.1).	The	choice	of	a	Black	steward	to	
defend	a	complaint	of	racism	was	a	deliberate	ploy	by	the	stewards	to	strengthen	that	
defence;	stewards	and	convenors	who	worked	with	and	knew	the	accused,	including	the	
two	lead	defenders,	were	confident	that	the	caretaker	was	not	a	racist	and	that	the	
allegation	was	false.		
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As	noted,	the	complaint	which	led	to	the	dismissal	included	an	allegation	of	racial	abuse,	
which	the	caretaker	denied,	which	none	of	the	shop	stewards	believed,	and	which	
management	did	not	pursue	(see	below).	The	caretaker	had	previously	given	evidence	
against	the	complainant	in	a	separate	case	brought	by	the	council,	and	claimed	she	had	
been	subjected	to	a	lengthy	campaign	of	harassment	from	him	as	a	result.	Indeed,	
management	confirmed	that	they	had	previously	received	complaints	from	her	about	this	
individual,	but	had	taken	no	action.	On	this	occasion,	the	caretaker	admitted,	she	had	lost	
her	temper	and	used	the	word	‘fuck’.	Nevertheless,	despite	these	mitigating	circumstances,	
the	caretaker	was	dismissed	after	a	disciplinary	hearing.		
	
For	the	stewards,	this	outcome	was	unexpected.	Although	the	case	had	been	discussed	
collectively	between	stewards	at	an	early	stage,	there	was	no	expectation	that	it	might	lead	
to	dismissal,	and	consequent	expressions	of	shock	when	it	did.	As	one	steward	put	it:	
	
‘-	verbal	abuse,	but	mitigation	-	long	running	dispute	because	caretaker	had	given	
evidence	{…}			
-	didn’t	expect	that		
“It	was	a	shock”	
-	eight	years	good	service,	the	tenants	love	her’.	
	
According	to	the	stewards,	such	a	case	would	usually	be	expected	to	result	in	a	reprimand	
and	written	warning.	Consequently,	an	appeal	was	lodged	using	the	formal	disciplinary	
procedure,	and	the	following	meeting	of	the	HASC	shop	stewards’	committee	discussed	how	
to	proceed.	As	a	result,	the	strategy	pursued	by	the	local	stewards	was	developed	in	
conjunction	with	the	convenors	and	other	stewards	on	the	committee.	One	aspect	of	these	
discussions	was	the	pooling	of	knowledge	of	the	disciplinary	procedure,	council	policies	on	
misconduct,	and	previous	experience	of	stewards	in	handling	this	type	of	case.	One	steward	
argued	that	management	was	at	fault:		
	
‘{Steward	1}	-	{London	Borough}	have	failed	because	they	put	her	in	that	situation…	
{Steward	2}	-	it's	not	as	simple	as	that,	because	she	could	have	walked	away’.		
	
In	this	exchange,	Steward	2	is	an	experienced	frontline	worker,	whereas	Steward	1	works	in	
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an	office	with	limited	public-facing	duties.	Consequently,	Steward	2	has	a	different	
understanding	of	the	type	of	argument	that	might	succeed	in	the	appeal,	based	on	a	
detailed	knowledge	of	the	policies	which	apply	to	frontline	workers,	and	greater	experience	
of	dealing	with	conflict	situations.	This	is	an	example	of	job	knowledge	being	significant	for	
issue-handling	by	shop	stewards.		
	
Besides	discussing	formal	representational	aspects	of	the	case,	stewards	also	outlined	
collective	approaches	towards	the	appeal	process.	These	took	a	variety	of	forms,	which	can	
be	seen	as	bargaining	resources:		
	
‘{Steward}	-	we	had	five	tenants’	reps	doing	supportive	statements,	{and	a}	petition’	
{...}	
{Steward	1}	-	we're	going	to	talk	to	people	about	going	to	councillors	
{Steward	2}	-	we	can	call	a	lobby	of	the	appeal	{…}	
-	caretakers	would	have	to	take	time	off	[to	attend	the	lobby]	....	
-	at	least,	we	want	convenors	there...	
{Steward	3}	-	there's	a	strong	feeling	about	this	-	caretakers	might	take	time	off...	
{Steward	2}	-	we	can	get	stewards	from	{nearby	offices}…	
-	caretakers	might	look	at	strike	action	...	We	can	say	to	caretakers,	if	she's	sacked,	do	
you	want	to	walk	out	on	strike?	
{Convenor	1}	-	I'll	be	at	the	lobby		
{Convenor	2}	-	I'll	be	there,	too’.	
	
Subsequently,	the	caretakers’	section	held	a	well-attended	union	meeting	at	which	a	motion	
was	passed	in	favour	of	a	lobby	of	the	appeal	hearing.	The	meeting	also	agreed	to	approach	
management	for	time	off	to	attend	the	lobby.	Thus,	in	the	run-up	to	the	appeal	hearing	
shop	stewards	adopted	a	twin-track	approach,	combining	expertise	in	formal	individual	
representation,	and,	at	the	same	time,	organising	collective	actions.		
	
At	this	point	there	were	indications	that	the	case	had	also	become	a	focus	of	attention	for	
managers,	both	in	HR	and	line	management.	During	a	diary-interview	with	a	convenor,	an	
email	arrived	from	a	steward	involved	in	the	case,	to	say	that	the	head	of	the	caretaking	
service	(who	had	refused	caretakers	time	off	to	attend	the	lobby)	was	requesting	a	meeting	
with	the	steward:	
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‘“Oh!	{Named	manager}	is	offering	{steward}	a	meeting”		
“She	{the	steward}	wants	to	know	who	will	go	with	her.	I	will.”		
Does	{steward}	say	what	the	meeting's	about?	
-	Yes	-	{manager	is}	saying,	“...can't	allow	time	off,	but	can	agree	to	a	meeting	to	
discuss	the	concerns	raised	in	your	motion”	...	[he's	saying]	you	can	have	access	to	my	
calendar	...	let	me	know	who's	coming	[to	the	meeting]’.		
	
A	further	indication	of	management	concern	about	this	case	came	from	HR,	in	the	form	of	
complaint	to	the	branch	secretary	about	the	conduct	of	the	steward	conducting	the	
representation;	specifically,	protesting	about	the	involvement	of	tenants’	reps	in	the	case	
(which	had	in	fact	been	at	their	own	initiative).	Somewhat	oddly,	HR	mis-identified	the	
steward	involved,	which	led	to	several	confused	telephone	discussions	between	the	
secretary	and	the	two	HASC	convenors	before	the	mix-up	was	clarified.	One	of	the	
convenors	commented	that	the	involvement	of	tenants’	reps	‘used	to	be	part	of	
campaigning’,	but	had	become	less	common.		
	
The	stewards	pressed	on	with	organising	a	collective	response	to	the	dismissal.	The	lobby	of	
the	appeal	hearing	took	place,	attended	by	tenants’	reps,	a	number	caretakers	who	had	
booked	annual	leave	to	attend,	stewards	from	nearby	offices,	and	convenors.	Placards	were	
made.	One	steward	described	the	lobby	as,	“A	good	little	crowd”.	The	steward	representing	
the	dismissed	caretaker	later	said	that	the	lobby	made	her	‘feel	better	about	doing	it’.	Later,	
the	Branch	Secretary	described	the	elements	of	mobilisation	in	this	case	as	"entirely	
unrepresentative".	However,	while	this	example	of	individual	casework	was	unusual	in	the	
mobilisation	of	a	collective	protest	at	the	appeal	hearing,	other	individual	cases	did	
generate	lower	levels	of	collective	mobilisation,	such	as	office-level	union	meetings.	
Furthermore,	small-scale	lobbies	outside	council	meetings	were	quite	commonly	employed	
by	the	branch	over	a	number	of	issues,	and	clearly	featured	in	these	stewards'	repertoire	of	
contestation.		
	
At	London	Borough,	dismissal	appeals	were	heard	by	a	panel	of	three	elected	members	
(councillors).	In	this	case,	the	appeal	was	successful	and	the	caretaker	was	reinstated,	
described	by	one	steward	as,	‘a	great	outcome'.	This	news	was	received	with	considerable	
jubilation	amongst	workmates	and	stewards,	with	one	steward	reporting,	“People	were	
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jumping	round	office”.	This	suggests	that	a	significant	proportion	of	workers	had	some	
understanding	of	the	wider	(collective)	implications	of	the	result	of	this	individual	case.		
	
At	the	stewards'	committee	meeting	following	the	reinstatement	there	was	considerable	
discussion	of	the	case.	Some	discussion	focussed	on	the	conduct	of	the	formal	
representation	and	procedures.	However,	the	discussion	also	looked	at	two	aspects	that	
involved	significant	collective	issues;	namely,	efforts	to	attribute	motives	to	the	managers	
involved,	and	wider	implications	for	other	workers.	Again,	this	evidence	supports	the	notion	
that	individual	cases	can	be	significant	in	terms	of	collective	issues.	The	steward	who	had	
represented	the	caretaker	at	the	formal	hearings	explained	the	wider	collective	significance	
of	this	case:		
	
‘-	people	were	worried...	
-	we're	dealing	with	different	people	all	the	time...		
[i.e.	some	people	are	very	offensive	and	abusive	towards	council	employees.]	
-	you	try	to	keep	calm...	then	you	come	back	to	the	office	and	let	off	steam...		
“We're	not	robots,	we're	only	human	beings”	
-	...	you've	got	to	give	us	some	leeway...	
-	…	they	can	give	you	a	rap	on	the	knuckles	for	losing	your	temper	-	but	not	ruin	your	
life’.		
	
The	concern	of	other	workers	was	that	one	mistake	under	provocation	could	result	in	
dismissal,	because	frontline	council	staff	regularly	deal	with	abuse	from	members	of	the	
public.	Consequently,	securing	the	caretaker’s	reinstatement	maintained	previous	standards	
and	reaffirmed	the	circumstances	in	which	managers	could	and	could	not	take	a	decision	to	
dismiss.	This	is	plainly	an	example	of	an	individual	case	which	has	implications	for	the	
frontier	of	control	and	limits	on	managerial	prerogative.	Here,	the	words	of	the	steward	
who	attended	the	formal	hearing	are	informative:	'they	can	give	you	a	rap	on	the	knuckles	
for	losing	your	temper	—	but	not	ruin	your	life'.	This	statement	clearly	carries	an	
understanding	of	what	management	may	and	may	not	legitimately	do.	It	concedes	a	right	of	
management	to	discipline	workers	in	certain	circumstances,	and	at	the	same	time	carries	a	
firm	denial	of	what	managers	may	not	legitimately	do.	That	is,	the	statement	shows	a	clear	
sense	of	limiting	managerial	prerogatives.	In	this	instance,	then,	this	steward	saw	her	and	
the	union's	role	in	terms	of	preventing	management	from	doing	something	that	they	
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wanted	to	do,	but	which	the	stewards	thought	they	should	not	be	able	to	do.	This	is	clear	
evidence	of	an	outcome	that	resulted	from	the	actions	of	both	parties;	that	is,	it	is	a	
bargained	outcome.		
	
The	same	steward	also	thought	there	were	implications	for	the	image	of	the	union:	
	
‘-	It's	good...	people	see	you	can	turn	things	round…		
{…}	
-	it’s	a	good	recruitment	tool…		
{…}	
“...it	encourages	everybody”’.		
	
That	is,	this	steward	had	an	understanding	of	collective	implications	of	this	individual	case,	
in	terms	of	frontier	of	control	issues,	and	in	terms	of	strengthening	collective	union	
organisation	(cf.	the	attempted	dismissal	of	'Gary'	in	Taylor	and	Bain	2003:	162).	
	
It	was	clear	that	management	also	appreciated	the	wider	implications	of	this	case.	Shortly	
after	the	reinstatement,	HR	sent	an	email	to	convenors	stating	that	this	case	did	not	form	‘a	
precedent’,	which	was	discussed	at	the	following	stewards'	committee:		
	
‘{Steward}	-	HR	said	it's	not	a	precedent....	
[General	derision.]	
{Convenor}	-	they	said	the	same	thing	with	{another	case}	last	year	
-	well,	they	don't	get	to	decide....	It	is	a	precedent.	
-	we	need	to	look	out	for	it...	And	be	on	the	offensive’.		
	
Finally,	the	stewards	also	discussed	the	grounds	upon	which	the	councillors	had	rescinded	
the	decision	of	management	to	dismiss	the	caretaker.	Collective	issues	and	motive	
attribution	were	to	the	fore.	The	steward	who	did	the	individual	representation	described	
the	turning	point	in	the	appeal	hearing:	
	
‘-	the	way	it	came	across...	the	manager	had	only	listened	to	HR	-	they	only	looked	at	
the	incident,	and	councillors	berated	them...	
“I	was	expecting	thanks	and	goodbye”	[like	usual...]	
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“I'd	never	seen	that	before,	when	councillors	turn	on	a	manager...	I	had	expected	
them	to	turn	on	me.”	
-	it	was	when	they	interrogated	the	manager	-	that's	what	swung	it		
{...}	
-	{We}	came	out	of	the	meeting	and	half	an	hour	later	she	got	the	phone	call	saying	
she'd	been	reinstated...	
-	the	best	part	was,	in	the	appeal...	they	agreed	she	wasn't	racist...	a	councillor	said	to	
the	manager,	so,	you've	sacked	her	for	saying	Fuck?’.	
	
The	presence	of	the	councillors	was	seen	by	stewards	as	introducing	a	significant	outside	
influence	and	constraint	on	management.	One	convenor	summarised:		
	
‘-	if	anyone...	is	sacked,	you've	got	far	more	chance	of	being	reinstated	in	front	of	a	
members	panel	than	at	an	ET’.	
	
Overall,	then,	this	case	exhibits	a	considerable	and	significant	intertwining	of	individual	and	
collective	issues,	and	also	shows	that	stewards	had	an	understanding	of,	and	an	orientation	
upon,	those	issues.	
	
Stewards	developed	explanations	of	management’s	course	of	action	in	this	case,	which	
centred	on	the	perceived	role	of	the	HR	department.	For	instance:		
	
‘{Convenor}	-	“I	think	there's	an	issue	with	HR	being	off	the	leash…"	
-	the	one	I	did	last	year	[an	appeal	that	got	reinstatement]...	
-	she	had	done	something	wrong,	but	[the	sack	was]	out	of	proportion....	
-	HR	really	pushing	it...	
-	but	they	pushed	it	too	far	-	it	looked	bad	in	front	of	councillors....	
-	she'd	made	a	mistake,	but	hadn't	defrauded	the	council,	or	acted	dishonestly…	
{...}	
{Steward	1}	-	why	do	you	think	they	went	down	that	route?	{i.e.	dismissal}	
{Steward2}	-	I	think	there's	something	going	on	here....	{they}	just	sacked	another	
steward.	HR	seem	to	have	made	a	change	-	if	you	swear....	if	you	lose	your	temper	...	
They're	saying	if	you	are	a	front	line	worker,	you	cannot	be	a	human	being	or	make	a	
mistake	
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{...}	
{Steward}	-	is	this	someone	in	HR	who's	decided	to	say,	we	can	do	you	whenever	we	
want	to…?	
{Several}	-	yes,	it	looks	like	it.	It's	a	general	push’.	
	
This	view	was	supported	by	several	stewards	who	knew	the	manager	who	had	taken	the	
original	decision	to	dismiss,	who	was	widely	seen	as	a	fair	and	reasonable,	and	therefore	
unlikely	to	dismiss	someone	in	such	circumstances	unless	under	pressure	from	higher	
management.	The	dismissal	was	taken	as	evidence	that	HR	had	been	driving	the	disciplinary	
process,	not	the	manager:	
	
'{Convenor}	-	need	to	understand,	HR	are	pressing	managers	to	sack	people	-	we	need	
to	remind	management	that	HR	are	only	there	for	advice		
{…}		
“{we}	have	to	say	to	managers,	it	is	your	decision”.’	
{...}	
{Steward	1}	-	so,	it	looks	like	manager	was	only	listening	to	HR...?	
{Steward	2}	-	yes’.		
	
Furthermore,	stewards	expressed	an	understanding	of	the	importance	of	the	changing	
relationship	between	HR	and	line	management:	
	
‘{Steward	1}	-	if	HR	are	driving	it,	what	do	management	think	about	it?	
{Steward	2}	-	some	don't	like	it,	but	they	won't	break	ranks...	
{Steward	1}	-	can't	we	put	out	some	sort	of	communication?	
{Steward	2}	-	we	need	to	be	aware	of	what	their	role	is	
{Convenor}	-	absolutely...	
{Steward	2}	-	need	to	make	sure	that	managers	know	they	should	be	running	it,	and	
HR	are	there	to	advise...	
{Convenor}	-	most	managers	don't	have	the	training	and	confidence	to	run	the	
hearing...	
-	but	you've	got	a	few	who	are	trained	and	confident	enough	to	actually	run	the	
hearing,	and	challenge	HR.	Then	you	get	a	better	hearing’.	
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Once	more,	this	discussion	demonstrates	the	significant	frontier	of	control	issues	that	run	
through	many	individual	cases,	of	which	the	stewards	at	London	Borough	were	certainly	
aware,	and	which	guided	their	approach	to	dealing	with	their	workload	of	individual	
representation.		
	
Overall,	evidence	from	London	Borough	demonstrates	that	individual	representation	and	
casework	can	and	does	entail	significant	collective	issues.	Consequently,	this	evidence	
undermines	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards,	which	sees	in	the	growth	of	
individual	casework	a	move	away	from	dealing	with	collective	issues.	While	the	case	of	the	
dismissed	caretaker	has	been	discussed	at	greater	length	than	others,	carried	greater	
collective	significance	than	many,	and	showed	a	greater	range	of	shop	steward	responses,	
nevertheless,	the	fieldwork	at	London	Borough	found	qualitatively	similar	issues	embedded	
time	and	time	again	in	the	more	mundane,	everyday	cases.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	first	
detailed	study	of	shop	stewards	for	some	thirty	years	had	no	difficulty	in	uncovering	a	great	
deal	of	evidence	to	show	the	intertwining	of	individual	and	collective	issues	in	these	cases.	
As	such,	this	evidence	presents	a	serious	challenge	to	the	widely	accepted	view	that	when	
shop	stewards	are	engaged	in	individual	representation,	they	are	not	dealing	with	collective	
issues.	The	final	part	of	this	chapter	sets	this	aspect	of	shop	steward	activity	in	the	broader	
context	of	union–management	relations	at	London	Borough.		
	
	
5.4	Shop	stewards	and	managers:	attitudes	and	impacts			
	
Evidence	from	London	Borough	shows	that	shop	stewards	reported	some	variety	in	their	
relations	with	managers.	Commonly,	stewards	reported	broadly	friendly	or	at	least	
business-like	relations	with	local	managers.	One	steward	stated:		
	
‘-	my	manager	likes	to	talk	things	over	
-	uses	me	as	a	sounding	board		
-	so	far	I've	been	able	to	put	her	off	...	She	likes	to	be	popular	...	I	know	her	weak	
spots	…	[but]	I'm	reaching	the	limits’.		
	
Many	stewards	reported	regular	informal	discussions	with	managers,	which	could	at	times	
be	used	to	resolve	issues	on	behalf	of	members.	Thus,	some	instances	of	proposed	changes	
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to	holiday	working	rotas	and	minor	alterations	of	duties	were	dropped	by	managers	after	
informal	shop	steward	action.	For	some	stewards,	such	contacts	with	managers	were	so	
commonplace	that	they	were	initially	not	included	in	diary	entries,	coming	to	light	only	in	
diary-interviews.	Fewer	stewards	reported	informal	meetings	with	more	senior	managers,	
though	some	did;	for	instance,	over	more	difficult	and	protracted	individual	casework.	
Generally,	this	was	limited	to	more	experienced	and	confident	stewards.	One	longstanding	
convenor	said	of	her	relationship	with	managers,		
	
‘-	I	think	that	I've	really	grown	up...	Age	and	experience...	I'm	not	intimidated	by	any	
of	them’.		
	
The	experience	of	this	steward	reflects	a	common	feature	of	relations	between	a	number	of	
senior	unions	reps	and	a	number	of	senior	managers,	who	had	often	known	each	other	for	
many	years,	even	having	worked	together	at	some	point.	At	the	highest	levels	of	
management,	however,	such	relations	were	much	less	common,	due	to	frequent	changes	of	
management	personnel	via	external	recruitment	of	executives.		
	
Stewards	also	reported	elements	of	tension	with	managers.	For	instance,	one	characterised	
relations	with	managers	in	his	office	as,		
	
'"Cordial	with	a	certain	amount	of	kvetching"'.	
	
During	a	diary-interview,	this	steward	was	unwilling	to	discuss	certain	issues	in	the	cafe	
close	to	his	workplace,	in	case	he	should	be	overheard.	Other	stewards	were	of	the	opinion	
that	management	in	this	office	could	be	difficult	and	hostile	towards	unions	reps.	Not	
surprisingly,	this	steward	also	said	that	he	was	careful	when	raising	problems	with	
management,	making	sure	he	adopted	a	calm	and	polite	manner.	Generally,	a	similar	
approach	was	adopted	by	stewards	across	the	council,	in	order	to	avoid	conflict	that	
distracted	from	the	matter	in	hand.	Furthermore,	senior	union	reps	were	keen	to	reduce	
opportunities	for	management	to	single	out	individual	stewards	for	disciplinary	action.	Thus,	
individual	authors	were	not	named	in	branch	newsletters,	apart	from	purely	factual	reports	
and	features.	For	instance,	during	the	dispute	over	the	new	contracts,	one	convenor	said	of	
the	newsletter:		
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‘“We	don't	name	check”		
-	it	makes	it	easier	to	get	them...		
[i.e.	easier	for	management	to	target	individuals]	
{…}	
“management	are	really	pissed	off	about	the	stuff	we’re	putting	on	there”’.		
	
Overall,	then,	relations	between	shop	stewards	and	managers	showed	a	mixed	pattern:	
commonly	business-like,	in	some	cases	friendly,	but	with	elements	of	tension	in	some	areas,	
particularly	if	stewards	were	engaged	in	contesting	managerial	prerogatives.		
	
During	the	in-depth	interviews,	stewards	were	asked	whether	they	thought	the	union	at	
London	Borough	had	any	influence	over	management	and	management	decisions.	With	
only	two	exceptions,	the	stewards	agreed	that	the	union	did	have	an	influence	over	
management,	which	they	almost	all	described	in	terms	of	‘restraining’	or	‘moderating’.	That	
is,	stewards	saw	their	activities	as	having	a	real,	if	limited,	impact	on	management	and	
managerial	decision-making.	Notably,	the	two	exceptions,	who	thought	the	union	had	no	
real	effect	on	management,	were	both	very	experienced	and	long-standing	stewards.	This	
contrasts	with	the	characterisation	by	Brown	and	Nash	(2008:	100)	of	stewards	who	report	
contemporary	union	bargaining	influence	as	looking	back	to	'a	past	era	when	collective	
bargaining	was	more	robust’.	In	this	case	study,	the	reps	who	saw	union	influence	as	least	
significant	were	among	those	who	had	personal	experience	of	greater	union	influence.		
	
The	lack	of	research	evidence	from	managers	in	this	case	study	presents	difficulties	for	
interpreting	stewards’	expressed	views	on	management	relations.	Fortunately,	the	second	
case	study	did	have	access	to	managers,	and	here	it	was	found	that	stewards’	accounts	of	
relations	with	management	significantly	coincided	with	managers’	accounts	(see	Chapter	6).	
This	suggests	that	the	method	adopted	were	robust,	and	that	findings	from	this	case	study	
can	likewise	be	considered	reliable.	Observation	and	diary:diary-interviews	produced	a	good	
deal	of	evidence	from	multiple	sources	showing	numerous	instances	of	managers	modifying	
their	course	of	actions	after	the	input	of	shop	stewards.	Consequently,	the	evidence	from	
London	Borough	shows	that	the	actions	of	shop	stewards	had	real	and,	at	times,	significant	
effects	on	managerial	decision-making.		
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Conclusion		
	
The	first	important	finding	of	the	case	study	at	London	Borough	was	that,	contra	the	current	
standard	view,	shop	stewards	were	handling	collective	issues	to	a	far	greater	extent	than	is	
commonly	asserted	in	recent	accounts.	The	implementation	by	senior	management	of	new	
contracts	involved	stewards	in	a	significant	campaign	around	fundamental	collective	issues	
of	terms	and	conditions	of	employment.	Lengthy	negotiations	saw	collective	bargaining	of	
the	classic	type.	While	most	of	the	formal	bargaining	was	conducted	by	a	small	number	of	
branch	officers	and	senior	stewards,	a	much	wider	layer	of	shop	stewards	directed	their	
efforts	towards	the	mobilisation	of	union	members	around	this	issue,	despite	the	difficulties	
outlined.	These	efforts	were	successful	in	securing	a	number	of	changes	to	management	
proposals.	Other	collective	issues	regularly	dealt	with	by	these	stewards	included	pay	and	
grading,	work	rosters,	work	duties	and	job	requirements,	and	workload.	Continual	service	
reorganisation	saw	considerable	shop	steward	activity	around	work	organisation	and	effort.	
Plainly,	the	growth	of	individual	representation	and	casework	at	London	Borough	had	not	
seen	the	end	of	stewards	dealing	with	collective	issues.	Nor	did	formally	designated	
'consultation'	procedures	constitute	unilateral	decision-making	by	management.	Despite	
numerous	difficulties,	shop	stewards	at	London	Borough	were	clearly	able	to	use	
consultation	processes	to	pursue	collective	issues,	to	secure	modifications	to	management	
decisions,	and	thereby	to	affect	outcomes	for	the	union	members	they	represented.		
	
The	second	important	finding	concerned	the	character	and	significance	of	individual	
representation.	Again	contra	the	current	standard	view,	this	case	study	found	that	individual	
casework	was	significantly	varied,	and	could	not	be	straightforwardly	counterposed	to	
collective	issues.	While	some	individual	cases	were	narrowly	individual	in	character,	others	
carried	considerable	significance	for	collective	workplace	relations.	Moreover,	both	
stewards	and	managers	were	aware	of	these	differences	and	adapted	their	approach	
accordingly.	Thus,	not	only	had	the	growth	of	individual	representation	not	seen	the	
abandoning	of	collective	issues	by	shop	stewards,	but	a	close	examination	of	actual	
casework	revealed	collective	issues	embedded	in	a	significant	number	of	those	cases.	This	
aspect	of	casework	is	entirely	missing	from	accounts	adopting	the	current	standard	view	of	
shop	stewards.		
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These	findings	contribute	significantly	to	the	argument	of	this	thesis.	Clearly,	evidence	from	
the	case	study	at	London	Borough	strongly	supports	previous	criticisms	of	the	current	
standard	view	of	shop	stewards.	In	particular,	the	evidence	undermines	sharp	conceptual	
distinctions	between	negotiation	and	consultation,	and	between	collective	issues	and	
individual	representation.	It	is	also	apparent	that	shop	stewards	at	London	Borough	had	at	
their	disposal	a	significant	range	of	bargaining	resources,	some	of	which	were	recognisable	
from	previous	studies	while	others	were	novel.	In	terms	of	developing	an	overall	analysis,	it	
is	clear	that	shop	stewards	in	this	study	continued	to	be	occupied	to	a	considerable	extent	
with	issues	relating	to	the	effort	bargain	and	the	frontier	of	control,	suggesting	important	
continuities	with	earlier	periods	of	workplace	bargaining.	This	case	study	also	found	an	
unexpected	patterning	of	shop	steward	activity.	In	particular,	while	stewards	had	difficulties	
in	mobilising	union	members	around	the	issue	of	new	contracts,	effort	bargaining	was	
significantly	clustered	around	service	reorganisations,	while	frontier	of	control	issues	tended	
to	cluster	around	individual	representation	and	casework.	These	distinctive	patterns	will	be	
discussed	in	Chapter	7,	where	they	will	be	linked	to	underlying	dynamics	of	workplace	
relations.	Before	that,	Chapter	6	presents	the	mains	findings	from	the	second	case	study,	at	
Big	Car.	Despite	very	considerable	differences	in	industrial	context,	union	organisation,	and	
day-to-day	issues,	it	will	be	seen	that	the	activities	of	these	two	groups	of	shop	stewards	
shared	important	continuities	as	well	as	divergences.		
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Chapter	6:	Big	Car		
	
	
This	chapter	continues	the	presentation	of	research	findings,	with	the	case	study	at	Big	Car.	
As	did	the	previous	chapter,	this	account	details	shop	stewards'	day-to-day	activities,	
meanings	and	intentions,	arguments	and	explanations.	Again,	these	findings	are	a	significant	
contribution	to	empirical	research	in	this	area.	In	particular,	the	first	detailed	study	of	shop	
stewards	inside	a	lean	production	auto	manufacturer	in	the	UK	sheds	significant	new	light	
on	the	capacity	of	shop	stewards	to	adapt	to	new	management	methods.	Shop	stewards	at	
Big	Car	dealt	with	a	wide	range	issues,	which	in	places	overlapped	with	their	counterparts	at	
London	Borough,	but	which	was	in	other	respects	significantly	different.	Issues	the	stewards	
dealt	with	ranged	from	everyday	queries	over	pay-slips,	holiday	entitlements	and	the	like,	
through	individual	casework	representation,	to	the	tough	reality	of	lean	production,	and	
questions	concerning	the	continued	existence	of	the	plant.	Again,	as	at	London	Borough,	
some	of	the	methods	utilised	by	stewards	at	Big	Car	were	familiar	from	previous	research,	
while	others	were	more	unexpected	and	surprising.		
	
This	chapter	follows	the	same	structure	as	Chapter	5,	to	enable	broad	comparison	across	
the	two	case	studies.	The	first	section	outlines	the	structure	and	workings	of	shop	steward	
organisation	at	Big	Car.	The	following	section	describes	the	main	collective	issues	that	
stewards	dealt	with,	including	surprising	and	important	evidence	of	bargaining	within	the	
lean	production	system;	an	area	which,	according	to	many	previous	accounts,	has	secured	
unilateral	management	control	and	the	exclusion	of	stewards	(Section	4.5).	Next,	the	
chapter	presents	evidence	concerning	individual	representation	and	casework,	which	again	
challenges	the	conceptual	distinctions	of	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards.	A	final	
section	discusses	relations	between	shop	stewards	and	managers	more	generally.		
	
Unlike	the	previous	case	study,	at	Big	Car	the	research	had	good	access	to	managers,	and	
this	provided	additional	evidence	to	support	the	overall	argument	of	the	thesis.	For	the	
most	part,	evidence	from	managers	was	used	to	aid	triangulation,	to	help	assess	evidence	
gathered	from	stewards.	Mangers'	accounts	strongly	supported	stewards'	accounts,	adding	
to	confidence	in	the	quality	of	evidence	gathered.	The	focus	of	this	chapter,	though,	
remains	firmly	upon	the	stewards,	their	activities,	and	their	accounts;	consequently,	
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relatively	little	evidence	from	managers	is	presented,	apart	from	on	a	few	specific	points.	
Once	more,	while	the	presentation	in	this	chapter	might	seem	entirely	descriptive,	evidence	
has	been	selected,	ordered	and	presented	so	as	to	comprise	the	first	stage	of	analysis,	
which	will	be	developed	and	deepened	in	subsequent	chapters.		
	
	
6.1	The	shop	steward	organisation		
	
Unite	the	union	organised	across	the	plant	at	Big	Car,	with	high	membership	density,	more	
than	50	shop	stewards,	and	four	convenors.	Together,	these	union	representatives	
comprised	the	plant	shop	stewards'	committee.	At	local	level,	stewards	were	organised	into	
eight	smaller	'shop	committees'.	At	the	time	of	the	research,	the	plant	was	operating	two	
shifts,	and	each	shop	committee	covered	one	shift	in	each	main	production	area.	Each	shop	
committee	also	elected	a	senior	steward.	Senior	stewards	and	convenors	were	on	full-time	
release,	some	16%	of	all	union	representatives.	The	remaining	stewards	spent	their	shifts	
working	on	production,	fitting	in	shop	steward	activities	as	best	they	could	during	very	short	
work-breaks,	or	haggling	with	supervisors	and	local	managers	for	time	away	from	the	job	to	
carry	out	this	or	that	aspect	of	their	trade	union	duties.	In	contrast	to	London	Borough,	all	
the	stewards	and	convenors	were	white	men,	reflecting	the	almost	entirely	white	and	male	
workforce.	There	was	some	variation	in	age,	though,	with	the	generally	younger	workforce	
in	the	more	physically	demanding	General	Assembly	area	(see	below)	electing	younger	
stewards,	mainly	in	their	30s.		
	
Arrangements	for	meetings	of	the	shop	stewards'	committees	at	Big	Car	were	quite	
different	from	London	Borough.	The	full	plant	shop	stewards'	committee	met	relatively	
rarely	unless	there	were	major	issues	to	discuss,	which	was	not	the	case	during	this	
research.	Meetings	of	this	committee	were	held	at	6.45am	so	that	stewards	from	both	day	
and	night	shifts	could	attend.	During	the	fieldwork	there	were	three	meetings,	which	were	
very	well	attended,	with	almost	all	stewards	present.	The	conduct	of	the	meeting	was	also	
very	different	from	London	Borough.	After	a	few	brief	business	items,	the	convenor	made	a	
lengthy	and	detailed	report	of	recent	activity	and	then	took	questions.	The	convenor's	
report	and	other	items	of	business	led	to	very	few	questions	and	no	discussion,	so	that	the	
meetings	lasted	only	a	little	over	an	hour.	Apart	from	one	or	two	factual	questions	the	
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stewards	listened	in	silence.	Stewards	offered	two	explanations	for	the	limited	discussion.	
First,	it	was	said	that	arguments	more	often	arose	over	the	most	important	issues,	such	as	
pay	or	the	future	of	the	plant;	but	nothing	of	this	sort	was	on	the	agenda	at	the	time	of	the	
fieldwork.	Secondly,	stewards	were	wary	of	voicing	disagreement	with	the	convenors,	which	
could	result	in	being	‘shot	down’	in	front	of	an	audience.	Instead,	stewards	took	detailed	
notes	to	report	back	to	their	section,	showing	impressive	organisation	and	seriousness.		
	
Meetings	of	shop	committees	were	even	more	constrained	for	time,	usually	taking	place	
during	lunch	breaks,	which	lasted	only	23	minutes,	because	of	difficulties	getting	stewards	
off	the	line	at	other	times.	Meetings	were	usually	called	by	the	senior	steward,	on	an	ad	hoc	
basis,	to	report	back	on	particular	local	issues	or	update	on	developments	at	plant	level.	
Although	these	meetings	were	more	informal	and	conducive	to	open	discussion,	time	
constraints	meant	that	in	practice	discussion	was	limited.	Consequently,	for	these	shop	
stewards,	disagreement	and	discussion	was	not	a	normal	practice	in	formal	settings.	
Instead,	discussion	took	place	elsewhere.		
	
From	time	to	time,	stewards	at	all	levels	complained	that	convenors	took	decisions	and	
even	made	agreements	without	consulting	the	stewards	who	would	have	to	deal	with	the	
consequences.	At	the	same	time,	the	convenors	personally	were	held	in	very	high	regard	by	
stewards,	and	often	credited	with	keeping	the	plant	open.	Nevertheless,	the	difficulty	for	
stewards	in	raising	differences	and	disagreements	at	the	top	level	meant	that	certain	issues	
were	discussed	quietly,	away	from	the	main	union	office.	Indeed,	the	fieldwork	discovered	a	
number	of	practices	that	were	not	part	of	official	union	policy	or	company	procedure,	and	
which	remained	hidden	from	both	higher	management	and	senior	union	representatives.	At	
the	level	of	senior	steward	and	below	discussions	among	stewards	were	very	frequent,	with	
often	daily	contacts	between	senior	and	line-level	stewards,	and	close	relations	between	
neighbouring	stewards.		
	
On	one	issue	in	particular,	though,	there	was	agreement	across	stewards	and	convenors	
alike:	the	need	to	keep	the	plant	open,	even	if	this	meant	making	concessions	to	
management.	One	older	steward	contrasted	the	current	situation	with	the	1970s:	
	
'we’re	all	a	bit	more	realistic	nowadays…	[about]	where	we	need	to	be	to	survive’.		
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Importantly,	concessions	were	viewed	as	a	necessity	rather	than	a	virtue;	in	contrast	with	
other	accounts	of	concession-bargaining	(Moody	2007).	One	long-standing	steward	put	it	
like	this:	
	
‘-	…it’s	a	matter	of	keeping	jobs:	
“But	not	at	any	price”	
-	…	a	case	of	giving	up	as	little	as	you	have	to’.		
	
At	the	time	of	the	research,	the	plant	was	waiting	for	a	new	model	to	be	introduced,	for	
which	further	concessions	had	been	made,	though	many	of	the	details	had	not	been	made	
public.	Two	experienced	stewards	discussed	the	situation:	
	
‘{Steward	1}	-	a	victory	over	a	company	which	closes	is	no	use	to	me…		
{Steward	2}	-	The	best	outcome	for	me	will	be	if	they	take	on	a	whole	shift	of	young	
people’.	
	
Senior	union	reps	in	particular	were	proud	that	the	plant	was	still	open,	and	still	employing	
several	thousand	workers	on	some	of	the	best	terms	and	conditions	in	the	area.	One	of	the	
younger	stewards	contrasted	his	experience	of	work	with	long-term	Big	Car	employees:	
	
‘-	…	the	guys	who	have	been	at	{Big	Car}	since	they	were	16	don’t	understand	what	
the	world	of	work	is	like	outside:	
-	this	is	my	twenty-fifth	job…	I’ve	been	here	eight	years	
-	I	worked	for	an	agency…	11	jobs	with	them	in	different	factories…	
How	old	are	you?	
{Steward}	-	34'.		
		
This	general	view	was	shared	by	the	great	majority	of	the	stewards	who	took	part	in	the	
research,	and	who	broadly	accepted	the	rationale	of	the	need	make	concessions	to	keep	the	
plant	open.	A	small	number	of	stewards	thought	the	union	had	given	away	too	much,	but	
this	was	a	distinctly	minority	view,	and	most	supported	the	approach	adopted	by	the	
convenors.	Nevertheless,	it	was	not	the	case	that	contestation	and	shopfloor	bargaining	had	
been	eradicated	by	the	general	consensus	among	stewards	on	the	need	for	concessions.	
Indeed,	as	will	be	shown	in	what	follows,	the	fieldwork	uncovered	considerable	evidence	of	
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shop	steward	contestation	and	bargaining.		
	
Senior	reps	from	Big	Car	were	clearly	influential	at	national	level	in	Unite,	at	least	within	the	
sector,	and	stewards	from	the	plant	had	gone	on	to	become	regional	or	national	FTOs.	
Senior	reps	were	also	strong	supporters	of	the	broad	left	organisation	within	Unite,	and	of	
the	incumbent	general	secretary,	Len	McCluskey.	At	the	start	of	the	fieldwork,	an	election	
for	the	post	of	general	secretary	was	underway,	and	the	stewards	worked	hard	to	turn	out	a	
good	vote	for	McCluskey.	In	some	regards,	both	local	and	national	FTOs	showed	a	degree	of	
dependence	on	the	union	organisation	at	Big	Car;	not	least	in	terms	of	electoral	support.	
Certainly,	the	convenors	did	not	adopt	a	subservient	position	towards	the	national	union	
leadership.	On	one	notable	occasion,	a	convenor	was	observed	giving	a	very	severe	dressing	
down	to	someone	over	the	phone;	after	the	call,	the	convenor	said	he	had	been	talking	to	
an	assistant	general	secretary	of	Unite,	who	had	changed	the	date	of	a	sector	committee	
meeting	without	consulting	the	lay	chair	of	the	committee.	This	convenor	was	proud	of	his	
status	as	a	lay	representative,	and	considered	that	to	become	an	FTO	would	be	to	lose	
influence	and	independence.	Clearly,	these	convenors	were	confident	of	their	position	
within	the	wider	union.	The	following	section	discusses	how	shop	stewards	at	Big	Car	dealt	
with	collective	issues	inside	the	plant.		
	
	
6.2	Shop	stewards	and	collective	issues:	job	times	and	lean	production		
	
As	at	London	Borough,	it	quickly	became	obvious	during	the	fieldwork	that	shop	stewards	at	
Big	Car	were	dealing	with	collective	issues	far	more	often	than	would	have	been	expected	
on	the	basis	of	recent	literature.	Moreover,	this	activity	focused	significantly	around	central	
aspects	of	the	lean	production	system;	in	particular,	the	job-time	system	of	work	
organisation,	and	accompanying	Kaizen	and	continuous	improvement	process	(CIP)	
procedures.	This	section	discusses	in	detail	how	shop	stewards	at	Big	Car	dealt	with	these	
issues.	First,	general	features	of	the	job-time	system	will	be	outlined,	before	discussion	
moves	to	work	re-organisation	processes	under	Kaizen	and	CIP.		
	
Job	times	and	lean		
The	lean	production	system	at	Big	Car	meant	that	every	task	on	the	production	line	was	
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specified	in	detail	on	a	job-sheet.	With	few	exceptions,	a	job-sheet	was	attached	to	each	
work	station	on	the	line,	detailing	the	work	to	be	carried	out	there.	For	shop	stewards,	the	
contents	of	job-sheets	were	a	significant	focus	of	activity.	Stewards	generally	developed	a	
good	understanding	of	the	job-sheet	system,	and	some	had	become	real	experts.	Before	
examining	the	place	of	job-sheets	and	job-timings	in	shopfloor	bargaining	processes,	it	is	
necessary	first	to	explain	the	system	in	sufficient	detail	to	understand	the	aspects	that	were	
important	for	shop	stewards.		
	
At	the	time	of	the	research,	General	Assembly	(GA)	was	producing	33	cars	per	hour,	down	
from	51	cars	per	hour	before	the	recession.	Individual	workers	were	assigned	to	work	
stations	marked	out	on	the	floor	beside	the	production	line,	and	worked	on	each	car	in	turn	
as	it	moved	steadily	along	the	track.	At	that	speed	of	production,	each	car	was	in	front	of	
each	worker	for	109	seconds,	known	as	‘takt	time’.	Managers,	production	engineers,	and	
Kaizen	teams	attempted	to	fill	as	much	of	that	time	as	possible	with	work.	Job-sheets	
detailed	the	tasks	to	be	carried	out	on	each	work	station.	Jobs	were	broken	down	into	a	
number	of	‘operations’,	which	were	then	further	sub-divided	into	‘elements’,	each	of	which	
attracted	a	set	portion	of	time.	Job	elements	were	put	together	in	a	laboratory	away	from	
the	production	areas,	by	technicians	working	from	a	menu.	Every	walk,	reach,	pick,	bend,	
push,	etc.,	was	allotted	a	time,	some	down	to	as	little	as	0.2	seconds,	and	these	times	were	
listed	on	the	job-sheets.	As	an	example,	one	job-sheet	showed	a	total	job-time	of	99.16	
seconds,	covering	31	individual	operations,	which	were	further	broken	down	into	100	job	
elements,	printed	across	4	sheets	of	A3	paper.	A	worker	was	required	to	carry	out	those	
operations,	in	that	order,	within	the	109	seconds	takt	time.	For	the	workers,	the	job-sheet	
detailed	the	repetition	of	their	working	day.	As	one	car	moved	off,	another	was	arriving,	and	
the	109	second	cycle	started	again,	33	times	an	hour,	9.5	hours	each	day.	Overall,	the	
detailed	specification	of	job-times	represented	a	formidable	management	effort	to	control	
labour	on	the	line.		
	
Although	the	intention	of	lean	production	was	to	fill	each	109	second	takt-time	with	work,	
this	was	seldom	achieved.	Often,	technical	issues	restricted	management’s	freedom	to	
organise	and	re-organise	work.	On	a	most	basic	level,	some	jobs	had	to	be	done	before	
others.	For	instance,	cars	had	to	be	painted	before	seats	were	fitted.	The	same	principle	
applied	to	myriad	other	parts,	which	had	to	be	fitted	before	they	were	connected,	inserted	
before	they	were	tightened,	or	adjusted	before	they	were	checked.	Other	difficulties	
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stemmed	from	the	layout	of	the	production	line	itself.	So,	some	components	needed	a	
power-tool	for	fitting,	but	these	were	not	available	at	every	work	station.	Sometimes,	the	
floor	area	around	a	work	station	was	crowded	with	bulky	parts	awaiting	assembly,	
preventing	the	delivery	of	additional	parts	to	that	location.	All	these	technical	factors	and	
more	restricted	management’s	freedom	to	organise	work	in	the	way	they	wanted.		
	
Consequently,	in	practice,	the	amount	of	work-time	detailed	on	each	job-sheet	varied.	For	
example,	one	section	with	12	operatives	had	job-times	that	varied	between	91.1	and	107.87	
seconds.	Such	jobs	were	known	as	‘under-takt’,	because	not	all	the	109	seconds	was	filled.	
In	theory,	management	could	add	work	to	those	jobs,	to	reduce	labour	elsewhere.	Indeed,	
the	search	for	such	reorganisations,	though	not	straightforward,	was	a	continuing	
management	priority	(see	below).	While	most	jobs	were	‘under-takt’,	some	jobs	were	’over-
takt’;	that	is,	they	had	more	work	allotted	to	them	than	109	seconds.	Usually	this	resulted	
from	variation	between	individual	cars,	according	to	what	‘options’	were	specified;	for	
instance,	engine	size,	engine	type,	left-hand	drive,	automatic	gearbox,	fancy	interior,	leather	
seats,	sun-roof,	sat-nav,	bike	rack,	alloy	wheels,	fancy	alloy	wheels.	The	list	of	options	was	
very	long.	As	a	result	of	options,	some	operations	were	performed	on	every	car,	but	others	
were	not.	So,	on	a	work	station	with	options,	the	job-sheet	included	operations	and	job-
elements	for	every	option,	all	with	different	job-times.	These	job-sheets	could	become	very	
long	and	complex;	one	example	included	some	200	job-elements	and	ran	to	nine	A3	pages;	
all	to	cover	just	109	seconds	takt-time.	Sometimes,	particular	options	took	a	job	over-takt.	
But	management	might	then	argue	that	those	option	were	rare,	and	the	rest	of	the	job	was	
under-takt,	so	on	average	the	job	remained	within	agreed	limits.	If	a	particular	option	was	
indeed	rare,	and	the	job	was	on	average	under-takt,	then	stewards	and	workers	would	
usually	accept	an	occasional	over-takt	option.	However,	predicting	the	numbers	for	each	
option	was	not	an	exact	science,	and	a	succession	over-takt	options	could	push	the	average	
over	109	seconds.	Consequently,	the	issue	of	options	was	often	a	source	of	conflict	between	
management	and	workforce,	on	the	question	of	whether	a	job	was	over-takt	in	practice,	
even	if	it	looked	under-takt	on	paper.		
	
Significantly,	job-sheets	and	timings	were	subject	to	contestation	and	bargaining	on	a	
regular	basis.	An	important	issue	for	shop	stewards	was	whether	the	job-sheets	accurately	
reflected	the	work	done	on	each	station.	This	was	important	because,	as	far	as	the	stewards	
were	concerned,	production	workers	were	paid	an	hourly	rate	to	do	the	work	on	the	job-
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sheet,	and	therefore	any	elements	not	recorded	on	the	job-sheet	were	seen	as	unpaid	work.	
Stewards	commonly	described	the	importance	of	checking	job-sheets	in	terms	of	ensuring	
that	workers	were	paid	for	all	the	work	they	did.	As	one	commented:	
	
‘-	if	all	the	elements	aren't	in,	then	people	are	doing	work	they're	not	getting	paid	
for’.	
	
Whenever	work	was	reorganised,	which	happened	often,	shop	stewards	examined	the	new	
job-sheet	in	detail	to	see	that	it	gave	an	accurate	account	of	the	job,	and	in	particular	to	
check	for	any	missing	elements.	Another	steward	criticised	management	over	new	job-
sheets	on	a	job	that	was	being	reorganised:	
	
'-	they've	been	cutting	corners	-	shaving	the	times	to	suit	them...	leaving	things	out...	
-	we've	found	a	few	of	those	…	
-	I	don't	know	if	they	thought	we	wouldn't	notice’.	
	
There	was	a	widespread	feeling	among	stewards	that	management	persistently	
manipulated	times	on	the	job-sheets.	On	several	occasions	stewards	had	difficulty	obtaining	
copies	of	revised	job-sheets	from	managers	or	Kaizen	teams,	and	pressed	over	several	days	
to	secure	them.	Stewards	often	found	discrepancies	which	led	to	new	job	designs	being	
amended.	A	former	steward	said	of	missing	elements,	
	
‘-	they	do	it	on	purpose	
-	it	makes	us,	the	plant,	look	more	efficient	on	paper	
-	but	men	{sic.}	are	doing	work	they’re	not	getting	paid	for	
-	we’d	have	a	row…			
-	I	don’t	care	whose	fault	it	is	-	I	just	want	it	put	back	in	
Did	you	get	stuff	put	back	in?		
{Steward}	nods,	and	says	definitely:	
“Oh,	yeh.”’	
	
This	example	indicates	one	reason	why	stewards	placed	considerable	importance	on	
spotting	missing	elements.	Despite	their	expressed	scepticism	over	how	the	job-time	system	
was	managed,	it	was	possible	for	stewards	to	get	missing	items	of	work	reinstated	onto	job-
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sheets.	This	had	two	effects;	first,	it	limited	the	effort	required	of	a	worker	on	that	particular	
job.	As	one	steward	put	it:	
	
‘-	it	might	only	be	half	a	second	here,	a	couple	of	seconds	there...	
-	two	or	three	seconds	doesn't	sound	like	much...	but	it	means	a	lot	to	the	guy	who's	
doing	the	job	all	day’.	
	
Secondly,	ensuring	that	all	of	the	job-elements	were	recorded	on	a	job-sheet	restricted	
management’s	ability	to	add	further	work	in	the	future.	It	became	clear	from	early	in	the	
fieldwork	that	the	contestation	of	job-sheets	by	shop	stewards	had	real	impacts	on	the	
effort	bargain	of	workers	in	their	section.	The	high	priority	placed	on	this	issue	
demonstrates	the	continuing	importance	of	the	effort	bargain	for	these	stewards.	
Furthermore,	shop	steward	contestation	in	this	area	clearly	constrained	management’s	
freedom	to	reorganise	work,	showing	the	continued	relevance	of	the	frontier	of	control	for	
understanding	shop	steward	activity	in	this	case	study.			
	
The	regular	highlighting	by	stewards	of	job-sheet	irregularities	contributed	to	a	widespread	
perception	that	management	were	culpable	in	this	matter,	which	contributed	towards	a	
cumulative	delegitimising	of	the	job-time	process	as	a	whole.	Many	stewards	had	become	
adept	at	utilising	such	instances	to	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	particular	managers.	On	one	
occasion,	an	experienced	steward	suspected	a	manager	was	fiddling	job	times,	and	
repeatedly	and	publicly	requested	copies	of	the	new	job-sheets,	which	the	manager	
appeared	unwilling	to	produce.	In	fact,	unknown	to	the	manager,	the	steward	had	already	
obtained	copies	of	the	job-sheets	and	knew	there	were	discrepancies.	When	the	manager	
finally	produced	the	job-sheets,	omitted	elements	were	confirmed,	and	stewards	publicly	
accused	management	of	deception.	As	a	result,	this	manager	was	removed	from	the	project	
by	senior	management,	and	the	job-sheets	were	re-issued	with	the	missing	elements	
included.	As	a	supervisor	commented,		
	
‘“They	were	bluffing	the	timings	and	they	got	caught	bluffing	the	timings.”	
-	and	now	no	one	trusts	them’.	
	
The	undermining	of	trust	that	resulted	from	instances	of	missing	job-elements	had	
repercussions	for	relations	between	stewards	and	managers.	One	senior	steward	
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summarised:	
	
‘they	do	that	-	they	say	it’s	an	oversight	-	then…	it’ll	keep	on	happening,	until	we	get	
fed	up…	[and]	think	they’re	a	liar,	and	deal	with	someone	else’.	
	
The	ability	of	stewards	to	short-circuit	the	managerial	hierarchy	in	this	way	showed	a	strong	
element	of	continuity	with	older	accounts,	such	as	McCarthy	(1966:	29-32).		
	
Stewards	had	also	devised	various	other	methods	for	dealing	with	jobs	that	were	
considered	over-takt.	One	method	involved	addressing	arguments	directly	to	management	
during	the	CIP	process	(see	below).	Another	common	method	was	to	stop	the	line.	The	lean	
production	system	at	Big	Car	included	a	component	of	team	working	whereby,	if	there	was	
a	production	problem,	a	worker	could	pull	a	cord	and	stop	the	line	so	that	a	team	leader	
could	sort	out	the	difficulty	before	re-starting	the	line.	Stewards	had	adopted	the	tactic	of	
making	sure	that	the	line	was	stopped	if	a	job	was	felt	to	be	over-takt.	Rather	than	
increasing	the	pace	of	work	to	finish	the	job	before	the	car	moved	on,	the	line	was	stopped	
while	the	worker,	continuing	at	a	normal	pace,	finished	the	operations	on	the	job-sheet.	
This	method	was	summarised	in	advice	from	a	senior	steward	to	a	line-level	steward	about	
how	to	contest	an	over-takt	job:		
	
“Pull	the	fucking	cord	and	stop	the	line”.		
	
The	success	of	this	tactic	depended	on	workers	observing	a	norm	for	effort	and	speed	of	
work,	rather	than	working	faster	to	keep	up	with	the	production	line.	This	practice	is	
therefore	a	clear	example	of	restriction	of	output.	Significantly,	the	tactic	was	widely	
adhered	to	by	workers	on	the	production	line.	The	few	workers	prepared	to	work	faster	
than	the	norm	were	discussed	by	stewards	and	other	workers	in	derogatory	terms.	
Generally,	stopping	the	line	had	the	desired	effect	of	getting	management’s	attention,	often	
followed	by	a	resolution	of	the	issue.	As	one	senior	steward	put	it:	
	
‘“Everyone	comes	running	when	you	stop	the	track	-	and	usually	mob-handed	as	
well”.	
	
One	reason	for	this	effect	was	that	the	company	kept	records	of	down-time,	which	was	
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costed	at	£12,000	per	minute.	Down-time	appeared	next	to	the	name	of	an	individual	
manager	or	supervisor,	and	sections	that	recorded	a	lot	of	down-time	became	a	focus	of	
attention.	Managers	were	therefore	keen	to	minimise	interruptions	to	production.	Hence,	
small	stops	to	the	line,	which	did	not	significantly	affect	overall	production	levels	or	
profitability,	nevertheless	put	significant	pressure	on	individual	managers	and	supervisors.1	
By	adopting	this	tactic,	stewards	could	bring	significant	pressure	to	bear	on	managers	to	
address	discrepancies	in	job-times	and	job-sheets.		
	
The	importance	of	job-sheets	for	shop	steward	bargaining	meant	that	some	had	developed	
considerable	expertise	concerning	the	job	timing	system.	One	GA	steward	was	regularly	
approached	by	others	for	advice	on	timings	and	job-sheets.	On	one	occasion	supervisors	
from	another	section	approached	him	with	concerns	that	jobs	in	their	area	were	much	
tighter	than	the	job-sheets	indicated.	The	steward	checked	some	22	job-sheets	and	
identified	49	seconds	of	work	missing,	commenting,		
	
‘the	supervisor	who	asked	me	was	…	happy	as	Larry’.		
	
When	the	missing	work	was	added	in,	some	jobs	went	over	takt,	meaning	that	work	would	
be	removed	and	redistributed,	reducing	effort.	At	first	sight	it	might	appear	odd	that	
supervisors	in	a	lean	production	setting	should	be	‘happy	as	Larry’	at	the	prospect	of	
reducing	the	output	of	workers	in	their	section.	However,	supervisors	were	under	scrutiny	
over	down-time,	and	one	consequence	of	jobs	being	over-takt	was	that	workers	would	stop	
the	track	more	often.	Consequently,	over-takt	jobs	translated	into	an	accumulation	of	
down-time	for	that	supervisor.	Thus,	workers’	collective	refusal	to	work	faster	than	the	
norm	meant	that	supervisors	had	an	interest	in	not	over-burdening	workers	in	their	section,	
so	that	smooth	production	could	be	maintained	and	down-time	reduced.	This	finding	
																																								 																				
1	During	the	fieldwork	there	were	4-5	brief	work	stoppages	of	a	different	type.	These	all	
occurred	over	one	24	hour	period	of	unusually	cold	and	wet	weather	in	May	–	after	the	
plant's	main	heating	system	had	shut	down	for	the	summer.	Due	to	low	temperatures	or	
water	leaking	through	the	roof	onto	working	areas,	work	halted	for	a	few	minutes	on	some	
sections	while	management	rectified	the	problem	with	makeshift	rain-protection	or	mobile	
industrial	heaters.	While	management	was	keen	to	see	work	resumed,	these	stoppages	
were	treated	more	as	technical	difficulties	than	worker	recalcitrance;	even	though	the	
workers	involved	voiced	their	complaints	in	strong	terms.	Although	a	case	could	be	made	
for	seeing	these	stoppages	as	forms	of	'demonstration'	strike	(Hyman	1989:	24),	they	
seemed	to	play	little	part	in	influencing	established	bargaining	relations	in	the	plant,	and	
have	therefore	not	been	included	in	the	main	discussion.		
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supports	the	conception	of	the	dual	role	of	management	as	entailing	both	the	control	of	
labour	and	the	coordination	of	production	(Section	3.2).			
	
While	the	research	produced	numerous	examples	of	job-sheets	which	under-recorded	work,	
there	were	also	examples	of	job-sheets	which	included	times	for	work	which	was	not	in	fact	
performed.	Stewards	pointed	out	examples	where	time	was	allowed	for	walking	between	
tasks	which	in	fact	were	adjacent,	meaning	that	no	walking	was	required,	or	tasks	that	were	
timed	separately	but	performed	simultaneously.	Sometimes	a	task	was	listed	twice.	One	
steward	attributed	these	errors	to	the	technician	responsible	for	job-sheets	in	his	area:	
	
‘-	he’s	clever	-	but	he	doesn’t	know	the	job…		
-	he’s	just	overworked…	he	spends	all	his	time	in	the	office,	in	front	of	a	computer	…	
he	never	comes	and	looks	at	the	job,	so	he	doesn't	know	how	it	really	works,	so	his	
time	sheets	don't	fit	the	job’.		
	
While	it	cannot	be	said	that	these	advantages	in	terms	of	effort	had	accrued	due	to	the	
actions	of	shop	stewards,	it	is	significant	that	stewards	kept	quiet	about	discrepancies	which	
favoured	the	workers	they	represented,	because	it	indicates	that	the	stewards	viewed	the	
job-sheet	system	in	terms	of	effort	bargaining,	rather	than	as	an	aspect	of	a	rational	
management	system	that	they	had	bought	into.		
	
In	other	sections,	Kaizen	teams	were	more	often	on	the	line.	Another	steward	had	a	
different	explanation	for	elements	on	a	job-sheet	which	were	not	in	the	job.	His	view	was	
that	members	of	the	Kaizen	team	sometimes	deliberately	padded	out	job-sheets	with	small	
pieces	of	non-existent	work,	because	they	were	assessed	by	management,	in	part,	according	
to	how	much	of	the	109	seconds	was	filled:		
	
‘the	closer	he	can	get	them	to	the	mark,	the	better	is	it	for	him’.		
	
This	steward	added	that	phoney	elements	could	be	switched	for	real	work	at	a	later	date.		
	
In	some	areas	job-sheets	were	left	deliberately	slack	by	management	to	allow	for	flexibility.	
For	instance,	a	steward	from	a	section	towards	the	end	of	the	assembly	line	said	their	times	
were	kept	under-takt	so	that	workers	could	look	for	problems	before	final	quality	checks,	
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and	either	rectify	them	or	notify	management:		
	
‘We’re	fix	or	phone’.		
	
In	Quality	Assurance	(QA),	where	workers	checked	production	standards,	job-sheets	were	
kept	under-takt	to	allow	management	to	temporarily	add	extra	checks	for	particular	
production	problems,	known	as	‘hot	items’.	Hot	items	were	a	continual	source	of	conflict	
between	stewards	and	managers	in	QA,	and	stewards	spent	a	lot	of	time	monitoring	them	
to	ensure	that	takt	times	were	not	exceeded.	Issues	could	also	arise	when	hot	items	were	
removed	from	the	job-sheet.	As	one	steward	explained,	workers	could	get	into	the	habit	of	
doing	the	check	even	after	it	had	been	removed	from	the	job-sheet:		
	
‘-	I	like	hot	items	to	change	as	fast	as	possible	
-	cos	they	become	the	norm	if	they	stay	in	too	long...	
-	and	people	do	them	without	being	paid	for	them’.	
	
Again,	this	view	that	work	done	should	not	exceed	work	paid	for,	as	detailed	on	the	job-
sheet,	was	typical	of	stewards'	concern	to	maintain	or	shift	the	balance	of	wages	and	effort	
in	favour	of	the	workers	they	represented.		
	
Thus,	stewards	were	not	concerned	to	correct	inaccurate	job-sheets	if	there	were	no	
adverse	effects	on	the	effort-bargain,	and	would	not	challenge	faulty	timings	that	favoured	
the	workers	they	represented.	Some	stewards	reported	jobs	on	their	section	which	looked	
very	tight	or	even	over-takt	on	paper,	but	which	were	not	hard	jobs	in	practice,	and	which	
they	therefore	did	not	challenge.	This	might	seem	an	obvious	point,	but	it	does	emphasise	
the	motivation	of	these	stewards	concerning	the	effort	bargain.	More	surprisingly,	stewards	
might	not	challenge	jobs	that	looked	easy	on	paper	but	were	much	harder	in	practice.	
Again,	the	determining	consideration	was	the	overall	effort	bargain.	One	steward	reported	
that	on	his	section,	if	supervisors	knew	a	particular	job	was	hard,	they	would	not	try	to	put	
any	extra	work	on	it.	Furthermore,	since	most	teams	rotated	jobs,	the	hard	ones	were	
spread	around.	Counter-intuitively,	some	stewards	thought	that	having	a	hard	job	on	a	team	
was	advantageous	when	dealing	with	management:		
	
‘“It’s	always	good	to	get	a	job	in	your	team	that's	a	bit	ropey	-	you	can	play	on	it”.’	
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Thus,	the	main	issue	for	stewards	in	dealing	with	inaccurate	job-sheets	was	maintaining	or	
improving	the	wage-effort	bargain.		
	
Further	evidence	of	this	effort-bargaining	approach	was	provided	on	a	few	occasions	when	
the	assembly	line	was	found	to	be	running	slightly	too	fast,	at	around	33.5	cars	per	hour.	
These	instances	led	to	significant	arguments	between	shop	stewards	and	managers.	On	one	
occasion,	workers	realised	that	one	section	had	been	running	fast	all	morning.	As	far	as	the	
stewards	were	concerned,	this	meant	that	the	company	owed	those	workers	time	for	the	
extra	work	done.	Managers	agreed	the	line	was	running	fast	and	had	it	returned	to	the	
correct	speed,	but	were	unwilling	to	agree	that	time	was	owed	to	the	workers.	After	sharp	
exchanges	with	the	manager	responsible,	and	with	the	backing	of	convenors,	a	senior	
steward	told	the	manager	that,	failing	an	agreement,	he	would	personally	stop	the	line	for	
the	amount	of	time	owed.	After	this	threat,	the	manager	agreed	that	the	time	would	be	
repaid.	The	manager	and	steward	then	jointly	calculated	that	workers	on	this	section	were	
owed	exactly	nine	minutes	and	five	seconds,	and	the	manager	agreed	to	give	them	all	an	
extra	ten	minute	tea	break	that	afternoon,	which	settled	the	dispute.		
	
It	was	clear,	then,	that	shop	stewards	in	this	case	study	saw	the	job-sheet	as	an	important	
link	between	work	done	and	payment	received.	Consequently,	stewards	attached	a	high	
importance	to	understanding	job-sheets	and	the	management	processes	which	surrounded	
them.	Stewards	perceived	a	balance	between	work	and	pay,	with	work	measured	in	the	
times	listed	on	the	job-sheet	and	pay	measured	by	the	hourly	rate.	It	was	also	clear	that	
effort	bargaining	remained	a	central	feature	of	shop	steward	activity	in	this	plant.	As	one	
particularly	well-read	convenor	commented:		
	
‘“You	know	that	book,	We	Sell	Our	Time?	-	that's	exactly	what	we	do”’.		
	
This	comment	is	an	interesting	misremembering	of	the	actual	title	of	Stewart	et	al.'s	(2009)	
We	Sell	Our	Time	No	More.	For	these	shop	stewards,	the	workers	at	Big	Car	certainly	did	sell	
their	time,	and	they	were	keen	to	maintain	or	improve	the	terms	of	the	trade.		
	
Work	reorganisation:	CIP	and	Kaizen		
At	the	heart	of	lean	production	is	the	‘continuous	improvement	process’	(CIP),	based	on	the	
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idea	of	Kaizen,	a	Japanese	word	meaning	‘improvement’	(Section	4.5).	In	theory,	the	CIP	
programme	at	Big	Car	applied	to	several	aspects	of	work,	including	safety,	housekeeping,	
and	production	quality.	In	practice,	though,	the	main	focus	for	management	was	the	
continuing	drive	to	reduce	labour,	or	'headcount'.	Consequently,	the	labour-reduction	
aspect	of	lean	production	was	a	significant	focus	for	shop	stewards	at	Big	Car,	and	this	
section	examines	their	activity	in	this	area.		
	
The	CIP	process	at	Big	Car	was	subject	to	a	collective	bargaining	agreement	which	had	been	
in	place	for	some	twenty	years.	The	union	at	plant	level	had	agreed	to	lean	production	in	
principle	while	at	the	same	time	negotiating	an	agreed	procedure	for	handling	work	
reorganisation	that	ensured	a	role	for	shop	stewards.	In	the	words	of	one	of	its	architects,	
this	procedure	replaced	the	‘chaos’	that	had	gone	before.	The	procedure	gave	the	CIP	
process	a	formal,	set-piece	character,	encapsulated	in	a	phrase	commonly	used	in	the	plant:	
‘doing	a	CIP’.	The	procedure	for	re-organising	work	required	a	meeting	away	from	the	
production	line,	comprising	supervisors,	team	leaders	and	shop	stewards	from	both	shifts.	
Formally,	stewards’	agreement	was	required	before	any	work	reorganisation	was	put	into	
operation.	Usually,	reorganised	work	was	then	trialled	across	both	shifts,	in	a	process	known	
as	‘try-and-test’.	Again,	the	stewards	had	to	agree	the	proposed	reorganisation	before	it	
was	made	permanent.	This	procedure	ensured	that	shop	stewards	continued	to	have	an	
influence	in	work	reorganisation.	The	main	focus	of	stewards	efforts	in	the	CIP	process	lay	in	
attempting	to	limit	labour	reduction;	as	a	senior	steward	summarised:		
	
‘-	they	can	change	a	job	-	it's	up	to	us	to	stop	them	taking	a	man	out’.		
	
Thus,	in	practice,	far	from	being	a	mechanism	of	unilateral	management	control,	the	CIP	
process	tied	together	the	effort	bargain	and	the	frontier	of	control	in	a	process	that	often	
involved	significant	contestation	by	shop	stewards.		
	
The	grounds	upon	which	a	steward	could	legitimately	oppose	a	CIP	were	limited	under	the	
terms	of	the	collective	agreement.	If	a	steward	registered	a	‘failure	to	agree’	(FTA)	to	a	CIP,	
management	could	go	to	the	next	level	of	union	representative,	all	the	way	up	to	convenor.	
Convenors	would	not	support	a	steward	in	opposing	a	CIP	if	it	met	the	criteria	set	down	in	
agreements.	In	those	circumstances,	the	convenors	would	effectively	veto	the	steward’s	
FTA,	agreeing	the	new	work	arrangements	with	management	over	the	head	of	the	steward.	
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Since	the	stewards	knew	the	agreements	and	the	policy	of	the	convenors	(and	national	
union),	it	was	rare	for	a	steward	to	formally	oppose	a	CIP	if	they	had	no	chance	of	winning	
under	the	procedure.	Hence,	the	importance	of	time-sheets:	a	CIP	could	be	refused	if	it	took	
a	job	over-takt,	and	the	convenors	would	support	a	steward	in	those	circumstances.	If	it	was	
to	be	successful,	steward	opposition	to	a	CIP	had	to	fall	within	the	criteria	set	out	by	the	
agreed	procedures.	Otherwise,	the	steward	would	have	to	come	up	with	other	methods	for	
challenging	the	re-organisation	of	work,	such	as	health	and	safety	concerns,	ergonomic	
issues,	or	other	technical	difficulties.	Shop	stewards	commonly	developed	a	detailed	
knowledge	of	the	jobs	in	their	section,	including	the	physical	lay-out,	the	tasks	involved,	any	
tooling	requirements,	particular	technical	difficulties,	and	any	physically	awkward	or	
demanding	job-elements.	Stewards	could	and	did	make	use	of	such	difficulties	in	influencing	
management	decisions	on	work	organisation	(see	below).		
	
When	considering	shop	steward	involvement	in	the	CIP	process	at	Big	Car,	it	is	important	to	
understand	that	when	production	was	reorganised	to	‘get	rid	of	a	job’,	that	did	not	result	in	
someone	being	made	redundant.	Thus,	when	a	steward	agreed	a	CIP,	it	was	agreement	to	a	
reorganisation	of	work,	and	often	an	intensification,	but	not	a	redundancy.	Rather,	the	
person	whose	job	had	disappeared	would	stay	on	the	team,	as	‘spare	labour’,	until	a	
vacancy	arose	elsewhere	and	the	worker	was	redeployed.2	In	the	meantime,	this	worker	
was	available	for	temporary	redeployment	to	areas	of	labour	shortage.	While	plant	
management	was	committed	to	reducing	labour,	local	management	commonly	valued	
having	some	spare	labour	available,	because	it	gave	them	cover	for	absences	in	conditions	
where	labour	supply	was	deliberately	kept	very	tight.	Surprisingly,	workers	on	teams	with	a	
spare	person	generally	considered	it	not	a	benefit	but	a	nuisance,	because	members	of	the	
team	could	be	redeployed	on	a	daily	basis	to	fill	gaps	elsewhere	on	the	production	line.	One	
steward	recalled	being	on	a	team	with	a	spare	worker	for	ten	years:		
	
‘-	when	a	job	is	got	rid	of,	the	man	stays	on	the	team	until	someone	says,	he’s	needed	
permanently	over	there...	
-	having	spare	labour	causes	a	lot	of	upset	
																																								 																				
2	This	is	the	example,	mentioned	in	Section	4.4,	whereby	I	was	given	the	same	piece	of	
information	on	two	occasions	during	the	fieldwork,	but	it	only	made	a	significant	impact	on	
my	understanding	of	the	CIP	process	on	the	second	occasion;	that	is,	after	long	immersion	
in	the	field	had	sensitised	me	to	the	importance	of	what	I	was	being	told.	This	example	is	a	
good	illustration	of	an	important	benefit	of	the	ethnographic	method	of	research.		
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-	…	I	used	to	say,	can't	we	get	rid	of	that	man?	I	used	to	get	really	wound	up,	sent	to	a	
different	job	every	day	
-	as	a	steward,	I	see	it	differently	now...		
[Because	the	union	is	committed	to	saving	jobs.]	
-	[but]	you	always	do	your	best	to	get	the	spare	man	put	on	a	different	team’.	
	
Hence,	the	counter-intuitive	finding	that,	despite	the	intensification	of	labour	under	lean	
production,	having	a	‘spare	man’	on	the	team	was	generally	considered	unfortunate.		
	
An	important	part	of	the	shop	steward	effort	on	CIPs	was	ensuring	that	management	stuck	
to	the	agreed	procedure.	During	the	fieldwork	there	were	examples	where	managers	
attempted	to	reorganise	work	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	Described	by	one	steward	as	a	‘smuggled-
in	CIP’,	stewards	resisted	this	strenuously	and	usually	successfully.	For	example,	a	steward	
reported	that	managers	in	his	section	wanted	to	do	a	CIP	without	a	formal	meeting,	while	
the	line	was	still	running.	The	steward	was	resisting	this,	and	came	to	a	senior	steward	for	
back-up,	who	offered	the	following	advice:	
	
‘-	If	they	want	to	do	a	CIP,	get	both	shifts	in,	and	the	Kaizen	men,	and	the	stewards,	
and	we'll	say	if	it	works	or	not...	
-	if	they	do	it	like	this,	just	moving	work	about,	that	takes	the	shop	steward	out	of	it,	
and	we	won't	have	that...	
-	the	shift	manager	said	to	the	steward	…	“it's	a	new	procedure”…	
-	well	it's	not	a	procedure	we	know	about	-	and	I'll	ask	{convenor}	and	he	won't	have	
heard	of	it	either’.		
	
In	this	case,	the	agreed	procedure	was	enforced,	the	CIP	was	postponed,	and	this	aspect	of	
the	frontier	of	control	successfully	defended.		
	
In	practice,	some	CIPs	went	through	with	little	practical	opposition	from	the	stewards.	
These	tended	to	be	where	management	had	correctly	identified	jobs	with	slack	times,	and	
where	work	could	be	redistributed	relatively	easily.	One	steward	described	management’s	
approach:		
	
‘-	they’ve	got	cuter...		
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-	they	look	out	for	guys	who	look	like	they've	got	a	bit	of	time…		
“They	don't	miss	a	trick”’.			
	
Stewards	usually	regarded	such	CIPs	with	resignation,	using	phrases	like,	‘it	went	straight	
in’.	In	such	circumstances,	stewards	found	it	difficult	to	mount	significant	opposition	to	
management,	reflecting	established	union	policy	on	the	issue.	Even	where	a	CIP	could	not	
be	prevented,	however,	shop	steward	influence	often	resulted	in	changes	to	aspects	of	job	
reorganisation	that	mitigated	its	worst	impacts;	for	instance,	minimising	ergonomic	stresses	
or	other	health	and	safety	concerns.	These	factors	were	particularly	important	in	CIPs	
involving	workers	with	physical	impairments	(see	below).	
	
Management	in	each	production	area	had	annual	targets	for	labour	reduction.	During	the	
fieldwork,	the	target	in	General	Assembly	was	22	workers	over	the	course	of	a	year	(out	of	a	
total	of	some	650).	A	senior	steward	commented:	
	
‘-	I've	seen	the	plans...	they	had	a	presentation	about	a	month	ago	-	22	men	by	the	
end	of	the	year...	
-	I	said	that's	not	feasible	-	they	said,	we	like	to	aim	high...	I	said	it	doesn't	matter	
where	you	aim,	that's	not	feasible’.	
	
Another	senior	steward	said,	
	
‘…the	stewards	now	have	to	argue	that	managers	are	trying	to	reduce	numbers	too	
far,	and	look	for	arguments	to	protect	labour’.	
	
Stewards	were	adept	at	making	the	case	that	labour	was	short.	One	described	the	outcome	
of	a	CIP:	
	
‘-	we	didn't	lose	a	man...	[and]	we	only	got	a	bit	of	work...	we're	quite	happy	about	
it...	
-	we	only	got	three	elements	of	work...	
That's	not	a	lot	…		
{Steward}	-	“Still	have	to	moan	about	it”		
-	if	you	don't	moan,	they	think	they	haven't	given	you	enough’.	
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Clearly,	these	stewards	saw	individual	CIPs	within	an	overall	process	of	labour	reduction,	but	
on	which	they	could	have	some	influence.		
	
Although	the	number	of	workers	required	to	run	the	plant	was	an	issue	of	dispute	between	
union	reps	and	senior	plant	management,	at	shopfloor	level	day-to-day	labour	shortages	
were	a	constant	source	of	difficulties,	with	important	consequences	for	local	managers.	
Often,	it	was	difficult	for	managers	to	get	stewards	and	team	leaders	‘off	the	line’	so	they	
could	attend	CIP	meetings,	and	on	numerous	occasions	CIPs	were	postponed	as	a	result.	As	
one	steward	said	of	a	CIP,	
	
‘-	they	cancelled	it	this	morning	[due	to]	a	shortage	of	labour...!	
-	they	want	to	take	a	man	out	and	they	can't	run	the	CIP	because	they've	not	got	
enough	men!’.	
	
On	another	occasion,	after	a	failed	try-and-test,	a	steward	commented,	
	
‘-	to	be	honest,	a	try	and	test	usually	works...		
-	[the	reason	for	the	difficulties]	...	it's	been	the	indecent	haste...	they're	desperate	to	
get	that	job	moved...	
-	{the	problem	is}	labour	shortages’.	
	
This	situation	was	exacerbated	by	a	company	policy	of	reducing	overtime	costs.	Stewards	
explained	that	until	recently	CIP	meetings	had	usually	taken	place	on	Saturdays,	when	there	
was	no	production,	with	the	stewards,	team	leaders,	supervisors	and	Kaizen	team	all	coming	
in	on	overtime.	At	the	time	of	the	research,	the	CIP	meetings	had	generally	shifted	to	down-
days	(Section	4.5),	with	team	leaders	and	stewards	coming	in	while	other	workers	were	off.	
However,	this	opened	the	potential	for	further	delaying	tactics	by	stewards.	Since	a	CIP	
required	the	attendance	of	stewards	from	both	shifts,	a	down-day	CIP	meant	that	some	
stewards	had	to	change	shifts	to	attend.	Generally,	stewards	resisted	this,	and	on	occasions	
refused	entirely,	citing	issues	such	as	childcare.	For	instance,	two	stewards	were	asked	to	
come	in	for	a	CIP	on	a	Monday	day	shift,	despite	being	rostered	on	nights,	and	both	said	
they	were	unavailable:		
	
 	180	
‘{Steward	1}	-	[shrugs]	-	I'm	on	nights	on	Monday...	
I	bet	you've	got	things	to	do	on	Monday...	
{Steward	1}	-	I've	got	lots	of	things	to	do...	
{Steward	2}	-	I've	got	lots	of	things	to	do,	too	-	only,	I've	got	to	think	what	they	are	
{Steward	1}	-	you	can	take	my	kids	to	school	if	you	want’.		
	
Of	course,	labour	shortages	cannot	be	considered	evidence	of	shop	steward	bargaining.	
Nevertheless,	stewards	were	able	to	utilise	labour	shortages	to	delay	CIPs	and	further	
labour	reductions.		
	
Labour	shortages	were	not	only	of	concern	to	shop	stewards;	it	was	clear	that	a	number	of	
managers	were	also	unhappy	with	the	amount	of	labour	available.	A	senior	manager	told	a	
group	of	stewards:	
	
‘-	you	know…	I	don’t	like	lean’.		
	
There	was	also	evidence	of	managers	colluding	with	stewards	to	preserve	labour	or	to	
conceal	the	outcomes	of	CIPs,	with	the	intention	relieving	shortages	and	maintaining	
smooth	production.	In	one	CIP	that	was	observed	in	detail,	a	procedure	which	on	paper	
reduced	a	team	from	six	jobs	to	five,	in	practice	resulted	in	one	team	member	being	moved	
to	a	different	work-station	and	re-designated.	On	paper,	all	the	lean	production	boxes	had	
been	ticked:	management	were	happy,	Kaizen	were	happy,	the	target	for	labour-reduction	
had	been	met;	but	without	actually	reducing	labour.	It	was	also	clear	that	the	stewards	
involved	understood	beforehand	how	the	CIP	would	conclude.	Once	again,	the	dual	
pressures	on	management	were	apparent,	both	to	control	labour	but	also	to	coordinate	
production.		
	
Delays	to	CIPs,	whether	due	to	opposition	from	shop	stewards,	or	technical	difficulties,	or	
labour	shortages,	increased	the	pressure	on	managers	over	the	schedule	for	labour	
reductions	decided	at	plant	level.	Stewards	were	able	to	take	advantage	of	this.	A	fairly	
common	tactic	was	for	stewards	to	allow	a	management	plan	to	go	ahead,	knowing	it	would	
fail.	For	instance,	a	steward	representing	fork	lift	truck	drivers	reported,	
	
‘-	if	they	put	too	few	men	on,	we'll	turn	round	and	say	it	can't	be	done.	If	they	ignore	
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us,	we'll	turn	round	and	say,	well	get	on	with	it....	
-	on	one	occasion,	too	few	drivers	were	put	on…	and	by	the	end	of	a	week	the	offload	
racking	was	packed	to	overflowing,	there	was	a	backlog…	and	a	queue	of	trucks	
waiting	to	be	unloaded.	Then,	management	realised	their	mistake	and	put	more	men	
on’.	
	
Underlying	this	approach	was	the	same	collective	refusal,	noted	above,	to	work	harder	than	
the	commonly	accepted	norm;	effectively,	a	collective	restriction	of	effort.	This	attitude	
reflected	the	common	understanding	of	the	job-sheet	system.	Workers	would	put	up	
(grudgingly)	with	management	filling	slack	times.	On	the	other	hand,	workers	were	
generally	unwilling	to	work	faster	just	so	that	more	work	could	be	fitted	into	the	takt-time.		
	
Sometimes,	though,	CIPs	provoked	more	open	conflict	and	contestation.	Exact	numbers	
were	hard	to	gauge	because	contested	CIPs	had	a	stop-start	character,	due	to	technical	
difficulties,	labour	shortages,	and/or	union	opposition.	As	a	result,	some	dragged	on	for	
months,	and	what	appeared	initially	to	be	new	CIPs	turned	out	to	be	re-convened	old	ones.	
While	total	numbers	were	hard	to	assess,	several	CIPs	were	observed	in	which	shop	
stewards	put	up	significant	resistance	to	management,	utilising	a	variety	of	bargaining	
resources.	One	CIP	had	already	been	in	progress	for	four	months	before	the	fieldwork	
commenced,	and	was	still	unresolved	when	the	fieldwork	ended,	six	months	later.	
Management	wanted	to	merge	two	jobs	into	one	in	an	area	of	the	stores.	The	workers	
concerned	were	both	‘Restricted	Fitness	Employees’	(RFEs);	that	is,	workers	with	a	physical	
impairment	which	left	them	unable	to	work	on	the	assembly	line	under	the	tough	
conditions	of	lean	production.	Defending	RFEs,	who	were	usually	older	workers,	was	an	
important	priority	for	the	steward	organisation	in	Big	Car.	In	this	CIP,	stewards	marshalled	a	
considerable	range	of	bargaining	resources	to	frustrate	management’s	efforts	to	do	away	
with	an	RFE	job,	including	health	and	safety	regulations,	occupational	health	assessments,	
ergonomic	assessments,	existing	agreements	and	procedures,	and	job	skills	and	
occupational	expertise.	The	shop	steward	opposition	was	so	successful	that	the	manager	
heading	the	reorganisation	was	removed	from	the	project,	and	by	the	time	the	fieldwork	
finished	it	seemed	likely	that	the	plan	would	be	shelved	entirely.	When	interviewed,	this	
manager	described	his	frustration	at	the	level	of	opposition	from	the	stewards,	and	his	
under-estimation	of	their	tacit	knowledge	of	the	job.			
	
 	182	
In	another	CIP,	on	a	section	of	some	30	workers,	management	and	the	Kaizen	team	
proposed	getting	rid	of	one	job	by	moving	a	single	large	item	of	work,	but	with	the	knock-on	
effect	that	most	other	workers	in	the	section	would	move	jobs,	requiring	significant	
retraining.	The	training	issue	was	significant	because	new	job-skills	took	time	to	settle	in,	
leading	to	a	temporary	increase	in	mistakes	by	workers,	which	caused	faults	and	quality	
issues	in	production,	increased	down-time,	and	could	end	in	disciplinary	action	against	
individual	workers.	This	was	an	important	issue	for	managers,	who	were	under	scrutiny	over	
production	quality	and	down-time,	as	well	as	for	workers,	who	wanted	to	avoid	disciplinary	
action	over	mistakes.	In	opposition	to	management's	plan,	stewards	proposed	an	
alternative:	removing	one	job	by	redistributing	work	in	small	units,	requiring	few	job-moves	
and	little	retraining	–	and	less	retraining	meant	fewer	mistakes.	The	stewards'	plan	was	
calculated	to	appeal	to	all	parties:	managers,	supervisors	and	workers.	The	meeting	for	this	
CIP	lasted	over	three	hours,	with	14	people	present,	including	supervisors,	team-leaders,	a	
Kaizen	planner,	and	two	shop	stewards.	In	common	with	other	CIP	meetings	observed,	most	
of	the	discussion	was	conducted	at	a	very	high	level	of	technical	detail.	It	soon	became	
clear,	though,	that	tacit	job	knowledge,	which	the	Kaizen	process	is	supposed	to	appropriate	
for	the	company,	was	instead	being	used	by	the	stewards	as	a	bargaining	resource	to	
frustrate	management	plans	to	re-organise	work.	The	stewards	used	this	knowledge	in	a	
determined	argument	against	management's	proposal,	and	in	favour	of	their	own.		
	
Around	two	hours	into	the	meeting,	the	stewards’	plan	seemed	to	have	the	ascendency.	
During	a	tea-break,	the	lead	steward	confided	that	he	thought	he	was	winning:	the	quality	
arguments	were	convincing	Kaizen	and	the	supervisors,	and	the	reduced	job-reorganisation	
and	retraining	was	winning	over	the	team	leaders	and	would	carry	the	assembly	workers.	
This	represented	a	considerably	sophisticated	bargaining	strategy,	combining	elements	of	
‘integrative	bargaining’	and	‘intra-organisational	bargaining’	(Walton	and	McKersie	1991).	
However,	the	steward	revealed	a	further	concern,	which	had	not	been	voiced	in	the	
meeting:	he	believed	that	if	the	job	was	reorganised	as	management	wanted,	it	would	invite	
a	further	reorganisation	almost	immediately,	which	would	get	rid	of	another	job.	That	is,	the	
steward	was	thinking	a	couple	of	moves	ahead:		
	
'-	I'm	thinking	of	the	next	man	down	-	to	protect	him...		
-	if	we	do	it	the	way	they	want,	it'll	be	a	TL	{team	leader}	next,	because	it'll	be	a	two	
man	team	and	you	don't	need	a	TL	on	two	men...		
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“It’ll	be	a	freeby	for	them,	and	I'm	not	giving	them	freebies.”’		
	
The	second	steward	agreed	with	this	analysis	of	the	situation,	that	the	main	issue	at	stake	
was	saving	the	next	job	down	the	line.	Again,	this	is	clear	evidence	of	a	sophisticated	
bargaining	strategy	by	these	two	stewards.		
	
After	the	tea	break,	however,	the	meeting	took	an	unexpected	turn.	A	senior	manager	
arrived	and	announced,		
	
‘-	we	want	your	input	but	there	have	to	be	guidelines...		
-	{you}	come	up	with	the	proposals,	and	we'll	view	it	at	the	end’.	
	
The	effect	on	the	meeting	was	immediate.	Participants	understood	this	statement	to	mean	
that	managers	would	ignore	the	outcome	of	the	meeting	if	it	approved	a	plan	different	from	
the	one	originally	proposed	by	management.	Someone	angrily	commented,		
	
	 ‘What's	the	point	of	us	being	here	if	you're	going	to	tell	us	what	you	want	anyway?’		
	
When	the	manager	left	the	meeting	the	atmosphere	was	one	of	sullen	resignation,	and	
there	were	several	half-joking	comments	deriding	the	stewards’	failure	to	stop	
management’s	plans.	Significantly,	management’s	approach	in	this	situation	departed	from	
the	standard	claims	of	lean	to	use	workers’	suggestions	to	make	production	more	efficient.	
In	this	case,	when	workers’	tacit	knowledge	was	mobilised	against	management,	the	
response	was	to	push	through	reorganisation	by	more	traditional	means.	Other	stewards	
reported	similar	experiences;	one	expressed	frustration	at	the	way	another	CIP	worked:	
	
'“That	was	just	stupid”	
-	you	give	'em	ideas...	they	just	say	no...	
-	the	manager	has	his	grand	master	plan...	he	won't	hear	any	other	thing...		
-	that's	why	we've	ended	up	with	a	job	now	that	we've	got	ergonomic	issues	on...		
-	they're	all	the	same...		
-	they	say	at	the	end,	it's	your	CIP...	you	wrote	it	down...		
-	{but}	when	the	paperwork	comes	back,	it's	all	different...	
-	it's	paperwork...	they	just	hide	things	in	the	times	-	that's	my	opinion’.		
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This	evidence	supports	accounts	which	see	the	operation	of	lean	in	practice	as	less	than	
systematic	(Martin	2013),	and	less	concerned	with	utilising	the	initiative	of	workers	than	is	
usually	claimed.	In	this	case	study,	although	lean	was	a	continual	theme	of	management	
discourse,	in	practice,	management	methods	showed	significant	continuity	with	older	
traditions	of	openly	asserting	managerial	prerogatives.		
	
Nevertheless,	the	assertion	of	management	prerogatives	in	the	lengthy	CIP	meeting	
described	above	did	not	entirely	settle	the	matter,	and	the	CIP	continued	to	be	contested	by	
stewards	and	workers.	In	the	complex	reorganisation	of	work	after	the	CIP	meeting,	one	
team	was	required	to	take	on	a	small	amount	of	additional	work:	six	screws,	divided	
between	two	jobs	(three	on	each).	The	lead	steward	argued	that,	for	technical	reasons,	this	
extra	work	would	not	fit	into	the	job-times	for	that	team	and	would	result	in	excessive	
down-time.	However,	the	supervisors	were	not	convinced	and	pushed	through	the	CIP,	
which	fitted	on	paper.	In	the	event,	these	six	screws	became	the	cause	of	continual	
production	problems,	and	the	cord	was	pulled	many	times	to	stop	the	line.	Four	months	
later,	shortly	before	the	fieldwork	ended,	the	steward	reported	cheerfully	that	the	CIP	was	
to	be	reversed.	Evidently,	the	whole	team	were	pleased	with	this	outcome,	and	the	steward	
offered	the	following	comment	regarding	the	six	screws	which	had	been	contested	work:		
	
‘-	the	six	screws	-	they’ll	fly	in	now,	because	the	lads	aren't	taking	the	piss’.	
	
That	is,	for	more	than	four	months,	this	team	had	systematically	misled	management	about	
the	difficulty	of	performing	this	work,	until	management	were	convinced	to	move	it.	
Moreover,	this	was	not	the	only	example	of	stewards	and	workers	misleading	managers	
about	production	difficulties	in	order	to	influence	the	effort	bargain;	what	Taylor	would	
recognise	as	'systematic	soldiering'	(Braverman	1974:	98;	Rose	1998:	27).	This	approach	by	
stewards	reflects	longer-term	shifts	in	the	frontier	of	control,	inasmuch	as	covert	methods	
could	be	effective	without	carrying	so	much	risk	as	a	more	open	approach.	In	this	case,	
though,	the	team	drew	quiet	criticism	from	other	stewards	for	being	so	open	about	their	
deception.	Despite	their	partially	covert	and	hidden	nature,	shop	steward	contestation	in	
this	CIP	show	significant	continuity	with	traditions	of	effort	bargaining	stretching	back	
through	Brown	(1973),	Lupton	(1962),	and	Roy	(1952).		
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Altogether,	the	evidence	presented	in	this	section	shows	the	importance	attached	by	shop	
stewards	in	this	case	study	to	the	process	of	work-reorganisation	under	lean	production.	
The	evidence	also	indicates	the	various	ways	in	which	stewards	attempted	to	deal	with	the	
issue,	and	by	which	they	achieved	some	success	in	influencing	outcomes.	Implications	of	
this	evidence	will	be	discussed	at	more	length	in	following	chapters.	The	next	section	looks	
at	another	important	area	of	shop	steward	activity	at	Big	Car:	individual	representation.	
	
	
6.3	Individual	representation		
	
Unsurprisingly,	the	fieldwork	at	Big	Car	found	considerable	evidence	of	individual	
representation	and	casework	by	shop	stewards.	As	at	London	Borough,	though,	this	
evidence	significantly	undermines	any	sharp	distinction	between	individual	and	collective	
issues.	Interestingly,	stewards	at	Big	Car	took	a	somewhat	different	approach	to	individual	
casework,	compared	with	their	counterparts	at	London	Borough.	This	section	looks	at	how	
stewards	at	Big	Car	went	about	individual	representation,	and	seeks	to	draw	out	the	often	
complex	interweaving	of	individual	and	collective	issues.		
	
Individual	casework	and	shop	steward	bargaining		
Individual	representation	was	one	of	the	activities	most	commonly	recorded	in	shop	
steward	diaries	at	Big	Car.	However,	it	would	be	difficult	to	conclude	from	this	that	
individual	casework	was	the	main	focus	of	stewards’	activity.	Several	factors	meant	that	
individual	casework,	though	relatively	common	at	Big	Car,	usually	had	an	appreciably	
different	character	from	similar	activity	at	London	Borough.	The	first	striking	difference	was	
that	most	cases	were	dealt	with	quickly.	Hearings	commonly	lasted	around	15	minutes,	
rather	than	the	hour	or	more	at	London	Borough.	Nor	did	senior	reps	appear	overburdened	
with	casework,	despite	the	fairly	large	number	of	individual	cases	underway	at	any	one	
time.	One	senior	steward	commented	on	his	workload:	
	
'“That	might	be	typical.	Two	or	three	a	week?”	
-	they	come	in	waves’.		
	
Another	senior	steward	said:		
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‘-	I've	got	a	couple	of	case	reviews	before	dinner	and	an	absence	after	dinner...	
-	Could	be	worse’.		
	
Furthermore,	there	was	little	evidence	that	stewards	or	senior	reps	spent	significant	
amounts	of	time	preparing	cases.	When	this	was	commented	on,	one	senior	steward	said:	
	
‘[pausing	and	pulling	a	thoughtful	face]	
"Probably	about	right."	
-	...	the	thing	is,	whatever	can	be	settled	at	local	level,	we	do...	
-	...	[we]	try	and	keep	everything	in-house,	between	the	local	steward	and	the	local	
supervisor’.		
	
Thus,	the	practice	of	dealing	with	cases	at	the	lowest	level	('in-house'),	and	the	greater	
density	of	stewards,	together	with	the	smaller	amount	of	preparation,	limited	the	amount	
of	casework	that	more	senior	reps	were	required	to	do.	Nevertheless,	some	cases	did	
require	more	work:		
	
'-	...	[I]	take	them	as	they	come,	things	like	that...	
-	if	it's	a	sacking	or	something	serious…	[i.e.	serious	cases	get	more	work]	
-	but	this	is	in-house	stuff...		
“It	doesn't	really	warrant	it	-	if	someone's	employment's	at	risk,	well,	yeah.”'	
	
Overall,	though,	the	approach	of	stewards	at	Big	Car	was	notably	different	from	those	at	
London	Borough,	for	whom	individual	casework	was	significantly	more	burdensome.		
	
The	first	level	of	the	disciplinary	procedure	involved	a	meeting	with	the	member,	the	
supervisor	(‘foreman’),	and	the	local	steward.	At	this	'in-house'	stage,	the	steward	would	
either	‘agree’	the	outcome,	or	register	a	‘failure	to	agree’	(FTA).	The	lowest	level	of	formal	
sanction	was	a	'counselling	letter'	outlining	required	improvements,	and	above	that	was	a	
familiar	range	of	written	warnings,	final	written	warnings,	suspension,	and	dismissal.	An	FTA	
from	a	steward	triggered	an	appeal	hearing,	which	would	then	go	to	the	next	level	up,	with	
the	member	represented	by	a	senior	steward	at	a	meeting	with	a	shift	manager.	If	the	case	
went	higher	still,	a	convenor	would	be	involved	and	a	senior	HR	manager.	However,	cases	
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rarely	got	to	that	level.	Stewards	would	not	FTA	a	disciplinary	case	unless	they	thought	it	
was	justified;	that	is,	a	genuine	injustice,	and	a	reasonable	chance	of	winning	an	appeal.	As	
one	senior	steward	put	it:	
	
“If	you	take	it	to	{convenor},	it's	got	to	be	watertight”	
“He'd	have	my	bollocks	if	I	gave	him	a	turkey.”’	
	
When	stewards	could	see	no	reasonable	prospect	of	a	case	winning,	they	generally	would	
not	pursue	it	further,	and	would	‘agree’	the	outcome.	It	should	be	noted,	though,	that	when	
a	steward	‘agreed’	a	case,	it	did	not	usually	represent	assent	in	the	management	decision;	
more	commonly,	it	was	a	recognition	that	the	outcome	was	the	best	that	could	be	expected	
in	the	circumstances.	As	one	steward	commented	with	exasperation:	
	
‘-	the	operator	has	fucked	up	again...		
-	this	time,	I	advised	the	guy...	it's	un-defendable’.	
	
Usually,	stewards	reported	that	members	were	satisfied	with	this	approach.	One	senior	
steward	described:		
	
‘getting	people	to	toe	the	line’.		
	
That	is,	stewards	often	emphasised	to	individuals	they	represented	how	to	avoid	getting	
into	trouble.	Stewards	generally	knew	who	was	at	risk	of	disciplinary	action,	whether	over	
attendance	or	quality	issues.	One	steward	said,		
	
‘-	every	team's	got	one...		
[i.e.	someone	who	misses	things]’.	
	
Another	steward	said	of	a	member	facing	disciplinary	action,	
	
‘-	he's	been	pulled	before...	
-	[that]	job's	dead	easy...		
-	but	once	he	gets	talking...	
[i.e.	when	he	starts	talking,	he	doesn't	pay	attention]	
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-	he's	a	nice	lad,	but	he's	a	bit	clumsy...	and	forgetful’.		
	
Consequently,	the	day-to-day	individual	casework,	such	as	return	to	work	(RTW)	interviews	
or	low-level	disciplinaries,	were	often	seen	by	stewards	in	terms	of	ensuring	procedural	
fairness	in	the	treatment	of	individuals	by	management,	and	preventing	more	serious	
trouble	for	the	member,	rather	than	challenging	every	management	decision.	The	steward’s	
attendance	such	cases	might	also	serve	other	purposes:	
	
‘{Steward}	says,	whenever	he	goes	in	the	office	with	someone,	he	writes	it	down	in	a	
book	of	his	own	to	keep	a	record	of	what	happened	and	when.	He	says	this	is	useful	
for	him,	and	it's	also	useful	for	his	members.	For	instance,	keeping	track	of	dates	in	
sickness	absence	cases:	
{Steward}	-	they'll	say	to	me,	am	I	clear	now?	...	I	can	go	sick	again’.	
	
Several	stewards	reported	that	an	important	part	of	their	role	was	keeping	records	of	
disciplinary	sanctions	for	the	purpose	of	answering	queries	from	members.			
	
As	at	London	Borough,	stewards	reported	variation	in	the	number	and	severity	of	
disciplinaries.	Sometimes,	this	was	attributed	to	the	disposition	of	individual	supervisors.		
Some	supervisors	were	less	keen	on	pursuing	individual	cases:	
	
‘-	a	lot	of	the	sickness...	he's	ok	on	that...		
-	he's	never	done	all	of	his	job	on	sickness	and	absences...		
-	he	can	Counsel	as	long	as	he	wants’.		
	
Or	a	supervisor	might	be	absent:		
	
‘Have	you	had	quality	issues?	
{Steward}	-	not	really...	
-	my	supervisor	hit	the	sick,	didn't	he?	
“We've	not	had	to	sit	down	with	anyone	for	weeks”’.		
	
Some	supervisors	were	less	highly	regarded:	
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“We've	got	a	new	foreman	and	he's	a	tit”	
-	we	were	all	in	the	office	last	Thursday...	all	five	of	us...		
[i.e.	the	whole	team.]	
-	I	FTA'd	them	all...	{and}	the	manager	agreed	{with	me}’.		
	
Stewards	also	recognised	that	individual	casework	varied	with	changing	management	
priorities.	One	steward	described	the	uneven	distribution	of	disciplinaries	in	his	section:	
	
‘-	mine	tend	to	all	come	at	once...	
-	it's	just	the	way	it	works...		
-	the	foreman	on	my	section…	[pause]	…	I	don't	know	if	his	manager	pokes	him	with	a	
stick...	says	to	the	foreman,	do	these	ones’.		
	
There	was	a	general	feeling	among	stewards	that	discipline	had	tightened	up	in	recent	
years;	for	instance,	over	quality	issues:	
	
‘-	it	never	used	to	be	{like	this}…	it	was,	let	him	know	he's	missed	it...	
[i.e.	the	supervisor	told	the	steward	to	tell	the	guy	he'd	missed	a	part]	
-	now,	management	have	clamped	down	on	quality...	management	get	onto	the	
supervisors...	pressure	to	discipline’.		
	
Again,	this	is	evidence	of	important	variation	in	individual	representation.		
	
Stewards	also	reported	that	changes	in	production	influenced	individual	casework.	For	
instance,	the	introduction	of	new	parts	and	processes	led	to	mistakes	and	consequent	
disciplinaries	for	quality	issues.	Clusters	of	over-takt	options	led	to	operators	being	rushed	
and	making	mistakes.	Sometimes,	down-days	saw	a	rush	of	disciplinary	hearings	to	clear	a	
backlog	of	cases,	simply	because	individual	workers	and	stewards	were	released	from	
production:		
	
‘-	when	they	can	get	the	steward	off	and	the	guy...	[they	say]	we'll	do	one’.	
	
By	contrast,	there	might	be	fewer	disciplinaries	when	production	levels	were	high:	
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‘-	they	let	things	slide...	when	they're	flying	out	the	door’.		
	
During	the	fieldwork,	a	management	drive	to	raise	production	quality	was	widely	seen	by	
stewards	as	having	increased	the	number	of	disciplinaries:		
	
‘-	I've	had	quite	a	few	in	the	office,	over	quality...	
-	...	been	under	scrutiny...	
Is	that	usual	or	does	it	vary?	
{Steward}	-	it	seems	to	go	through	spells	…	
“A	bit	of	a	purge,	as	we	say.”’	
	
It	was	clear	that,	for	these	stewards,	individual	cases	were	linked	to	management	policies	
which	affected	the	whole	workforce.	Again,	this	undermines	the	sharp	distinction	between	
individual	and	collective	issues.		
	
When	individual	cases	did	arise,	the	aim	of	the	stewards	at	Big	Car	was	to	get	the	case	
dropped,	where	possible,	or	alternatively	to	get	the	severity	of	the	outcome	minimised.	
Stewards	were	surprisingly	successful	in	these	efforts.	A	variety	of	tactics	were	employed.	
Sometimes,	stewards	were	able	to	show	procedural	irregularities,	such	as	excessive	delay	in	
dealing	with	a	case.	One	steward	explained	that	he	never	tried	to	hurry	a	case	along:	
	
‘-	it	doesn't	bother	me	[if	there	is	a	long	delay]	
-	I'll	say,	that's	a	month	now,	you	can't	do	that’.	
	
Similarly,	a	steward	got	a	Stage	1	reduced	to	a	counselling	letter:		
	
‘-	it	was	nine	months	ago...	it's	unfair...	if	it	was	nine	weeks,	ok...	
Where	did	you	put	this	argument	-	to	a	manager,	or	at	the	hearing?	
{Steward}	-	at	the	hearing,	I	argued	it’.	
	
Some	delays	were	caused	because	of	labour	shortages,	and	stewards	were	able	to	play	on	
this.	One	senior	steward	commented	after	a	hearing:	
	
‘“The	people	who	were	in	that	meeting...	they	had	to	release	two	people	from	the	
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line…	Because	I'm	not	going	to	do	it	without	the	local	steward	there…"	
-	if	they	want	to	do	lots	of	cases,	they	have	to	release	people...	
“That	line	would	have	suffered	because	of	that.	Well,	good.”’	
	
In	other	cases,	there	might	have	been	inadequate	investigation	by	management.	One	
steward,	said	that	he	had	‘quite	a	good	success	rate’	in	individual	casework,	and	attributed	
this	to	management’s	poor	preparation,	especially	a	lack	of	proper	investigation.	The	
steward	had	a	theory	about	why	this	happened:	
	
'“The	supervisors	are	under	the	cosh”	
-	I	can	remember...	years	ago,	the	supervisors	could	make	decisions…	
-	now	the	managers	tell	the	supervisors	what	to	do...	
-	if	they	tell	the	supervisors	to	do	somebody,	it	all	depends	on	whether	the	supervisor	
does	the	research...	but	they're	too	busy...	
-	often,	they've	not	done	the	research’.		
	
	
Sometimes,	stewards	used	detailed	job-knowledge	to	show	that	technical	problems	had	
been	the	cause	of	a	quality	problem,	rather	than	operator	error:		
	
‘-	they	said	I	hadn't	tightened	a	part...	but	it's	[something	technical]	
-	I	said	to	them,	I	didn't	have	a	red	light...	
-	they	found	out	the	gun	was	faulty’.		
	
Sometimes,	real	detective	work	was	required.	One	steward	described	a	case	that	involved	a	
worker	failing	to	fit	an	important	part	that	was	subject	to	'error-proofing';	that	is,	an	electro-
mechanical	system	which	stops	the	line	unless	the	operator	presses	a	button	to	confirm	a	
part	has	been	fitted	correctly:		
	
‘-	we	fit	a	box...	the	stop/start	box…	
-	…a	light	comes	on	and	you	press	a	button	{'error-proofing'}	…	 	
-	one	got	missed...	
-	the	team	leader	came	down	and	said,	I've	got	to	do	a	PPS...	every	man	and	his	dog	
knows	about	it...	even	{senior	manager}	
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What's	a	PPS?		
{Steward}	-	it's	a	form...	it's	"the	five	why's"...	"Why	did	you	miss	it?"...	all	that		
-	when	we	sat	down	and	went	through	it,	we	worked	it	out...	
-	the	night	before,	when	he	missed	it...	there	was	a	power	surge...	all	the	power	went	
out...	it	probably	tripped	the	error-proofing	{system}…	
-	he	was	on	there	from	half-twelve	to	one,	and	the	power	went	at	ten	to	one...		
-	we	can't	work	out	the	exact	car...	but	it's	close	enough...	when	we	said	that,	{shift	
manager}	was	happy....	
Is	he	usually	a	good	worker?		
{Steward}	-	he's	generally	all	right	…		
-	he	shouldn't	miss	any	because	of	the	error-proofing…	he	shouldn't	have	missed	
because	of	the	light...	so	it's	a	good	chance	the	power	surge	tripped	it’.		
	
Stewards	were	also	able	to	use	inexperience	or	lack	of	training:	
	
‘-	where	we	used	to	have	offline	training,	now	it's	online,	which	is	not	as	effective...	
it's	head	count...		
[i.e.	training	has	suffered	because	of	reductions	in	labour.]	
Does	the	lack	of	training	cause	you	problems,	as	a	steward,	with	more	quality	issues?			
{Steward}	-	“I	just	tell	them	where	to	stick	it”	
-	I	can	get	away	with	it	for	a	period	-	about	two	or	three	weeks’.	
	
Underlying	all	these	example,	then,	is	a	sense	of	achieving	a	degree	of	fair	treatment	of	
workers	by	management;	something	that	shows	clear	continuity	with	Brown's	(1973:	136)	
'shop-stewardliness'	(Section	2.2).		
	
Perhaps	the	most	unexpected	feature	of	individual	representation	at	Big	Car	was	shop	
stewards'	bargaining	with	management	over	the	outcomes	of	cases,	which	was	a	common	
practice	in	many	areas.	Bargaining	of	this	type	usually	took	the	form	of	an	arrangement	
between	a	steward	and	a	supervisor	or	local	manager,	though	they	also	occurred	at	higher	
levels.	Stewards	almost	always	referred	to	such	arrangements	as	‘a	deal’.	Usually,	the	‘deal’	
was	not	a	clearly	defined	quid	pro	quo,	though	it	could	be.	More	commonly,	the	process	
worked	as	a	form	of	credit	whereby	a	good	turn,	or	favour,	by	one	party	would	result	in	a	
benefit	to	that	party	at	some	point	in	the	future,	when	the	favour	was	returned.	Evidence	of	
 	 193	
this	practice	came	up	very	frequently	in	the	fieldwork,	and	was	reported	by	many	of	the	
stewards;	again,	this	indicates	the	high	bargaining	awareness	and	considerable	
sophistication	of	these	stewards.		
	
Stewards	used	a	variety	of	tactics	to	achieve	a	'deal'.	Often,	there	was	an	overlap	with	the	
approach	outlined	above,	whereby	stewards	would	use	a	combination	of	mitigation	
(sometimes	exaggerated)	together	with	an	element	of	bargaining,	to	influence	a	manager’s	
decision.	In	the	following	case,	a	steward	got	a	disciplinary	case	dropped.	The	following	
excerpts	show	this	approach	in	context:	
	
‘{Steward}	-	[I’ve	had]	the	normal	disciplinaries	-	where	we	look	after	each	other	
“I've	got	away	with	a	couple	of	those,	I	think.”	
How	do	you	mean?		
{Steward}	-	…	a	lad	missed	several	things	over	the	last	months	
-	I	didn't	lie	as	such...	
-	I	made	a	couple	of	points...	[first]	it's	not	his	normal	job...	[second]	he's	doing	the	
company	a	favour'.			
	
That	is,	the	steward	mitigated	this	workers'	error	by	pointing	out	that	he	was	frequently	
sent	to	work	on	a	job	in	another	section,	despite	lacking	experience.	In	fact,	the	steward	
confided,	the	worker	knew	the	job	quite	well	–	hence,	the	steward’s	comment	that	he	
'didn't	exactly	lie'.	The	steward	continued:		
	
'-	he's	lent	in	from	another	line	-	he	doesn't	complain...		
-	but	he's	done	six	{errors}	in	the	last	three	weeks...		
That's	a	lot...		
Steward	nods	in	agreement.	It	is	a	lot.'		
	
Usually,	this	number	of	errors	would	result	in	disciplinary	action,	but	in	this	case	the	
steward	was	able	to	do	a	deal:		
	
'{Steward}	-	{the	manager}	accepted	what	I	said...		
[i.e.	the	lad	didn't	get	disciplined.]	
-	it's	the	last	chance	-	I've	accepted,	if	he	makes	another,	it's	the	PDP...		
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-	I've	explained	to	the	operator,	it's	best	deal	I	could	get	at	the	time	
Can	you	often	do	that	sort	of	thing?	
{Steward}	smiles.	
{Steward}	-	“It	can	be	done,	yeh”	
-	depends	who	the	operator	is	
-	you	look	for	away	out...	in	the	majority,	you	will	find	a	way	out	-	or	a	way	to	get	
lesser	action’.			
	
In	this	case,	besides	the	overstated	mitigation,	the	implicit	bargaining	element	lies	in	the	
advantage	to	management	of	relatively	hassle-free	labour	mobility,	in	exchange	for	leniency	
on	the	disciplinary	issue.	Furthermore,	this	example	illustrates	another	feature	of	the	
handling	of	disciplinary	matters	at	Big	Car;	namely,	the	'second	chance',	reminiscent	of	
Gouldner's	(1965:	18-22)	'indulgency	pattern'.		
	
An	offer	from	stewards	of	limited	concessions	on	labour	flexibility	was	a	common	element	
in	deals	with	managers	over	disciplinary	cases.	In	these	cases,	labour	shortages	became	a	
factor	working	in	favour	of	the	stewards.	The	following	example	is	from	a	diary-interview:		
	
‘{Steward}	says	he's	only	had	a	few	issues.	In	his	diary,	there	are	a	few	individual	cases	
he's	dealt	with.	He	picks	out	one	of	these,	where	he	was	particularly	pleased	with	the	
result.	
{Steward}	-	a	possible	quality	issue...	
[i.e.	possible	disciplinary	over	quality]		
-	wrong	cables	fitted...	
[i.e.	gear	cables]	
{Steward}	says,	when	the	car	moves	on	from	their	section,	the	engine	is	put	in,	and	
various	other	parts,	so	it's	been	built	up	quite	a	bit	before	the	next	QA	check.	By	that	
time,	the	gear	cable	is	inside	a	lot	of	other	stuff:		
{Steward}	-	it	takes	three	hours	to	get	the	wrong	one	out...	
This	is	the	kind	of	thing	that	leads	to	disciplinary	action.	
But	{Steward}	was	able	to	do	a	deal,	to	get	disciplinary	action	dropped.		
{Steward}	-	the	lad's	got	skills	and	they	wanted	him	lent	out	as	cover...	
-	he's	happy	to	go...	I	talked	to	him	[to	check]...	
-	the	deal	was,	they	didn't	discipline	-	and	we'd	let	him	get	lent	out...	
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-	he's	out	of	turn	on	the	rota...	
-	otherwise,	they	have	to	take	the	next	guy	on	the	rota...	but	he's	not	got	the	skills’.		
	
Sometimes,	a	steward	might	be	willing	to	break	rules	imposed	by	union	policy:			
	
‘{Steward}	-	I	had	a	case	last	week...	a	lad	coming	up	for	a	Stage	3	{suspension}…	
-	they're	short	on	the	section...	so	I	offered	to	lend	myself	out,	and	[arrange	for]	
another	guy	to	come	in	and	cover...	you're	not	supposed	to	lend	out	the	steward,	but	
I	said	I	would	do	it...	and	I	said,	right,	if	I	do	that,	I	want	the	lad	to	get	a	counselling	
letter'.	
	
In	this	case,	the	steward	was	successful.		
	
Other	instances	show	the	credit-favours	approach.	In	the	following	example,	a	steward	from	
the	fork	truck	drivers	reported	how	he	dealt	with	another	Stage	3	disciplinary,	which	would	
otherwise	have	resulted	in	a	suspension:		
	
‘{Steward}	went	to	see	the	manager	and	said,	do	me	a	favour,	just	give	him	a	
bollocking	and	a	warning	-	“I'm	clawing	one	back”	-	if	you	do	that	you'll	get	kudos	for	
not	doing	him	when	you	could	have,	and	he'll	know	you're	not	just	out	to	get	him	
(this	lad	thinks	the	manager	is	out	to	get	him).	The	manager	says,	yes	I'll	take	a	bite	of	
that.	{Steward}	says	this	manager	will	go	for	this	sort	of	arrangement.’	
	
Later,	I	asked	the	steward	what	he	meant	by	‘clawing	one	back’:		
	
‘{Steward}	explains	that	this	manager	was	in	an	area	which	is	separate	from	the	
stores…	with	it's	own	allocation	of	drivers…	If	that	area	is	short	of	drivers,	the	
manager	will	come	and	ask	the	steward	if	a	driver	can	be	spared	from	the	stores	that	
day	to	go	and	work	in	his	area.	Formally,	there	are	company	rules	and	agreements	
restricting	where	and	when	drivers	can	be	lent	out	-	but	if	it's	not	too	busy	in	the	
stores,	the	steward	is	willing	to	lend	out	a	driver	as	a	favour.	Seemingly,	the	manager	
knows	it's	a	favour,	and	from	time	to	time	{Steward}	will	“claw	one	back”.'	
	
On	other	occasions,	special	pleading	was	combined	with	more	open	threats.	For	example,	a	
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steward	representing	a	team	of	five	operators	facing	disciplinary	action	explained:	
	
‘-	so	I	went	in	the	manager's	office...	and	basically	whinged	loads...	and	he	let	me	off...		
-	five	Stage	1’s	and	we	got	away	with	all	of	them...	I	couldn't	believe	it...	
-	basically,	through	a	bit	of	intimidation		
What	do	you	mean,	"intimidation"?		
{Steward}	-	basically...	[we	said]	you	do	this,	or	we'll	stop	the	line’.		
	
Although	these	particular	tactics	were	not	typical,	this	example	shares	with	others	the	
overlap	between	individual	representation	and	collective	issues,	both	in	the	way	stewards	
thought	about	individual	cases,	and	in	the	ways	they	attempted	to	deal	with	them.	Taken	
together,	this	evidence	shows	the	significant	extent	to	which	individual	and	collective	issues	
were	intertwined	in	shop	steward	activity	at	Big	Car.		
	
Next,	the	discussion	presents	surprising	evidence	of	a	type	of	casework	which	became	
apparent	during	the	fieldwork	at	Big	Car:	individual	workers	engaged	in	individual	
bargaining.		
	
Individual	bargaining		
This	section	presents	evidence	of	a	type	of	individualised	bargaining	which	does	not	appear	
in	the	previous	literature,	and	which	was	therefore	entirely	unexpected.	As	such,	it	presents	
a	challenge	for	previous	accounts,	as	for	this	one.	This	evidence	shows	that	a	small	but	
significant	section	of	the	workforce	at	Big	Car	took	a	distinctively	individualistic	approach	
towards	improving	their	own	position,	especially	in	relation	to	effort.	With	high	rates	of	
sickness	absence,	poor	work	discipline,	and	a	willingness	to	lie	to	both	management	and	
union	reps,	especially	if	an	easy	job	was	available,	these	were	the	workers	who,	as	stewards	
commonly	expressed	it,	'took	the	piss'	–	in	order	to	secure	a	relatively	easy	life	inside	the	
factory.	Although	not	a	large	section	of	union	membership,	this	group	took	up	a	significant	
amount	of	stewards'	time	in	some	areas,	especially	senior	stewards	and	convenors,	and	
therefore	cannot	be	ignored	in	an	account	of	shop	steward	activity.	While	the	research	did	
not	focus	on	this	area,	and	was	not	able	to	gather	sufficient	evidence	for	a	full	analysis,	the	
findings	suggest	that	comparable	practices	might	be	found	elsewhere.	
	
Although	the	practices	discovered	were	certainly	individual	in	form,	nevertheless,	these	
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cases	also	entailed	important	collective	aspects;	both	in	terms	of	the	bargaining	
opportunities	and	resources	available,	and	in	stewards’	responses	to	the	challenges	posed	
by	these	practices.	Consequently,	this	evidence	shows	that	even	an	apparently	entirely	
individualised	phenomenon	cannot	be	understood	or	explained	without	grasping	the	
essentially	collective	context	and	dynamics	involved.	The	following	account	describes	the	
main	features	of	individual	bargaining	at	Big	Car.		
	
One	area	where	attempts	at	individual	bargaining	were	relatively	common	involved	the	RFE	
scheme,	whereby	physically	impaired	employees	were	found	less	demanding	jobs,	so	that	
they	could	remain	employed	at	the	plant,	rather	than	face	dismissal	on	capability	grounds.	A	
steward	recounted	that,	at	the	time	the	scheme	was	set	up,	there	were	around	30	RFE	staff;	
but	once	the	scheme	was	set	up,	that	number	increased.			
	
‘-	what	happened	after	that	was	the	30	or	so	in	rehab	went	up	to	40	or	so...	
-	people	saw	they	were	getting	easier	jobs,	and	thought	this	was	a	way	to	get	one	-	
and	the	numbers	of	people	with	back	trouble,	etc,	started	increasing...	
{...}	
-	they	started	to	get	people	{...}	from	all	round	the	plant,	who	{stewards}	thought	
were	obviously	making	false	claims,	in	order	to	get	an	easier	job.		
-	...	basically,	they	didn't	want	to	work...			
“arseholes”’.	
	
This	steward	was	later	involved	with	managers	and	Occupational	Health	(OH)	staff	in	
assessing	applicants	for	an	RFE	job:	
	
‘-	when	they	first	started	having	parts	delivered	{to	the	line}…	towed	behind	little	
trucks,	a	lot	of	people	thought,	that's	a	nice	job	-	driving	round	on	a	little	golf	cart…'		
{...}	
They	interviewed	15	people	…		All	of	these	people	claimed	to	have	various	serious	
health	problems	-	like	bad	backs.	But	{Steward}	says	many	of	them	looked	like	they	
spent	a	lot	of	time	in	the	gym		
{...}		
{Steward}	and	the	other	interviewers	said	{to	the	interviewees},	well	this	job	involves	
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pulling	loaded	dollies3	out	of	the	stacks	and	hooking	them	up	to	the	cart	-	do	you	
think	you	can	do	that?	yes,	they	said.		
So	the	interviewees	were	taken	out	into	the	warehouse	area	to	do	a		demonstration.		
{...}	
{Steward}	-	we	asked	them	to	pull	dollies	with	axles	on..	they're	690kg	...	you	have	to	
pull	them	out	and	turn	them...	[to	hook	them	up	to	the	cart]	
-	after	that,	dollies	with	wheel	nuts...	over	800kg...	
-	of	the	15,	14	did	all	the	tasks,	so	the	stewards,	the	managers,	and	OH	all		said,	
there's	nothing	wrong	with	you,	and	sent	them	back	to	their	old	jobs'.		
	
Other	stewards	reported	similar	examples	of	feigned	injuries	in	attempts	to	get	easier	jobs.	
These	cases	involved	a	complex	interweaving	of	individual	and	collective	issues	that	are	
familiar	from	recent	industrial	relations	literature,	but	which	were	combined	in	an	
unexpected	way:	union	reps	devised	and	negotiated	a	procedure	through	collective	
bargaining,	reinforced	by	equalities	legislation,	to	protect	the	employment	of	mainly	older	
and	injured	workers,	in	a	context	of	lean	production	and	work	intensification,	which	
encountered	serious	problems	from	individualised	workers.	In	some	cases,	stewards	
engaged	jointly	with	management	in	quasi-disciplinary	action	against	individual	bargainers,	
while	in	other	cases,	stewards	were	able	to	utilise	resources	of	their	own;	such	as	peer	
pressure	on	malingerers,	or	an	insistence	on	medical	assessment	for	RFE	jobs.	Nevertheless,	
stewards'	success	in	negotiating	permanent	'light	duties'	jobs	for	impaired	workers	had	the	
unexpected	effect	of	placing	stewards	in	a	policing	role	over	access	to	those	jobs.		
	
Stewards	offered	an	explanation	of	this	individualised	behaviour,	commonly	describing	this	
group	as	‘Thatcher’s	children’,	with	the	greedy	and	self-centred	attitudes	that	implied.	In	
1998,	Big	Car	had	taken	on	an	entire	new	shift,	some	800	workers,	known	as	the	‘98ers’,	and	
a	disproportionate	number	of	difficult	members	came	from	that	intake.	Other	stewards,	
however,	noted	that	several	of	the	best	young	stewards	were	also	98ers.	Similar	difficulties	
arose	with	a	second	smaller	intake	in	2011.	One	convenor	described,		
	
'-	guys	who've	been	here	two	years	who've	had	more	sick	than	I've	had	in	forty	years'.	
	
																																								 																				
3	'Dollies'	was	the	term	for	wheeled	platforms,	of	various	types	and	sizes,	used	to	transport	
parts	around	the	plant,	usually	towed	behind	small	LPG-powered	trucks.		
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This	convenor	offered	a	different	explanation	for	the	behaviour	of	recent	intakes:	
	
'-	most	of	them	came	straight	in	off	the	dole		
-	they	had	never	been	in	a	union	before	and	many	had	never	had	a	job	before’.	
	
These	descriptions	bring	to	mind	accounts	of	growing	individualism	and	the	undermining	of	
collectivity	since	the	1980s	(e.g.	Brown	1990;	see	discussion	in	Kelly	1998:	39-42).	However,	
contrary	to	the	unstated	assumption	of	the	end-of-collectivism	thesis,	it	was	clear	that	
managers	at	Big	Car	saw	no	benefit	in	the	attitudes	and	behaviours	of	this	section	of	the	
workforce.	If	anything,	these	workers	presented	more	problems	for	management	than	they	
did	for	the	union	organisation.	A	convenor	who	had	represented	a	number	of	these	workers	
at	serious	disciplinary	hearings	agreed:		
	
'-	management	know	they	have	a	lot	of	trouble	with	the	98ers		
-	[shrugs]	...	I	say,	well,	you	employed	them’.		
	
Clearly,	if	'Thatcher's	children'	were	characterised	by	a	lack	of	collectivity,	they	were	at	least	
equally	wanting	in	labour	discipline	and	work	ethic.	While	there	is	insufficient	evidence,	
here,	for	a	full	analysis,	it	is	plausible	that	for	some	groups	of	workers	the	existence	of	
collectively	bargained	and	legally	supported	individual	rights	can	offer	opportunities	and	
resources	for	individual	bargaining.	Consequently,	it	is	possible	that	similar	practices	may	be	
found	elsewhere.	However,	firm	conclusions	must	await	further	research.		
	
	
Overall,	the	evidence	presented	in	this	section	shows	that	shop	stewards	at	Big	Car	were	
dealing	with	individual	representation	and	casework	that	was	often	linked	to	collective	
issues,	both	in	terms	of	root	causes	and	the	ways	that	stewards	addressed	them.	Linkages	
between	individual	and	collective	issues	were	often	unexpected,	and	involved	real	
complexity	in	relations	between	stewards,	managers,	and	workers,	at	various	levels.	The	
final	shorter	section	of	this	chapter	will	look	more	specifically	at	shop	steward	attitudes	
towards	management	in	this	case	study.		
	
	
 	200	
6.4	Shop	stewards	and	managers:	attitudes	and	impacts		
	
Although	important	aspects	of	shop	steward	attitudes	towards	management	were	visible	in	
the	preceding	account,	this	section	draws	out	more	explicitly	some	of	the	common	
approaches	and	orientations	that	became	apparent	during	the	fieldwork.	The	most	obvious	
finding	was	the	importance	attached	by	stewards	to	‘good	bargaining	relations’	with	
managers.	Stewards	were	often	actively	engaged	in	trying	to	shape	relations	with	managers,	
rather	than	passively	accepting	whatever	relationship	management	decided	upon.	This	is	
not	to	say	that	stewards	were	always	successful.	Nevertheless,	securing	a	relationship	of	
trust	and	reciprocity	was	clearly	a	significant	area	of	concern	for	these	stewards.	
	
The	shop	stewards	at	Big	Car	often	expressed	the	importance	they	attached	to	having	good	
relations	with	managers,	especially	at	supervisor	(‘foreman’)	and	line	manager	level.	As	one	
of	them	put	it:		
	
“You	have	to	have	a	working	relationship,	don’t	you?”.		
	
Stewards	described	the	type	of	manager	they	appreciated:	
	
‘-	he's	a	good	manager...	he'll	help	people	out'	
	
‘-	fortunately,	the	manager	…	is	quite	good	and	will	help	you	out	if	he	can'	
	
‘-	…I’ve	got	quite	a	good	relationship...	I	prefer	that	-	you	can	do	deals'	
	
‘-	his	managers	were	great	about	it...		
[They	said]	“put	the	books	away”		
What	does	that	mean?		
{Steward}	-	informal	chat...	sort	of	unofficial’.		
	
By	contrast,	stewards	had	a	low	opinion	of	any	seeming	dishonesty	by	managers.	The	case	
outlined	above	(Section	6.2),	where	a	manager	was	caught	falsifying	job-time	sheets,	led	to	
that	manager	being	removed	from	the	CIP	after	shop	steward	protests.	A	meeting	was	held	
with	higher	managers,	senior	union	reps,	and	the	manager	concerned,	where	the	issue	was	
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addressed	in	very	strong	terms.	One	convenor	described	this	meeting	as	‘a	straightener’,	
and	explained	the	severe	treatment	of	the	guilty	manager	in	that	meeting:	
	
‘“We	abused	him	up	hill	and	down	dale”	
-	…	after	this,	{senior	manager}	got	involved,	and	{manager}	got	a	huge	bollocking	
{…}	
{Convenor}	-	“{Manager}	did	get	his	comeuppance”.'	
	
There	were	other	examples	of	shop	stewards	putting	managers	and	supervisors	under	
pressure	to	move	towards	good	bargaining	relations.	One	steward	described	difficulties	with	
a	new	supervisor:	
	
‘-	we've	got	a	temporary	supervisor...	we've	been	helping	him	out...	he's	learning	the	
ropes	
-	sometimes,	we've	had	to	come	down	on	him...		
-	he	tends	to	be	in	your	face	too	much...	on	one	occasion	words	were	thrown...		
[i.e.	by	the	steward]		
{...}		
-	people	didn't	like	some	of	the	decisions	he	was	making...	I	had	to	confront	that...		
-	he's	gradually	learning	the	ropes’.	
	
On	one	occasion,	this	new	supervisor	gave	a	work	instruction	which	was	seen	as	
unreasonable,	and	the	shop	steward	responded:		
	
‘-	I	said	to	the	lads,	don't	do	it		
-	there	was	consequences	
-	the	next	week,	the	shift	manager	looked	into	it	-	to	check	what	I'd	said...		
{…}	
-	the	following	week,	he	{supervisor}	did	it	gracefully...	we	had	a	laugh	about	it’.		
	
The	steward	explained:	
	
‘-	I	was	trying	to	make	a	point	
-	perhaps...	[I	went]	a	bit	overboard	with	my	tone	and	words...		
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“But	it	did	work”	
{…}		
-	…	that’s	why	I've	been	voted	in...	the	lads	know	I	can	do	that...	
-	when	calm	conversation	doesn't	to	work,	you	have	be	able	to	raise	the	fire	a	bit’.		
	
This	is	an	interesting	version	of	‘helping	out’	a	new	supervisor	while	he	learns	the	ropes.	But	
it	does	illustrate	efforts	made	by	stewards	to	influence	the	behaviour	of	individual	
supervisors	and	managers	in	the	direction	of	good	bargaining	relations.		
	
A	further	example	of	this	approach	came	from	the	fork	truck	drivers	and	concerned	the	lean	
production	system	of	‘suggestions’,	whereby	workers	were	encouraged	to	make	suggestions	
for	improving	production	in	exchange	for	financial	rewards	–	paid	in	proportion	to	the	
savings	made.	Some	of	the	drivers	were	very	experienced	and	possessed	a	high	degree	of	
job-knowledge,	far	more	so	than	their	managers.	These	drivers	regularly	came	up	with	
suggestions	to	improve	efficiency,	some	of	which	had	been	taken	up	globally	by	Big	Car,	
winning	the	top	prize	of	£5,000.	Stewards	among	the	fork	truck	drivers	had	previously	
established	that	all	suggestions	would	be	channelled	via	senior	stewards	and	submitted	
collectively,	but	with	two	rules:	first,	the	suggestion	must	not	reduce	the	head	count;	
second,	the	names	of	all	drivers	would	be	added	to	the	suggestion	form,	so	that	each	
worker	received	a	share	of	the	reward	–	up	to	£180	each.	This	method	was	well-established,	
and	was	used	by	the	stewards	to	reinforce	collectivity	among	the	drivers.		
	
On	one	occasion,	prior	to	the	fieldwork,	a	highly	successful	suggestion	was	made	but	no	
reward	was	forthcoming.	It	transpired	later	that	local	managers	had	claimed	the	suggestion	
for	themselves,	and	the	drivers	lost	their	reward.	The	senior	steward	said,	
	
"We	got	bit."	
	
In	response,	the	stewards	organised	a	meeting	at	which	drivers	agreed	they	would	put	
forward	no	more	suggestions;	effectively,	a	suggestion	strike.	This	policy	remained	in	place	
for	three	years,	until	shortly	before	the	fieldwork	commenced.	According	to	the	senior	
steward,	when	the	offending	manager	was	later	‘done	in’	by	higher	management	and	
replaced,	the	new	manager	made	it	clear	that	he	expected	a	resumption	of	suggestions	
from	the	drivers.	Stewards	secured	a	clear	undertaking	that	there	would	be	no	more	
 	 203	
cheating	on	the	rewards	and	decided	initially	to	put	in	one	suggestion,		
	
"to	get	him	on	our	side".		
	
Other	suggestions	were	withheld	until	the	reward	was	paid,	as	a	safeguard.	During	the	
fieldwork,	having	secured	the	first	payment,	stewards	were	considering	further	suggestions.	
In	this	part	of	the	plant,	then,	suggestions	had	effectively	been	collectivised	by	the	shop	
steward	organisation,	and	were	even	used	as	a	bargaining	resource.		
	
As	regards	the	impact	that	stewards	were	able	to	have	as	a	result	of	established	bargaining	
relations,	participants	in	in-depth	interviews	were	unanimous	in	stating	that	the	union	did	
have	an	influence	upon	management	and	management	decisions	at	Big	Car.	A	typical	
answer	was:	
	
“Yeh,	they’ve	definitely	got,	in	my	opinion,	they've	got	an	influence.”		
	
This	answer	displays	a	second	common,	though	not	universal,	feature	of	stewards’	views	on	
this	matter;	namely,	the	feeling	that	the	main	influence	of	the	union	was	at	convenor	level.	
Another	steward	said	of	union	influence:		
	
“Higher	up,	yeh.	We’ll	fight	our	battles	down	here…	I	think	they	have	got	a	bit	of	
sway,	but	I	think	there’s	a	lot	of	things	that	go	on	to	get	them	that	sway”.		
	
This	steward	went	on	to	talk	about	concessions	that	the	union	had	agreed	in	recent	years,	
with	the	intention	of	keeping	the	plant	open.	During	the	fieldwork,	this	issue	formed	a	
continuous	backdrop	for	many	other	issues.	In	the	in-depth	interviews,	shop	stewards	were	
asked	whether	they	would	agree	with	the	view	that	the	union	had	given	too	much	away.	
Only	two	stewards	agreed	that	it	had.	Generally,	stewards	took	a	very	pragmatic	view,	
seeing	the	concessions	as	necessary	in	unfavourable	circumstances.	One	steward	
elaborated:		
	
“You	can’t	help	feeling	like	that	{i.e.	that	too	much	has	been	given	away}	…	you	can’t	
help	feeling	that	way.	But,	if	it	means	keeping	the	plant	open,	then,	I	suppose,	you	
have	to	accept	it…	[pause]	which,	you	know,	doesn’t	go	down	very	well.	But,	at	the	
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end	of	the	day,	it’s	open	and	we’re	all	working	here,	so	looking	back	now,	everything	
we’ve	done	here	to	keep	it	open…	[pause]	…	we’re	still	open,	so	it’s	worth	it.”		
	
Thus,	on	an	issue	of	central	importance	for	the	union	organisation	in	the	plant,	the	shop	
stewards	largely	shared	a	common	view	of	the	situation	and	a	commitment	to	the	union	
leadership’s	course	of	action.			
	
Unlike	at	London	Borough,	the	case	study	at	Big	Car	was	able	to	gather	evidence	from	
managers.	Evidence	from	managers	supported	that	from	stewards	in	relation	to	overall	
union-management	relations,	and	on	details	of	specific	incidents.	Observation	in	'unit	
consultation'	meetings,	fortnightly	forums	of	senior	stewards	and	production	managers,	
supported	stewards'	accounts	of	management	relations:	business-like,	at	times	tough,	but	
with	stewards	retaining	the	capacity	to	influence	management	decisions,	and	to	raise	issues	
of	their	own	and	gain	alterations	to	management	actions.	Furthermore,	managers	who	were	
interviewed	agreed	with	the	verdict	of	stewards	concerning	union	influence;	that	is,	these	
managers	were	all	of	the	opinion	that	the	union	had	an	influence	on	management	decision-
making.	Interviews	with	managers	were	conducted	towards	the	end	of	the	fieldwork,	after	
the	main	features	of	stewards'	accounts	had	become	clear.	Therefore,	corroboration	at	this	
point	suggests	the	research	methods	adopted	to	investigate	shop	stewards	had	produced	
reliable	evidence,	as	subsequently	triangulated	by	evidence	from	managers.		
	
Further	evidence	concerning	bargaining	relations	in	the	plant	came	from	an	interview	with	a	
senior	HR	manager.	In	response	to	the	standard	WERS	survey	question	about	whether	the	
workplace	had	a	consultation	committee	(Section	2.1),	instead	of	a	simple	yes/no	answer,	
the	manager	spoke	for	eight	minutes,	describing	a	considerable	number	of	joint	union-
management	forums,	at	many	levels.	Some	of	these	bodies	were	designated	as	
‘negotiating’,	some	as	‘consultative’,	while	others	had	neither	term	in	their	title.	These	
arrangements	involved	a	number	of	regularly	scheduled	meetings:	European	works	council-
style	forum;	Joint	National	Council	and	Staff	Joint	National	Council,	each	meeting	quarterly;	
Joint	Plant	Committee;	weekly	'plant	consultation	meeting’;	Health	and	Safety	Committee;	
Safety	Policy	Committee.	The	HR	manager	also	described	a	further	series	of	meetings	with	
union	reps:	‘employment	review	meetings’	(potential	dismissals);	weekly	‘absence	control	
meetings’;	‘RFE	separation’	(enhanced	redundancy	and	early	retirement	schemes	on	ill-
health	grounds,	with	Occupational	Health	involvement);	‘training	steering	meeting’.	Overall,	
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this	indicated	a	significant	level	of	regular,	formal	contact	between	managers	and	union	
representatives,	especially	at	senior	levels.		
	
When	asked	WERS	questions	about	issues	upon	which	the	company	negotiated,	consulted,	
provided	information,	or	excluded	the	union,	the	senior	HR	manager	at	Big	Car	was	
reluctant	to	answer	in	an	either/or	fashion.	Summarising	an	approach	to	the	union	that	
included	negotiation,	consultation	and	the	provision	of	information,	the	HR	manager	stated:		
	
“It	would	be	all	three,	really	…	because	that’s	generally	how	we	get	to	the	conclusion.	
It	depends	on	what	you’re	dealing	with.	…	There’s	generally	not	negotiation	because	
we	work	together	on	these	issues.”	
	
It	should	be	noted	that	there	certainly	were	significant	amounts	of	formal	negotiation	and	
collective	agreements	at	Big	Car.	Nevertheless,	this	formal	descriptor	did	not	by	any	means	
exhaust	the	extent	of	union-management	relations.	In	relation	to	the	union,	the	HR	
manager	said	that	on	many	issues,			
	
“they	would	have	a	point	of	view.	That’s	where	you’ve	got	the	fine	line	of	consult	and	
negotiate,	because	we	always	have...	[pause]	the	two	come	into	play.	…	You’ve	go	to	
gauge	what	you’re	dealing	with.	You’ve	got	to	sort	of,	think	of	your	tactics	and	how	
you’re	going	to	get	the	best	out	of	the	situation.”	
	
Furthermore,	in	the	HR	manager’s	description	of	the	numerous	union-management	forums,	
the	same	names	came	up	repeatedly,	making	it	clear	that	a	relatively	small	group	of	senior	
managers	and	senior	union	reps	met	frequently,	under	many	different	auspices,	and	had	
done	so	over	many	years.	That	is,	the	HR	manager	described	a	set	of	established	social	
relations	between	managers	and	union	reps.	The	HR	manager	characterised	union-
management	relations	as	follows:		
	
“So,	I	would	suggest	that	we	involve	them	quite	heavily	in	terms	of,	sometimes	
consulting,	sometimes	informations,	sometimes	getting	their	agreement	on	stuff	to	
go	out	–	I	also	show	them	all	the	works	notices	…	on	any	subject	at	all,	before	it’s	
issued.	So	what	I	would	say	is,	if	you	like,	they’re	partners,	very	much	partners	-	that’s	
the	way	I	view	it	…	it’s	very	transparent	…	there’s	no	barriers	between	us	in	any	way,	
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we’ve	got	excellent	relationships.	We	don’t	always	agree	-	of	course	we	don't	always	
agree.	But	I	think	we	have	a	very	mature	relationship,	and	I	think	all	those	forums	
help	us	to	do	that.”				
	
For	this	manager,	then,	negotiation	and	consultation	were	closely	intertwined	aspects	of	an	
established	bargaining	relationship.		
	
Finally,	evidence	from	observation	and	interviews	with	senior	union	representatives	showed	
that	a	number	of	issues	came	up	in	formally	designated	negotiation	and	consultation	
meetings,	and	were	subject	to	both	procedures.	For	instance,	procedures	for	down-days	
were	subject	to	an	annualised	hours	agreement	negotiated	at	JNC	level,	but	weekly	
arrangements	were	discussed	at	plant	consultation	meetings.	On	more	than	one	occasion	
during	the	fieldwork,	union	representatives	refused	management	requests	for	corridor	
working	at	'consultation'	meetings,	using	aspects	of	the	negotiated	collective	agreement.	
Thus,	not	only	did	some	issues	move	between	negotiation	and	consultation,	but	
‘consultation’	could	leave	managers	unable	to	pursue	their	preferred	course	of	action.		
	
	
Conclusion		
	
The	evidence	presented	in	this	chapter	gives	a	level	of	detail	concerning	the	everyday	
activity	of	contemporary	shop	stewards	that	is	unmatched	in	recent	research.	A	number	of	
issues	stand	out	prominently.	Contrary	to	expectations	of	the	current	standard	view,	shop	
stewards	were	clearly	significantly	engaged	in	bargaining	activity.	Moreover,	shop	steward	
bargaining	was	often,	to	some	degree,	successful.	There	was	considerable	evidence	of	effort	
bargaining	by	stewards.	The	link	between	wages	and	effort	was	made	explicit	by	the	job-
sheet	system,	and	shop	steward	activity	in	this	area	showed	notable	continuity	with	older	
traditions	of	workplace	bargaining.	Important	frontier	of	control	issues	arose	in	the	
stewards'	defence	of	the	formal	procedure	for	CIPs.	Although	this	agreed	procedure	
circumscribed	the	grounds	on	which	stewards	could	oppose	work	reorganisation	and	labour	
intensification,	this	framework	guaranteed	the	involvement	of	stewards	in	the	CIP	process,	
resulting	in	important	restrictions	on	management	freedoms.	Individual	and	collective	
issues	were	clearly	linked,	especially	through	stewards'	established	practice	of	seeking	
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'deals'	with	management	that	exchanged	temporary	labour	flexibility	for	leniency	in	
disciplinary	cases.	Stewards	had	accumulated	significant	collective	knowledge	of	new	
management	methods,	and	had	developed	viable	bargaining	resources	from	aspects	of	
those	practices.	Evidence	from	managers	showed	that	they	recognised	the	restraining	effect	
of	shop	steward	activity	upon	their	prerogatives.	These	findings	significantly	undermine	the	
current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards,	and	also	stand	in	significant	contrast	to	previous	
accounts	of	lean	production	in	UK	car	plants.		
	
The	research	at	Big	Car	also	found	considerable	evidence	of	formally	designated	
‘consultation’	meetings	which	nevertheless	embodied	genuine	bargaining	processes.	There	
was	also	clear	evidence	that	stewards	were	successful	in	securing	modified	management	
decisions	through	the	entirely	less	promising	channel	of	CIP	procedures.	Evidence	from	the	
senior	HR	manager	at	Big	Car	further	undermines	the	distinction	between	negotiation	and	
consultation,	especially	in	the	blurring	of	issues	across	union-management	forums	at	
different	levels	within	the	plant	and	firm.	While	some	issues	were	fixed	in	particular	forums	
—	such	as	pay-bargaining	in	the	JNC	—	a	significant	number	of	issues	were	dealt	with	by	
more	than	one	union-management	body,	crossing	boundaries	of	formally	designated	
‘negotiation’	and	‘consultation’	arrangements.	Evidence	from	this	manager	supported	
accounts	from	senior	union	reps.	The	complexity	of	answers	given	by	this	individual	to	
standard	WERS	questions	underlines	the	problematic	methodology	upon	which	the	current	
standard	view	is	based.		
	
The	close	of	this	chapter	concludes	the	presentation	of	empirical	evidence.	By	adopting	the	
methods	of	detailed	workplace	study,	this	research	has	gathered	a	depth	and	detail	of	
evidence	about	the	day-to-day	activities	of	contemporary	shop	stewards	that	is	unrivalled	in	
recent	accounts.	However,	the	challenge	of	this	project	was	not	only	empirical	but	also	
theoretical;	to	present	a	critique	of	recent	accounts,	but	also	to	develop	an	alternative	
framework	for	understanding	the	activity	of	shop	stewards.	Therefore,	the	next	chapter	
returns	to	conceptual	and	theoretical	issues	discussed	in	Chapters	2	and	3,	and	re-evaluates	
those	discussions	in	the	light	of	the	new	evidence.		
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Chapter	7:	Discussion		
	
	
It	was	argued	at	the	outset	of	this	thesis	that	an	adequate	answer	to	its	motivating	question	
–	What	do	shop	stewards	do?	–	requires	not	only	empirical	but	also	conceptual	and	
theoretical	work.	The	underlying	problem	is	one	of	generalisation.	It	is	not	enough	to	say	
what	these	shop	stewards	were	doing.	The	point	is	to	draw	some	wider	conclusions	about	
what	shop	stewards	do	in	general.	But	that	is	not	a	straightforward	matter	for	case	study	
research.	Rather	than	basing	generalisation	on	the	relationship	of	a	sample	to	a	whole	
population,	generalisation	must	be	analytical,	based	on	theoretical	arguments	about	the	
significance	of	findings	and	how	to	understand	them	(Section	4.4).	Therefore,	this	chapter	
returns	to	themes	and	issues	explored	in	Chapters	2	and	3,	which	will	be	re-examined	in	the	
light	of	considerable	new	evidence.		
	
The	chapter	begins	with	an	overview	of	the	research,	which	will	present	answers	to	the	
research	questions,	discuss	its	strengths	and	limitations,	and	outline	a	basis	for	
generalisation.	As	may	be	clear	already,	the	picture	of	shop	steward	activity	that	emerged	
from	the	fieldwork	does	not	sit	easily	with	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards.	
Therefore,	the	second	section	of	the	chapter	will	revisit	the	critique	presented	in	Section	
2.1,	to	show	how	the	new	evidence	supports	that	critique.	The	second	section	will	also	
begin	the	process	of	theorisation	by	conceptualising	salient	features	of	the	findings.	The	
third	section	discusses	possible	explanations	for	these	patterns	by	revisiting	the	shop	
steward	typologies	rooted	in	the	classic	accounts.	Finally,	the	fourth	section	will	present	an	
alternative	approach	to	understanding	shop	stewards	that	aims	to	be	of	more	general	
applicability,	and	therefore	potentially	useful	for	researchers	elsewhere.	This	framework	will	
link	patterns	of	shop	steward	activity	to	underlying	dynamics	of	workplace	relations,	as	
mediated	by	particular	groupings	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources.	In	this	way,	the	
chapter	will	move	from	empirical	findings,	through	a	process	of	conceptual	critique	and	
theoretical	development,	to	present	a	generalised	way	of	thinking	about	shop	stewards	that	
moves	closer	to	answering	that	initial	question	–	What	do	shop	stewards	do?		
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7.1	Review	of	the	research		
	
This	section	presents	an	assessment	of	the	research,	starting	with	summary	answers	to	the	
research	questions	presented	in	Chapter	1.	Subsequently,	the	strengths	and	limitations	of	
the	study	are	discussed,	focussing	especially	on	methodological	and	theoretical	issues.	
Finally,	this	section	outlines	a	basis	for	generalisation	from	the	present	research.		
	
Research	questions	answered		
Having	presented	the	main	empirical	findings	in	the	preceding	two	chapters,	it	is	now	
possible	to	offer	answers	to	the	research	questions	presented	in	Section	1.1.	At	this	stage,	
these	answers	are	mainly	empirical,	and	conceptual	elements	will	be	developed	
subsequently.	Nevertheless,	the	essential	features	of	the	findings	are	clear	enough.		
	
Q1.	To	what	extent	do	shop	stewards	seek	to	influence	the	regulation	of	employment	
relations?		
Shop	stewards	in	the	two	case	studies	sought	to	influence	the	regulation	of	employment	
relations	to	a	considerable	extent.	These	efforts	accounted	for	a	significant	proportion	shop	
steward	activity.	Stewards	utilised	a	wide	variety	of	means	in	attempting	to	influence	
management	decisions,	to	restrict	managerial	prerogatives,	and	thereby	to	influence	the	
regulation	of	employment	relations.	Furthermore,	stewards	were	found	to	exert	genuine	
influence,	and	were	able	to	act	as	a	‘restraint’	on	management.	In	some	circumstances,	
shop	stewards'	influence	was	significantly	greater;	but	even	where	their	success	was	more	
limited,	stewards	continued	to	make	such	efforts.	Of	course,	the	transformed	context	of	
workplace	relations	meant	that	management	exercised	considerable	control	over	many	
aspects	of	work	organisation,	etc..	Nevertheless,	managerial	prerogatives	were	contested	
and	limited	by	the	activity	of	shop	stewards	in	numerous	ways,	and	to	a	significantly	greater	
extent	than	was	expected.			
	
Q2.	What	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources,	if	any,	are	shop	stewards	using?	
This	research	found	shop	stewards	to	be	using	a	range	of	bargaining	opportunities.	
Stewards'	efforts	to	challenge	and	influence	management	decision-making	often	centred	on	
opportunities	presented	by	aspects	of	management	practices,	such	as	the	CIP	process	at	Big	
Car,	or	the	extensive	use	of	individual	procedures	at	London	Borough.	Such	opportunities	
might	take	individual	or	collective	forms.	Bargaining	resources	at	the	disposal	of	shop	
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stewards	were	numerous	and	varied.	Some	were	familiar	from	previous	periods;	for	
instance,	grievance	procedures,	withdrawal	of	cooperation,	and	political	exchange	(Section	
3.1).	Others	appeared	to	be	more	recent	in	origin,	and	represented	innovations	by	shop	
stewards	in	response	to	new	management	methods,	such	as	the	increased	use	of	formal	
workplace	procedures,	or	lean	production.	More	narrowly,	bargaining	sanctions	available	to	
shop	stewards	were	clearly	less	effective	than	those	documented	by	the	classic	studies.	
Most	obviously,	shop	stewards	no	longer	had	the	strike	weapon	at	their	disposal	to	any	
significant	extent,	though	the	fieldwork	did	record	a	few	small	and	brief	work	stoppages.	
Instead,	shop	stewards	were	using	a	considerable	variety	of	other	bargaining	resources	in	
their	dealings	with	management,	ranging	from	more	collective	to	more	individual	in	nature.		
	
Q3.	What	bargaining	activity,	if	any,	are	shop	stewards	engaged	in?		
Shop	stewards	were	engaged	in	a	considerable	range	of	bargaining	activities,	under	a	variety	
of	arrangements,	from	formally	designated	negotiation	or	consultation	arrangements,	or	
other	formal	contexts,	to	entirely	informal,	nameless,	and/or	covert	practices.	To	a	far	
greater	extent	than	expected,	shop	stewards	dealt	directly	with	collective	issues.	Shop	
stewards	were	also	able	to	influence	management	decisions	and	actions	through	individual	
representation	and	casework,	which	can	be	considered	a	form	of	bargaining	insofar	as	it	had	
effects	in	restricting	managerial	prerogatives.	Differences	in	patterns	of	shop	steward	
bargaining	reflected	differences	in	management	practices;	suggesting	that	shop	steward	
activity	had	adapted	to	changing	management	methods,	and	a	transformed	context	of	
workplace	relations.		
	
Having	answered	the	original	research	questions	on	the	basis	of	evidence	from	the	two	case	
studies,	a	further	question	arises:	to	what	extent	can	these	findings	be	generalised?	The	
remainder	of	this	section	will	assess	the	research,	examining	its	strengths	and	limitations,	
and	outline	a	basis	for	generalisation.		
	
Strengths	and	limitations	of	the	study	
This	study	has	two	main	strengths.	The	first	lies	in	its	empirical	contribution,	which	brings	
considerable	and	important	new	evidence	to	discussions	of	workplace	union	representation	
and	the	contemporary	role	of	shop	stewards.	The	revival	of	ethnographic	methods	in	this	
area	has	produced	a	depth	and	richness	of	evidence	that	is	unsurpassed	in	more	than	three	
decades	of	industrial	relations	research,	and	which	clearly	demonstrates	the	advantages	of	
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such	methods	over	the	large-scale	surveys	that	form	the	empirical	basis	of	the	current	
standard	view	of	shop	stewards.	The	use	of	ethnography	also	overcame	difficulties	with	
relying	on	interview	methods	to	conduct	qualitative	research	(Section	4.3).	In	addition,	the	
innovative	use	of	diary-based	methods	has	significantly	developed	a	highly	productive,	if	
demanding,	method,	which	has	been	significantly	under-utilised	in	the	field	up	to	now.	
Hopefully,	these	methods	will	be	taken	up	and	refined	by	other	researchers,	in	a	wider	
challenge	to	the	current	one-sided	dominance	of	large-scale	surveys	in	industrial	relations	
research.		
	
The	second	main	strength	of	the	research	is	theoretical.	This	study	has	approached	high	
level	theory	more	thoroughly	than	is	usually	the	case	in	industrial	relations	research:	with	
only	a	few	exceptions,	such	as	Edwards	(1986),	'mid-range'	conceptualisation	is	generally	
preferred	(Kelly	1998:	20).	In	this	study,	linkages	between	the	day-to-day	activities	of	shop	
stewards	in	the	workplace	and	general	social	theory	have	been	traced	more	consistently.	
Whereas	social	structure	is	often	treated	either	simply	as	context,	or	narrowly	as	a	
restriction	or	'constraint'	on	agency	(Callinicos	2009:	1),	the	present	study	has	shown	how	a	
more	fully	developed	understanding	of	social	structure	and	its	relation	to	agency	can	
contribute	an	appreciation	of	structure	as	enabling	as	well	as	limiting,	thereby	bringing	a	
fresh	perspective	on	workplace	relations	and	hence	on	the	role	of	shop	stewards	within	
those	relations.	The	study	has	also	contributed	a	definition	of	bargaining,	which	lends	the	
present	analysis	a	firm	conceptual	basis	lacking	in	previous	accounts.			
	
There	are	also	two	main	limitations	of	the	study,	both	of	which	are	empirical.	First,	there	is	
the	inevitable	limitation	of	case	study	research:	an	unrepresentative	sample.	The	
characteristics	of	the	case	studies	that	made	them	amenable	for	investigation	by	a	lone	
observer	–	namely,	numerous	shop	stewards	organised	into	committees	that	met	regularly	
–	meant	that	they	were	unlikely	to	be	representative	of	shop	stewards	in	general.	
Consequently,	generalisation	from	the	present	study	must	be	approached	with	caution.	No	
claims	will	be	made,	for	instance,	about	how	common	the	specific	activities	recorded	here	
might	be	across	employment	as	a	whole.	The	second	limitation	of	the	present	research	
derives	from	its	exploratory	nature.	Since	this	area	has	been	significantly	under-researched	
over	several	decades,	it	was	necessary	to	design	research	that	could	capture	a	very	broad	
range	of	shop	steward	activities.	The	inevitable	down-side	to	this	approach	emerged	during	
the	fieldwork,	as	it	became	clear	that	some	important	areas	would	benefit	from	more	
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detailed	research.	Three	examples	spring	to	mind	immediately:	the	CIP	process	at	Big	Car,	
service-reorganisation	at	London	Borough,	and	individual	representation	at	either	(or	both)	
could	all	form	the	basis	of	worthwhile,	and	probably	fascinating,	further	study.	The	present	
research	was	prevented	from	developing	a	deeper	understanding	of	these	areas	by	the	
need	to	maintain	a	wider	view	of	the	overall	spread	of	shop	steward	activity.	Consequently,	
some	questions	that	arise	from	the	present	findings	must	remain	without	definitive	answers	
until	further	research	is	conducted.	Nevertheless,	despite	these	limitations,	this	research	
has	produced	important	insights	that	can	be	generalised;	as	the	next	sub-section	will	argue.		
	
Basis	of	generalisation	
Case	study	research	cannot	be	generalised	on	grounds	of	statistical	representativeness,	and	
therefore	another	means	must	be	found	if	the	study	is	not	to	remain	purely	descriptive.	
While	description	plays	an	important	part	in	the	development	of	knowledge	(Flyvberg	2006:	
222),	this	research	has	further	ambitions.	Fortunately,	case	study	research	can	be	
generalised	on	theoretical	grounds	(Yin	2009:	38).	As	noted	in	Chapter	2,	previous	theory	
around	shop	stewards	can	be	divided	into	two	broad	approaches:	the	current	standard	view	
and	the	workplace	bargainer	view.	This	study's	critique	of	the	current	standard	view	has	
focussed	not	on	empirical	refutation,	but	on	the	identification	of	conceptual	difficulties.	As	
will	be	shown	in	Section	7.2,	the	findings	of	this	research	strongly	support	that	critique.	
Therefore,	generalisation	starts	with	undermining	the	theoretical	propositions	of	the	
current	standard	view.	Subsequently,	an	alternative	framework	will	be	presented	(Section	
7.4)	that	offers	a	theoretical	account	of	general	applicability;	constructed	from	aspects	of	
the	workplace	bargainer	view,	together	with	elements	of	Marxist	sociology,	and	a	new	
definition	of	bargaining	drawn	from	bargaining	theory	(Chapter	3).		
	
While	it	was	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study	to	fully	test	this	alternative	framework,	it	is	
possible	to	claim	a	degree	of	generalisability.	First,	the	research	has	identified	a	number	of	
'demi-regs'	(Lawson	1998:	149-153),	which,	according	to	critical	realism,	can	form	the	basis	
for	inductive	generalisation	(Sections	4.1,	4.4,	and	7.2).	That	is,	regularities	in	the	findings	
indicate	the	effects	of	underlying	generative	mechanisms	(Section	7.2)	that	are	active	more	
widely.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	findings	of	this	study	would	be	observed	in	identical	forms	
elsewhere.	As	Bhaskar	(2008:	49)	argues,	generative	mechanisms	rarely	produce	identical	
effects,	and	often	produce	no	observable	effects	at	all.	Nevertheless,	the	identification	of	
generative	mechanisms	underlying	the	present	findings	does	permit	claims	that	there	is	a	
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tendency	for	such	effects	to	be	found	elsewhere;	claims	that	would,	of	course,	require	
further	empirical	investigation	to	substantiate	or	refute.	Second,	this	research	has	
presented	a	strongly	theorised	and	defensible	account	of	the	structure	of	workplace	
relations	(Chapter	3),	to	which	demi-regs	in	the	findings	can	be	causally	linked	(as	will	be	
argued	in	Section	7.4).	Hence,	by	linking	research	findings	to	an	overall	analysis	of	the	
structured	social	relations	of	employment,	it	is	possible	to	make	claims	about	the	types	
processes	likely	to	be	found	elsewhere.	While	this	approach	cannot	overcome	entirely	the	
difficulties	associated	with	generalising	from	case	studies,	it	does	provide	grounds	for	
theoretical	development	and	the	production	of	new	knowledge.		
	
	
This	section	has	provided	summary	answers	to	the	research	questions,	assessed	the	
strengths	and	limitations	of	the	study,	and	argued	that	generalisation	is	possible	on	the	
basis	of	theoretical	argument.	That	is,	patterns	in	shop	steward	activity	can	be	used	to	
identify	causal	mechanisms	linking	aspects	of	shop	steward	activity	to	underlying	dynamics	
of	employment	relations.	Theoretical	development	thus	combines	sensitivity	to	
'foreshadowed	problems'	(Section	4.1),	conceptual	critique,	and	new	evidence,	to	produce	
new	knowledge.	The	next	section	begins	this	process	by	discussing	the	main	conceptual	
implications	of	the	research	findings	presented	in	Chapters	5	and	6.		
	
	
7.2	Contemporary	features	of	shop	steward	activity		
	
This	section	starts	the	analytical	process	by	expressing	the	main	research	findings	in	
conceptual	terms.	It	begins	by	revisiting	the	critique	of	the	current	standard	view	presented	
in	Section	2.1;	which,	it	will	be	argued,	has	been	strongly	supported	by	the	research	
findings.	Particular	attention	will	be	paid	to	the	problematic	conceptual	distinctions	
highlighted	previously.	Subsequently,	discussion	moves	to	an	interpretation	of	the	overall	
findings,	utilising	the	definition	of	bargaining	introduced	in	Section	3.2.	The	section	closes	
with	a	summary	of	the	distinctive	patterning	of	shop	steward	activity	found	by	the	research.		
	
The	current	standard	view	(re)assessed		
Central	to	the	current	standard	view	is	the	claim	that	shop	stewards	have	moved	away	from	
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negotiation	with	management,	towards	consultation	(at	best).	This	view	sees	negotiation	
and	consultation	as	clearly	differentiated,	with	the	former	defined	as	joint	regulation	and	
the	latter	as	a	form	of	unilateral	management	control.	Yet,	this	research	found	that	
processes	not	formally	designated	as	negotiation	could,	and	often	did,	produce	bargained	
outcomes;	in	the	sense	of	management	modifying	decisions	and	altering	a	course	of	action	
as	a	result	of	shop	stewards'	activity.	That	is,	joint	regulation	was	present	in	aspects	of	
workplace	relations	that	were,	formally,	not	negotiations.	Sometimes,	arrangements	
formally	designated	as	'consultation'	were	the	site	of	entirely	conventional	labour	
negotiations	of	the	type	described	by	Walton	and	McKersie	(1991).	Sometimes,	issues	were	
dealt	with	both	in	formally	designated	'negotiation'	and	'consultation'.	Other	practices	
resembled	the	description	by	Evans	(1973:	100),	of	managers	taking	soundings	from	shop	
stewards	as	part	of	a	decision-making	process.	Sometimes,	management	decisions	were	
simply	dropped	in	the	face	of	worker	opposition,	leaving	no	formal	trace	of	a	changed	
decision	by	managers.	Furthermore,	shop	stewards	were	clearly	able	to	influence	
management	decisions	via	arrangements	that	are	not	usually	considered	part	of	collective	
relations	at	all,	such	as	grievance	and	disciplinary	procedures	and	the	CIP	process.	Thus,	
contrary	to	the	claims	of	the	current	standard	view,	processes	other	than	formal	
'negotiation'	nevertheless	produced	genuinely	bargained	outcomes.	Consequently,	the	
sharp	conceptual	distinction	between	negotiation	and	consultation	is	severely	undermined	
by	the	present	research.	This	finding	fits	with	concerns	voiced,	though	not	developed,	by	
Gospel	and	Willman	(2003:	145)	and	Marginson	(2014);	with	Hyman's	(1997:	316)	notion	of	
'blurred'	categories;	and	with	older	accounts	such	as	Clegg	(1972),	Clegg	and	Chester	(1954),	
McCarthy	(1966),	and	Kuhn	(1961).		
	
This	research	demonstrates	clearly	that	workplace	processes	cannot	be	understood	solely	
on	the	basis	of	formal	designations.	Rather,	it	is	necessary	also	to	consider	social	content.	
Few	of	the	various	practices	investigated	by	this	research	were	formally	designated	as	
negotiation,	yet	they	frequently	involved	management	making	adjustments	to	decisions	and	
actions	as	a	result	of	the	activity	of	shop	stewards.	According	to	the	definition	in	use	here,	
such	processes	constitute	bargaining	(this	argument	is	developed	further	below).	The	
disjuncture	between	formal	designation	and	social	content	means	that	a	sharp	conceptual	
distinction	between	negotiation	and	consultation	is	unsustainable,	and	should	be	rejected.	
Furthermore,	if	negotiation	and	consultation	cannot	be	clearly	distinguished,	then	the	claim	
that	shop	stewards	have	moved	from	one	to	the	other	is	difficult	to	sustain.	Thus,	findings	
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of	this	research	strongly	support	the	critique	of	the	current	standard	view	outlined	earlier.	
While	the	balance	of	power	within	bargaining	relations	has	shifted	significantly	in	favour	of	
management,	it	is	not	the	case	that	there	has	been	a	qualitative	shift	from	a	form	that	
entails	joint	regulation	to	a	form	that	permits	only	unilateral	regulation	by	managers.		
	
A	second	central	claim	of	the	current	standard	view	is	that	shop	stewards’	activity	has	
shifted	significantly	from	dealing	with	collective	issues	towards	individual	representation.	
This	claim	has	two	linked	aspects,	one	conceptual	and	one	empirical.	Conceptually,	it	is	
premised	on	a	clear	separation	of	the	two	forms.	Empirically,	it	sees	a	significant	
measurable	shift	in	the	activity	of	shop	stewards	away	from	collective	issues.	Findings	from	
this	study	challenge	both	aspects.	Empirically,	the	significant	involvement	of	stewards	with	
collective	issues	must	raise	questions	about	the	easy	dismissal	of	steward	activity	in	this	
area	often	found	in	accounts	taking	the	current	standard	view	(e.g.	Brown	2010;	Brown	and	
Nash	2008;	Charlwood	and	Angrave	2014;	McIlroy	and	Daniels	2009;	Terry	2004;	2010;	van	
Wanrooy	et	al.	2013).	At	the	very	least,	it	suggests	greater	variation	in	the	involvement	of	
stewards	with	collective	issues	than	is	usually	presumed.	These	findings	similarly	urge	
caution	concerning	the	commonly	heard	claim	that	shop	steward	concern	for	collective	
issues	is	being	undermined	by	individual	representation	(Charlwood	and	Forth	2008:	15)	as	
part	of	'"hollow	shell"	trade	unionism'	(ibid.:	14-15).		
	
Conceptually,	this	study	presents	a	serious	challenge	to	recent	accounts.	As	with	negotiation	
and	consultation,	this	research	undermines	any	sharp	distinction	between	collective	issues	
and	individual	representation.	The	research	found	that	individual	representation	was	far	
more	varied	and	complex	than	it	appears	in	the	current	standard	view.	Even	the	incidence	
of	casework	varied	greatly,	according	to	influences	such	as	changing	management	priorities,	
differences	between	individual	managers,	and	shop	stewards'	organisational	arrangements.	
Thus,	a	category	that	appears	entirely	individual,	in	reality,	entails	numerous	social	(and	
therefore	collective)	determinants.	Moreover,	individual	representation	can,	and	often	
does,	involve	genuinely	collective	issues.	Shop	stewards	understood	the	varied	significance	
of	cases	and	adjusted	their	approach	accordingly,	demonstrating	a	considerably	strategic	
orientation	towards	individual	representation.	These	important	dimensions	of	variation	in	
individual	representation	are	entirely	missing	from	the	simplistic	conceptualisation	of	the	
current	standard	view.	The	present	findings	show	that	individual	representation	is	
significantly	varied,	and	cannot	be	treated	as	a	homogeneous	mass.	Therefore,	the	positing	
  217	
of	an	undifferentiated	concept	of	individual	representation,	unproblematically	
counterposed	to	a	simple	concept	of	collective	issues,	is	mistaken	and	misleading.	
Consequently,	the	involvement	of	shop	stewards	in	individual	representation	and	casework	
cannot	be	taken	straightforwardly	as	evidence	of	a	move	away	from	dealing	with	collective	
issues.	In	important	respects,	individual	cases	often	represent	collective	issues	under	a	
different	flag.	Again,	this	account	significantly	undermines	the	conceptual	framework	of	the	
current	standard	view.		
	
As	noted	previously,	a	further	conceptual	difficulty	with	the	current	standard	view	is	its	
narrow	definition	of	shop	steward	sanctions	as	traditional	industrial	action	(Terry	2010:	
281).	This	issue	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	below	(Section	7.4),	but	clearly	this	research	
has	produced	considerable	evidence	showing	that	shop	stewards	can	and	do	utilise	a	far	
wider	range	of	bargaining	resources	in	their	efforts	to	restrict	managerial	prerogatives.	For	
the	moment,	it	must	suffice	to	note	that	these	findings	support	the	earlier	critique	of	the	
narrow	view	of	sanctions	(Sections	2.1	and	3.1).	Again,	the	conceptual	framework	of	the	
current	standard	view	is	found	wanting.		
	
Finally,	the	success	of	this	research	in	producing	a	large	amount	of	rich	and	detailed	
evidence	vindicates	the	return	to	ethnographic	case	study,	and	supports	the	earlier	critique	
of	the	methods	underpinning	the	current	standard	view.	The	far	greater	depth	and	richness	
of	the	present	findings	emphasise	the	shortcomings	of	large-scale	survey	methods	for	
exploring	the	complexity	of	workplace	relations.	Furthermore,	the	prioritising	of	responses	
from	(often	senior)	managers	in	the	WERS	series	appears	particularly	problematic.	Perhaps	
most	significantly,	the	findings	of	the	present	research	strongly	support	the	critique	outlined	
previously	(Section	2.1),	of	the	inclusion	in	the	WERS	questionnaire	of	an	assumption	that	
negotiation	and	consultation	can	be	sharply	distinguished.	The	undermining	of	this	
distinction	by	the	present	research	must	introduce	significant	concerns	regarding	the	
validity	of	conclusions	based	on	WERS	evidence	in	this	area.	Taken	together,	then,	findings		
from	this	study	significantly	undermine	the	methodology,	and	therefore	the	empirical	basis,	
upon	which	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards	is	constructed.		
	
Overall,	this	research	produced	substantial	evidence	to	support	the	critique	of	the	current	
standard	view	of	shop	stewards	outlined	in	Section	2.1;	specifically,	that	negotiation	and	
consultation	cannot	be	sharply	separated,	that	collective	and	individual	issues	cannot	be	
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sharply	separated,	that	bargaining	resources	are	not	limited	to	the	strike	sanction,	and	that	
large-scale	survey	methods	are	ill	suited	for	investigating	these	areas.	Consequently,	the	
current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards	is	significantly	undermined.	Therefore,	the	
remainder	of	this	section	sets	out	elements	for	an	alternative	conceptual	framework.		
	
The	persistence	of	bargaining		
The	most	notable	finding	of	the	present	research	was	the	persistence	of	bargaining	among	
shop	stewards.	This	claim	requires	careful	substantiation,	given	the	wide	currency	of	
accounts	that	argue	the	contrary	(Section	2.1).	The	first	question	is:	To	what	extent	can	
findings	from	the	present	research	be	interpreted	as	evidence	of	bargaining?	On	the	
definition	developed	in	Section	3.4,	bargaining	comprises	three	aspects:	the	presence	of	two	
(or	more)	parties;	that	the	parties	have	interests,	some	in	common	and	some	opposed;	and	
that	outcomes	are	influenced	by	the	actions	of	both	parties.	In	workplace	relations,	the	first	
two	aspects	derive	from	the	employment	relationship.	Therefore,	the	key	issue	for	
determining	the	presence	(or	absence)	of	bargaining	is	assessing	the	presence	(or	absence)	
of	outcomes	that	are	influenced	by	the	actions	of	both	parties.	It	can	be	assumed	that,	in	
most	employment,	managerial	prerogatives	will	be	exercised	to	organise	production,	
discipline	labour,	and	so	on.	Thus,	the	identification	of	bargaining	resolves	to	determining	
empirically	any	influence	of	shop	steward	activity	on	the	outcomes	of	management	
initiatives.	In	this	regard,	the	findings	were	clear:	in	both	case	studies	there	was	
considerable	evidence	of	outcomes	influenced	by	the	actions	of	shop	stewards.	Sometimes	
the	effect	of	shop	stewards	in	a	particular	instance	could	be	significant;	elsewhere,	
stewards'	influence	lay	in	an	accumulation	of	small	acts	of	contestation.	Nevertheless,	on	
the	definition	in	use	here,	such	outcomes	are	considered	as	bargained	outcomes,	and	the	
processes	from	which	these	outcomes	derive	are	bargaining	processes.	Therefore,	on	this	
definition,	bargaining	was	present	in	both	case	studies,	and	to	an	extent	significantly	greater	
than	anticipated	at	the	start	of	the	research.		
	
This	definition	provides	a	framework	for	assessing	a	range	of	shop	steward	activities.	
Clearly,	the	definition	can	include	negotiations	under	the	formal	arrangements	recognised	
by	WERS.	At	the	same	time,	it	also	recognises	that	if	the	balance	of	power	is	very	unequal,	
formal	'negotiations'	might	result	in	entirely	unilateral	management	decision-making,	with	
no	restraint	of	managerial	prerogatives,	and	consequently	with	no	actual	bargaining	
content.	Conversely,	by	making	bargaining	an	empirical	question,	this	redefinition	
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acknowledges	that	bargaining	can	take	place	in	processes	other	than	formal	negotiating	
arrangements;	a	possibility	that	is	excluded	from	WERS	and	the	current	standard	view	by	
definition	(Section	2.1).	Most	obviously,	this	redefinition	allows	that	genuine	bargaining	can	
take	place	in	formal	'consultation'	procedures,	insofar	as	outcomes	show	the	influence	of	
shop	stewards	as	well	as	managers.	Indeed,	this	research	found	numerous	such	examples	
that	would	not	have	been	picked	up	by	WERS	because	of	the	formal	definitions	it	uses.	
Furthermore,	the	present	definition	also	recognises	that	entirely	informal	arrangements	
between	managers	and	shop	stewards	can	entail	bargaining	content.	Although	this	
important	feature	of	workplace	relations	was	apparent	to	the	classic	studies,	the	present	
redefinition	of	bargaining	gives	those	analyses	a	firmer	conceptual	basis.	Thus,	not	only	
does	the	definition	of	bargaining	developed	here	lead	to	a	significantly	different	view	of	
contemporary	shop	steward	activity,	compared	with	the	current	standard	view,	it	is	also	
compatible	with	accounts	of	bargaining	from	the	classic	studies.		
	
Furthermore,	on	this	definition,	individual	representation	may	be	viewed	as	part	of	the	
overall	bargaining	process.	Individual	casework	regularly	carries	important	consequences	for	
collective	issues,	and	has	important	effects	in	limiting	managerial	prerogatives.	While	other	
research	has	established	the	impact	of	individual	ET	cases	on	managerial	relations	(Colling	
2012;	Dix	et	al.	2009;	Drinkwater	and	Ingram	2005;	Kersley	et	al.	2006;	Knight	and	Latreille	
2000;	Latreille	et	al.	2007),	this	research	has	shown	that	cases	which	remain	within	an	
employing	organisation	can	also	have	similar	collective	impacts.	This	is	not	to	say	that	all	
individual	representation	is	bargaining:	as	recognised	by	shop	stewards	in	the	case	studies,	
some	individual	representation	is	purely	individual	in	scope.	The	bargaining	content	of	any	
particular	case	must	be	determined	empirically;	but,	in	conceptual	terms,	individual	
representation	cannot	be	excluded	from	discussions	of	bargaining	and	bargaining	relations.		
	
It	might	be	objected	that	this	redefinition	of	bargaining	is	too	wide,	and	includes	processes	
that	are	too	weak	or	peripheral	to	be	considered	genuine	bargaining.	There	are	two	points	
to	make	in	response	to	such	objections.	First,	if	the	present	definition	is	inadequate,	then	a	
better	one	is	required.	Yet	the	previous	industrial	relations	literature	contains	no	definition	
at	all,	while	the	present	one	has	the	benefit	of	being	widely	accepted	in	a	related	field	
(Section	2.4).	Secondly,	the	current	definition	certainly	does	not	automatically	admit	all-
comers	to	the	category	of	bargaining;	quite	the	reverse.	By	establishing	a	conceptual	
framework	for	the	investigation	of	bargaining,	something	lacking	in	previous	accounts,	the	
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present	definition	makes	bargaining	an	empirical	question	and	avoids	the	problem	of	a	
priori	knowledge	encountered	by	the	current	standard	view.	The	present	definition	would,	
for	instance,	permit	empirical	investigations	of	stronger	and	weaker	forms	of	bargaining.	Of	
course,	empirically,	it	may	be	that	the	stewards	in	the	two	case	studies	are	entirely	
exceptional	in	the	extent	of	their	bargaining	activity;	however,	it	will	be	argued	below	that	
there	are	good	grounds	for	thinking	that	such	processes	are	more	widespread	(Section	7.4).	
The	key	point,	though,	is	that	the	definition	proposed	here	offers	conceptual	clarity	for	the	
empirical	investigation	of	bargaining	processes.	This	represents	a	clear	advantage	over	the	
current	standard	view,	which	attempts	to	deal	with	such	questions	a	priori,	by	definition.		
	
The	present	findings	also	support	the	conception	of	bargaining	as	a	continuum,	as	opposed	
to	the	hierarchy	of	distinct	forms	proposed	by	the	current	standard	view	(Section	2.2).	Once	
it	is	recognised	that	bargaining	is	not	limited	to	formal	negotiating	arrangements,	
theorisation	must	be	capable	of	encompassing	a	range	of	forms,	their	variations	and	
intermediations.	Viewing	bargaining	in	terms	of	a	continuum	is	far	better	suited	to	this	
conceptual	task	than	the	current	standard	view's	hierarchy.	On	the	continuum,	actual	
bargaining	relations	can	be	placed	according	to	how	much	real	bargaining	content	is	
present;	construed	as	the	extent	to	which	outcomes	are	modified	by	the	activity	of,	in	this	
instance,	shop	stewards.	Such	a	continuum	could	be	used	to	chart	variation	in	bargaining	
over	time	and	across	different	workplaces,	sectors	of	employment,	unions,	and	so	on.		
	
While	this	approach	stands	in	clear	contrast	to	the	current	standard	view,	it	is	compatible	
older	accounts.	In	particular,	for	Clegg	(1972),	a	general	notion	of	bargaining	comprises	a	
spectrum	of	practices,	from	formally	constituted	negotiation	and	consultation	
arrangements,	through	informal	agreements	and	understandings,	to	habits	and	ways	of	
working	that	arise	undefined	within	the	day-to-day	to-and-fro	of	the	workplace.	The	present	
definition	can	encompass	Clegg's	approach,	with	its	overlapping	processes,	discontinuities	
between	form	and	content,	and	blurred	distinctions.	Similarly,	it	is	useful	to	recall	and	
extend	Kuhn's	(1961)	insight,	that	grievance	procedures	can,	at	times,	entail	genuine	
bargaining;	though,	as	Kuhn	also	notes,	the	precise	degree	of	bargaining	in	any	grievance	
process	cannot	be	ascertained	outside	of	empirical	investigation.	Both	these	accounts	are	
much	better	suited	to	understanding	the	complexities	of	workplace	bargaining	processes	
than	the	strict	divisions	of	the	current	standard	view.	Moreover,	both	these	accounts	are	
clearly	compatible	with	the	present	approach.		
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Furthermore,	this	research	is	also	compatible	with	Brown’s	(1973)	account	of	shop	steward	
bargaining	under	piecework	(Section	2.2).	Brown	(ibid.:	133)	identifies	‘four	implicit	
principles	of	shop	steward	behaviour’:	‘the	pursuit	of	unity’	among	members;	the	‘pursuit	of	
…	equity’	among	members;	maintaining	a	good	bargaining	relationship	with	management’;	
and	‘the	reduction	of	uncertainty’	in	relations	with	management	(ibid.:	132-6).	Three	of	
these	‘implicit	principles’	figured	prominently	in	the	activity	of	shop	stewards	in	both	case	
studies.	The	‘pursuit	of	equity’	and	‘the	reduction	of	uncertainty’	were	apparent	in	a	range	
of	steward	activities,	from	the	defence	of	members	against	disciplinary	sanctions,	to	the	
rotation	of	jobs	on	an	assembly	line.	Furthermore,	stewards	were	almost	unanimous	in	
valuing	‘good	bargaining	relations’	with	management.	Even	stewards	with	strongly	left-wing	
politics,	who	were	outspokenly	critical	of	management	in	general,	nevertheless	valued	
having	relations	of	trust	with	managers	as	individuals.		
	
The	only	one	of	Brown’s	‘principles’	that	appeared	significantly	reduced	in	importance	was	
the	‘pursuit	of	unity’	among	constituents.	Brown	(1973:	133-4)	clearly	saw	this	dimension	as	
linked	to	industrial	action,	so	it	seems	likely	that	its	reduced	importance	reflected	the	
decline	of	such	action	in	shop	stewards'	‘repertoires	of	collective	action’	(Tilly	1978:	151).	
Even	so,	some	evidence	of	this	principle	was	found	among	stewards	at	London	Borough,	
who	were	concerned	that	the	introduction	of	new	contracts	among	a	significant	proportion	
of	the	workforce	would	divide	union	members	in	the	event	of	future	industrial	action.	It	
might	be	assumed,	therefore,	that	this	‘principle’	would	figure	more	prominently	should	
industrial	action	again	become	common.	Overall,	though,	this	study	shows	the	persistence	
of	significant	aspects	of	Brown’s	‘shop-stewardliness’.	Furthermore,	since	Brown's	account	
focussed	on	bargaining	within	piecework,	his	approach	leaves	open	the	question	of	how	the	
‘four	principles'	might	be	pursued	in	other	circumstances;	whereby	stewards	might	utilise	a	
range	of	methods	for	achieving	'shop-stewardly'	ends.	Here,	Brown's	account	is	compatible	
with	the	notion	of	shifting	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources	developed	above	(Section	
3.1),	and	which	is	discussed	further	below	(Section	7.4).	First,	though,	discussion	turns	to	
the	distinctive	patterns	of	shop	steward	activity	documented	by	the	research.			
	
Clusters	of	contestation			
Having	established	the	presence	of	shop	steward	bargaining,	a	further	issue	arises;	namely,	
how	to	explain	the	patterns	of	bargaining	identified	in	the	fieldwork.	As	demonstrated	in	
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Chapters	5	and	6,	shop	steward	activity	in	challenging	management	was	not	evenly	spread.	
Rather,	while	shop	stewards	actively	challenged	management	across	a	range	of	issues,	there	
were	marked	concentrations	in	particular	areas.	These	concentrations	of	shop	steward	
challenges	to	management	will	be	referred	to	as	clusters	of	contestation.	On	the	definition	
in	use	here,	contestation	of	management	decision-making	is	necessary	for	shop	steward	
bargaining,	and	therefore	clusters	of	contestation	indicate	concentrations	of	shop	steward	
bargaining	activity.	This	is	not	to	say	that	all	shop	steward	contestation	results	in	bargained	
outcomes;	but	without	the	former	the	latter	is	impossible.	Consequently,	understanding	the	
dynamics	of	shop	steward	bargaining	is	tied	to	explaining	the	clusters	of	contestation.		
	
Clusters	of	contestation	were	identified	as	follows.	As	expected,	there	was	a	concentration	
of	challenges	to	management	decision-making,	in	both	case	studies,	centred	around	
individual	representation	and	casework;	although	this	generally	carried	greater	significance	
at	London	Borough	than	at	Big	Car.	Another	cluster	of	contestation	was	identified	in	shop	
steward	activity	around	service	reorganisation	at	London	Borough.	Finally,	a	cluster	of	
contestation	was	apparent	in	shop	steward	activity	around	the	CIP	process	at	Big	Car.	Taken	
together,	these	clusters	of	contestation	form	a	distinctive	pattern	of	shop	steward	activity	
and	efforts	to	influence	management	decisions.	Having	identified	the	clusters	of	
contestation,	the	next	question	becomes	how	to	explain	them.		
	
An	important	advantage	of	the	two-case	study	design	adopted	for	this	research	is	that	two	
cases	can	test	theory	in	a	way	that	a	single	case	cannot	(Reuschmeyer	2003:	324;	Section	
4.1).	In	particular,	two	cases	enabled	comparisons	between	groups	of	shop	stewards	from	
very	different	organisations	and	sectors.	Although	some	of	the	issues	they	dealt	with	were	
similar,	others	were	very	different,	and	issues	were	often	handled	in	different	ways.	The	
theoretical	challenge	was	therefore	to	move	from	describing	contrasting	sets	of	findings,	to	
providing	a	general	account	in	terms	of	common	causal	influences,	while	remaining	
sensitive	to	specific	mediating	factors	in	each	case	study.	Therefore,	the	clusters	of	
contestation	were	treated	as	'demi-regs'	(Lawson	1998).	It	will	be	recalled	that,	for	critical	
realism,	demi-regs	suggest	the	presence	of	underlying	generative	mechanisms;	via	the	
qualified	inductivism	employed	for	this	research	(Section	4.1).	Hence,	the	identification	of	
clusters	of	contestation	opened	the	possibility	of	linking	observed	shop	steward	behaviour	
to	underlying	social	dynamics,	in	causal	explanations.	Furthermore,	if	clusters	of	
contestation	could	be	used	to	identify	causal	mechanisms,	then	the	way	is	open	for	
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theoretical	generalisation.	That	is,	insofar	as	mechanisms	shaping	particular	clusters	of	
contestation	could	be	shown	to	be	general	features	of	employment	under	capitalism,	then	it	
could	be	suggested	that	similar	tendencies	would	be	found	elsewhere.	It	will	be	argued	
below	(Section	7.4)	that	the	clusters	of	contestation	identified	in	this	research	are	indeed	
explicable	in	terms	of	underlying	dynamics,	and	that	therefore	such	features	are	likely	to	
occur	elsewhere	in	employment.		
	
This	section	has	shown	that	the	current	standard	view	cannot	offer	an	adequate	explanation	
of	the	patterns	of	contestation	and	bargaining	identified	by	this	research.	Furthermore,	this	
section	has	examined	features	of	shop	steward	activity	identified	in	the	case	studies,	and	
developed	initial	conceptual	implications	of	those	findings.	The	discussion	has	established	
that	the	conceptual	critique	of	the	current	standard	view	developed	in	Chapter	2	was	
strongly	supported	by	evidence	from	the	research.	Consequently,	an	alternative	explanation	
for	the	findings	was	required;	in	particular,	for	the	persistence	of	bargaining,	and	for	its	
distinctive	patterning.	In	Section	7.4,	a	framework	will	be	presented	that	links	shop	steward	
contestation	and	bargaining	to	underlying	dynamics	within	the	employment	relationship,	
and	which	is	capable	of	providing	adequate	explanations	for	the	patterns	of	shop	steward	
contestation	and	bargaining	observed	in	this	research.	First,	the	next	section	looks	at	other	
explanations	for	patterns	of	shop	steward	behaviour;	in	particular,	the	shop	steward	
typologies	derived	from	the	classic	accounts,	which	will	be	re-examined	in	the	light	of	the	
research	findings.		
	
	
7.3	Shop	steward	typologies	reviewed		
	
As	argued	in	Section	2.2,	previous	accounts	of	workplace	union	organisation	have	proposed	
typologies	of	shop	steward	behaviour.	Difficulties	within	these	typologies	led	to	critiques	
that	generated	new	variations.	Nevertheless,	problems	remained,	and	evidence	from	this	
research	permitted	a	re-evaluation	of	these	contributions.	This	section	discusses	two	
typologies	in	detail,	before	drawing	more	general	conclusions.	Although	it	will	be	argued	
that	the	typological	approach	poses	considerable	difficulties,	the	importance	of	typologies	
in	industrial	relations	scholarship	means	that	a	full	discussion	is	warranted.		
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Once	more	on	leaders	and	populists		
The	best	known	typology	is	Batstone	et	al.’s	(1977)	‘leaders’	and	‘populists’.	As	was	argued	
in	Section	2.2,	the	‘union	principles’	dimension,	which	is	fundamental	to	this	typology,	
appears	problematic;	in	part,	due	to	the	difficulty	of	distinguishing	which	principles	should	
be	identified	with	‘union	ideology’.	Furthermore,	the	empirical	findings	of	a	number	of	their	
critics	showed	that	in	practice	shop	stewards	shifted	their	arguments	depending	on	the	
issue	and	circumstances	they	were	dealing	with	(Broad	1983;	Partridge	1978;	Pedler	1973;	
Willman	1980).	Not	surprisingly,	then,	‘union	principles’	proved	the	least	helpful	dimension	
in	understanding	shop	steward	activity	in	the	present	study.	Some	arguments	identified	by	
Batstone	et	al.	(1977:	11)	as	expressing	'union	principles'	(e.g.	‘ideas	of	fairness	and	justice’)	
were	almost	ubiquitous	among	shop	stewards	in	both	case	studies.	Others,	though,	(e.g.	
‘maintenance	of	the	collectivity’,	‘unity’	against	sectional	demands;	ibid.:	11)	were	almost	
uniformly	absent.	At	the	same	time,	arguments	rated	by	Batstone	et	al.	as	low	on	union	
principles	(‘standing	up	to	management’,	‘giving	a	voice’;	ibid.:	24-29)	were	significant	
components	of	stewards’	outlooks	across	the	sample,	and	came	out	strongly	in	interview	
accounts	of	why	they	took	up	the	role.	This	pronounced	mixing	together	of	arguments	that	
Batstone	et	al.	saw	as	aspects	of	opposed	shop	steward	types	supports	previous	critiques	of	
the	‘union	principles’	dimension	of	the	typology	as	too	fixed	(Marchington	and	Armstrong	
1983;	Willman	1980).	Certainly,	a	fixed	notion	of	union	principles	does	not	fit	the	findings	of	
the	present	study;	moreover,	this	view	may	never	have	been	an	adequate	characterisation	
of	shop	steward	activity.		
	
By	contrast,	the	representative—delegate	dimension	of	the	typology	seems	more	
serviceable,	although	difficulties	remain.	Almost	all	of	the	stewards	in	this	research	
expressed	a	positive	attitude	towards	a	central	element	of	the	representative	approach;	
namely,	a	selective	approach	to	the	issues	they	raised	with	management.	Now,	on	Batstone	
et	al.'s	typology,	a	strongly	'representative'	steward	with	the	low	attachment	to	'union	
principles'	(as	identified	in	the	previous	paragraph)	is	termed	a	'cowboy'	(Batstone	et	al.	
1977:	34).	However,	this	characterisation	could	scarcely	be	less	appropriate	for	the	stewards	
in	this	study;	indeed,	this	category	seems	entirely	unhelpful	(cf.	Marchington	and	Armstrong	
1983).	A	small	number	of	stewards	were	closer	to	the	delegate	type,	but	these	mapped	
poorly	onto	the	overall	typology.	At	Big	Car,	two	stewards	in	particular	were	more	willing	to	
take	up	and	press	strongly	issues	simply	on	the	basis	that	they	had	been	raised	by	members	
in	their	section.	Yet,	contrary	to	Batstone	et	al.'s	assumptions,	these	stewards	did	not	
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secure	strong	support	among	their	constituency.	In	fact,	these	stewards	were	most	
frequently	subject	to	electoral	challenges	within	their	section.	Rather	than	securing	a	
populist	base	of	support,	their	pursuit	of	the	demands	of	some	members	had	the	effect	of	
aggravating	others,	leading	to	friction	within	the	section.	Thus,	although	the	delegate—
representative	variable	was	in	evidence,	it	did	not	map	easily	onto	‘leader—populist’.	
Consequently,	categories	on	this	dimension	appear	mixed	in	unexpected	ways,	which	
undermines	the	overall	typology.		
	
Stewards	in	this	study	were	nearly	unanimous	in	stating	a	commitment	to	filtering	issues;	a	
characteristic	of	‘leader’	stewards,	according	to	the	typology.	For	instance,	stewards	at	
London	Borough	identified	the	proposed	new	contracts	as	a	priority	organising	issue.	In	
practice,	though,	these	stewards	found	it	difficult	to	convert	their	understanding	into	a	
mobilisation	of	members.	Rather,	steward	activity	was	significantly	driven	by	the	demanding	
timetable	of	service	reorganisations;	a	process	which	impacted	strongly	upon	union	
members.	Thus,	stewards	who	appeared	as	‘leaders/representatives’	in	their	committee	
meetings	took	on	the	aspect	of	‘populist/delegate’	in	their	workplace	activity.	Again,	this	
admixture	of	opposed	elements	of	the	leader—populist	typology	undermines	the	overall	
conception.		
	
Evidence	from	this	study,	then,	broadly	supports	accounts	which,	in	critiques	of	Batstone	et	
al.,	emphasise	the	ability	of	shop	stewards	to	select	different	approaches	for	different	
issues,	and	to	act	strategically	(Broad	1983;	Marchington	and	Armstrong	1983;	Partridge	
1978;	Pedler	1973;	Willman	1980).	Moreover,	the	evidence	here	is	not	simply	that	stewards	
shifted	between	various	of	the	Batstone	et	al.	types;	rather,	the	activity	of	shop	stewards	
was	varied	in	more	complex	ways	than	can	be	encompassed	on	a	simple	four-part	typology	
with	two	dimensions.	Consequently,	these	findings	pose	equal	difficulties	for	other	two-
dimensional	typologies	(e.g.	Marchington	and	Armstong	1983).	Therefore,	discussion	turns	
now	to	multi-dimensional	approaches.		
	
The	multi-dimensional	approach		
In	developing	a	critique	of	Batstone	et	al.,	Darlington	(1994)	proposed	a	multi-dimensional	
model,	which	offers	greater	flexibility,	permitting	analysis	of	the	social	relations	entered	
into	by	shop	stewards	along	three	dimensions	(Section	2.2).	These	dimensions	are:	
resistance—accommodation	in	relation	to	management;	dependence—independence	in	
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relation	to	full-time	officers	(FTOs);	and,	democracy—bureaucracy	in	relaton	to	union	
members.	Furthermore,	for	Darlington,	these	dimensions	also	indicate	the	strength	and	
effectiveness	of	workplace	union	organisation;	thus,	Darlington	explicitly	endorses	union	
organisation	characterised	by	resistance	not	accommodation,	independence	not	
dependence,	and	democracy	not	bureaucracy.	Again,	the	present	research	produced	
abundant	evidence	that	could	be	used	to	test	this	framework.		
	
On	the	resistance—accommodation	dimension,	the	research	found	clear	evidence	of	
contradictory	pressures.	Shop	stewards	at	Big	Car	often	expressed	tensions	and	dilemmas	in	
this	area,	especially	over	concessions	made	to	the	company	in	return	for	continued	
production,	even	though	most	stewards	broadly	agreed	with	the	approach	adopted	by	the	
convenors	and	national	union	officers.	However,	while	this	aspect	could	be	characterised	as	
accommodation,	other	areas	exhibited	very	significant	levels	of	resistance.	Unlike	many	
plants	where	concessions	have	been	made,	it	was	clear	that	shop	stewards	at	Big	Car	had	
not	‘surrendered’	the	shopfloor	(Moody	2007:	106-114;	Section	4.5).	The	simultaneous	
presence,	in	this	case	study,	of	both	accommodation	and	resistance,	but	in	differing	areas	of	
workplace	relations,	suggests	a	greater	complexity	than	can	be	easily	represented	on	a	
single	dimension	(cf.	Edwards	1989).	At	London	Borough,	the	picture	was	different	but	no	
less	complex.	Here,	stewards	almost	universally	favoured	resistance	to	management	yet,	in	
practice,	were	significantly	less	able	to	challenge	management	than	their	counterparts	at	
Big	Car.	Thus,	stewards	at	London	Borough	appeared	very	high	on	resistance	in	terms	of	
consciousness,	while	simultaneously	making	many	accommodations	in	practice.	Perhaps	
these	stewards	could	be	characterised	as	reluctant	accommodators.	The	main	conceptual	
point,	though,	is	that	in	both	case	studies	the	single	resistance—accommodation	dimension	
appears	insufficient	for	grasping	the	complexity	in	the	evidence.		
	
The	dependence—independence	dimension,	concerning	the	relationship	of	stewards	to	full	
time	officers	(FTOs),	also	encountered	difficulties	in	mapping	complex	evidence	from	the	
case	studies.	At	Big	Car,	the	involvement	of	convenors	in	official	union	bodies	and	broad	left	
(leading	stewards	were	enthusiastic	supporters	of	Unite	general	secretary,	Len	McCluskey),	
entailed	significant	contact	with	FTOs,	indicating	a	clear	congruence	of	political	and	
ideological	outlooks.	However,	while	this	relationship	could	not	be	characterised	as	
‘independence’,	neither	could	it	straightforwardly	be	construed	as	‘dependence’.	On	a	day-
to-day	basis,	the	shop	steward	organisation	at	the	plant	was	highly	independent	of	FTOs,	
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relying	strongly	on	its	own	bargaining	resources.	Of	course,	daily	shop	steward	activity	took	
place	within	a	framework	of	bargaining	relations	shaped	by	collective	agreements	drawn	up	
with	input	from	the	national	union;	although	the	convenors	saw	themselves,	not	the	FTOs,	
as	the	initiators	of	those	agreements.	By	contrast,	London	Borough	stewards	frequently	
expressed	strong	commitment	to	independence	from	union	officials.	Unlike	at	Big	Car,	
stewards	regularly	criticised	the	national	union	leadership	for	being	excessively	timid	and	
unreliable,	while	regional	FTOs	were	seen	as	an	active	barrier	to	local	industrial	action,	and	
therefore	to	determined	resistance	to	management.	In	part,	these	opinions	reflected	the	
influence	of	left	politics	within	the	branch	(cf.	Darlington	2009a;	2009b).	On	this	evidence,	
London	Borough	stewards	showed	considerable	independence	from	FTOs.	However,	on	day-
to-day	workplace	issues,	senior	stewards	at	London	Borough	had	significantly	greater	
contact	with	FTOs	than	did	their	counterparts	at	Big	Car;	for	instance,	concerning	legal	
advice	over	casework,	contractual	matters,	or	TUPE	cases.	Sometimes,	FTO	influence	was	
central	to	the	outcome	of	bargaining,	as	when	regional	FTOs	were	instrumental	in	gaining	
assurances	from	elected	Labour	council	chiefs	over	the	honouring	of	national	pay	awards.	A	
common	feature	of	these	contacts	with	FTOs	was	that	they	took	place	when	stewards’	own	
bargaining	resources	had	proved	insufficient,	and	stewards	turned	to	FTOs	for	assistance	
despite	their	professed	unwillingness.	Thus,	shop	stewards	at	London	Borough	might	be	
characterised	as	reluctant	dependents:	politically	and	ideologically	strongly	independent	of	
the	national	union,	yet	at	key	points	reliant	upon	FTOs	to	progress	issues.	By	contrast,	
stewards	at	Big	Car	were,	in	ideological	and	political	terms,	notably	more	closely	aligned	
with	national	union	leadership,	yet	were	highly	independent	in	day-to-day	activity.	Overall,	
then,	evidence	from	the	case	studies	showed	greater	complexity	in	relations	between	shop	
stewards	and	FTOs	than	could	be	mapped	onto	a	single	dependence–independence	
dimension.		
	
The	democracy—bureaucracy	dimension	experienced	similar	difficulties	with	complex	
findings.	Darlington	(1994:	28-31)	is	concerned	that	workplace	union	organisation	should	
facilitate	workers’	demands	against	the	employer,	rather	than	act	as	a	restraint.	
Consequently,	this	dimension	maps	the	extent	to	which	stewards	progress	issues	raised	by	
their	members	(‘democracy’),	or	alternatively	squash	those	demands,	in	favour	of	
maintaining	good	relations	with	management	(‘bureaucracy’).	The	significant	weakening	of	
workplace	union	organisation	since	the	1970s	and	1980s	(the	period	Darlington	focuses	on)	
meant	that	stewards	in	this	research	seldom	faced	strong	sectional	demands,	and	
  228	
consequently	experienced	fewer	dilemmas	on	this	dimension.	Nevertheless,	at	London	
Borough	stewards	were	certainly	more	active	on	the	relatively	sectional	issue	of	service	
reorganisation,	a	priority	pressed	by	union	members,	in	contrast	to	their	lower	level	of	
activity	on	the	wider	issue	of	new	contracts,	which	the	stewards	themselves	had	identified	
as	a	priority.	Yet,	it	is	difficult	to	see	this	as	evidence	of	greater	democracy,	rather	than	
simply	an	inability	to	mobilise	workers	over	the	contracts	issue.	A	commitment	to	
democracy	certainly	was	evident	at	London	Borough	in	the	conduct	of	internal	branch	
organisation,	with	relatively	frequent	meetings	of	steward	committees,	featuring	lengthy	
and	open	discussion.	By	contrast,	at	Big	Car	there	was	a	high	degree	of	central	control	
within	the	shop	steward	body,	with	little	scope	for	intra-organisational	discussion	(at	least,	
in	the	formal	meetings).	Thus,	shop	steward	organisation	at	London	Borough	was	closer	to	
the	‘democracy’	end	of	the	spectrum	than	was	the	Big	Car	organisation.	On	Darlington’s	
typology,	this	difference	should	have	given	London	Borough	distinct	advantages	in	terms	of	
the	ability	of	workers	to	challenge	management.	In	reality,	though,	stewards	at	Big	Car	
enjoyed	significantly	greater	influence	on	management	decisions	and	actions	than	did	their	
counterparts	at	London	Borough.	Consequently,	this	finding	runs	counter	to	Darlington’s	
framework,	which	sees	democracy	as	a	key	component	of	workplace	union	strength,	and	
top-down	control	as	detrimental.	Of	course,	the	relative	strength	of	workplace	union	
organisation	is	affected	by	many	other	factors.	Notably,	union	organisation	on	a	car	
production	line	might	be	expected	to	be	more	powerful	than	in	local	government.	But,	if	
technology	is	the	main	determinant,	then	any	typology	focused	on	shop	steward	orientation	
is	undermined.	Moreover,	a	focus	on	technology	cannot	adequately	explain	the	difference	
in	the	character	of	shop	steward	organisation	in	the	two	case	studies:	the	less	democratic	
organisation	was	the	most	combative	in	terms	of	day-to-day	challenges	to	managerial	
prerogatives.	Overall,	then,	the	evidence	again	showed	greater	complexity	than	the	
typology	could	encompass.		
	
In	summary,	then,	while	Darlington’s	multi-dimensional	typology	could	map	some	aspects	of	
the	evidence,	other	areas	remained	problematic.	More	generally,	the	difficulties	
encountered	by	two	key	typologies	of	shop	steward	behaviour	pose	questions	about	the	
suitability	of	this	approach	for	dealing	with	the	complexities	of	workplace	relations.	This	
section	therefore	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	some	of	those	problems.		
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The	trouble	with	typologies		
The	problem	with	the	typologies	discussed	above	is	that	the	evidence	from	both	case	
studies	shows	significantly	greater	variation	than	any	of	the	models	can	encompass.	It	is	not	
simply	a	matter	of	variation	between	different	dimensions:	the	real	difficulty	is	that	
considerable	variation	was	found	within	individual	dimensions.	That	is,	for	a	given	shop	
steward	activity,	some	aspects	appeared	at	one	point	on	the	dimension,	while	other	aspects	
of	the	same	activity	appeared	elsewhere	on	the	same	dimension.	Consequently,	it	was	not	
possible	to	place	shop	steward	activity	on	any	dimension	with	any	certainty.	One	response	
to	this	type	of	difficulty	would	be	to	introduce	further	dimensions,	covering	more	aspects	of	
variation	in	steward	behaviour.	The	problem	with	such	a	response,	however,	is	not	only	that	
multiple	dimensions	greatly	complicate	the	typology	but,	more	importantly,	it	reduces	the	
typology	to	a	series	of	ad	hoc	responses	to	empirical	variety,	shifting	it	increasingly	towards	
a	purely	descriptive	function,	and	undermining	explanation	and	theorisation.		
	
Consequently,	the	problem	is	not	simply	a	matter	of	insufficiently	supple	or	detailed	
typology	construction.	Rather,	the	problem	lies	in	the	method	of	attempting	to	understand	
the	social	world	through	the	construction	of	models	and	ideal	types.	Although	this	approach	
is	an	advance	on	narrow	empiricism,	and	attempts	to	develop	explanations	beyond	simple	
empirical	description	(Bhaskar	2008:	27),	significant	difficulties	arise	when	‘the	objects	of	
scientific	knowledge	are	models,	ideals	of	natural	order	...	objects	[that]	are	artificial	
constructs’	(ibid.:	25).	Although,	in	this	case,	models	and	typologies	are	ideals	of	social	
order,	the	problem	is	the	same.	For	Bhaskar,	the	objects	of	science	are	real	generative	
mechanisms,	not	artificial	constructs,	and	consequently	the	construction	of	models	and	
typologies	is	symptomatic	of	‘the	incompleteness	of	science’	(ibid.:	157).	Indeed,	since	the	
typological	approach	replaces	the	study	of	real	generative	mechanisms	with	the	study	of	
ideal	types,	Bhaskar	(ibid.:	25)	terms	this	approach	'transcendental	idealism'.	Bhaskar’s	
characterisation	of	typologies	and	models	as	‘conceptual	crutches	for	the	tender-minded	
and	...	heuristic	devices	for	the	young’	(ibid.:	156)	seems	harsh;	after	all,	the	models	and	
typologies	discussed	here	have	contributed	genuine	insights.	Nevertheless,	the	preference	
for	description	and	mid-range	theory	has	been	a	pervasive	problem	in	industrial	relations	
research,	and	a	barrier	to	the	development	of	more	sophisticated	theory	(Kelly	1998:	18-
21).	Consequently,	this	account	will	not	attempt	to	construct	further	(artificial)	models	or	
ideal	types.	Rather,	it	will	seek	to	identify	underlying	generative	mechanisms,	to	trace	the	
'inner	connection’	(Marx,	cited	in	Callinicos	2014:	73)	between	causal	mechanisms	and	
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observed	shop	steward	activity,	and	then	to	reconstruct	them	in	theory	(Sayer	1998).	Of	
course,	the	results	still	might	show	symptoms	of	‘the	incompleteness	of	science’;	but	it	is	
hoped	that	sufficient	progress	will	be	apparent	to	vindicate	the	overall	approach.		
	
	
The	foregoing	discussion	has	shown	that	although	typologies	can	provide	some	insights	into	
patterns	of	issue-handling,	the	observed	activity	of	shop	stewards	in	this	study	was	more	
complex	than	these	models	allow,	and	varied	in	ways	that	did	not	easily	fit	their	dimensions.	
Consequently,	none	could	encompass	the	variety	or	unexpected	combinations	found	by	the	
present	research.	Moreover,	as	essentially	heuristic	devices,	these	models	cannot	offer	
causal	explanations	for	patterns	of	steward	activity,	the	determinations	of	which	lie	outside	
the	models	themselves	(Section	2.2).	Consequently,	the	typological	approach	was	not	
adopted	for	explaining	patterns	of	bargaining	activity	in	the	present	research.	Instead,	
explanation	was	sought	in	the	wider	dynamics	of	the	workplace	in	which	steward	activity	is	
situated.	The	final	section	of	this	chapter	outlines	the	main	components	of	this	approach.		
	
	
7.4	Shop	steward	bargaining:	dynamics,	opportunities	and	resources		
	
This	section	returns	to	an	issue	left	over	from	the	earlier	critique	of	the	current	standard	
view	of	shop	stewards.	That	is,	if	shop	stewards	have	not	shifted	their	activity	in	the	way	
that	the	current	standard	view	claims,	what	are	they	doing?	Shop	steward	activity	has	
obviously	changed	significantly	since	the	classic	studies,	but	how	can	the	new	patterns	of	
activity	be	explained?	Two	things	are	clear	from	the	preceding	discussion.	First,	shop	
stewards	in	this	research	continued	to	be	significantly	involved	in	efforts	to	influence	
management	decisions	and	to	restrain	managerial	prerogatives,	in	processes	that	entailed	
significant	bargaining	content,	in	practice	if	not	in	formal	designation.	Second,	previous	
accounts	of	shop	stewards	cannot	adequately	explain	the	particular	patterns	of	activity	
found	here.	Consequently,	this	section	proposes	an	alternative	framework.	Discussion	starts	
from	the	clusters	of	contestation	identified	in	Section	7.1,	and	traces	the	'inner	connections'	
between	those	clusters	and	underlying	dynamics	of	workplace	relations.	This	discussion	
revisits	theoretical	issues	addressed	in	Chapter	3;	in	particular,	the	structure	and	dynamics	
of	the	employment	relationship	under	capitalism,	the	effort	bargain,	and	the	frontier	of	
control.	The	section	then	discusses	bargaining	opportunities,	and	bargaining	resources,	
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considered	as	mediating	factors	in	the	expression	of	underlying	dynamics.		
	
Structure,	dynamics	and	interests		
This	study	represents	a	shift	in	focus.	As	noted	in	Section	3.2,	previous	accounts	of	shop	
steward	activity	have	usually	emphasised	agency	and	subjective	factors	such	as	'trade	union	
principles'	(Batstone	1977),	political	commitment	(Darlington	2009a;	2009b),	workplace	
traditions	(Terry	and	Edwards	1988),	or	'militancy'	(Gall	2003a).	By	contrast,	this	account	
emphasises	the	importance	of	the	structure	and	dynamics	of	social	relations	in	the	
workplace	for	understanding	the	activity	of	shop	stewards.	Moreover,	structure	is	seen	here	
not	simply	as	limiting	or	restricting,	but	crucially	as	enabling	(Callinicos	2009).	This	focus	on	
the	structured	dynamics	of	the	workplace	can	offer	explanations	for	findings	that	were	
unexpected	or	even	counter-intuitive,	such	as	clusters	of	contestation	around	CIPs	at	Big	
Car,	and	variance	between	stewards'	expressed	priorities	and	their	observed	activity	at	
London	Borough.	Why	would	shop	stewards	at	Big	Car	chose	to	concentrate	their	activity	
around	what	has	been	identified	as	the	most	unfavourable	aspect	of	lean	production?	Why	
were	stewards	at	London	Borough	so	active	around	service	reorganisations,	when	their	
expressed	priority	was	the	issue	of	new	contracts?	Neither	of	these	clusters	of	contestation	
seem	amenable	to	explanation	purely	in	terms	of	agency.	By	contrast,	the	approach	
adopted	here	can	offer	explanations	that	do	not	rely	only	on	subjective	factors.		
	
In	this	research,	clusters	of	contestation	were	identified	in	both	case	studies	around	
individual	representation	and	casework.	Moreover,	it	is	clear	from	the	evidence	that	the	
pursuit	of	individual	casework	by	stewards	had	important	effects	in	limiting	managerial	
prerogatives	to	discipline	and	dismiss	workers,	and	could	be	used	by	stewards	in	efforts	to	
enforce	the	terms	of	existing	collective	agreements	and	procedures.	According	to	
Goodrich's	(1975:	20)	definition,	‘issues	of	discipline	and	management’	are	central	to	the	
frontier	of	control,	as	are	‘the	demand	not	to	be	controlled	disagreeably,	the	demand	not	to	
be	controlled	at	all,	and	the	demand	to	take	a	hand	in	controlling’	(ibid.:	43).	Plainly,	these	
were	central	concerns	for	shop	stewards	in	their	pursuit	of	individual	casework.	Therefore,	
individual	representation	and	casework	should	be	considered	an	aspect	of	the	frontier	of	
control.	That	is,	far	from	being	a	move	away	from	dealing	with	collective	issues,	individual	
casework	is	often	an	important	part	of	contemporary	shop	stewards'	efforts	to	influence	
collective	relations	in	the	workplace.	The	identification	of	frontier	of	control	issues	in	
individual	casework	further	undermines	accounts	that	see	shop	stewards'	efforts	in	this	area	
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as	a	move	away	from	dealing	with	collective	issues	(for	instance	Charlwood	and	Forth	2008;	
Dickens	2012;	Dickens	and	Hall	2003;	Kersley	et	al.	2006;	McKay	and	Moore	2007;	van	
Wanrooy	et	al.	2013).		
	
Further	clusters	of	contestation	were	found	around	service	reorganisations	at	London	
Borough,	and	around	CIPs	at	Big	Car.	As	the	empirical	evidence	showed	clearly,	both	these	
processes	involved	management	attempts	to	reorganise	work,	usually	with	the	intention	of	
intensifying	labour.	Therefore,	both	these	clusters	of	contestation	should	be	seen	in	terms	
of	the	effort	bargain	and	attempts	by	shop	stewards	to	influence	its	terms.	Despite	the	
changed	institutional	forms	in	which	these	processes	were	situated,	the	identification	of	
these	clusters	of	contestation	as	forms	of	effort	bargaining	emphasises	continuity	with	shop	
steward	practices	dating	back	through	McCarthy	(1966),	Lupton	(1963)	and	Roy	(1952).	The	
effort	bargain	is	a	central	feature	of	collective	workplace	relations	(Edwards	1986:	236-246).	
This	evidence	therefore	further	undermines	claims	that	the	decline	of	formal	negotiating	
arrangements	means	that	shop	stewards	no	longer	bargain	over	collective	issues	(for	
instance,	Brown	2010;	Brown	and	Nash	2008;	Charlwood	and	Angrave	2014;	Charlwood	and	
Forth	2009;	Heery	et	al.	2004;	McIlroy	and	Daniels	2009;	Millward	et	al.	2000,	2006;	Terry	
2004;	van	Wanrooy	et	al.	2013).		
	
Establishing	that	the	clusters	of	shop	steward	contestation	identified	by	this	study	centred	
around	the	frontier	of	control	and	effort	bargain	is	important	for	two	reasons.	First,	it	
demonstrates	that	these	issues	remain	central	features	of	shop	steward	activity	despite	
many	changes	in	workplace	relations	since	the	period	of	the	classic	studies.	Secondly,	as	
discussed	in	Section	7.2,	clusters	of	contestation	were	treated	as	demi-regs,	which,	
according	to	the	qualified	inductivism	adopted	here	(Section	4.1),	indicate	the	influence	of	
underlying	generative	mechanisms.	As	demonstrated	in	Section	3.1,	the	effort	bargain	and	
frontier	of	control	are	consequences	of	the	dynamic	of	exploitation	that	runs	through	the	
employment	relationship.	Therefore,	the	location	of	clusters	of	contestation	around	the	
effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control	indicate	the	influence	of	the	dynamic	of	exploitation,	
as	an	underlying	generative	mechanism	shaping	patterns	of	shop	steward	activity.		
	
On	one	level,	evidence	from	this	study	supports	accounts	such	as	Hyman	(1975a:	27),	which	
see	workplace	relations	as	'necessarily	conflictual';	a	view	which	is	common	to	many	radical	
pluralist	and	Marxist	accounts	(for	instance,	Edwards	1986;	2014;	Gall	and	Hebdon	2008;	
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Kelly	1998).	At	the	same	time,	though,	the	argument	presented	here	builds	upon	and	
develops	this	analysis,	by	applying	it	closely	and	specifically	the	activity	of	shop	stewards.	
Rather	than,	as	in	most	treatments,	regarding	conflict	simply	as	a	general	feature	of	
relations	between	'employers	and	employees'	(Hyman	1975a:	27),	here	the	argument	is	not	
only	that	workplace	relations	are	inherently	(though	not	solely)	conflictual,	but	that	this	
conflictual	character	is	reflected	in	the	activity	of	shop	stewards.	This	generalisation	should	
be	understood	in	tendential	terms,	rather	than	as	a	prediction	of	invariate	empirical	
regularity	(or	constant	conjunction;	cf.	Bhaskar	2008).	That	is,	the	underlying	dynamic	of	
exploitation	drives	a	tendency	towards	shop	steward	contestation	and	bargaining,	especially	
around	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control,	which	is	likely	(though	not	certain)	to	
emerge	and	re-emerge	in	actual	workplace	practices.	Since	it	is	not	possible	to	do	away	with	
this	dynamic	under	capitalist	relations	of	production,	shop	steward	contestation	and	
bargaining	are	likely	to	cluster	around	the	frontier	of	control	and	effort	bargain,	no	matter	
how	seemingly	unfavourable	the	management	system	(Big	Car),	and	even	contrary	to	shop	
stewards'	expressed	priorities	(London	Borough).		
	
The	crucial	linkage	between	the	structure	and	dynamics	of	workplace	relations	and	the	
agency	of	shop	stewards	is	provided	by	the	concept	of	interests	(Section	3.2).	Interests	are	
inscribed	into	the	relationship	between	capital	and	labour,	managers	and	workers,	in	both	
the	definition	of	bargaining	developed	in	Section	3.2,	and	as	'structural	capacities'	(Callinicos	
2009:	85-102,	146)	consequent	upon	the	exploitative	nature	of	the	employment	
relationship	under	capitalism.	Seen	in	this	way,	interests	continue	to	shape	the	options	
available	to	both	parties	of	the	employment	relationship;	moreover,	these	structural	
capacities	persist	despite	real	and	important	changes	in	workforce	composition.	While	
subjective	factors	influence	the	responses	of	social	actors	in	relation	to	structural	capacities,	
agency	cannot	do	away	with	them.	The	argument	here	is	that	it	is	through	interests	that	
structural	aspects	of	the	employment	relationship	have	a	continuing	influence	on	patterns	
of	shop	stewards	activity,	and	on	patterns	of	contestation	and	bargaining.	The	defence	of	a	
notion	of	interests	presented	in	Section	3.2	is	therefore	an	important	part	of	the	overall	
argument	of	this	thesis.	Moreover,	the	evidence	from	the	case	studies	tends	to	support	that	
account.	Structural	capacities	significantly	influenced	observed	patterns	of	shop	steward	
activity;	for	instance,	the	structural	capacities	of	employers	and	managers	in	seeking	to	
increase	the	intensity	of	labour	and	to	enforce	labour	discipline,	and	the	structural	
capacities	of	shop	stewards	to	influence	the	frontier	of	control	and	effort	bargain	by	taking	
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advantage	of	available	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources	(see	below).	By	contrast,	the	
'social	construction'	approach	to	interests	(Blyton	et	al.	2011;	Heery	2011b;	Simms	and	
Charlwood	2010;	Simms	et	al.	2013)	is	undermined	by	the	present	research;	plainly,	shop	
steward	activity	was	enabled	by	their	structural	capacities	around	the	frontier	of	control	and	
effort	bargain,	rather	than	restricted	by	difficulties	of	interest	construction.		
	
So	far,	the	discussion	in	this	section	has	shown	that	the	clusters	of	contestation	can	be	
explained	by	the	influence	of	a	generative	mechanism	rooted	in	the	structure	of	workplace	
relations;	namely,	the	exploitative	employment	relationship	under	capitalism.	Exploitation	is	
the	common	dynamic	underlying	patterns	of	shop	steward	activity	in	both	case	studies,	and	
the	concept	of	interests	provides	the	link	between	this	dynamic	and	the	agency	of	shop	
stewards	in	its	varied	forms.	However,	the	fact	that	clusters	of	contestation	were	different	
in	each	case	indicates	that	this	explanation	requires	additional	mediating	factors.	
Consequently,	the	discussion	turns	next	to	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	
resources.	It	will	be	argued	that	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources	are	key	mediating	
factors	in	the	development	of	particular	patterns	of	shop	steward	contestation	and	
bargaining.	Furthermore,	different	management	methods	and	practices	significantly	
influence	the	patterns	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources	that	are	available.		
	
Bargaining	opportunities		
In	order	for	underlying	dynamics	towards	conflict	to	be	expressed	in	actual	episodes	of	
contestation,	there	must	be	opportunities	for	this	to	occur.	The	argument	here	is	that	
contestation	tends	to	cluster	in	particular		areas	due	to	the	availability	of	such	
opportunities.	In	relation	to	the	effort	bargain,	two	clusters	of	contestation	stand	out,	both	
of	which	saw	significant	and	unexpected	concentrations	of	shop	steward	activity;	namely,	
service	reorganisations	at	London	Borough,	and	CIPs	at	Big	Car.	In	terms	of	bargaining	
opportunities,	the	feature	shared	by	these	clusters	was	that	they	centred	on	discontinuities	
in	the	production	process	(Section	3.1).	In	both	cases,	discontinuities	of	production	occurred	
as	management	attempted	to	reorganise	work,	usually	(but	not	necessarily)	with	the	
intention	of	increasing	the	intensity	of	labour.	That	is,	as	work	was	reorganised,	an	old	way	
of	working	paused,	and	a	new	one	was	instituted.	From	the	point	of	view	of	effort,	the	
terms	on	which	the	new	work	organisation	was	brought	in	(re)set	the	effort	bargain	for	a	
number	of	workers	for	the	period	after	the	reorganisation;	whether	the	work	was	assembly	
tasks	on	a	production	line,	or	administrative	procedures	in	a	council	office.	Consequently,	
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these	discontinuities	in	production	offered	opportunities	to	shop	stewards	to	influence	the	
(re)setting	of	the	effort	bargain	for	a	(larger	or	smaller)	group	of	workers.	Therefore,	
although	steward	activity	around	the	effort	bargain	could	be	observed	elsewhere,	
bargaining	over	effort	clustered	significantly	around	these	discontinuities.		
	
This	pattern	clearly	fits	the	analysis	of	Lerner	and	Marquand	(1962),	who	identified	
discontinuities	in	production	as	sites	where	re-negotiation	of	the	effort	bargain	took	place.	
Although	Lerner	and	Marquand	(ibid.)	do	not	use	the	term	effort	bargain,	the	analyses	are	
clearly	compatible.	That	is,	not	only	was	effort	bargaining	clearly	present	in	the	two	case	
studies,	but	a	feature	of	shop	steward	bargaining	identified	during	the	heyday	of	workplace	
bargaining	could	still	be	identified	in	the	activity	of	contemporary	shop	stewards,	more	than	
50	years	later.	This	finding	therefore	indicates	further	important	continuities	with	the	
workplace	bargainer	view	of	shop	stewards,	as	opposed	to	the	sharp	discontinuity	claimed	
by	the	current	standard	view	(Section	2.1).		
	
The	contention	here	is	that	this	insight	can	be	generalised.	Shop	steward	contestation	and	
bargaining	over	effort	will	show	a	tendency	to	cluster	around	discontinuities	in	production,	
because	of	the	opportunities	they	present	for	re-setting	the	effort	bargain.	Furthermore,	
the	distribution	of	discontinuities	in	production	will	be	influenced	by	particular	management	
practices,	which,	in	turn,	will	shape	the	way	the	tendency	is	manifested.	Consequently,	
variation	in	management	methods	over	time	and	across	different	industries	and	workplaces	
will	influence	the	specific	patterns	of	contestation	and	bargaining	that	emerge.		
	
Other	bargaining	opportunities	were	identified	in	relation	to	the	frontier	of	control.	As	will	
be	recalled,	the	frontier	of	control	concerns,	for	workers,	‘the	demand	not	to	be	controlled	
disagreeably,	the	demand	not	to	be	controlled	at	all,	and	the	demand	to	take	a	hand	in	
controlling’	(Goodrich	1975:	37).	The	present	research	confirmed	the	continuing	importance	
of	these	issues	for	contemporary	shop	stewards.	Stewards'	workload	of	individual	
representation	and	casework	involved	a	mixture	of	cases,	some	of	which	were	narrowly	
individual	and	carried	no	wider	implications,	but	others	of	which	carried	consequences	
(sometimes	significant)	for	wider	relations	between	managers	and	workforce.	Thus,	
individual	representation,	under	grievance,	disciplinary	and	other	procedures,	presented	
shop	stewards	with	opportunities	to	challenge	and	restrict	managerial	prerogatives	around	
issues	of	labour	discipline.	These	procedures	should	therefore	be	considered	as	bargaining	
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opportunities	over	the	frontier	of	control.		
	
Again,	this	analysis	can	be	generalised.	Grievance	and	disciplinary	procedures	offer	
opportunities	for	shop	stewards	to	contest	management	decisions	around	the	frontier	of	
control.	Consequently,	shop	steward	activity	will	tend	to	cluster	in	this	area.	As	with	effort	
bargaining,	particular	patterns	of	bargaining	opportunities	will	reflect	management	
methods	and	practices,	and	these	will	be	an	important	source	of	variation	across	
employment.	In	workplaces	with	a	'centralised'	HRM	approach	(Saundry	and	Wibberley	
2014:	5),	as	at	London	Borough,	the	outcomes	of	individual	cases	are	more	likely	to	form	a	
more	or	less	secure	framework	of	precedents,	with	a	certain	standardisation	of	rule-making	
and	interpretation.	By	contrast,	where	individual	casework	is	left	in	the	hands	of	local	and	
line	management,	as	at	Big	Car,	there	is	potentially	greater	scope	for	flexible	interpretation	
and	discretion	(though	this	scope	is	likely	to	vary,	dependent	upon	other	workplace	
conditions	and	practices	–	see	below).	Thus,	while	the	tendency	towards	bargaining	over	the	
frontier	of	control	is	common	across	employment,	management	practices	shape	the	
configuration	of	bargaining	opportunities	in	any	particular	workplace,	and	thereby	influence	
actual	patterns	of	contestation.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	availability	of	bargaining	
opportunities	is	the	only	influence	on	patterns	of	shop	steward	bargaining	activity.	
Nevertheless,	available	bargaining	opportunities	form	a	basic	framework	within	which	
bargaining	processes	develop,	and	their	mark	is	left	on	the	patterns	that	emerge.		
	
Patterns	of	bargaining	around	the	frontier	of	control	are	also	influenced	by	wider	bargaining	
practices,	through	their	effects	on	bargaining	opportunities.	Where,	as	at	Big	Car,	individual	
casework	is	linked	through	shop	steward	bargaining	to	the	organisation	of	work	and	the	
effort	bargain,	or	where	local	management	operates	any	element	of	‘indulgency	pattern’	
(Gouldner	1954),	other	opportunities	for	bargaining	over	the	frontier	of	control	may	
become	available	to	shop	stewards;	and,	consequently,	the	relative	importance	of	individual	
representation	may	be	reduced.	By	contrast,	where,	as	at	London	Borough,	the	scope	for	
effort	bargaining	is	more	restricted	and	frontier	of	control	issues	more	free-standing	relative	
to	the	effort	bargain,	then	individual	casework	is	likely	to	carry	greater	significance	as	an	
opportunity	for	bargaining	over	the	frontier	of	control;	and,	consequently,	the	importance	
of	individual	representation	may	be	heightened,	for	shop	stewards	and	managers	alike.	The	
more	that	individual	procedures	are	entrenched	in	a	management	regime,	the	greater	the	
prioritisation	of	individual	representation	by	shop	stewards	is	likely	to	be.	By	contrast,	
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where	HR	management	is	less	centralised,	and	where	shop	stewards	are	able	to	maintain	a	
relatively	strong	framework	of	established	rules,	then	it	may	even	be	possible	for	individual	
workers	to	negotiate	for	themselves	a	relaxation	of	work	discipline	and	intensity	(even	if	this	
is	on	a	questionable	basis,	as	in	some	cases	at	Big	Car).	Consequently,	specific	patterns	of	
bargaining	opportunities	must	be	understood	in	the	wider	context	of	workplace	relations.	In	
particular,	shop	steward	orientation	towards	particular	bargaining	opportunities	is	likely	to	
be	influenced	by	the	availability	of	bargaining	resources;	to	which	discussion	now	turns.		
	
Bargaining	resources		
The	notion	of	bargaining	resources	developed	from	the	discussion	of	sanctions	(Sections	2.1	
and	3.1).	Given	the	decline	of	strikes	since	the	era	of	the	classic	studies,	it	was	expected	that	
they	would	figure	only	slightly,	if	at	all,	in	the	case	studies.	In	fact,	work	stoppages	were	not	
entirely	absent:	there	were	a	few	small-scale	examples	at	Big	Car,	and	the	fieldwork	at	
London	Borough	took	place	in	the	context	of	a	national	pay	campaign	that	saw	strike	action.	
Nevertheless,	the	overall	picture	was	as	expected	and,	therefore,	shop	stewards	had	to	rely	
on	other	means	for	pressuring	management	if	they	were	to	achieve	bargained	outcomes.	
Consequently,	one	influence	on	patterns	of	shop	steward	activity	was	the	availability	of	
bargaining	resources	for	contesting	management	decisions	and	actions.		
	
The	mobilisation	of	union	members	can	obviously	be	an	important	bargaining	resource	for	
shop	stewards,	even	when	it	does	not	involve	strike	action.	This	research	underlined	that,	
even	when	they	identify	an	issue	as	important,	stewards	can	face	serious	difficulties	in	
mobilising	union	members.	The	campaign	by	London	Borough	stewards	in	opposition	to	the	
introduction	of	new	contracts	was	unable	to	mobilise	members	in	sufficient	numbers	to	
exert	enough	bargaining	leverage	to	force	management	to	back	down	over	key	issues.	
Drawing	firm	conclusions	about	why	the	stewards	were	unable	to	mobilise	union	members	
is	difficult,	because	the	research	focussed	on	shop	steward	activity,	rather	than	workers'	
overall	consciousness	and	organisation.	Nevertheless,	Kelly’s	(1998)	mobilisation	theory	
suggests	that	an	important	issue	was	a	lack	of	perceived	injustice	(ibid.:	27-30).	Signing	the	
new	contracts	was	voluntary,	so	workers	who	saw	detriment	in	the	revised	terms	and	
conditions	generally	did	not	sign	up.	Those	who	did	sign	received	a	£1000	payment.	Either	
way,	a	strong	feeling	of	injustice	was	unlikely	to	result,	and	the	fundamental	starting	point	
of	Kelly’s	model	was	therefore	missing.	Subsequently,	after	the	main	period	of	fieldwork	
had	ended,	stewards	reported	a	rising	level	of	grievance	among	workers	on	the	new	
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contracts,	due	to	widely	perceived	iniquities	in	the	operation	of	the	PRP	component,	and	
the	branch	initiated	a	campaign	over	the	appraisal	procedure.	Thus,	the	emergence	of	
perceived	injustice	opened	possibilities	for	mobilisation	that	were	not	previously	available.	
This	evidence	supports	Kelly's	model.	It	is	notable	that	the	stewards	at	London	Borough	did	
not	give	up	on	the	issue	of	new	contracts,	even	though	they	could	not	mobilise	union	
members	to	take	collective	action.	Instead,	they	made	the	best	use	they	could	of	alternative	
bargaining	resources.	Even	though	these	were	less	powerful	than,	say,	a	strike	might	have	
been,	the	steward	organisation	was	still	able	to	extract	some	concessions.		
	
Despite	difficulties	with	mobilisation,	and	very	limited	use	of	work	stoppages,	this	research	
nevertheless	found	shop	stewards	using	a	wide	range	of	bargaining	resources.	These	
resources	can	be	looked	at	in	various	ways.	Some	were	familiar	from	the	classic	workplace	
studies;	for	instance,	withdrawal	of	cooperation,	interruptions	of	production,	restriction	of	
output,	short-circuiting	of	management	structures,	coordinated	use	of	grievance	
procedures,	'nagging	and	sulkiness'	(Section	3.1).	Others	were	clearly	of	more	recent	origin	
or	even	entirely	unexpected;	for	instance,	expertise	in	job-timings,	expertise	in	employment	
rights,	sophisticated	knowledge	of	employer	policies	and	procedures,	'deals'	over	
disciplinary	outcomes,	or	coordinated	task	avoidance	of	the	‘body	swerve’	variety.	
Bargaining	resources	also	varied	in	the	degree	to	which	they	involved	collective	organisation	
and	activity	by	workers.	Collective	resources	included	refusing	to	work	faster	than	a	
commonly	accepted	norm,	non-cooperation	with	management	requests	or	initiatives,	
boycotts	of	inadequate	facilities	and	management	meetings,	and	the	'body-swerve'.	The	
number	and	variety	of	bargaining	resources	available	to	stewards,	and	used	by	them,	
significantly	undermines	the	narrow	definition	of	sanctions	as	'muscle'	(Terry	2010:	281)	
offered	by	the	current	standard	view.		
	
As	with	bargaining	opportunities,	the	specific	assemblages	of	bargaining	resources	available	
to	stewards	reflected	management	methods.	Stewards	had	developed	considerable	
expertise	in	the	operation	of	job-timing	systems,	and/or	were	adept	in	the	use	of	grievance,	
disciplinary	and	other	procedures;	and	these	resources	were	used	by	shop	stewards	in	
efforts	to	influence	management	decisions.	Casework	expertise	appeared	higher	where	
such	procedures	were	more	thoroughly	embedded	in	management	practices	(London	
Borough).	Thus,	shop	stewards	had	developed	effective	bargaining	resources	from	aspects	
of	the	management	systems	they	faced,	and	bargaining	resources	tended	to	track	
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management	methods.		
	
Once	more,	this	account	can	be	generalised.	Underlying	dynamics	of	employment	drive	
contestation	around	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control.	Bargaining	opportunities	are	
significantly	patterned	by	varied	management	regimes.	This	process	encourages	and	
facilitates	the	development	of	bargaining	resources	appropriate	to	those	opportunities.	That	
is,	structured	dynamics	of	workplace	relations,	mediated	by	different	management	systems,	
continually	pose	the	issue	of	bargaining	resources,	and	there	is	therefore	a	tendency	for	
shop	stewards	to	develop	new	forms	as	management	methods	change.		
	
However,	the	pattern	of	bargaining	resources	in	use	is	less	structurally	determined	than	is	
the	pattern	of	bargaining	opportunities;	that	is,	shop	stewards	agency	in	relation	to	new	
management	practices	is	an	important	influence	on	the	development	and	deployment	of	
new	bargaining	resources.	In	part,	this	reflects	the	distinction	between	workers'	'structural	
power'	and	'associational	power'	(Silver	2003;	Wright	2000;	Section	3.1).	Plainly,	
associational	power	relies	more	heavily	upon	subjective	factors	than	does	structural	power,	
even	though	the	latter	cannot	be	utilised	without	some	degree	of	subjective	activity.	In	
developing	and	deploying	bargaining	resources,	a	number	of	associational	factors	come	into	
play.	For	instance,	level	of	trade	union	experience	(Marchington	and	Armstrong	1983),	
political	orientation	(Darlington	2009a;	2009b),	and	internal	organisation	of	the	shop	
steward	body	(Brown	et	al.	1978),	are	all	likely	to	influence	the	collective	learning	processes	
that	permit	the	development	and	use	of	new	bargaining	resources	in	the	repertoire	of	
contestation.	Wider	union	policies	can	play	a	role	in	either	encouraging	or	inhibiting	
stewards	attempts	to	develop	bargaining	resources	and	strategies	(Carter	and	Kline	2015).	
Not	all	bargaining	resources	are	novel.	Any	particular	assemblage	of	bargaining	resources	
may	include	older	forms,	such	as	withdrawal	of	cooperation	or	political	exchange.	
Continued	use	of	older	forms	may	reflect	continuing	features	of	an	industry	or	workplace,	
such	as	differences	between	car	manufacture	and	local	government,	but	will	also	reflect	
subjective	factors,	such	as	the	long-term	strength	and	continuity	of	shop	steward	
organisation,	and	workplace	traditions	(Terry	and	Edwards	1988).	Bargaining	resources	may	
also	originate	outside	the	workplace;	for	instance,	in	the	legal	employment	rights	and	quasi-
legal	regulations	that	stewards	in	this	study	had	certainly	integrated	into	their	bargaining	
activity,	supporting	Heery	(2011a).	Nevertheless,	despite	these	other	influences,	evolving	
management	methods	shape	the	options	available	to	shop	stewards	to	a	considerable	
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extent,	and	encourage	the	development	and	use	of	certain	bargaining	resources	rather	than	
others.		
	
Finally,	shop	stewards	can	also	make	use	of	a	feature	of	workplace	relations	that	is	less	
obviously	a	resource	for	bargaining	and	contestation;	namely,	cooperation.	Cooperation	
with	management	over	short-term	alterations	to	work	organisation	were	used	to	secure	
management	indulgence	over	matters	of	work	discipline.	Stewards	attempted	to	influence	
management	decisions	by	emphasising	issues	of	product	quality,	and	used	arguments	about	
standards	of	public	services	in	efforts	to	bargain	with	managers	over	issues	as	diverse	as	
outsourcing,	workload,	work	organisation,	and	grading	disputes.	Of	course,	such	examples	
may	also	reflect	traditional	craft	or	occupational	pride	in	manufacturing,	or	the	public	
service	ethos	of	local	government	workers	and	unions	(Carter	and	Kline	2015).	Yet,	the	
prevalence	of	this	approach	across	both	case	studies	suggests	stewards	were	able	to	gain	
bargaining	leverage	by	such	methods.	While	many	accounts,	especially	from	a	radical	
perspective,	see	cooperation	with	management	in	terms	of	consent	or	compromise	
(Bélanger	and	Edwards	2007;	Burawoy	1979;	Edwards	1989),	this	study	supports	Marx's	
insight	that	cooperation	is	far	more	integral	to	the	production	process	(Section	3.2).	This	
adds	a	dimension	of	complexity	to	workplace	relations	which	is	largely	unexplored	in	
previous	research,	and	which	may	well	reward	further	investigation.	Certainly,	Atzeni's	
(2010:	27)	attempt	to	link	Marx's	analysis	of	cooperation	only	to	worker	solidarity	is	overly	
simplistic.	Rather,	shop	stewards	are	able	to	take	advantage	of	management’s	dual	role,	as	
both	controlling	labour	and	coordinating	production,	to	gain	concessions	on	the	former	by	
means	of	pressure	on	the	latter	(Section	3.2).	Thus,	counter-intuitively,	elements	of	
cooperation	may	contribute	to	the	bargaining	resources	available	to	shop	stewards	in	
dealing	with	management.	This	is	not	to	say	that	cooperation	always	signifies	bargaining.	
Rather,	it	is	to	recognise	the	complex	reality	of	workplace	relations	and	the	unexpected	
forms	that	bargaining	resources	can	and	do	take.		
	
	
This	section	has	argued	that	clusters	of	contestation	can	be	explained	as	resulting	from	the	
combination	of	two	sets	of	influences.	First,	the	continuing	dynamic	of	exploitation	within	
capitalist	relations	of	employment	drives	an	underlying	tendency	towards	conflict	and	
contestation	around	the	effort	bargain	and	the	frontier	of	control.	Shop	steward	
contestation	therefore	tends	to	emerge	in	these	areas.	Second,	management	methods	
  241	
provide	a	framework	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	resources,	within	which	
contestation	can	develop,	giving	rise	to	particular	patterns	of	activity	and	clusters	of	
contestation.	As	management	systems	change	over	time	and	vary	across	different	industries	
and	workplaces,	patterns	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources	also	shift.	As	a	
consequence,	patterns	of	shop	steward	activity	change	and	evolve	as	contestation	and	
bargaining	cluster	around	available	opportunities	and	resources.		
	
	
Conclusion		
	
This	chapter	has	considerably	advanced	the	argument	of	the	thesis.	First,	empirical	answers	
were	provided	for	the	study's	research	questions.	Strengths	and	limitations	of	the	research	
were	discussed	and	a	basis	established	for	generalisation.	It	was	then	shown	that	the	
research	findings	strongly	supported	the	critique,	developed	in	Chapter	2,	of	the	current	
standard	view;	a	view	which	must	therefore	be	considered	significantly	undermined.	
Contrary	to	that	view,	this	research	found	considerable	evidence	of	the	persistence	of	shop	
stewards	bargaining,	patterned	around	distinctive	clusters	of	contestation.	Next,	previous	
shop	steward	typologies	were	re-examined	using	findings	from	this	research.	A	number	of	
problems	were	identified	in	applying	particular	typologies	to	the	research	findings,	and	the	
typological	approach	in	general	was	found	to	be	problematic.	Finally,	the	chapter	developed	
an	alternative	framework	for	interpreting	the	findings,	which	returned	to	themes	from	the	
theoretical	discussion	in	Chapter	3;	in	particular,	the	structured	dynamics	of	workplace	
relations,	and	patterns	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources.	This	framework	built	on	
previous	radical	and	Marxist	sociologies	of	workplace	relations,	but	developed	a	more	
detailed	analysis	of	shop	steward	activity.	The	benefits	of	the	lengthy	detour	in	Chapter	3,	to	
explore	structural	aspects	of	the	employment	relationship,	can	now	be	seen.	While	this	
study	is	based	firmly	in	a	significant	effort	of	empirical	research,	it	has	also	placed	
considerable	emphasis	on	developing	and	clarifying	conceptual	and	theoretical	issues.	A	
clarified	conceptual	framework,	including	defensible	concepts	of	exploitation,	conflict	and	
cooperation,	interests,	effort	bargain,	and	frontier	of	control,	has	provided	the	basis	for	
generalisation	from	the	present	findings.		
	
The	present	account	differs	from	previous	analyses	in	its	focus	on	structural	aspects	of	the	
employment	relationship.	Whereas	recent	accounts	have	tended	to	treat	conflict	(where	
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they	have	not	ignored	it	completely)	as	a	general	contextual	feature	or	product	of	agency,	
this	study	has	traced	through	the	dynamics	of	conflict	to	provide	an	explanation	of	the	
detail	of	observed	workplace	bargaining	processes	and	the	role	of	shop	stewards.	Starting	
from	the	nature	of	conflict	under	capitalist	relations	of	production,	as	driven	by	the	dynamic	
of	exploitation,	this	account	has	been	able	to	provide	an	explanation	of	patterns	of	shop	
steward	bargaining	that	were	not	only	contrary	to	the	current	standard	view,	but	that	also	
ran	counter	to	the	expectations	of	the	research	and	even	to	the	priorities	of	shop	stewards	
themselves.	This	underlines	the	importance,	especially,	of	the	notion	of	interests;	the	key	
conceptual	link	between	structure	and	agency,	which	permits	the	construction	of	non-
deterministic	explanations	linking	the	structure	of	workplace	relations	to	patterns	of	
contestation	and	bargaining	among	shop	stewards.	These	findings	are	generaliseable	not	in	
the	sense	of	claiming	to	present	a	description	of	what	all	shop	stewards	do.	Rather,	this	
research	has	developed	a	general	conceptual	framework	which	can	be	used	to	explain	the	
activity	of	shop	stewards	observed	in	this	research,	and	which,	because	it	is	based	in	the	
underlying	dynamics	of	workplace	relations,	suggests	that	similar	processes	and	activities	
are	likely	to	be	found	elsewhere,	driven	by	those	same	underlying	dynamics	of	exploitation	
within	the	employment	relationship.		
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Chapter	8:	Conclusions		
	
	
This	research	set	out	to	answer	a	basic	question:	What	do	shop	stewards	do?	Answering	this	
question	required	new	empirical	evidence,	but	it	was	also	necessary	to	address	conceptual	
and	theoretical	problems	in	previous	accounts,	because	explanation	in	social	science	
requires	not	just	evidence	but	also	the	ordering	and	interpretation	of	evidence.	
Consequently,	this	research	started	from	a	critique	of	what	has	been	termed	the	current	
standard	view	of	shop	stewards.	Fresh	research	was	then	designed	and	carried	out,	which	
generated	considerable	empirical	evidence	and	insights	into	the	activity	of	contemporary	
shop	stewards.	The	findings	of	this	research	strongly	supported	the	conceptual	and	
methodological	critique	of	the	current	standard	view	presented	in	Section	2.1.	Therefore,	an	
alternative	conceptual	framework	was	developed,	building	upon	Marxist-influenced	
sociologies	of	workplace	relations.	Now,	a	number	of	conclusions	can	be	drawn.	These	
conclusions	will	be	set	out	over	the	remaining	pages,	and	can	be	considered	the	main	
contributions	to	knowledge	of	the	present	research.		
	
In	summary,	the	main	contributions	of	this	thesis	are:	a	vindication	of	detailed	case	study	
research	for	understanding	workplace	relations;	a	demonstration	of	the	problematic	nature	
of	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards;	a	conceptually	clarified	definition	of	
bargaining;	a	framework	for	understanding	patterns	of	bargaining	through	the	assessment	
of	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources;	an	outline	proposal	for	further	research;	and	a	
theoretical	framework	for	understanding	shop	stewards	that	links	workplace	bargaining	to	
underlying	workplace	dynamics	more	securely	than	has	been	done	previously.	The	
remainder	of	the	chapter	will	follow	this	structure,	outlining	these	contributions	in	turn.	
Since	this	chapter	contains	a	summary	of	the	main	arguments	put	forward	in	the	thesis,	
there	is	no	need	to	repeat	all	the	references	already	provided;	therefore,	apart	from	a	few	
specific	points,	previous	discussions	will	be	indicated	by	referring	to	earlier	sections	of	this	
dissertation.		
	
The	research	methods	and	design	adopted	for	this	study	were	modelled	on	workplace	
studies	of	the	classic	period	of	industrial	relations	research	(Sections	2.2	and	4.3),	in	the	
belief	that	such	an	approach	could	again	produce	a	depth	and	richness	of	evidence	that	is	
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not	available	through	other	means.	This	belief	proved	well	founded.	Lengthy	and	intimate	
acquaintance	with	the	daily	activities	of	shop	stewards	generated	evidence	that	revealed	far	
greater	variety	and	complexity	than	can	be	captured	by	large-scale	surveys,	or	even	by	
qualitative	research	based	on	interview	methods.	What	the	case	study	design	lacked	in	
statistical	representativeness	was	more	than	made	up	for	by	the	detailed	exploration	of	
shop	steward	activity.	Overall,	this	study	demonstrates	that	ethnography	remains	a	
powerful	tool	for	industrial	relations	research,	if	an	under-used	one,	and	strongly	endorses	
Tope	et	al.'s	(2005)	advocacy	of	'the	benefits	of	being	there'.	Furthermore,	the	diary-based	
methods	developed	for	this	research	also	proved	highly	beneficial,	giving	access	to	areas	of	
shop	steward	activity	that	would	otherwise	have	remained	hidden	due	to	problems	of	
access	and	the	limitations	of	single-researcher	fieldwork	(Section	4.3).	Although	diary-based	
research	presents	challenges	for	both	researchers	and	participants,	it	offers	considerable	
advantages	for	carrying	out	detailed	workplace	research	in	an	era	when	access	is	often	
difficult	to	secure.	The	revival	of	detailed	workplace	study	and	development	of	diary-based	
methods	therefore	represent	genuine	methodological	contributions	from	this	research.		
	
This	research	also	underlines	the	benefits	of	small-N	case	studies	(Section	4.2).	The	utility	of	
findings	from	the	present	research	for	supporting	conceptual	critique	shows	that	such	
studies	are	fully	capable	of	generating	theoretically	significant	findings.	Narrowly	empiricist	
critiques	of	small-N	studies,	like	McGovern's	(2014b),	jeopardise	such	theoretical	
development	through	adherence	to	a	misplaced	notion	of	scientific	rigour	(Bhaskar	2008;	
Section	4.1).	At	the	same	time,	though,	this	research	certainly	benefitted	from	the	selection	
of	two	contrasting	case	studies;	for	instance,	through	the	identification	of	similar	patterns	of	
shop	steward	activity	in	very	different	surroundings	(supporting	the	arguments	of	
Rueschemeyer	2003).	Overall,	then,	while	the	problems	of	generalising	from	small-N	studies	
should	not	be	underestimated,	neither	should	the	theoretical	benefits	of	in-depth	
encounters	with	workplace	activity.		
		
Empirically,	this	study	found	considerable	evidence	of	shop	stewards	bargaining	with	
managers,	and	dealing	with	collective	issues.	To	recap,	the	current	standard	view	claims	
that	shop	steward	activity	has	shifted	from	negotiation	(seen	as	joint	regulation)	to	
consultation	(seen	as	a	form	of	unilateral	management	decision	making),	and	from	dealing	
with	collective	issues	to	individual	casework	(Section	2.1).	Yet,	not	only	has	this	thesis	
identified	the	presence	of	important	bargaining	processes	within	arrangements	formally	
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designated	as	'consultation',	it	also	found	bargaining	in	workplace	processes	that	are	usually	
seen	as	entirely	separate	from	collective	arrangements;	for	instance,	in	grievance	and	
disciplinary	procedures,	and	even	in	the	CIP	processes	at	the	heart	of	lean	production.	
Consequently,	evidence	from	this	study	significantly	undermines	the	claims	and	conceptual	
framework	of	the	current	standard	view	of	shop	stewards.		
	
Rather	than	a	clear	distinction	between	negotiation	and	consultation,	this	research	found	
considerable	overlap.	Far	from	being	a	site	of	unilateral	management	decision-making,	
consultation	frequently	resulted	in	outcomes	that	were	modified	as	a	result	of	shop	steward	
activity.	Instead	of	a	clear	separation	between	collective	issues	and	individual	
representation,	the	research	found	complex	inter-weaving.	Stewards	pursued	individual	
cases	using	collective	means,	and	collective	issues	through	individual	casework.	By	
demonstrating	that	formally	designated	'consultation'	processes	and	individual	casework,	in	
practice,	often	entail	genuine	bargaining,	these	findings	contribute	important	new	insights	
into	the	activities	of	shop	stewards,	with	implications	for	wider	research.	In	particular,	the	
findings	of	this	study	present	a	considerable	challenge	to	the	WERS	framework,	which	
features	a	strong	assumption	that	negotiation	and	consultation	are	distinct	forms.	
Consequently,	given	the	wide	currency	of	the	WERS	account,	the	findings	of	this	study	have	
potentially	significant	implications	for	wider	industrial	relations	research.		
	
By	contrast,	elements	of	the	workplace	bargainer	view	of	shop	stewards	(Section	2.2)	
proved	more	robust.	While	the	classic	studies	no	longer	provide	an	accurate	account	of	
current	shop	steward	activity,	insights	from	those	studies	remain	useful	for	understanding	
important	aspects	of	workplace	contestation	and	bargaining.	In	particular,	issues	around	the	
effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control	continue	to	be	central	concerns	of	shop	stewards,	
despite	significant	changes	in	the	context	in	which	stewards	operate.	Moreover,	a	number	
of	commentators	have	suspected	that	shop	stewards	might	have	responded	to	changing	
circumstances	by	developing	new	ways	of	contesting	management	decisions	(e.g.	Edwards	
2010;	Edwards	et	al.	1995;	Hyman	1997).	The	findings	of	this	study	support	these	intuitions.	
Detailed	evidence	about	the	day-to-day	activity	of	contemporary	shop	stewards	has	indeed	
permitted	the	identification	of	ways	in	which	shop	stewards	have	adapted,	and	new	forms	
of	contestation	and	bargaining	that	stewards	have	developed.	However,	the	identification	of	
these	new	forms	also	required	the	development	of	a	conceptual	framework	for	
understanding	these	new	practices;	to	which	discussion	turns	next.		
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Central	to	the	conceptual	framework	of	this	research	is	the	introduction	of	a	clear	definition	
of	bargaining	to	the	study	of	workplace	relations,	something	missing	in	previous	accounts	
(Section	3.2).	This	definition	proved	extremely	useful.	By	conceptualising	bargaining	in	
terms	of	outcomes	influenced	by	both	parties,	it	became	possible	to	identify	bargaining	
content	within	a	variety	of	workplace	processes,	whether	formally	designated	as	
negotiation	or	consultation	(or	neither),	whether	collective	or	individual,	formal	or	informal,	
open	or	hidden.	This	definition	also	provided	a	conceptual	basis	for	rejecting	the	hierarchy	
of	bargaining	forms	proposed	by	the	current	standard	view	(Section	2.1).	In	one	sense,	this	
research	supports	the	argument	of	Hyman	(1997:	316)	that	the	distinction	between	
negotiation	and	consultation	has	become	‘blurred’.	However,	the	conclusions	of	this	
research	go	further,	and	cast	doubt	on	whether	negotiation	and	consultation	were	ever	in	
reality	sharply	separated.	Instead,	this	research	proposed	a	continuum	view	of	workplace	
bargaining,	based	on	variation	in	the	degree	to	which	management	decisions	and	outcomes	
are	influenced	by,	or	modified	as	a	result	of,	the	activities	of	shop	stewards.	An	important	
advantage	of	this	definition	is	that	whereas	the	current	standard	view	treats	bargaining	
content	on	the	basis	of	a	priori	definitions,	the	approach	adopted	here	treats	the	extent	of	
bargaining	(if	any)	as	an	empirical	matter.		
	
By	the	same	token,	the	new	definition	also	sets	out	the	conditions	under	which	it	can	be	
determined	that	no	bargaining	is	present;	that	is,	where	outcomes	result	from	the	actions	of	
only	one	party.	Thus,	this	definition	is	not	a	catch-all	that	sees	bargaining	in	every	workplace	
interaction.	By	making	the	attribution	of	bargaining	content	a	matter	for	empirical	
investigation,	with	variation	along	a	continuum,	the	definition	offers	a	framework	for	
comparing	bargaining	forms	and	bargaining	content	over	time,	and	across	different	sectors	
of	employment	and	workplaces.	The	definition	of	bargaining	developed	in	this	thesis	is	
therefore	potentially	applicable	across	a	range	of	research	settings,	including	non-union	
contexts,	further	underlining	the	benefits	of	situating	analysis	in	terms	of	social	dynamics	
rather	than	institutional	forms.		
	
This	thesis	also	developed	a	framework	for	grasping	patterns	of	workplace	contestation	and	
bargaining,	based	on	the	dual	categories	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	
resources.	While	both	these	terms	have	been	used	before	(Section	3.1),	this	research	has	
developed	and	clarified	previous	analysis.	It	was	shown	that	the	clusters	of	contestation	
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identified	by	the	fieldwork	were	significantly	shaped	by	the	availability	to	shop	stewards	of	
bargaining	opportunities	and	resources.	Whereas	shop	stewards	in	the	classic	studies	had	
the	strike	weapon	at	their	disposal,	this	research	has	demonstrated	the	capacity	of	stewards	
to	develop	alternative	bargaining	resources	from	materials	found	in	contemporary	
workplace	relations	and	management	practices.	The	range	of	bargaining	resources	deployed	
by	shop	stewards,	and	their	success	in	using	them	to	secure	modifications	to	management	
decisions,	demonstrate	that	the	use	of	traditional	economic	sanctions	in	the	form	of	work	
stoppages	–	Terry's	'muscle'	–	cannot	be	taken	as	the	sine	qua	non	of	workplace	bargaining.	
Whereas	the	current	standard	view	uses	the	absence	of	shop	steward-led	strikes	to	deny	
the	presence	of	negotiation	by	definition	(Section	2.1),	this	research	has	shown	that	
bargaining	can	and	does	take	place	utilising	a	considerable	variety	of	bargaining	resources.	
Furthermore,	the	research	identified	a	tendency	for	contestation	and	bargaining	to	cluster	
where	bargaining	resources	were	available.		
	
Similar	considerations	were	also	applied	to	bargaining	opportunities.	This	research	
identified	a	tendency	for	shop	steward	contestation	to	cluster	where	opportunities	were	
available	to	challenge	management	decision-making.	In	relation	to	the	effort	bargain,	
contestation	tended	to	cluster	around	discontinuities	in	production,	which	presented	
opportunities	to	reset	the	effort	bargain;	a	pattern	first	noted	by	Lerner	and	Marquand	
(1962)	more	than	50	years	ago.	Discontinuities	of	production	will	be	found	across	
employment,	and	therefore	it	is	likely	that	similar	clusters	will	be	found	elsewhere.	Other	
bargaining	opportunities	are	of	more	recent	origin.	For	instance,	formal	management	
procedures	for	enforcing	labour	discipline	are	now	commonplace,	and	therefore	figure	
prominently	in	shop	steward	contestation	through	individual	representation.	Moreover,	the	
importance	of	individual	representation	for	shop	stewards	is	likely	to	be	heightened	where	
management	adopt	'centralised'	HRM	practices	(Saundry	and	Wibberley	2014:	5).	By	
contrast,	the	importance	of	formal	casework	can	be	reduced	where	stewards	have	other	
means	for	influencing	managers;	for	instance,	where	bargaining	over	work	organisation	
provides	stewards	with	additional	resources	for	dealing	with	individual	representation	
(Section	6.3).	The	general	conclusion,	here,	is	that	as	management	methods	change,	so	too	
do	the	assemblages	of	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources	available	to	shop	stewards,	
leading	to	shifting	patterns	of	contestation	and	bargaining.		
	
This	approach	to	mapping	patterns	of	shop	steward	activity	contrasts	with	the	approach	of	
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classic	studies	such	as	Batstone	et	al.	(1977,	1978).	Rather	than	focussing	on	features	of	the	
stewards	themselves	–	often	subjective	ones,	such	as	attachment	to	'union	principles'	
(Section	2.2)	–	this	research	starts	from	an	examination	of	actual	bargaining	processes,	
analysed	in	terms	of	opportunities	and	resources.	Thus,	in	the	relation	to	the	two	groups	of	
shop	stewards	investigated	by	Batstone	et	al.	(1977),	it	is	plausible	that	the	bargaining	
opportunities	and	resources	available	to	stewards	among	newly	organised	white	collar	
workers	were	different	from	those	available	to	stewards	among	strongly	organised	
shopfloor	production	workers,	and	that	these	differences	might	go	some	way	to	explaining	
the	different	approaches	of	stewards	in	each	area.	Thus,	the	distinction	between	bargaining	
opportunities	and	resources	offers	a	potentially	useful	framework	for	conceptualising	
variation	in	bargaining	forms	and	practices.		
	
In	considering	bargaining	opportunities	and	bargaining	resources,	useful	distinctions	can	be	
made	between	collective	and	individual	on	two	levels:	the	nature	of	the	issue,	and	the	
means	by	which	it	is	pursued.	That	is,	individual	issues	may	be	pursued	by	individual	means	
(as	expected	from	recent	literature;	Section	2.1);	or,	alternatively,	individual	issues	may	be	
pursued	by	collective	means	(as	noted	by	Kelly	1998:	136).	Likewise,	collective	issues	may	be	
pursued	by	collective	means	(as	long	established;	Section	2.2),	or	by	individual	means	
(through	the	use	of	grievance	and	disciplinary	procedures).	The	identification	by	this	study	
of	this	fourth	configuration	–	collective	issues	pursued	by	individual	means	–	completes	the	
permutations	of	collective	and	individual,	and	represents	a	further	contribution	of	the	
present	research.		
	
The	framework	outlined	so	far	provides	conceptual	bases	both	for	identifying	workplace	
bargaining	processes	and	for	grasping	variation	in	their	forms.	However,	given	the	wide	
variation	of	employment	and	the	inevitable	limitations	of	case	study	research,	the	account	
presented	here	must	be	considered	incomplete	until	further	research	has	been	conducted.	
Future	research	might	usefully	develop	in	three	directions.	First,	more	case	studies,	of	a	
broadly	similar	type	to	those	conducted	here,	could	be	used	to	assess	the	framework	
developed	above,	and	to	identify	aspects	that	might	benefit	from	further	exploration	and	
development.	For	instance,	a	wider	variety	of	workplaces	might	be	investigated	to	assess	
the	presence	(or	otherwise)	of	the	types	of	bargaining	processes	identified	here,	and/or	to	
examine	variation	in	bargaining	opportunities	and	resources.	Second,	and	perhaps	more	
importantly,	the	findings	of	this	research	indicate	a	need	for	quantitative	research	designed	
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to	investigate	the	extent	to	which	the	types	of	bargaining	practices	identified	here	can	be	
found	more	widely	across	employment.	While	the	present	research	provides	theoretical	
grounds	for	expecting	forms	of	shop	steward	bargaining	to	occur	more	widely,	only	
empirical	investigation	can	confirm	or	refute	such	claims.		
	
A	third	potential	direction	for	future	research	is	more	methodological	in	nature;	namely,	the	
further	rehabilitation	of	detailed	workplace	studies.	If	nothing	else,	this	research	has	shown	
that	these	methods	have	an	enormous	and	currently	largely	untapped	potential	for	
investigating	workplace	relations	and	processes.	Industrial	relations	and	related	research	
would	undoubtedly	benefit	from	the	wider	deployment	of	such	methods.	Furthermore,	this	
thesis	has	mounted	a	robust	defence	of	small-N	studies	(Section	4.2).	This	is	not	to	
conclude,	though,	that	any	and	all	case	studies	are	capable	of	generating	theoretically	
significant	results.	The	present	research	combined	detailed	empirical	investigation	within	a	
small-N	case	study	design,	together	with	conceptual	critique	and	clarification,	and	made	
significant	use	of	theoretically	'foreshadowed	problems'	(Section	4.1).	The	success	of	this	
study	therefore	underlines	the	importance	of	theoretically	informed	research,	and	supports	
arguments	made	above	for	the	rejection	of	grounded	theory	(Section	4.1).	This	research	
endorses	both	O'Reilly's	(2012:	29)	'iterative-inductive'	approach,	and	Bhaskar's	(2008:	214-
228)	more	philosophical	treatment	of	induction.	Thus,	while	this	research	strongly	
vindicates	the	renewal	of	detailed	workplace	study,	at	the	same	time	it	encourages	a	
greater	attention	to	theoretical	clarification	than	is	often	the	case	in	industrial	relations.		
	
Theoretically,	this	research	started	from	the	centrality	of	the	employment	relationship,	
contra	recent	critiques	(e.g.	Ackers	2014;	Section	3.1).	Like	much	recent	industrial	relations	
scholarship,	the	account	presented	here	views	the	employment	relationship	as	a	continuing	
source	of	conflict	and	contestation	workplace	relations.	However,	while	an	appreciation	of	
the	conflictual	nature	employment	is	common	to	many	accounts	of	industrial	relations	
(Section	3.2),	it	is	usually	treated	as	a	contextual	feature,	the	backdrop	against	which	the	
action	of	workplace	relations	takes	place.	This	study	goes	further,	tracing	the	'inner	
connection[s]'	(Marx,	cited	in	Callinicos	2014:	73)	that	link	the	underlying	dynamic	of	
exploitation,	through	a	number	of	intermediate	determinations,	to	particular	patterns	of	
day-to-day	shop	steward	contestation	and	bargaining.	That	is,	in	this	account,	exploitation	
and	conflict	are	not	present	simply	as	poorly	defined	and	'ahistorical'	(Howell	2005:	12)	
background.	Rather,	the	theoretical	framework	presented	in	this	thesis	offers	a	way	to	link	
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underlying	dynamics	to	specific	patterns	and	forms	of	contestation,	in	a	non-deterministic	
way	that	is	sensitive	to	historical	and	contextual	variation.		
	
Thus,	key	drivers	of	workplace	conflict	and	contestation	remain	rooted	in	the	exploitation	of	
labour	in	capitalist	employment,	while	the	forms	in	which	they	find	expression	have	altered	
considerably.	Returning	to	the	metaphor	used	in	the	conclusion	of	Chapter	1,	shop	stewards	
no	longer	have	in	their	hands	the	big	stick	of	the	strike	weapon	when	dealing	with	
management.	Instead,	they	have	looked	around	for	alternative	weapons	in	the	new	terrain	
of	workplace	relations,	and	have	found	small	rocks	which	they	can	pick	up	and	throw	from	a	
safe	distance.	This	metaphor	encapsulates	the	shift	in	bargaining	resources	that	has	taken	
place	over	the	last	30	years	or	so	–	a	shift	which	has	important	implications	for	bargaining	
outcomes.	The	relative	weakness	of	contemporary	shop	steward	bargaining	resources,	
compared	with	the	sectional	strikes	of	previous	eras,	means	that	while	stewards	are	able	to	
restrict	managerial	prerogatives	and	impede	management	initiatives,	they	are	rarely	able	to	
stop	them	in	their	tracks.	As	a	result,	managers	have	been	able	gradually	to	encroach	on	the	
effort	bargain	and	the	frontier	of	control,	even	in	relatively	strongly	unionised	workplaces	
such	as	the	ones	investigated	here.	Unless	or	until	shop	stewards	(re)gain	access	to	more	
effective	bargaining	resources,	this	trend	is	likely	to	continue.		
	
The	theoretically	robust	account	developed	in	Chapter	3	rooted	the	dynamics	of	workplace	
relations	in	the	underlying	dynamics	of	the	employment	relationship,	to	provide	analytical	
grounds	for	generalising	from	the	present	research.	A	crucial	part	of	that	account	was	the	
notion	of	interests;	a	concept	that	has	for	too	long	been	marginalised	in	industrial	relations	
research	(Section	3.2).	The	problem	with	accounts	that	dispense	with	a	notion	of	interests,	
or	that	reduce	interests	to	a	more	or	less	contingent	product	of	indeterminate	social	
construction	(e.g.	Blyton	et	al.	2011;	Heery	2011b;	Simms	and	Charlwood	2010;	Simms	et	al.	
2013),	is	that	explanations	for	the	behaviour	of	social	actors	in	any	particular	case	are	
limited	to	that	specific	context,	and	cannot	be	generalised	across	other	cases	and	contexts	
by	reference	to	social	structure.	That	is,	without	interests	consequent	upon	social	structure,	
each	case	must	be	explained	in	its	own	terms;	a	stance	which	is	corrosive	of	any	overall	
project	of	social	scientific	explanation.	The	importance	of	reinstating	a	concept	of	interests,	
especially	when	seen	as	structural	capacities,	is	that	it	provides	a	non-deterministic	link	
between	social	structure	and	agency,	which	therefore	permits	the	connection	of	individual	
cases	into	general	theoretical	accounts.		
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Consequently,	while	agency	is	essential	to	the	development	of	any	particular	bargaining	
practices,	this	account	gives	a	central	explanatory	role	to	structure	in	driving	the	dynamic	
towards	conflict	and	contestation	that	is	crucial	for	understanding	workplace	relations,	
bargaining	processes,	and	the	role	of	shop	stewards.	That	is,	the	nature	of	the	employment	
relationship	is	central	to	understanding	the	structured	dynamics	of	workplace	relations.	
Although	the	present	study	has	argued	for	restoring	cooperation	as	an	aspect	of	workplace	
relations,	exploitation	in	capitalist	employment	drives	a	powerful	dynamic	towards	conflict	
at	work.	Therefore,	inasmuch	as	this	relationship	is	found	throughout	employment	in	
capitalism,	then	similar	dynamics	will	be	present	across	workplaces	far	beyond	the	ones	
investigated	here.		
	
In	general	terms,	the	argument	presented	here	builds	on	accounts	that	stress	conflict	within	
employment	relations,	but	has	extended	that	analysis	theoretically	and	empirically	to	look	
in	detail	at	the	role	of	contemporary	shop	stewards.	This	research	has	shown	that	the	
underlying	dynamic	of	exploitation	within	the	employment	relationship	continues	to	
influence	the	activity	of	shop	stewards,	leading	to	clear	elements	of	continuity	with	earlier	
periods;	in	particular,	the	centrality	of	the	effort	bargain	and	frontier	of	control	to	shop	
steward	contestation	and	bargaining.	Thus,	exploitation	continues	to	be	the	centre	of	
gravity	around	which	the	role	of	the	shop	steward	orbits.	The	transformation	of	the	context	
in	which	shop	stewards	operate	has	not	done	away	with	this	underlying	reality.	At	the	same	
time,	as	the	methods	by	which	managers	attempt	to	influence	the	effort	bargain	and	the	
frontier	of	control	change	and	develop,	so	the	patterns	of	available	bargaining	opportunities	
and	resources	shift,	in	turn	shaping	actual	shop	steward	activity	in	particular	observable	
ways.	This	re-theorisation	of	links	between	the	dynamics	of	workplace	relations	and	actual	
patterns	of	shop	steward	activity,	via	the	mediation	of	specific	combinations	of	bargaining	
opportunities	and	resources,	constitutes	the	main	theoretical	contribution	of	the	present	
research.		
	
In	practice,	actual	relations	within	any	workplace	comprise	a	mix	of	conflict,	contestation,	
cooperation,	resistance,	endurance,	coping	–	and	bargaining.	Since	capitalist	employment	
cannot	do	away	with	the	dynamic	of	exploitation,	it	is	likely	that	shop	stewards	will	continue	
to	be	implicated	in	conflict,	contestation,	and	bargaining	between	labour	and	capital,	
workers	and	management,	within	workplace	relations;	even	though	the	forms	in	which	
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these	are	played	out	have	changed	significantly,	and	will	continue	to	do	so.	It	was	assumed	
in	Chapter	1	that	shop	stewards	remain	'intelligent	trade	unionists'	(Hyman	1997:	318),	and	
that	the	experience	of	capitalist	employment	continues	to	be	a	'life-long	wrestling	match	
with	the	experience	of	wage-labour'	(Connell	1983:	31).	This	research	has	strongly	
vindicated	those	assumptions,	and	the	activities	of	shop	stewards	documented	here	bear	
the	mark	of	both.	Shop	stewards	continue	to	be	involved	in	attempts	to	influence	
management	decisions,	in	the	interests	of	the	workers	they	represent,	using	whatever	
means	are	available,	and	as	such	can	still	be	said	to	be	significantly	engaged	in	workplace	
bargaining.	That,	at	least	as	far	as	this	research	is	concerned,	is	what	shop	stewards	do.		
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Appendix	1:	Doing	fieldwork	–	a	personal	account		
	
From	the	outset,	an	important	intention	of	this	research	project	was	to	reinstate	the	voices	
of	shop	stewards	into	academic	debates	about	workplace	union	organisation;	very	much	as	
a	response	to	their	effective	sidelining	in	research	based	on	management	surveys.	It	was	
therefore	a	priority	of	the	fieldwork	to	spend	a	good	deal	of	time	with	stewards,	getting	to	
know	them,	the	issues	they	were	dealing	with,	their	successes,	setbacks,	hopes,	plans	and	
frustrations.	One	of	the	advantages	I	had	in	establishing	good	field	relations	was	my	own	
previous	experience	as	a	workplace	union	rep	(in	the	newspaper	printing	industry),	and	as	a	
tutor	in	trade	union	education	–	running	courses	for	shop	stewards	and	safety	reps.	This	
background	meant	that	I	had	a	good	deal	of	empathy	with	the	stewards,	and	usually	at	least	
some	understanding	the	issues	they	were	dealing	with.	Most	participants	in	the	study	got	to	
know	about	my	background,	and	this	generally	gave	them	a	degree	of	confidence	that	I	
would	understand	both	their	aspirations	and	their	difficulties;	which	indeed	I	did.	In	turn,	
confidence	that	they	were	talking	to	a	sympathetic	listener	meant	that	stewards	opened	up	
about	what	they	were	doing	to	an	extent	that	might	well	not	have	been	possible	with	a	
younger	and	less	TU-experienced	researcher.	As	one	of	the	convenors	at	Big	Car	put	it	when	
introducing	me	to	a	group	of	stewards,	'He's	one	of	us.'	Clearly,	my	relative	'insider'	status	
assisted	the	research	significantly	in	gaining	the	confidence	of	the	stewards,	thereby	
enhancing	the	depth	and	richness	of	the	data	gathered	(for	a	discussion	of	insider/outsider	
status	issues,	see	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	86-89).		
	
Of	course,	my	previous	experience	as	a	workplace	union	rep,	and	my	basic	sympathy	with	
what	the	stewards	were	trying	to	do,	meant	that	I	had	to	guard	against	bias;	both	in	what	I	
recorded	and	how	I	interpreted	it.	Since	I	was	acutely	aware	of	this	danger,	I	adopted	three	
main	strategies	to	guard	against	it.	First,	I	continually	reminded	myself	of	the	prominent	
warnings	in	the	ethnographic	literature.	I	was	aware	that	the	experience	of	ethnographic	
fieldwork	can	lead	to	researchers,	especially	new	researchers,	feeling	overwhelmed	by	the	
sheer	volume	of	data	that	presents	itself	before	them;	the	head-spinning	shock	of	total	
immersion	into	a	new	social	environment.	Necessarily,	choices	must	be	made	about	what	to	
record,	and	the	researcher	making	those	choices	may	well	be	disorientated,	bemused,	or	
just	plain	scared.	It	is	not	difficult	to	imagine	that	in	such	circumstances	a	new	researcher	
might	fall	back	on	habitual	or	common	sense	interpretations,	and	fit	observations	into	a	pre-
existing	framework,	rather	than	develop	fresh	insights.	That	is,	disorientation	could	easily	
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open	the	door	to	bias.	Therefore	the	first	strategy	I	adopted	to	avoid	this	difficulty	was	to	
carry	with	me	at	all	times	a	copy	of	the	research	questions,	and	to	read	them	often,	
especially	in	moments	of	uncertainty,	doubt,	or	confusion.	This	simple	technique	
contributed	significantly	to	steadying	my	view	of	the	field,	reinforcing	the	explicit	
framework	of	the	study,	and	reducing	implicit	assumptions	in	my	recording	of	events.		
	
Second,	I	had	to	deal	with	the	process	of	writing	up	full	fieldnotes	from	brief	jottings	made	
in	the	field;	a	well	known	feature	of	ethnographic	practice.	At	the	end	of	each	day,	I	would	
sit	in	my	room	(or	on	a	train	heading	home)	and	go	over	what	notes	I	had,	expanding	them	
into	a	fuller	account.	Often,	parts	of	the	notes	would	already	be	quite	complete:	during	
quiet	periods	in	the	union	office	I	would	take	the	opportunity	to	expand	my	notes	on	the	
day's	events.	Usually,	though,	much	of	the	day's	notes	would	be	in	the	form	of	brief	
sketches	and	comments,	even	single	words	or	short	phrases	from	shop	stewards'	speech	(I	
tried	especially	hard	to	record	the	latter,	leaving	contextual	details	to	be	filled	in	later).	Of	
course,	in	reconstructing	the	events	of	the	day,	it	was	possible	that	bias	might	creep	in	as	I	
wrote	about	the	stewards	who	I	generally	liked	a	great	deal	and	sympathised	with	to	a	
considerable	extent.	Here,	I	adopted	a	simple	strategy	to	avoid	bias.	I	imagined	as	I	wrote	
that	someone	was	sitting	behind	me,	looking	over	my	shoulder	and	reading	the	account	as	I	
worked.	I	asked	myself:	Would	this	anonymous	observer	recognise	my	description?	Would	
they	agree	that	it	was	a	fair	account?	Would	they	think	I	had	left	some	things	out,	or	
embellished	others?	The	effect	of	this	strategy	was	to	promote	balance	in	my	fieldnotes.	
Where	my	own	personal	or	intellectual	inclinations	might	have	highlighted	a	particular	
aspect	of	a	certain	event	–	say,	the	success	of	a	steward	in	defeating	a	manager's	plan	–	the	
figure	behind	me	made	sure	that	my	record	did	not	omit	other	features	–	perhaps,	the	
disappointment	of	the	steward	that	greater	progress	had	not	been	made,	the	wistful	
comment	that	this	was	the	first	success	this	year,	or	the	concessions	made	on	another	issue.	
The	introduction	of	this	third	party,	the	sceptical	observer,	was	a	deliberate	strategy	
designed	to	keep	my	account	honest,	and	looking	back,	I	am	confident	that	they	would	
endorse	my	efforts	at	avoiding	bias.		
	
Third,	I	recognised	from	the	outset	that	I	would	need	to	guard	against	becoming	too	much	
'at	home'	in	the	fieldwork	setting	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	90).	Certainly,	there	
were	times	when	this	danger	appeared.	In	particular,	since	I	was	a	very	experienced	former	
union	rep,	there	were	occasions	when	stewards	facing	difficulties	asked	for	my	opinion	or	
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advice.	However,	I	was	keen	not	to	influence	stewards'	actions,	since	the	aim	of	the	
research	was	to	investigate	what	stewards	were	doing,	not	what	they	might	do.	Therefore,	
my	standard	response	to	such	enquiries	was	to	adopt	a	thoughtful	countenance	and	
comment	sympathetically,	'Hmmm,	that's	a	tricky	one',	or	something	similarly	non-
committal.	While	other	researchers	might	legitimately	adopt	other	strategies,	it	was	
crucially	important	for	this	research	that	I	observed	stewards'	own	decision-making	
processes.	For	the	same	reason,	on	a	few	occasions	when	stewards	adopted	an	approach	to	
a	problem	that	seemed	to	me	a	poor	option	or	tactical	mistake,	it	was	important	that	I	said	
nothing,	passed	no	comment,	but	rather	observed	and	recorded,	and	explored	with	the	
steward	their	reasons	and	motivation	for	doing	what	they	did.	In	this	way,	I	was	able	to	
maintain	focus	on	what	stewards	were	doing,	and	how	they	understood	their	actions,	
adding	further	richness	to	the	data	by	ensuring	the	inclusion	of	the	full	range	of	steward	
activities;	even	ones	I	personally	disagreed	with.	Overall,	the	range	of	findings,	and	the	
depth	and	richness	of	data	from	the	fieldwork,	suggest	that	the	strategies	adopted	to	avoid	
bias	were	effective.		
	
Ethnographic	field	work,	though,	combines	intellectual	challenges	with	numerous	others;	
not	least	the	physical	and	logistical	difficulties	of	being	in	the	field	for	extended	periods,	and	
potential	barriers	to	becoming	acquainted	with	the	stewards	and	their	work.	During	the	first	
period	of	fieldwork,	at	London	Borough,	getting	to	know	the	stewards	was	made	difficult	
because	of	council	management's	decision	to	ban	me	from	all	their	premises	except	the	
union	office.	Here,	contact	with	the	stewards	was	limited	to	attendance	at	stewards'	
committee	meetings,	shadowing	convenors	during	their	facility	time	in	the	office,	and	brief	
meetings	with	stewards	for	diary-interviews,	which	usually	took	place	during	lunch	breaks	
or	immediately	after	work.	Stewards'	committee	meetings	were	long	and	tiring	for	this	
observer.	Although	I	had	participated	in	many	meetings	of	this	type	during	my	time	as	a	
union	activist,	I	was	surprised	how	much	more	concentration	was	needed	to	make	
fieldnotes	for	two	or	three	hours.	Nevertheless,	the	process	was	easy	to	organise.	Stewards	
would	gather	–	between	five	and	twenty	in	number	–	and	I	would	sit	at	the	back,	tapping	
quietly	on	my	iPad.	Usually,	by	the	end	of	the	meeting	I	was	too	tired	to	engage	in	much	
discussion	with	stewards,	and	after	an	exchange	of	pleasantries,	or	making	arrangements	
for	further	meetings,	I	would	head	home	to	write	up	my	notes.		
	
Days	(or	half-days)	spent	shadowing	convenors	were	generally	easier	work.	I	would	arrive	at	
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the	office	at	the	agreed	time	and	usually	sit	with	the	union	rep	as	they	worked	at	their	desk.	
We	would	chat	about	what	they	were	doing.	I	would	listen	to	phone-calls,	or	sit	in	on	
discussions	with	visiting	union	members.	Sometimes	convenors	would	go	through	their	
email	inbox,	explaining	the	issues	they	were	currently	dealing	with.	Most	were	happy	to	do	
this,	but	some	were	more	reluctant.	One,	in	particular,	said	he	was	keen	to	participate	in	the	
research,	but	proved	impossible	to	pin	down	to	a	definite	time	and	date.	Ha	asked	me	what	
other	convenors	were	doing	and	telling	me,	so	I	gave	a	few	examples;	phone	calls,	talking	
over	issues,	looking	at	emails,	etc..	A	few	days	later,	this	convenor	approached	me	
enthusiastically,	saying	that	he	would	like	to	fix	a	date	for	us	to	meet,	adding	that	he	had	
tidied	up	his	email	inbox	in	preparation.	My	heart	sank.	This	rep	had	re-constructed	an	
important	part	of	the	evidence	to	comply	with	some	implicit	understanding	of	what	he	
ought	to	be	doing,	rather	than	letting	me	see	what	he	was	actually	doing.	Fortunately,	by	
this	time	I	had	secured	enough	participation	from	other	convenors	that	I	could	manage	
without	this	offer.	I	thanked	him	and	explained	that	I	already	had	enough	participants.	
Ethnographers	understand	the	problem	of	research	subjects	changing	their	behaviour	due	
to	the	presence	of	an	observer,	and	my	prior	reading	had	alerted	me	to	these	difficulties;	
yet,	this	significant	early	example	underlined	the	importance	of	checking	as	far	as	I	could	for	
other	instances.	Fortunately,	this	problem	arose	only	rarely	during	the	study,	and	generally	
in	much	smaller	examples.		
	
The	lack	of	access	for	workplace	observation	at	London	Borough	significantly	increased	the	
importance	of	the	diary:diary-interview	component	of	the	research	design.	This	aspect	also	
turned	out	to	be	by	far	the	most	demanding,	physically	and	logistically,	intellectually	and	
emotionally.	Workplaces	were	scattered	around	the	borough,	which	meant	a	good	deal	of	
travelling	was	required	to	meet	up	with	stewards	for	diary-interviews.	A	lot	of	time	and	
money	was	spent	on	London	transport,	going	back	and	forth	from	my	home,	and	travelling	
around	within	the	borough.	Much	time	was	spent	sitting	with	stewards	in	coffee	shops,	
sandwich	bars,	cafes,	pubs,	public	squares,	parks,	libraries,	or	just	walking	the	streets.	One	
steward	insisted	that	I	sat	with	her	over	lunch	in	the	Town	Hall	staff	canteen,	even	though	I	
was	banned	from	the	premises:	fortunately,	no	one	spotted	me.	The	other	major	difficulty	
with	diary-interviews	at	London	Borough	was	simply	making	arrangements	to	meet	the	
stewards.	The	main	form	of	communication	between	myself	and	the	stewards	was	email.	
Needless	to	say,	for	me,	emails	requesting	updates	and	asking	for	a	time	to	meet	were	
among	the	most	important	I	had	ever	sent.	Maintaining	contact	with	stewards	was	of	the	
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highest	priority	for	the	success	of	my	PhD.	Of	course,	for	the	stewards,	my	emails	were	just	
one	more	among	the	tidal	wave	of	electronic	communications	that	make	up	a	large	part	of	
the	working	day	of	most	local	government	workers.	Why	should	my	email	be	a	priority?	
During	the	fieldwork	at	London	Borough,	I	would	often	spend	days	in	anguish,	waiting	for	a	
reply	from	one	steward	or	another.	It	was	excruciating.	A	typical	week	might	involve	one	or	
two	committee	meetings,	half	a	day	with	a	convenor,	a	couple	of	diary-interviews,	the	
necessary	travelling,	and	lots	of	worrying	about	the	stewards	I	had	not	heard	from	for	days	
or	weeks.	This	continually	broken	pattern	of	contact	with	stewards	made	it	very	difficult	to	
establish	a	routine,	which	in	turn	led	to	delays	in	other	parts	of	the	PhD	process;	reading	
slowed	and	drafting	thesis	chapters	proved	impossible.	Nevertheless,	as	the	fieldwork	
progressed,	I	was	increasingly	sure	that	my	efforts	were	worth	it.		
	
Despite	the	frustrations	of	access,	and	difficulties	maintaining	the	diary:diary-interview	
process,	I	finished	the	first	period	of	fieldwork	feeling	that	I	had	succeeded	in	gaining	a	good	
deal	of	genuine	close	insight	into	the	day-to-day	activities	of	the	shop	stewards	at	London	
Borough.	At	Big	Car,	though,	the	intimacy	of	my	contact	with	shop	stewards	was	at	an	
altogether	higher	level.	Once	access	was	agreed,	plant	management	were	helpful	and	
cooperative	on	the	occasions	when	I	needed	to	approach	them,	and	by	and	large	I	was	
simply	left	to	get	on	with	it.	As	a	result,	the	data	gathered	was	even	more	rich	and	detailed	
than	the	already	impressive	results	from	London	Borough.		
	
Within	a	few	days	of	arriving	at	Big	Car,	it	was	obvious	to	me	that	this	fieldwork	would	be	
rather	different	from	London	Borough.	Since	I	had	been	granted	access	to	the	workplace,	I	
planned	to	spend	whole	days	on	site.	The	Big	Car	plant	is	located	too	far	from	where	I	live	
for	reasonable	daily	commuting,	so	I	had	to	spend	time	each	week	away	from	home.	I	
travelled	out	from	London	on	Monday	evenings	and,	having	found	cheap	digs	a	couple	of	
miles	from	the	plant,	arrived	at	the	factory	on	Tuesday	morning.	To	start	with,	I	was	on	site	
Tuesday	and	Wednesday	and	travelled	back	home	on	Wednesday	evening.	Quite	soon,	
however,	I	decided	to	stay	for	Thursday	as	well.	Partly,	this	was	because	I	discovered	that	
meetings	between	shop	stewards	and	production	managers	often	took	place	on	Thursdays.	
More	significantly,	though,	the	generous	access	which	had	been	granted	provided	an	
opportunity	to	really	immerse	myself	in	the	life	of	the	stewards’	organisation	within	the	
factory.	It	seemed	too	good	to	miss,	and	I	decided	not	to	miss	it.	Vicki	Smith	(2014)	has	
emphasised	the	importance	of	opportunism	in	the	conduct	of	qualitative	research,	in	the	
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sense	of	researchers	having	an	awareness	that	unexpected	opportunities	might	arise	during	
the	course	of	fieldwork,	and	of	nurturing	a	willingness	to	adjust	the	research	design	should	
an	opportunity	arise.	This	describes	very	well	the	situation	which	greeted	me	at	Big	Car,	and	
within	a	month	of	arriving	I	had	moved	to	spending	three	days	a	week	on	site.		
	
At	the	time	of	the	research,	the	plant	was	in	operation	four	days	each	week,	the	union	
having	agreed	to	a	reorganisation	of	working	hours	the	previous	year.	Consequently,	
attendance	at	the	site	for	three	days	at	a	time	gave	me	access	to	the	bulk	of	the	working	
week	during	the	research	period.	The	plant	shut	down	for	one	week	at	spring	bank	holiday,	
and	for	three	weeks	in	August.	I	also	missed	one	week	for	personal	reasons.	The	rest	of	the	
time	I	was	on	site,	except	for	Mondays	and	occasional	days	off	to	attend	research	seminars	
and	similar.	Spending	three	full	days	a	week	at	the	plant	inevitably	meant	that	I	would	
accumulate	significantly	more	research	data	from	Big	Car	than	I	had	collected	from	London	
Borough,	thereby	introducing	an	imbalance	between	the	two	case	studies	(Section	4.4).	
Nevertheless,	I	decided	this	would	not	overly	skew	the	project,	because	I	was	confident	I	
had	gathered	enough	data	from	London	Borough	to	enable	proper	analysis	and	conclusions.		
	
One	obvious	difference	from	the	fieldwork	at	London	Borough	was	the	level	of	cooperation	
received	from	managers	at	Big	Car.	Thankfully,	the	fact	that	my	initial	access	to	the	plant	
had	been	through	the	support	of	senior	union	reps	did	not	seem	a	barrier	to	my	establishing	
good	relations	with	managers.	Although	there	were	a	few	raised	eyebrows	to	start	with,	and	
some	caution,	these	managers	were	used	to	dealing	with	union	people,	and	held	no	great	
fear	when	encountering	a	new	variety:	the	union	researcher.	Furthermore,	when	introduced	
to	managers,	I	made	sure	to	emphasise	that	I	was	from	a	Business	School,	not	a	union,	and	
that	the	research	was	not	policy-based	but	academic:	‘I’m	just	here	to	find	out	what	shop	
stewards	do	these	days’,	was	my	general	approach.	I	also	emphasised	the	importance	of	
trust	and	confidentiality	in	the	research,	and	reassured	them	that	nothing	they	said	to	me	
would	be	passed	to	the	union	–	or	vice	versa.	I	also	emphasised	that	this	applied	to	
everyone	taking	part,	including	between	the	unions	reps	themselves.	‘For	instance’,	I	would	
say,	‘There	might	be	differences	of	opinion	on	some	issues	between	different	stewards	or	
between	stewards	and	convenors…’,	and	I	was	duty-bound	not	to	repeat	those	comments,	
either.	Interestingly,	this	last	argument	always	seemed	to	have	a	reassuring	effect	on	
managers.	It	was	not	possible	to	tell	if	this	was	because	they	were	aware	themselves	of	
differences	between	various	union	reps,	or	because	they	simply	understood	from	their	
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experience	as	managers	that	differences	of	opinion	within	an	organisation	are	
commonplace.	But	whatever	the	reason,	the	managers	I	dealt	with	quickly	accepted	my	
presence,	and	were	generally	forthcoming	about	their	work	and	their	dealings	with	
stewards.	One	final	strategy	for	building	good	field	relations	with	managers	at	Big	Car	was	to	
ask	about	the	factory	and	the	organisation	of	production	–	a	prodigious	feat	of	coordination,	
which	managers	were	justifiably	proud	of	and	which	they	liked	to	talk	about.	Altogether,	the	
combination	of	enthusiasm	from	union	reps,	and	acceptance	from	managers,	meant	that	I	
quickly	settled	in	to	the	second	period	of	fieldwork.	
	
My	daily	routine	at	Big	Car	varied	little.	I	would	arrive	at	the	main	reception	of	the	very	large	
site	around	8.15am,	having	sent	a	text	message	to	one	of	the	senior	stewards	a	few	minutes	
earlier.	I	would	sign	the	visitor’s	book	and	sit	and	wait	for	the	steward	to	come	and	pick	me	
up;	as	a	visitor,	plant	safety	rules	prevented	me	from	walking	around	the	site	
unaccompanied.	Sitting	in	reception	every	morning,	I	watched	the	looped	safety	video	many	
times.	When	the	senior	steward	arrived,	we	would	then	set	off	back	to	the	main	union	
office.	This	involved	leaving	the	reception	block	and	walking	a	considerable	distance,	first	
across	a	large	open	space,	before	climbing	a	long	flight	of	industrial	stairs,	entering	a	huge	
shed,	and	walking	for	another	five	minutes	through	the	main	stores,	to	arrive	at	the	union	
office	some	ten	minutes	or	so	after	leaving	reception.	The	day	shift	started	work	at	7am,	so	
by	the	time	I	got	there,	the	senior	stewards	had	a	good	idea	about	overnight	events,	latest	
developments	of	any	ongoing	issues,	and	their	schedule	for	the	rest	of	day.	Thus,	the	
morning	walk	to	the	union	office	became	one	of	my	main	sources	of	general	information	
and	background;	a	kind	of	orientation	and	update	session.	Furthermore,	as	I	got	to	know	the	
senior	stewards,	the	morning	walk	gave	them	a	chance	to	talk	outside	of	the	union	office,	
giving	me	insights	into	their	own	personal	views	and	thoughts.		
	
Once	in	the	union	office,	I	would	take	out	my	iPad	and	put	on	my	safety	boots,	say	hello	to	
whichever	union	reps	were	around,	sort	out	cups	of	tea	and	coffee,	and	then	settle	down	to	
see	what	the	day	would	bring.	The	main	union	office	was	situated	within	a	huge	stores	area,	
but	immediately	adjacent	to	General	Assembly	and	the	main	production	area.	The	office	
was	of	fairly	basic	construction	–	similar	to	a	portakabin	unit	–	and	perched	up	another	flight	
of	industrial	stairs,	on	top	of	a	toilet	block.	There	was	a	lesser-used	office,	nick-named	‘the	
boardroom’,	where	a	long	table	was	available	for	meetings	in	a	room	adorned	with	union	
banners,	posters,	photographs	and	other	union	memorabilia.	Most	of	the	diary-interviews	
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were	conducted	in	here.	The	main	union	office	was	next	door.	A	door	opened	into	an	office	
area	of	the	type	commonly	found	in	industrial	settings:	worn	carpet,	two	or	three	battered	
desks,	filing	cabinets	that	had	seen	better	days,	and	computers	in	a	similar	condition.	This	
first	area	was	used	by	senior	shop	stewards	and	saw	a	lot	of	traffic,	with	members,	
stewards,	and	sometimes	managers	coming	and	going	frequently.	Further	inside,	doors	led	
to	two	more	offices;	one	with	desks	for	the	deputy	convenors,	and	beyond	that	the	
convenor’s	office.	These	offices	had	windows	all	round,	so	the	convenors	could	be	seen	
from	without,	but	this	arrangement	gave	them	some	seclusion	from	the	often	noisy	comings	
and	goings	in	the	senior	stewards'	area.	Senior	stewards	in	other	production	areas	had	their	
own	offices,	but	the	presence	of	the	convenors	meant	that	this	office	saw	interactions	over	
plant-wide	as	well	as	local	issues.	As	a	site	for	gaining	insight	into	the	overall	range	of	
steward	activity,	it	could	hardly	have	been	better.		
	
During	the	fieldwork	I	spent	a	lot	of	time	sitting	in	the	senior	stewards’	area,	observing	the	
comings	and	goings,	and	chatting	with	whoever	was	around.	This	space	was	an	important	
point	of	contact	for	stewards	coming	up	from	the	GA	assembly	line	with	problems	that	
required	advice	or	the	intervention	of	a	senior	steward.	Stewards	would	also	come	up	from	
time	to	time	for	a	general	chat;	for	instance,	if	there	was	a	delay	in	production.	Even	
stewards	who	had	not	been	seen	all	week	would	come	up	to	the	office	every	Thursday	to	
drop	off	money	from	the	weekly	lottery	competition	–	run	by	the	union	to	raise	funds,	
provide	entertainment	for	members,	and	to	give	the	union	a	profile	as	a	social	organisation	
rather	than	just	a	narrow	work-related	one.	Consequently,	I	had	opportunities	to	chat	with	
GA	stewards	–	most	of	whom	were	keeping	diaries	–	on	at	least	a	weekly	basis,	and	often	
much	more	frequently,	especially	if	they	were	dealing	with	a	difficult	issue.		
	
Despite	initial	concern	on	my	part	that	the	view	from	the	senior	stewards’	office	might	give	
a	distorted	picture	of	the	activities	of	the	shopfloor	stewards,	it	actually	turned	out	to	be	a	
good	place	from	which	to	gain	a	wider	view	of	the	activities	of	the	stewards.	The	restrictions	
on	my	movements	due	to	my	visitor	status	would	have	made	it	quite	difficult	for	me	to	
spend	time	on	the	shopfloor	with	the	working	stewards,	besides	which,	stewards	on	the	line	
were	pretty	much	tied	to	their	work	station	as	a	result	of	work	intensification	over	recent	
years,	making	it	much	harder	for	them	to	come	and	go.	Given	these	constraints,	shadowing	
senior	stewards	meant	that	I	saw	the	issues	that	stewards	brought	‘upstairs’,	and	I	could	
accompany	the	senior	stewards	around	the	shopfloor	as	they	did	their	daily	rounds,	visiting	
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stewards,	members	and	managers	around	the	plant.	Combining	this	approach	with	the	
stewards'	diaries	and	diary-interviews	gave	me	good	insight	into	the	general	activities	of	
ordinary	stewards	on	the	line.	I	also	had	access	to	meetings	of	shop	committees,	the	plant	
shop	stewards’	committee,	and	meetings	between	stewards	and	managers	of	various	types.	
Of	course,	this	level	of	access	to	the	work	of	shop	stewards	and	their	organisation,	and	to	
union-management	relations	was	a	genuine	contrast	to	the	fieldwork	at	London	Borough,	
and	produced	some	highly	valuable	findings.		
	
The	other	striking	difference	with	the	experience	of	fieldwork	at	London	Borough	was	the	
relative	ease	with	which	the	diary:diary-interview	method	could	be	put	into	operation.	In	
contrast	to	London	Borough,	there	was	little	difficulty	keeping	in	contact	with	the	stewards	
who	had	diaries;	whereas,	at	London	borough,	stewards	were	an	email	away,	here,	they	
were	on	the	premises.	I	regularly	saw	stewards	around	the	plant,	and	was	able	to	have	
numerous	conversations	apart	from	the	slightly	more	formal	diary-interview	meetings.	One	
consequence	of	this	was	that	the	drop-out	rate	of	diarists	at	Big	Car	was	much	lower	than	it	
had	been	at	London	Borough;	a	feature	that	might	be	born	in	mind	by	other	researchers	
considering	such	methods.	In	this	case	study,	the	'benefits	of	being	there'	(Tope	et	al.	2005)	
included	not	only	the	advantages	of	direct	observation,	but	also	improvements	in	the	
performance	of	non-observational	methods.	Indeed,	my	experience	at	Big	Car	makes	it	
difficult	to	think	of	any	significant	disadvantages	of	this	type	of	research	for	investigating	
workplace	relations	–	apart	from	the	unavoidable	demands	on	researchers'	time	and	effort.		
	
At	the	end	of	each	period	of	fieldwork,	I	had	to	negotiate	the	final	obstacle	that	all	
ethnographers	face:	leaving	(see	discussion	in	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	2007:	94-96).	In	
each	case	study,	some	contact	was	maintained	for	a	time	after	the	main	fieldwork,	to	clarify	
particular	points	and	follow	up	on	certain	issues.	But	the	end	of	the	fieldwork	meant	taking	
leave	of	stewards	who	I	had	developed	a	working	relationship	with,	often	a	close	one,	and	
whose	lives	I	had	got	to	know	a	lot	about.	I	knew	about	their	kids,	their	partners,	their	
holidays,	their	hobbies,	their	football	teams,	their	first	jobs,	their	Mums	and	Dads,	their	
plans	for	retirement.	And	I	knew	a	lot	about	their	efforts	to	defend	or	improve	the	working	
lives	of	their	members,	their	union	careers,	their	hopes	and	fears,	their	greatest	victories	
and	their	bitterest	defeats.	All	this	was	left	behind	when	the	fieldwork	was	over.	In	order	to	
maintain	anonymity,	agreements	were	made	to	forego	Facebook	friendship.	When	I	left,	
that	was	it.	Once	again,	I	was	very	glad	that	the	books	had	warned	me	about	this.	But	in	
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each	case	study,	at	the	end	of	each	period	of	fieldwork,	and	each	immersion	into	other	
peoples'	lives,	I	realised	I	was	putting	off	leaving.	But	for	that,	each	case	study	would	have	
been	at	least	two	weeks	shorter.	Still,	at	least	I	can	say	that	my	efforts	to	make	the	
fieldwork	a	success	paid	off.	I	did	get	a	great	wealth	of	richly	detailed	data.	I	can	now	
reintroduce	the	voice	of	shop	stewards	into	the	academic	debate.	And,	despite	all	its	many	
challenges,	the	experience	of	fieldwork	powerfully	reinforced	my	belief	in	the	importance	of	
this	type	of	research.	I	am	glad	I	took	on	the	challenges,	even	though	I	needed	a	long	rest	
afterwards.		
	
 	 285	
Appendix	2:	Diary	procedure		
	
Shop	stewards	were	invited	to	participate	in	the	diary	research	at	initial	briefing	sessions.		
The	aims	and	nature	of	the	research	were	discussed.	Stewards	were	told	that	the	aim	of	the	
research	was	to	get	the	voice	of	shop	stewards	back	into	the	academic	debate,	and	that	the	
focus	was	on	‘what	shop	stewards	do’.	Stewards	who	agreed	to	participate	were	given	a	
Participant	Information	Sheet	and,	after	due	discussion,	signed	an	Informed	Consent	form	
(Appendix	3).	Participating	stewards	were	given	a	notebook	and	a	‘Diary	Instructions’	sheet	
(Appendix	3),	which	gave	guidance	about	what	to	record	and	how.	Participants	were	asked	
to	make	a	diary	entry	whenever	they	undertook	some	activity	in	their	role	as	steward;	for	
instance,	answering	questions	from	a	member,	taking	up	an	issue	with	a	manager,	or	
representing	a	member	at	a	disciplinary	or	grievance	hearing.	Participants	were	asked	to	
record	who	they	were	dealing	with,	what	the	issue	was,	and	how	they	handled	it.	Since	the	
research	was	qualitative	and	exploratory,	diary	instructions	were	deliberately	left	slightly	
open-ended,	so	that	participants	could	select	aspects	of	their	activity	according	to	their	own	
frames	of	reference	and	meaning,	rather	than	according	to	an	imposed	framework.	On	
average,	participants	kept	up	their	diary-entries	for	around	two	months	–	although	some	
managed	up	to	six	months,	while	others	did	much	less.	As	noted	in	Section	4.3,	diary-based	
research	requires	a	significant	effort	on	the	part	of	participants,	so	it	is	not	surprising	that	
most	stewards	could	not	keep	entries	going	throughout	the	six	months	of	the	case	study.	
Nevertheless,	it	is	beyond	doubt	that	what	they	did	manage	contributed	significantly	to	the	
richness	and	detail	of	the	research	findings.		
	
The	recruitment	of	diarists	was	different	in	some	respects	at	the	two	case	studies.	At	
London	Borough	stewards	were	usually	approached	in	groups	towards	the	end	of	stewards'	
committee	meetings.	This	resulted	in	high	numbers	of	initial	take-up	of	the	diaries.	
However,	some	stewards	who	agreed	participate	did	not	respond	to	subsequent	
approaches	regarding	their	progress.	It	is	possible	that	they	made	some	diary	entries,	but	if	
so	these	were	never	returned	to	the	research.	As	a	result,	from	a	total	of	36	stewards	who	
agreed	to	participate	in	the	diary	part	of	the	research	at	London	Borough,	22	actually	
returned	dairies	with	entries	(61	per	cent).	By	contrast,	at	Big	Car,	due	to	time	constraints	
on	stewards'	meetings	(Section	6.1),	stewards	were	approached	individually	about	
participating	in	the	research,	which	permitted	a	fuller	discussion	of	the	research	and	what	it	
entailed.	Furthermore,	it	was	easier	to	maintain	contact	with	stewards	at	Big	Car,	because	
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the	researcher	was	present	in	the	workplace	much	of	the	week.	Consequently,	a	lower	
proportion	of	shop	stewards	dropped	out	of	the	diary-based	part	of	the	research	at	Big	Car	
than	was	the	case	at	London	Borough;	of	22	stewards	who	agreed	to	take	diaries,	18	made	
entries	and	returned	diaries	for	inclusion	in	the	study	(82	per	cent).	It	is	likely	that	the	
differences	in	recruitment	of	participants,	and	in	the	ease	and	regularity	of	contact	during	
the	study,	were	the	main	explanations	for	differences	in	drop-out	rates.	It	should	be	borne	
in	mind,	though,	that	differences	in	the	number	and	detail	of	diary-entries	within	each	
sample	make	strict	numerical	comparisons	difficult.	Nevertheless,	future	researchers	might	
benefit	from	appreciating	differences	in	recruitment	and	retention	of	participants	across	the	
two	case	studies.		
	
It	is	not	clear	what	impact	the	differential	drop-out	rates	made	to	the	diary-based	findings	
at	the	two	case	studies.	It	should	be	born	in	mind,	though,	that	stewards	who	dropped	out	
of	diary-based	activity,	or	who	did	not	agree	to	participate	in	that	aspect	of	the	research,	
usually	continued	to	participate	in	other	ways;	for	instance,	through	attendance	at	
stewards'	committees,	or	observed	conversations	with	other	stewards,	or	in	direct	
discussions	with	the	researcher.	Furthermore,	this	research	was	inherently	qualitative	in	
nature,	and	sought	to	investigate	what	types	of	activity	stewards	were	engaged	in,	rather	
than	to	apply	numerical	values	to	that	activity.	What	emerged	from	the	fieldwork	was	an	
overall	picture	of	the	range	of	shop	steward	activities,	and	the	broad	patterns	and	variation	
across	the	two	samples	did	not	appear	to	be	significantly	different	for	stewards	who	took	
diaries	and	those	who	did	not.	Triangulation	with	other	stewards	suggested	broadly	similar	
activities	were	undertaken	across	the	steward	body	on	each	case	study.	Consequently,	the	
effect	of	drop-out	diarists	was	probably	relatively	minor.		
	
The	second	component	of	the	diary-based	research	also	contributed	a	great	deal	to	the	
findings;	namely,	the	diary-interviews.	Though	often	frustratingly	difficult	to	organise	(see	
Appendix	1)	the	diary-interviews	allowed	stewards	to	expand	on	diary	entries,	and	gave	the	
researcher	important	opportunities	to	probe	for	additional	layers	of	meaning	and	
commentary	from	participants.	In	this	research,	diary	entries	were	used	as	guides	for	these	
informal	interviews,	disclosing	activity	to	the	researcher	that	would	otherwise	have	
remained	hidden,	and	acting	as	an	aide	memoire	for	the	stewards.	No	audio	recording	was	
used	at	the	diary-interviews.	Partly,	this	was	because	the	places	where	they	took	place,	such	
as	coffee	shops	and	other	public	spaces,	were	usually	not	suitable	due	to	background	noise.	
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Instead,	notes	were	taken	(with	consent)	while	the	stewards	talked	about	their	diary	entries	
and	what	they	had	been	doing.	Quite	often,	especially	near	the	start	of	their	participation,	
stewards	would	discuss	issues	that	were	not	mentioned	in	the	diary;	usually,	they	decided	
that	in	future	they	would	record	such	events.	Thus,	the	diary-interviews	contributed	
significantly	to	improving	the	performance	of	the	diary	component	of	the	research.	A	
further	valuable	contribution	of	the	diary-interviews	resulted	from	the	decision	not	to	
record	them,	which	led	to	gaps	in	the	conversation	–	sometimes	lengthy	ones	–	while	a	
researcher	without	shorthand	or	typing	skills	tapped	away	on	an	iPad	keyboard.	An	
unplanned	benefit	of	these	pauses	was	that	stewards	often	filled	the	gap	by	speaking	at	
greater	length,	expanding	on	their	previous	statements,	adding	thoughtful	commentary,	
and	further	enriching	the	data	gathered.		
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Appendix	3:	Diary	excerpts		
	
This	Appendix	contains	sample	pages	from	shop	steward	diaries,	as	recorded	in	digital	
photos	taken	during	diary-interviews.	Examples	have	been	chosen	to	give	some	idea	of	the	
spread	of	entries	made	by	stewards,	from	lengthy	and	detailed	to	brief	and	summary.	The	
selection	of	examples	was	severely	constrained	as	a	result	of	guarantees	to	participants	of	
anonymity	and	confidentiality:	many	pages	mention	individuals	or	the	employer	by	name,	
and	these	had	to	be	excluded.	
	
Example	1:	Big	Car.	This	diary	had	clearly	been	kept	in	an	overall	pocket.		
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Example	2:	London	Borough.	Diary	entries	by	the	steward	who	represented	the	dismissed	
caretaker.		
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Example	3:	London	Borough.	Some	stewards	provided	a	lot	of	detail.		
	
	
	 	
 	292	
Example	4:	London	Borough.	The	same	steward	continues...	
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Example	5:	London	Borough.	First	mention	of	'body	swerve'.		
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Example	6:	Big	Car.	Shop	steward	dealing	with	collective	welfare	issue.			
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Example	7:	Big	Car.	This	steward	followed	the	requested	format.	The	second	entry	records	
an	example	of	a	'deal'	resulting	in	leniency	for	a	member	under	the	disciplinary	procedure	
for	errors	in	production.		
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Example	8:	Big	Car.	Although	these	entries	are	very	brief,	ethnographic	immersion	in	the	
setting,	and	discussion	at	the	diary-interview,	meant	that	the	meaning	was	clear	to	the	
researcher.	In	this	case,	the	steward	had	represented	two	members	at	disciplinary	appeal	
hearings.	The	use	of	'won'	and	'lost'	indicates	the	adversarial	way	in	which	this	steward	
viewed	the	procedure.		
	
	
	 	
 	 297	
Example	9:	Big	Car.	These	entries	record	a	steward	dealing	with	work	organisation	and	
intensity	issues	over	a	period	of	five	days.	The	name	of	a	senior	steward	has	been	redacted.		
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Appendix	4:	Fieldnote	excerpts		
	
This	Appendix	contains	excerpts	from	fieldnotes	made	during	the	study.	These	followed	a	
standard	format,	kept	as	a	file	on	my	iPad,	and	copied	each	time	a	new	sheet	was	required.	
Brief	notes	were	made	in	the	field	and	written	up	later.	The	excerpts	reproduced	below	are	
in	the	original	format	but	have	been	edited	to	remove	names	and	identifying	information.	
Typographical	errors	have	not	been	corrected.		
Blank	fieldnote	sheet		
	
Date:  
Time:  
Location: 
Who
What happened
Thoughts
 	300	
Excerpt	1:	Fieldnotes	from	London	Borough		
 
 
Date: 6/11/12 
 
Time: 14.00-16.30 
 
Location: Branch Office 
 
 
Who 
 
HASC stewards Committee. 
 
{Convenor} 
{Steward 1}  
{Steward 2}  
{Steward 3}  
{Steward 4}   
 
{Steward 5}  
{Steward 6}  
2 Library stewards 
{Steward 7}  
 
Late arrivals:  
{Steward 8}  
{Steward 9}  
{Steward 10}   
{Steward 11}   
{Steward 12}  
{Steward 13}  
 
 
What happened 
 
Start delayed due to insufficient numbers.... 
General sound of warm and lively chat. 
 
Start at 2.15 
{Convenor} welcomes library stewards - will hear them first, then back to 
normal agenda.... 
 
Library steward: 
- There's two main issues .... We're concerned that some of the 
accommodation is completely substandard - Heating; Insufficient space; Use 
of staff rooms for confidential phone conversations. ... We've raised it with our 
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mgmt, they've said they'll look at space, but don't see staff using rest rooms 
for work space as a problem. Whole accommodation thing.... 
- Also, a number of duties that used to be done by housing staff [customer 
service type], will now be done by library staff - on lower pay grade, and doing 
work of people who have been made redundant 
- And we've had redundancies, too 
 
- The work they're expecting us to do.... Check in forms, ID for parking 
permits, helping people go on computers to do fill in online forms, etc.,...  
- {Customer Services} send people through to us all the time. It can take 3/4 
hour to do one form... Just can't do it. 
- It was done by people on scale 6, and we're on scale 4 
- They never said this would be happening... 
- And it's not our work.  
- Slippery slope to us doing more and more housing work.  
- They're talking about turning libraries into 'one stop shops'. 
 
{Steward 11} arrives 
 
{Convenor} - 'the document that came to us really downplayed this' ... 'It just 
said "support and signposting"' [as expected library staff duties].  
- We know it takes a lot of work if people aren't very computer literate - and 
not literate' ... 
- 'To help people, you need to know quite a lot of stuff' [about housing]. 
Document verification - like for parking permits - 'people get quite irrational....' 
... 'They can be completely insistent and quite bonkers' 
- Will need to make an issue of it... 
- Suggest keeping a log... Tick list, perhaps? 
- And, make an issue of the grading issue.... 
 
Library steward - 'Mgmt are saying, it wasn't really a big part of the job' [i.e. 
what they are asking us to do was not previously a big part of housing 
reception job, and therefore doesn't represent a significant shift of duties from 
housing workers to library workers.] 
 
{Convenor} - The danger is, the more library wkrs are forced to take on that 
kind of work, they get used to it, and in the future more comes in - unless 
people dig heels in and say something. 
 
Library steward - I went on the training to see what was involved....  
 
[Unknown] - {Convenor 2, not present} said why not just let them [tenants] 
use the photocopier [in the library] and let them use internal mail? [to reduce 
workload on library staff] 
{Convenor} - doesn't get round verification 
 
{Steward 3} - [key] fobs will be a big issue. When {tenants} are desperate for 
a fob, on benefits ... when people find out they go to the library, there'll be 
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tenants straight there. If they get on to the call centre, but don't get a fob, who 
are they going to come back to? 
- in [named library}, the library users group has been great.... 
- ... 'there will be offs' 
Library steward - 'we've already had them' 
{Steward 3} - what about safety and security? Are there panic buttons? 
{Steward 2} - 'It gets worse than that - in {second named library} housing 
workers have been told that library workers are the security'. ... 'The room 
was a cupboard - it's still got the electricity meter.' ... 'There's only one 
computer - only one person can work in there' ... 'If you use the panic button, 
who will respond?' ... We were told, 'Library staff' 
Library steward - 'Have they done a risk assessment' ... [to {Steward 2}] 'I'll be 
in touch'. 
 
{Steward 8} arrives 
 
{Steward 2} - we've agreed to hold a joint staff mtg at {third named library} - 
[of housing and library staff]. 
 
{Convenor} - We should think about getting a joint letter out from HASC and 
library stewards about the situation [to staff/members]. 
 
{Steward 9} arrives 
 
General discussion: 
What libraries are affected? 
It's not all the libraries..... 
 
{Convenor}, as chair - 3 action points proposed 
- joint letter to library staff - [to include] 'highlight the grading issue' 
- contact readers grps 
- {tenants organisation} reps 
 
Library steward - Issues with {Customer Services} - how much scanning and 
verifying, etc, do they do? 
 
{Steward 2} - what about joint shop mtgs? 
 
{Convenor} - 'The way to get them [management] moving is to have a bit of a 
profile and start things moving, so they notice we're taking it up'. 
- 'do a draft letter of what's happened, and we'll send it out to {tenants 
organisation} chairs - there's only five' 
- we can point out the changes make services worse - 'it's not a proper library 
service, and it's not a proper housing service'. 
 
{Steward 4} - 'if it's forced on you to do that, couldn't you send it all to the 
wrong departments and cause chaos? When that gets out.... There'll be 
uproar... Mgmt will have to go back to old ways.' 
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- could get disciplined 
{Convenor} - confidentiality 
{Steward 13} - Data protection, ... With hot desking, not allowed to leave 
anything on desktop with a tenants name on... 
 
{Steward 2} - what about keeping a log of how much time is taken up with 
housing duties? 
- it's not flat fobs, it's shed fobs, etc. still needs security, etc.... 
 
 
Training 
{Convenor} - do it now, or leave it til next time? 
See what we've got left at the end... 
Ok 
 
 
Minutes  
{Convenor} - I'd lost them til just now, so still in very short form 
Goes through minutes 
Building mtgs on pay modernisation 
- we've had quite a lot of queries 
- some posters up in {named office} 4th floor. Rest coming out... going out....  
{Convenor} - take what we've got here... 
- we need to be setting up mtgs ... Check someone can do the meeting - get 
on to me, {Convenor 2} and {Branch secretary}. 
 
 
{London Borough tenant's federation - "Fed"} - campaign to save it 
{Steward 3} - I thought {Convenor 2, not present} would sort this out.... 
{Steward 2} - mtg on 8th (Thurs) 
{Convenor} - they're trying to tender out tenants voice part of it. 
-> Fed could find itself in a matter of months, being without any ability to be a 
campaigning voice. They employ 1.5 people to do that now, 'it's about 
effectively taking away, destroying that'.  
{Steward 3} - propose motion to support Fed to continue with independent 
voice... 
Unanimous. 
[Lengthy and detailed discussion about the Fed and TRAs.] 
 
 
Reorganisations report back 
 
{Steward 12} - waiting period 
{Steward 1} - coming soon - not a lot of uptake on unmatched jobs - said at 
last mtg.  
- this is round 1 
{Steward 2} - looks like 2-3 weeks for expressions of interest. 
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{Convenor} - they would normally go through tiers ... Need to make sure that 
happens ... All internal opportunities, before it goes external. 
- Should know by end of wk. 
 
{Convenor} - other reorgs? 
 
[I can't tell WTF is going on! Confused discussion, mix of reports and 
moaning, {Convenor} supplying info on correct procedures, ] 
- open to agency staff at Round 3, before external advertise 
{Convenor} - need to watch that 
 
{Convenor} - reorg in residential care homes  
- mtgs w GMB at 2 home 
- GMB bullshit, etc - telling people they don't need to know about TUPE 
- 'I set people straight...' 
- have had 4 people come over from GMB because GMB has been so poor. 
- 'trying to do some of the preparatory work beforehand, so we're not 
hoodwinked' 
 - have got some gains, 'they didn't do their homework properly' 
- company trying to buy out terms... We opposed ... then GMB, too. 
- looks like after TUPE, they'll do ETR and everybody will take redundancy.... 
 
[{Convenor} does long explanation of {outsourcing} of care homes. Have lost 
a really good steward - {named steward}.] 
 
 
Update on {nearby outsourced workers'} dispute 
{Convenor} - it's me again, sorry' 
- summarises events in dispute.... 
- re-ballot, big majorities, etc. 
- region gets involved, warns out of legal protection, etc.... 
- region have decided need to re-ballot again, 2 weeks after ballot 
- region sent out ballot paper with covering letter - full of warnings, 
negotiations behind {members'} backs, lied about {branch} officers 
involvement..... 
- people are really pissed of 
- raised it through EC members - can't make complaint: 'it gets complicated' 
- tone of letter has really put people's back up 
- 'we've had to distance ourselves' 
 
Ballot result expected at end of this week. 
 
{London Borough} applied and are accredited as Living Wage employer - but 
seems no outsourced contracts are actually paid living wage.... 
{Convenor} and {Branch secretary} are putting together a letter to Ob 
- will circulate to stewards 
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{Convenor} - effect of letter {from Unison regional officers} has been to 
undermine 
{Convenor} - accusation from members is that there has been collusion 
between the union leadership locally and the employer - so we've had to 
distance ourselves. 
{Convenor}- 'Really abusive mgmt. really horrible. They'll come out and 
threaten you on the picket line.' 
 
{Steward 2} - we did a collection round the building - it was really good 
{Steward 9} - it was 
{Steward 1} - I got sarcastic comments.... 
 
 
{Building maintenance} and pay for manual wkrs 
{Steward 4} - don't know where to start 
- restructure 
- mgrs getting upgrade through reorg and regrade => pay rise! 
- members really pissed off.... 
- mgmt say they are getting more responsibilities 
- they ignore our extra responsibilities - {new work arrangements} means our 
job changes - we have to do estimates before the job, assessment of time 
and materials, etc.... 
{Steward 8} - it shouldn't be the tradesman's responsibility. 
{Steward 12} - you should have more responsibility, but should get paid more 
{Steward 4} - I'm being told off the record, when there's nobody around, 'this 
is what you do, if you don't like it, go and work somewhere else.' 
- supervisors used to be on £30 a week more than me, but now on £20k a 
year more than me. But {new work arrangements} will get the workers to do 
their job.  
- 'they've talked about new staff - but the money they're paying is so low, now 
they're looking for improvers and semi-retired.'  
- 'it's about time the union did something about it - the hierarchy of the union - 
otherwise everybody might just as well leave the union.' 
  
{Steward 10} arrives 
{Convenor} - you need to organise a meeting, work out your demands, get 
together with {Convenor 2}  
- It's not the hierarchy, the union is you and the members 
{Steward 4} - I'm being told [by the managers] you have to have a valid 
reason to go for a pay rise... You can't just say, they're getting one so we 
want one. 
{Steward 8} - there's lots of other questions to be asked about {new work 
arrangements} - e.g. risk assessments, paint appropriate for the work site - 
these need addressing by repairs staff and mgmt before the job [not left to the 
tradesmen to do it before they start work]. 
{Steward 5} - you telling me something I don't know? They don't listen to you. 
{Steward 2} - 'you have to think what will make them listen' 
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{Steward 3} - 'you need to make a list as long as the number of grievances for 
the mass meeting.' 
- you say 'we want to deal with everything that pisses you off', and then go 
from there 
{Steward 4} - 'people are asking when we're going out on strike' 
{Steward 8} - 'an argument needs to be had, that it's the managers who need 
to be deciding the job and materials beforehand' ... 'what happens if 
something goes wrong?' 
 
{Convenor} - 'if people are talking about strike action, you need to be ready, 
and need your demands' 
{Steward 1} - you mean, get 'formal agreement' from a meeting? 
Yes 
{Steward 4} - 'I'm calling a meeting [about a H&S issue] - I'll have the whole 
workforce there, then I can raise it' 
{Convenor} - 'No. You need to be focused on what you want to come out of 
the meeting. Get it agreed unanimously. Then take it to management - give 
them time limits. If they say no, then it's a dispute...' 
{Steward 1} - to {Steward 4} - 'you're leery of calling a shop meeting', because 
mgmt will take against it. There's been an issue about lone working at night - 
discussed at H&S mtg w mgmt, reps have [agreed?] '...having a meeting to 
pass this on.....' 
[This looks like the issue {Steward 1} told me about last week....] 
{Convenor} - 'you can't just add this on to a meeting over a health and safety 
issue' 
Agree to take this up w {Convenor 2}. 
 
 
Sacking of caretaker  
{Steward 6} - verbal abuse, but mitigation - long running dispute because 
caretaker had given evidence against the shopkeeper in a case  
- didn't expect that 'It was a shock' 
- eight years good service, the tenants love her..... 
{Steward 3} - we had five tenants reps doing supportive statements, petition 
{Steward 1}  - why do you think they went down that route? Not usual 
{Steward 3} - I think there's something going on here.... Just sacked another 
steward. HR seem to have made a change - if you swear.... if you lose your 
temper ... They're saying if you are a front line worker, you cannot be w 
human being or make a mistake. 
{Steward 2} - we know people bear grudges against caretakers who are 
witnesses in asb cases, so can say to council that this will undermine asb 
cases and policies 
{Convenor} - can bring in other examples 
 
Seems to be they're sacking people for altercations 
{Convenor} - to {Steward 6} - grab someone who's done this type of case....  
{Steward 3} - were going to have a shop mtg... 
{Steward 6} - well, hmmmm..... [sounds doubtful....] 
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{Steward 1}  - is this some no in hr who's decided to say, we can do you 
whenever we want to... 
General - yes, it looks like it. It's a general push.... 
 
{Steward 7} - lone working training  - we need to put up the sort of posters 
they have on the tube, etc. we put up with all sorts of crap'. If posters up, then 
can cut short the interview, point to the sign. No posters on estates. 
{Convenor} - it's up in soc serv offices, why is it not up in hosing? 
- can say, where is the protection for this caretaker? 
{Steward 3} - {Steward 7}s point is a good one, ... We need a really big 
campaign..... If people are abused  or sworn at, we need to use 6655 
{Steward 6} - she had reported abuse, but nothing done about it. 
 
 
Retired Resident caretakers staying in {tied} home 
{Convenor} - we've won an important case. 
{Steward 7} - I've got a similar one..... Tenant has a letter.... former caretaker. 
They saying, no, have to serve a notice.  
{Convenor} - I'll let you know when I get the advice. 
 
 
UAF Waltham Forest 
{Convenor} - good turn out 
- EDL banned 
- 'bedraggled and humiliated' 
 
 
Oct 20 demo 
{Steward 3} - it was good, it was big. 
{Steward 4}  - what was response from Unison leader? They've accepted on 
pensions.... 
{Convenor} - this one was on cuts, more. Bigger discussion to be had on 
what's coming next.... 
 
{Convenor} - leads well on to next stewards Cttee - will look at planning 
Branch Development day in Jan.... 
 
 
Shop reports: 
EO {Estate Officer} issue to be discussed amongst EO reps 
 
{Steward 10} - Issue w H&S  - hot desking at {named office} - need for special 
designated desk procedure for people statemented on designated desk 
equipment.  
{Convenor} - this is a reasonable adjustment [explains....] 
- we can arrange to write letter to person putting pressure on to move desk.... 
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Second issue - AMHPs - reorg of patches, causing uproar w {neighbouring 
borough} staff.  
Some discussion 
{Convenor} - knock on effect is that housing staff are going to be dealing with 
cases and issues that we never have done before 
{Steward 7} - new procedures and thresholds and cuts are pushing duties out 
to Taff who are not trained.... 
 
 
{Steward 8} - H&S issue with cleaning phones.... How often? 
- Nobody can remember.... 
{Convenor} - need to look into it - maybe raise at h&s 
- have found at [named office}, cleaning the beams is not in the contract, so 
{London Borough} are paying extra as a variation to get beams cleaned. 
 
 
{Steward 6} - customer serve are another directorate - we've been told it's a 
mgmt instruction 
{Steward 3} - were getting told lots of diff things... 
- we're going to dig our heels in... See what happens.... 
 
 
{Steward 3} - parking charges??? 
{Convenor} - not coming in yet 
{Steward 7} - there's going to be consultation..... 
{Convenor} - temporary passes at the moment. {London Borough} has a 
green policy, people shouldn't be driving in to work. They should be trying to 
discourage people from using their cars. That's fair enough. 
 
 
{Steward 4} - Good news here. I've been going on for months about the 
vehicles... finally, They've agreed that all the vehicles will be tracked. 
 
 
Meeting finishes after 4pm 
 
I go round and talk to the new folk who I don't know. 
 
{Steward 10} social worker steward {contact details}  
{Steward 11} {contact details}  
 
 
Mutual Exchange Visits 
What is the new procedure? 
{Steward 2} - we never got any guidance... 
{Convenor} - if you see anything dodgy, flag it up. 
{Steward 2} - guidance doesn't agree w form... 
{Convenor} -  
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{Steward 2} - how do we know about unauthorised repairs? What about e.g. 
rewires? Might not be obvious? 
{Steward 6}, {Convenor} - it's just the obvious ..... 
{Steward 3} - could put , I didn't see any, but I'm not a surveyor 
{Steward 2} - someone said, I don't know, and mgr ' was on it like a rat up a 
fucking drainpipe' 
Issue is not trained surveyors doing it.... 
{Steward 3} - need a checklist.... 
{Convenor} - don't want to be too specific 
{Steward 3} - most obvious one is people take fire doors off 
{Steward 2} - concerned that untrained EOs  
 
 
 
Thoughts 
 
I'm fucked! That was hard work. Chaotic at times. Slight signs of grumpiness 
from {Steward 3} and {Steward 2}, at different times. I'm sure it's frustrating, 
but little sign that more experienced reps are taking responsibility for sorting it 
out. in absence of {Convenor 2}, everything falls to {Convenor} - she chairs, 
and takes minutes, and introduces most of the items. Two thoughts on this....  
 
First, she doesn't control the meeting very well - not that surprising, really; 
most people show no discipline whatsoever and interrupt continually - must 
get rather resigned to letting them all get on with it. In kitchen afterwards, 
making a cup of tea, {Convenor} says, with a sigh, 'badly behaved people....'. 
I'm very surprised nobody offered to help her out - but, will they moan about it 
too. 
 
Second thing is, on several of the agenda items, I realise that I know more 
about the issue than the stewards, and indeed more than {Convenor} tells 
them - no conspiracy, though, time wouldn't allow more detail. But it suggests 
that the stewards don't talk to each other very much between committee 
meetings. Things like, developments in the {contractor} dispute; behaviour of 
FTOs; even ballot result; are not known to the other stewards - especially 
clear that less experienced stewards don't know this stuff' but still seems that 
e.g. {Steward 3} and {Steward 2} don't know it all. Does this mean there is no 
QE? Or is the QE just branch officers? Is there a 'bureaucracy' of reps with a 
lot of facility time? But, surely there must be other lines of communication.... 
Don't these people talk outside of office hours? 
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Excerpt	2:	Fieldnotes	from	Big	Car	
 
 
Date: 1/5/13 
 
Time: 8.05-16.15 
 
Location: TU office 
 
 
Who 
 
{Senior steward 1}  
{Safety rep}  
{Convenor 1} 
 
 
What happened 
 
I arrive at the office. Various reps... 
 
{Safety rep} is working on a procedure for emptying LPG from cars before the 
paint oven. 
 
{Senior steward 1} says he's got something 'a bit tasty' 
A steward came in just before I arrived, to say management want to run a CIP 
today, by taking men off the job 
{Senior steward 1} - it's the line where the try-and-test should have happened 
yesterday, but didn't... 
 
But this is outside the procedure for a CIP. 
{Senior steward 1} - If they want to do a CIP, get both shifts in, and the 
Kaizen men, and the stewards, and we'll say if it works or not... 
- if they do it like this, just moving work about, that takes the shop steward out 
of it, and we won't have that... 
- the shift manager said to the steward, we'll get men off the teams, and the 
steward said what do you mean, and the manager said, 'it's a new 
procedure'... 
- well it's not a procedure we know about - and I'll ask {Convenor 1}, and he 
won't have heard of it either... 
[{Convenor 1} walks through to the office.] 
{Senior steward 1} - {Convenor 1}, can I have a word? 
[They go off into {Convenor 1}'s office] 
{Senior steward 1} comes back. 
{Senior steward 1} - [to me, thoughtfully] - it's been forty minutes now, and the 
steward hasn't come back, so the manager might have backed off... 
- I don't really want people to have to come in on a down day, but if a CIP 
needs doing, it's a job for a down day... 
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What about the try-and-tests on a working day? 
{Senior steward 1} - well, then - they get all the work organised, get 
everything in place, then run it... 
- not moving work around in bits and pieces... 
'It's going to look like the steward is moving men around to fit work in, and we 
don't do that' 
 
I ask {Senior steward 1} to explain how they do try-and-tests vs. CIPs. He 
says CIPs are done when the track isn't moving, so only on a down day. On a 
try-and-test, that's when they set up the new job as part of the production line, 
and run it on production for a shift, to see how it works. 
 
[From what I can see, this is different from other some departments. I've seen 
two CIPs on the door rubbers, and one in the body shop, all on production 
days. But the door rubbers one was Supply Chain, so it's easier to get men off 
to attend the CIP, I guess - and it doesn't need a moving line. On the 
conveyor, this can't be done so readily, so CIPs have to be done on a down 
day.] 
 
 
{Safety rep} goes off to deal with the LPG issue. 
 
 
{Senior steward 2} arrives, and I ask him about the meeting yesterday - 
looking at the CIP. 
{Senior steward 2} - {named manager} is a liar - he said no decisions would 
be made without input and agreement of senior union reps... then he went 
over and got OH to do an assessment on the job... I can't stand people telling 
me lies 
- I've just been to see her {OH nurse} - she said she did a job assessment... 
{named manager} asked her to... 
[i.e. {Senior steward 2} has been to see the nurse in OH.] 
{Senior steward 2} - I'm going to go and see him now ... tell him he's lied to 
us... I won't do it in front of other people... 
[There's a meeting tomorrow about this CIP, so {Senior steward 2} could say 
his piece there, with others present - but he's chosen an alternative 
approach.]  
{Senior steward 2} - the problem is, he's taken over managing the restricted 
workers - it's a protected working environment - and he hates it and wants to 
get shot of it... 
- those jobs are value added - if they weren't doing those jobs, they'd be over 
with her on a  [some sort of procedural term] ... and they'd be getting them out 
on a capability... 
 
I ask {Senior steward 2} about the previous CIP in LFE jobs - cockpits and 
steering columns - the one that I had heard described in relation to, they got a 
driver to do it... 
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{Senior steward 2} explains, there was a job where the worker had to walk 
about ten yards to get the part, so they moved that job right up the other end 
of the line, round the other side 
{Senior steward 2} - well, that might save, say, two seconds on the walk, but 
adds, say, eight seconds to the drive... 
- and that's the bigger picture that he doesn't understand... 
[Again, the problem is identified as the manager from production, who doesn't 
understand supply chain.] 
 
More generally, {Senior steward 2} says there's one guy who's job has been 
done away with four times - every time by {named manager}. 
 
 
{Senior steward 1} answers the phone - it's a manager. 
{Senior steward 1} - ... from what I hear, it's not a try-and-test - you want them 
to do a CIP while they're working... 
- ok... Bye.... 
What's he saying? 
{Senior steward 1} - meeting at 10  
'I'll get you down there' 
 
 
Phone rings, {Senior steward 1} answers, brief call.  
{Senior steward 1} - [to {Senior steward 2}] - {HR} block at half ten over these 
smoking shelters... 
 
 
Then {Steward 1} arrives from the area where the CIP is planned. {Senior 
steward 1} and the steward and I set off to see the manager. When we arrive, 
{manager} seems quite relaxed to have me sitting in, and also perfectly 
relaxed about being in a meeting with two stewards and no other managers 
[that would never have happened at {my former workplace}]. 
 
{Steward 1} kicks it off: 
{Steward 1} - they're looking at ways of eliminating a man 
- it was tried yesterday, but there's more to it than moving a bit of work... 
- it needs a CIP 
- I looked at a couple of things yesterday, but it didn't work... it involved at 
least three other jobs... we need to get the other shift on it... [as well] 
Manager - was it post-marriage? 
{Steward 1} - yes 
Manager - Ok, the amount of content were looking at, it should be a CIP 
- ... not sure when we'll do it... 
- I want everyone to buy in - but I'm not sure the team leaders are buying in... 
We need to be proactive... a try-and-test needs input  
- it can border on a CIP... 
- we can't say, it's a bit involved, this isn't a try-and-test... 
{Senior steward 1} - but, {Steward 1} tried this last week... 
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- I spoke to {Convenor 1} ... we think it was an underhand CIP getting done on 
here last week... 
{Steward 1} - it was 25 seconds of work - that's a big reorganisation... 
- he shouldn't be left with it all on him... 
[i.e. on the worker where the job was being put.] 
Manager - who said that? 
[i.e. who said it was to be done like that?] 
{Senior steward 1} - that's just the way it ended up 
- why was there no Kaizen involved? 
Manager - they've been cut, too... now, it's more and more, the Team Leaders 
are going to be involved in getting the ideas together... they used to... 
[i.e. TLs used to perform this function.] 
Manager - now, we just rely on the Kaizen.... 
{Senior steward 1} - is this a new procedure...? 
Manager - no... going back years, the team leaders used to do this... 
{Senior steward 1} - and we do, but yesterday...  
Manager - I've seen notes saying the try-and-test was cancelled because it 
was a disaster... but, no, that's not the case - there was big down time and we 
needed the end of month production... that's the only reason... 
[i.e. problems elsewhere] 
{Senior steward 1} - we were told it was a disaster... 
Manager - there's a problem of communication... 
{Senior steward 1} - well... {Steward 1} thought it wasn't working.... 
{Steward 1} - it wasn't.... 
Manager - if there's problems, we'll look at it...  
- we did with that one the other week... and then continue with the 
alterations... 
- we've got to give the other shift an opportunity 
[i.e. to get involved] 
{Senior steward 1} - the procedure is to run it on both shifts... 
- that's not what happened today 
{Steward 1} - it didn't work yesterday - the time sheets don't work... 
Manager - there are no times? 
{Steward 1} - I couldn't understand them - nor could [other employees]... 
- I've not been on the course 
Manager - in a nutshell... 
- the try-and-test today, we can shelve 
- if your saying {Steward 1} won't look at it... 
{Senior steward 1} - we can do it... 
{Steward 1} - we've got enough to look at it...  
[i.e. enough labour] 
- but it wasn't working yesterday 
 
{Senior steward 1} - I've got a way out of it... 
Manager - what? 
{Senior steward 1} - it's a CIP... 
- a try-and-test won't work on the third or fourth reorganisation... 
- do a CIP on Thursday... 
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Manager - I'll talk to Dave... 
{Senior steward 1} - you'll get both shifts in... 
{Steward 1} - yes... 
Manager - if I'm going to get a shift in, I want some ideas to take in to them... 
{Steward 1} - we've got some ideas.... 
Manager - the issues are, what we need to move around, post-marriage... 
{Senior steward 1} - {Steward 1} has ideas, but he's going to need input from 
a team leader and a Kaizen man... 
Manager - can I suggest... maybe not [named Team Leader X]... talk to [other 
named Team Leader Y] - he's got a good knowledge of the job... 
- he's been vociferous against what I want to do, but he's good and he'll be 
objective... 
{Senior steward 1} - I've come in here to try and solve the problem, give you a 
way out... 
Manager - my Mrs says that when I give her a credit card... 
- finally, other compression work... another try-and-test... 
{Steward 1} - we've done it on nights... And A shift didn't follow it... 
{Senior steward 1} - are we doing the work again? 
Manager - it's good to be part of the lead shift... 
[i.e. this shift - B shift - are the lead shift] 
Manager - the cowl move will need a try-and-test... 
{Steward 1} - I didn't know about that... 
Manager - it's part of the try-and-test process... 
{Senior steward 1} - I don't know why it wasn't done in a CIP... 
Manager - we can do in the try-and-test... 
{Senior steward 1} - put all in one... 
{Senior steward 1}, {Steward 1} and the manager then make an arrangements 
to do the CIP next week. The CIP will be done on days, but B shift will be 
back on nights, so {Steward 1} will need to be released to com in on days. 
Then the meeting ends. 
 
When we get outside, {Senior steward 1} and {Steward 1} are pleased - 
especially {Steward 1}, as he will now only be working one night next week! 
 
{Steward 1} goes back to work, and {Senior steward 1} and I walk off to see 
some other stewards.  
{Senior steward 1} - [smiling] - we got what we wanted - that's what I've been 
suggesting for a month... 
- the only problem is, they might not agree the nights off 
I say to {Senior steward 1}, where's the manager coming from - is he just 
under pressure? 
{Senior steward 1} - that's it exactly - he's under pressure to get the man out... 
- a CIP can take a month or even two to organise - but they might get three 
try-and-tests out of that, and everyone's agreed... 
- 25 seconds is a lot of work to get moved... 
 
{Senior steward 1} then gives his view of the general approach on this issue - 
job reorganisation. 
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{Senior steward 1} - it's about co-operating, but making sure we get 
something out of it 
- if they do it that way, the manager can't say we were just saying no... 
 
We go outside for a few minutes, into bright spring sunshine, so {Senior 
steward 1} can have a cig. He says this manager is one of the better ones to 
deal with. 
{Senior steward 1} - you can talk to him and he's open to suggestions. With 
some of the others, it would have been more of an argument.  
I ask about the man who is taken out, if the CIP works.  
{Senior steward 1}  - he won't lose his job, he'll be moved... 
- that team will be over numbers, so they'll look for a team that's short... 
- A shift is short - they've got a team leader permanently on the line - they've 
cut down on team leaders... 
***[Look into the situation with team leaders - on the lean production tin, it 
says how important team leaders are - have Big Car, in practice, cut some of 
this out?]*** 
 
We head back in to see some stewards - part of {Senior steward 1}'s regular 
walk round. I say it was interesting to see how they put it to the manager. 
{Senior steward 1} says that's how they do it.  
{Senior steward 1} - ... leave them for a while, thinking were going to say no, 
then say we've got a solution... 
- when I first became a steward, {Convenor 1}  was my senior steward, and I 
learned a lot off him... 
'He uses a lot of big words... I tend to swear' 
 
When we get to the lines, everything has stopped for a team briefing session, 
so {Senior steward 1} decides against interrupting the stewards - he'll come 
back later. From what I can see, there's not a lot of briefing going on. {Senior 
steward 1} says, this is the usual thing -  
'people having sarnies and a sit down' 
... unless the TL has something in particular to say. 
***[Again, is this, in practice, a watering down of lean production methods?]*** 
***[To what extent, if any, has kaizen simply become about reducing 
labour?]***  
 
Back in the office, {Senior steward 1} gets a text. 
{Senior steward 1} - nights off agreed - that's a steward and a team leader 
made up!  
 
 
Later, {Production Worker} comes in. He's not a steward, but used to be. Now 
he's attached to a Kaizen team (I think) but co-operates with the stewards on 
issues identified by the stewards. He's complaining about the treatment of a 
member by the 'company doctor'. 
[I think this is actually the physio].  
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But, then, {Safety rep} starts to tell me about {Production Worker}. {Safety 
rep} says {Production Worker} has been here 28 years and has never been 
sacked, despite doing various crazy things. He used to work in the paint shop, 
but he didn't like his supervisor. {Safety rep} says on one occasion, he locked 
himself in the supervisor's office and ate his sarnies. 
{Production Worker} -  
'The best bit was when I drank his Coke. Psssht!' [mimes opening coke can]  
{Production Worker} - I can still see his face - outside the office, screaming, 
Get out my fucking office! 
{Safety rep}  - and he took the brake pads off his bike... 
{Production Worker} - and another time, I threw a bin through his window 
- and another time... [in response to something the supervisor did]... I took the 
doors off his office and turned them round, and put a floor cleaner in there 
with the water running. It was this deep in suds... [indicates knee deep] 
{Senior steward 1} - how did you get away with it? Why didn't they sack you? 
{Production Worker} - oh, it was in the 80s or 90s... 
Someone - they had a sense of humour back then... 
{Production Worker} - yeah - before this shit we've got now - where, fart and 
you're out... 
 
 
Later, I talk to {Convenor 2}. 
I ask if, after the Mrs T conversation, did he ring HR and say, don't be 
shouting at her?  
{Convenor 2} is a bit reluctant to come clean, so I say I'm interested in the 
relationships that stewards have with managers... [which I am] 
{Convenor 2} says he did ring {HR manager}. He says she would never shout 
at someone in a case meeting, but when he's in there and the doors are shut, 
'anything can happen'.  
- the same with {Convenor 1} and {Convenor 3} [i.e. she will shout at them, 
too]. 
'Recently, I said she'd got a personality disorder. She went loopy.' 
 
{Convenor 2} asks if I've been getting anything useful. I say, yes, lots of useful 
stuff - especially yesterday.  
[i.e. at the CIP meeting by the disco balls.] 
In particular, I say, it was interesting to see the issue of bargaining over the 
time sheets for jobs - making sure that all the job elements are on the sheet, 
etc.. I said that one of the things that gets said about lean production is that 
it's all tied down so tight there's no room any more for resistance. But from 
what I've seen, there's plenty of evidence. {Convenor 2} nods as I'm 
speaking. I say there's books going back to the 1940s about shop stewards 
bargaining over time in manufacturing, so it's really interesting to come into a 
factory and see it's still going on.  
 
Then I say, I'd spoken to {Senior steward 2} earlier, about the door rubber 
issue. {Convenor 2} knew that {Senior steward 2} had been to see {named 
manager}, to tell him he'd lied.  
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{Convenor 2} says: 
'It's all blown up today.' 
The reconvened meeting tomorrow might be off. 
[In fact, it was called off.] 
{Convenor 2} said {named manager} had clearly agreed that a senior steward 
would be involved when the OH evaluation was done, but had then gone 
ahead anyway. {Convenor 2} had tipped off OH, and {Senior steward 2} had 
spoken to OH later on, too, and found out what the manager had done. While 
{Senior steward 2} had gone and spoken to the manager, {Convenor 2} and 
gone down to speak to HR to say that if this carried on they'd 'pull the plug'. 
So, the CIP meeting tomorrow might not even take place. 
  
 
{Senior steward 1}'s walk round. {Senior steward 1} sets off for one of his 
regular walks round GA to see the stewards - he usually does this twice each 
day, morning and afternoon. Various issues come up: 
Lieu days on the door line - {Senior steward 1} has a list of requested days off 
from members in GA, and goes to see the senior overseer, who keeps the 
log. He's known as 'the Marine' [ex-Royal Marine] - {Senior steward 1} and 
the other stewards agree he is a good guy. The Marine sits at his computer, 
behind a low partition, a short distance from the door line. {Senior steward 1} 
looks over his shoulder at the floating vac spreadsheet. 
{Senior steward 1} : 
'{Named worker}, leg one, 20th of May.' 
The supervisor looks it up, and OKs it, and enters the name on the spread 
sheet. There are two more like this in May, both agreed. 
{Senior steward 1} - the rest are in, like, end of June, July - we'll leave them 
for a bit, eh? 
Supervisor agrees. They look at next week - the bank holiday and CIP: 
{Senior steward 1} - so, four off - you've still got your spare, yeh? 
It's all resolved amicably. As we walk off, I ask {Senior steward 1} why he held 
back some of the requests until later. As I expected, he says it's to even out 
the lieu days amongst the sections - there's a big backlog of lieu days at the 
moment, so he wants other sections to book some, before he puts in all the 
other requests from this one section. 
 
Then we start the walk round proper. {Senior steward 1} stops to talk to all the 
stewards, and some of the workers. Most of this is just chat, arranging out of 
work activities, etc., and {Senior steward 1} reports back on booked lieu days 
to the guys who have put in requests.  
 
There are a couple of ongoing issues to discuss, though... 
 
{Steward 2}, on engine dress - reports the {parts} boxes are looking good... 
now fifty-odd new ones in the system. Damaged ones are being taken out 
and seem to be staying out.  
The supervisor of the section is on the phone, talking loudly and striding 
about in an agitated fashion: 
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'You've been sending me shite all week, so pull your finger out. [Pause and 
smile] I say that in a teamly way...' 
The supervisor comes over to speak to {Steward 2} while {Senior steward 1}'s 
there - there's a try-and-test tomorrow... {Steward 2} will be taken off the line 
for that.  
As we walk away, {Senior steward 1} says this is a proper try-and-test, not a 
smuggled-in CIP, like the one that was put off this morning.  
{Senior steward 1} - by stopping {Steward 1}'s one today, we've put the stop 
on a try-and-test over here today... 
This is because some of the 25 seconds of work was coming over here, to 
engine dressing. So, {Senior steward 1} is pleased that they reinforced the 
process of proper planning and consultation on job re-organisation. 
 
As we walk back to the union office, I ask {Senior steward 1} if the Kaizen still 
makes economic sense, because they seem to spend an awful lot of time and 
money on it, for the amount of useful change they seem to get. {Senior 
steward 1} says, in here, all they look at is the times... to reduce labour. 
{Senior steward 1} - they've got a set plan for taking out so many heads a 
month... 
- that's what {Steward 1}'s was this morning...  
- that manager's got to get that man out this month... 
So that's why the manager's under pressure? 
{Senior steward 1} - Yeh... 
[Today is 1 May, so I guess he over-ran.] 
They've got a set plan? How did you get to see that? 
{Senior steward 1} - I've seen the plans... they had a presentation about a 
month ago - 22 men by the end of the year... 
- I said that's not feasible - they said, we like to aim high... I said it doesn't 
matter where you aim, that's not feasible... 
 
 
{Senior steward 1} sits at his desk and checks his emails. There's the new 
letter from the company about the electric cigs - he's not happy.  
{Senior steward 1} - [reading] - that's a lie... 
The letter says, the electric cigarettes contain tobacco, which they don't. 
There's no more senior reps about, so {Senior steward 1} phones someone to 
tell them the letter is wrong. 
{Senior steward 1} - they've got it wrong... it just makes them look like they 
don't know what they're talking about... 
 
 
{Senior steward 2} comes in. 
{Senior steward 2} - I went to see {named manager}... big argument...  
- {named manager} said, you can't accuse me of lying.  
{Senior steward 2} - I said, I can and I've got proof... I've been to speak to 
OH... 
- Unit management have got wind of it...  
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Then {Convenor 2} comes in. {Senior steward 2} tells the story again. 
{Convenor 2} says, Unit management have called a meeting for tomorrow. 
[I won't be here!]  
Later, {Convenor 2} calls this meeting: 
'a straightener'. 
 
{Senior steward 2} continues his account of the meeting with {named 
manager}. {Senior steward 2} said all his TU colleagues were in agreement 
with his view of the undertakings the manager made during the meeting, and 
he had checked with OH exactly what the manager had asked her to do - 
which was a job assessment on the LFE worker on the adjacent job. {Senior 
steward 2} said to the manager, there wasn't even a long gap between the 
meeting and the OH assessment - so the manager knew he had deliberately 
misled them. The manager, according to {Senior steward 2}, said, you can't 
say that, I'm not a liar. {Senior steward 2} said, you can call it a lie or you can 
call it misled, but the point is, how can I trust you ever again? {Senior steward 
2} says, in muffled tones, 'he went mad'.  
 
Shortly afterwards, when I go to say goodbye, the discussion has started 
again in the deputy convenors' office.  
{Senior steward 2} - how can I trust him again? 
{Convenor 2} - you don't have to trust him, I'll tell them we're not working with 
him any more... 
 
As I leave, I say, tell me about this next week. {Convenor 2} smiles broadly. 
{Convenor 1} says, brightly, See you on Tuesday! 
 
 
 
Thoughts 
 
Lots going on here. Some classic bargaining from {Senior steward 1}  and 
{Steward 1}. 
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Appendix	5:	Information	sheets	and	consent	form		
	
This	Appendix	contains	copies	of	paperwork	relating	to	approved	ethical	procedures.		
Participant	Information	Sheet			 	
	
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Research Title: Shop stewards in action 
 
My name is Simon Joyce and I am a researcher studying for a PhD at the University of 
Hertfordshire Business School. This research project will examine the contemporary role of shop 
stewards in the workplace. In particular, I want to look at the types of issues that stewards deal 
with and how those issues are handled. This will provide an understanding of patterns of union 
representation and bargaining. 
 
The research will include me observing shop stewards in various settings, such as the union 
office, as well as interviews and small surveys. Some shop stewards will be asked to keep a 
diary with brief entries about their union duties and activities. I also hope to conduct interviews 
and/or surveys with a sample of managers, union members, and union officers, and I will be 
reviewing relevant documents. The research will last up to six months.  
 
I would like to invite you to participate in the research. If you do decide to take part you will be 
asked to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and the other is for my records. Please 
note that you will remain free to withdraw from the research at any time, without disadvantage or 
having to give a reason. 
 
I can assure you that any information gathered during the research will be treated anonymously 
and in strict confidence. This can be guaranteed by ensuring that neither your details nor the 
identity of your employer is included in the dissertation or any reports that result from the 
research. Furthermore, any information you disclose will not be revealed to any other person 
participating in this research.  
 
During the research I will record information by taking notes and/or using digital recording 
equipment. All data collected during this research will be kept securely. Some data may be 
retained by myself for use in the future.  
 
On completion of the research, a PhD dissertation will be submitted to the University. It is also 
likely that some of the results will be published elsewhere - for instance, in academic journals. 
 
If you have any questions about the research please do not hesitate to contact me, here:  
 
Address: Flat 1 
22 Primrose Gardens 
London NW3 4TN 
Email:  s.c.joyce@herts.ac.uk 
Telephone:    Home – 020 7586 4516 
Mobile - 07811144890 
The research will be supervised by Dr David Allsop and two other members of staff at the 
University of Hertfordshire. If you have any concerns about the research project and the way it is 
being conducted, you can contact my supervisor, here: 
 
Address:  Dr David Allsop 
Learning and Teaching Fellow 
Business School Campus Manager 
University of Hertfordshire 
Hatfield AL102AB 
Email:   d.allsop@herts.ac.uk 
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Non-participant	Information	Sheet		
This	sheet	was	prepared	in	case	of	requests	for	information	from	non-participants	in	the	
research	setting.	In	fact,	very	few	of	these	were	requested	during	the	fieldwork.		
	
Information Sheet 
 
Research Title: Shop stewards in action 
 
My name is Simon Joyce and I am a researcher studying for a PhD at the University of 
Hertfordshire Business School. This research project will examine the contemporary role of shop 
stewards in the workplace. In particular, I want to look at the types of issues that stewards deal 
with and how those issues are handled. This will provide an understanding of patterns of union 
representation and bargaining. 
 
The research will include me observing shop stewards in various settings, such as the union 
office, as well as interviews and small surveys. Some shop stewards will be asked to keep a 
diary with brief entries about their union duties and activities. I also hope to conduct interviews 
and/or surveys with a sample of managers, union members, and union officers, and I will be 
reviewing relevant documents. The research will last up to six months. 
 
I can assure you that any information gathered during the research will be treated anonymously 
and in strict confidence. This can be guaranteed by ensuring that neither your details nor the 
identity of your employer is included in the dissertation or any reports that result from the 
research. Furthermore, any information you disclose will not be revealed to any other person 
participating in this research.  
 
If you do not wish your encounter with a shop steward to be observed, please let me know, and I 
will exclude it from the research.   
 
All data collected during this research will be kept securely. During the research I will record 
information by taking notes and/or using digital recording equipment. Some data may be 
retained by myself for use in the future.  
 
On completion of the research, a PhD dissertation will be submitted to the University. It is also 
likely that some of the results will be published elsewhere - for instance, in academic journals. 
 
If you have any questions about the research please do not hesitate to contact me, here:  
 
Address: Flat 1 
22 Primrose Gardens 
London NW3 4TN 
Email:  s.c.joyce@herts.ac.uk 
Telephone:    Home – 020 7586 4516 
Mobile - 07811144890 
 
The research will be supervised by Dr David Allsop and two other members of staff at the 
University of Hertfordshire. If you have any concerns about the research project and the way it is 
being conducted, you can contact my supervisor, here: 
 
Address: Dr David Allsop 
Learning and Teaching Fellow 
Business School Campus Manager 
University of Hertfordshire 
Hatfield AL102AB 
Email:   d.allsop@herts.ac.uk 
 !
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Statement	of	Informed	Consent	
	
	
 
 
Statement of Informed Consent 
 
Research Title: Shop stewards in action 
 
 
1. This part should be completed prior to conducting the research (Please tick boxes as 
appropriate) 
 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the study and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without disadvantage or having to give a reason. 
 
 
 
I am willing to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
 
I agree to the researcher taking notes and/or using digital recording equipment.  
 
 
 
 
I wish to keep my personal details and those of my employer anonymous. 
 
 
 
 
I understand that any information I disclose to the researcher will be treated in strict 
confidence, and will not be revealed to any other person participating in this research. 
 
 
 
 
Name (please print):      Date:     
 
 
Signature:        
 
 
 
 
 
2. This part should be completed after the research has been completed 
 
I am satisfied with the way the research was conducted and I am prepared to allow the information 
disclosed during the research to be used by the researcher when reporting the findings, subject to 
the guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality. 
 
 
 
Name (please print):      Date:     
 
 
Signature:             
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Appendix	6:	Interview	schedules			
	
This	Appendix	contains	schedules	used	for	in-depth	interviews.	Schedules	for	interviewing	
shop	stewards	were	identical	in	each	case	study,	apart	from	one	specific	question	about	a	
potentially	controversial	issue,	which	was	included	to	assess	intra-organisational	bargaining	
arrangements.	These	questions	appear	under	the	heading	'Specific	questions'.	Other	topics	
were	introduced	as	areas	for	discussion	–	sometimes	with	an	initial	question	–	and	stewards	
were	given	time	and	space	to	comment	on	each	area	of	investigation	at	length	if	they	
wanted	to.	Bullet	points	underneath	each	question	or	topic	were	reminders	to	the	
interviewer	for	areas	that	might	arise,	rather	than	a	series	of	scheduled	prompts.	Since	
interviewees	were	encouraged	to	respond	widely	and	freely,	interviews	often	moved	across	
topics	such	that	the	interview	did	not	follow	the	set	order	of	the	schedule;	in	which	case,	
the	interview	was	concluded	when	all	areas	had	been	discussed.	In	the	second	case	study	
managers	were	also	interviewed,	and	a	modified	form	of	the	same	schedule	was	used.	The	
interview	with	the	head	of	HR	in	this	case	study	also	included	questions	taken	directly	from	
WERS	2004	and	2011	questionnaires	(see	Section	4.3),	and	these	are	also	reproduced	
below.		
	
Shop	steward	interview	schedule		
Below	is	the	schedule	that	was	used	for	in-depth	interviews	with	shop	stewards.	The	layout	
has	been	edited	slightly	to	fit	the	current	format.	
 
 
Shop steward interview schedule  
 
Reminder to self: 'Conversation with a purpose' 'We want their words - the 
world according to them' 'The point of in depth interviewing is to get really 
really rich material' 
 
Introduction 
- aims of the study  
- anonymity, confidentiality and recording 
 
Warm up 
- name 
- job title 
- nature of work 
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- working hours  
 
- how long a steward 
- how many members 
- any other TU role 
- TU training 
 
The shop steward role  
Why did you become a steward?  
- motivation - what are you tying to achieve? 
    [- in relation to members] 
    [- in relation to management] 
 
The role of a shop steward 
- what do you think makes a good shop steward? 
 
What sort of relationship with members? 
For instance: 
- take up all the issues members bring to you, whatever they are 
- try to lead their members, because some issues are more important than 
others 
 
What sort of relationship with management? 
For instance: 
- confrontation 
- partnership 
- good bargaining relationship 
 
Do you have any frustrations about your role as a steward?  
For instance: 
- members 
- management 
- union 
- other 
 
Individual representation 
Do you do individual representation? 
- if not, why not? 
- if you do, how much? 
 
Do you think individual cases matter - or not? 
- why 
- how much 
 
How does individual casework fit into the wider picture? 
 
Do you have any alternative informal means for taking up issues with 
management?  
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Collective issues 
Do you take up collective issues? 
- when 
- where 
- how 
    - any examples 
- if not, why not? 
    - any examples 
- formal/informal? 
    - when 
    - where 
    - how 
 
Do collective issues come up in individual cases? 
- when 
- where 
- how 
- if not, why not? 
 
Shop meetings 
- do you hold them 
- if not, why not? 
- what are they like 
    - when 
    - where 
    - how 
- what do they achieve 
 
Dealing with management / management decisions 
Do you think the union in here has any influence over management 
decisions?  
 
Formal meetings with management  
    - how often? 
    - what level? 
- tell me about those 
- progress or pointless? 
 
Informal contacts with management  
    - how often? 
    - what level? 
- tell me about those 
- progress or pointless? 
 
Methods of pressuring management / leverage 
- do you use any? 
- tell me about those 
 	328	
    - when 
    - where 
    - how 
- if not, tell me about that 
 
Specific questions 
London Borough: New Contracts 
Do you think the new contracts could have been stopped? 
Big Car: Concessions  
You sometimes hear the opinion that the union has given away too much. 
Would you agree with that?  
 
Shop steward organisation 
Committees - steward committees / branch committees 
- tell me about those 
- how do you find them? 
e.g. 
[Reminders, not prompts] 
    - open/closed 
    - useful/not useful 
    - good points/problems 
    - bureaucratised 
    - democratic 
    - intra-organisational bargaining 
    - participant vs. representative 
 
Discussions with other shop stewards or branch officers? 
    - if not, why not? 
- who you have discussions with 
- tell me about those discussions 
For instance: 
    - open? 
    - useful? 
    - problems? 
- what kind of issues do you discuss 
    - current issues 
    - wider union issues 
    - social and political issues 
 
Conclusion 
Thank you for taking part in this research - your input has been important and 
appreciated. 
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Manager	interview	schedule		
Below	is	the	schedule	used	for	interviewing	managers.	Note,	the	research	only	had	access	
for	interviewing	managers	at	the	Big	Car	case	study,	and	the	schedule	reflects	that.		
	
	
Manager interview schedule  
 
Reminder to self: 'Conversation with a purpose' 'We want their words - the 
world according to them' 'The point of in-depth interviewing is to get really 
really rich material' 
 
Introduction 
- aims of the study - shop steward issues-handling  
- anonymity, confidentiality and recording 
 
Warm up 
- name 
- job title 
- nature of work 
- working hours  
 
- how long a manager  
    - come up through Vauxhall?  
- how many people do you manage 
 
Dealing with union representatives  
I'm interested in what kinds of dealings you have with shop stewards and 
other union representatives. 
 
Generally, how would you characterise your relationship with stewards / union 
reps? 
e.g. - confrontation? 
       - cooperation? 
       - partnership? 
       - good bargaining relationship?  
 
Formal meetings with union reps - are you involved? 
- tell me about those 
    - how often? 
    - what level? 
    - progress or pointless? 
 
Informal contacts with union reps - do you have any?  
- tell me about those 
   - how often? 
    - what level? 
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    - progress or pointless? 
    - do they come to you, or do you go to them?  
 
What kinds of issues?  
    - individual  
    - collective 
 
Individual case meetings  
- do they take up a lot of your time? 
I was wondering what your thoughts are about those individual cases. 
    - how do you see them fitting into your role as a manager? 
    - how do the individual cases fit into the wider picture? 
 
The role of a shop steward - I'm interested in how you see it  
- what makes a good shop steward? 
- what's your general opinion of the stewards you deal with?  
- do you get on better with some reps more than others? 
    - tell me some more about that 
 
The CIP process - I've found that very interesting 
    - how do you see the role of shop stewards in the CIP process?  
 
Facilitate or obstruct?  
In the academic circles I have contact with, you tend to hear two basic views 
about shop stewards / union reps - one is that they are facilitators, and the 
other is that they are an obstruction to management. 
- what would your thoughts be on this?  
    - how do you see it? 
 
Frustrations or problems?  
    - in dealing with stewards / union reps 
 
 
 
WERS	questions	included	in	HR	manager	interview		
From WERS 2011 Management Questionnaire 
 
p.40 
 
Are there any committees of managers and employees at this workplace, 
primarily concerned with consultation, rather than negotiation? These 
committees may be called joint consultative committees, works councils or 
representative forums.   
 
 
Looking at the following list, which issues are discussed by the committees? 
PROBE: Which others? UNTIL 'None'.   
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1. Production issues (e.g. level of production or sales, quality of product or 
service) 
2. Employment issues (e.g. avoiding redundancies, reducing labour turnover)  
3. Financial issues (e. g. financial performance, budgets or budgetary cuts)  
4. Future plans (e.g. changes in goods produced or services offered, 
company expansion or contraction)  
5. Pay issues (e.g. wage or salary reviews, bonuses, regarding, job 
evaluation)  
6. Leave and flexible working arrangements, including working time  
7. Welfare services and facilities (e.g. child care, rest rooms, car parking, 
canteens, recreation)  
8. Government regulations (e.g. EU Directives, Local Authority regulations)  
9. Work organisation (e.g. changes to working methods, allocation of work 
between employees, multi-skilling)  
10. Health and safety  
11. Equal opportunities and diversity  
12. Training  
13. Other (please specify)   
 
 
p.42 
 
Which of the following best describes managers' usual approach when 
consulting members of the committee?   
 
14. Seek solutions to problems  
15. Seek feedback on a range of options put forward by management   
16. Seek feedback on a preferred option put forward by management 
 
 
p.52 
 
[Thinking first of the unions that represent employees at this workplace, for / 
For] each of these issues I'd like to know whether management normally 
negotiates, consults, informs, or does not involve unions at all over these 
matters.  INTERVIEWER: If any of these issues are dealt with at a higher 
level in the organisation or through an employers' association, please record 
what happens at that level.  
 
From WERS 2004 Management Questionnaire:  
 
Rates of pay: 
 
Hours of work: 
 
Holiday entitlements: 
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Pension entitlements: 
 
Recruitment or selection of employees: 
 
Training of employees: 
 
Grievance procedures: 
 
Disciplinary procedures: 
 
Staffing plans: 
 
Equal opportunities: 
 
Health and safety: 
 
Performance appraisals: 
 
Work organisation: 
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Appendix	7:	Nodes	and	themes	
	
This	Appendix	contains	lists	of	the	analytical	nodes	from	thematic	data	analysis	conducted	
using	NViVo	software.	First,	the	list	is	presented	alphabetically,	which	shows	how	some	
themes	grew	and	differentiated	during	the	analysis	(see	Section	4.4).	Next,	the	same	list	is	
presented	in	order	of	the	number	of	references	for	each	node.	While	software	inflexibilities	
and	the	need	to	protect	anonymity	and	confidentiality	limit	the	data	that	can	easily	be	
included	in	this	view,	this	second	view	indicates	the	types	of	issues	that	came	up	most	
frequently	in	the	data	(though,	it	should	be	remembered	that	this	frequency	does	not	
represent	a	properly	quantitative	measure).	Both	lists	have	been	edited	to	remove	the	
names	of	individual	stewards	and	managers,	along	with	any	potentially	identifying	terms.		
	
As	discussed	in	Section	4.4,	analytical	themes	coalesced	around	a	mix	of	'foreshadowed	
problems'	and	scrutiny	of	the	data.	Nodes	were	grouped	variously	at	different	points	in	the	
analysis,	and	the	main	themes	utilised	can	be	seen	in	the	structure	of	Chapters	5-8.			
	
Nodes	listed	alphabetically		
98ers	
Absenteeism	
Advice	role	
Agency	workers	
Agreements	
Attitudinal	structuring	
Austerity	&	Budget	cuts	
Bargaining	relations	
Bluff	
Body	shop	
Boots	
Branch		Development	Day	
Breaks		
C&E	
Capability	&	performance	
Car	scheme	
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Charity	fund	
CIP	
Collective	action	
Collective	bargaining	
Collective	issue	
Collectivism	-	of	members	
Company	-	meetings	with	
Compassionate	leave	
Concessions	
Consultation	
Contractors	
Corridor	
Council	policy	
Councillors	
CSF	
Direct	Labour	
Disciplinary	
Discrimination	
Dismissal	
Doing	deals	-	with	manager	
Door	line	
Down	Days	
Down	Days	-	working	
Down-time	
EEF		
Embarrassment	factor	
Ergonomic	assessment	
ET	
Facility	time	
Fairness	
Field	Relations	
Flexible	working	
Floating	vacation	&	lieu	days	
FTO	
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GA	
Management	system	audit	
Good	place	to	work	
Grading	
Grievance	-	individual	
H&S	
HASC	
HASC	Stewards	Committee	
Hidden	practice	
Holidays	
HR	
IER	
Individual	bargaining	
Individual	bargaining	-	LFE	
Individual	representation	(steward)	
Individualism	(of	members)	
Informal	deal	
Insecurity	
Inter-plant	relations	
Intra-organisational	bargaining	
JIT	
JNC	
Job	element	sheets	
Job	knowledge	as	bargaining	resource	
Job	move	
Job	rotation	
Kaizen	
Labour	mobility	
Labour	Party	
Labour	reductions	
Labour	shortage	
Lean	production	
Legal	resources	
LFE	&	Restricted	
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LGBT	
Living	Wage	
Lying	to	management	
Management	-	accused	of	lying	
Management	-	arguments	used	
Management	-	double	standards	
Management	-	motive	attribution	
Management	-	renege	
Management	-	seen	as	helpful	
Management	-	shifted	
Management	-	steward	helping	
Management	-	stewards	challenge	
Manager	-	piss-taking	
Manager	(un-named)	
Managers	don't	know	the	job	
Maternity	
Members	-	demanding	
Members	-	inactive	
Members	-	to	blame	
Members	lying	to	stewards	
Members	moaning	about	stewards	or	union	
Mental	Health	Teams	
Morning	Star	
My	thoughts	
Non-cooperation	
Non-members	
OH	
On	the	track	
Options	(production	model)	
Other	issues	&	Non-union	issues	
Outsourcing	
Overtime	
Paint	shop	
Pay	-	collective	
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Pay	-	individual	
Pay	-	PRP	
Pensions	
Performance	
Persistence	
Personal	injury	
Political	issues	
Precedent	
Privatisation	
Procedures	used	as	resource	
Production	issues	
Providing	service	
Quality	-	disciplinary	issue	
Quality	-	production	issue	
Recruit	-	to	union	
Redundancy	-	collective	
Redundancy	-	individual	
Reorganisation	
Rota	
Rumours	
Saving	the	plant	
Senior	steward	role	
Sequencing	
Service	-	seniority	
Sexual	harassment	
Shifts	
Sickness	
Sickness	absence	
Social	workers	
Socialism	
Steward	committee	
Steward	elections	
Steward	leadership	
Steward	role	
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Steward	training	
Stewards	
Stoppage	
Stress	
Strikes	
Suggestions	
Supply	Chain	
TAKT	time	
Team	brief	
Team	Working	
Thatcher's	death	
Theft	
Toilets	
Track	speed	
Training	
Try	and	Test	
TUPE	
UAW	
Unison	national	
Unison	region	
Unit	consultation	
Unite	-	branch	
Unite	-	HQ	
Unite	-	political	school	
Unite	-	region	
United	Left	
Users	(services)	&	tenants	
VBA	
Big	Car	-	correspondence	
Welfare	issues	
Work	equipment	
Work	intensity	
Work	organisation	
Working	conditions	
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Working	week	
Xmas	rota	
Young	worker	
	
Nodes	listed	by	number	of	references	(highest	to	lowest)		
Bargaining	relations	
My	thoughts	
Management	-	motive	attribution	
Individual	representation	(steward)	
CIP	
Steward	role	
Intra-organisational	bargaining	
Work	organisation	
Management	-	stewards	challenge	
HASC	Stewards	Committee	
Field	Relations	
Supply	Chain	
Reorganisation	
H&S	
Collective	issue	
Work	intensity	
Disciplinary	
Quality	-	production	issue	
Management	-	arguments	used	
Labour	reductions	
Labour	shortage	
Steward	training	
Management	-	accused	of	lying	
LFE	&	Restricted	
Senior	steward	role	
Procedures	used	as	resource	
Management	-	steward	helping	
Job	element	sheets	
Quality	-	disciplinary	issue	
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HR	
Collective	bargaining	
Job	knowledge	as	bargaining	resource	
Consultation	
Management	system	audit	
Collectivism	-	of	members	
Managers	don't	know	the	job	
Steward	leadership	
Floating	vacation	&	lieu	days	
Pay	-	PRP	
Kaizen	
Dismissal	
Attitudinal	structuring	
Providing	service	
Sickness	absence	
Paint	shop	
OH	
Members	moaning	about	stewards	or	union	
Collective	action	
Sequencing	
Suggestions	
Management	-	seen	as	helpful	
Facility	time	
Sickness	
Body	shop	
Agreements	
Legal	resources	
Branch	Development	Day	
Other	issues	&	Non-union	issues	
Down-time	
United	Left	
Company	-	meetings	with	
Hidden	practice	
Saving	the	plant	
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Try	and	Test	
Stoppage	
Discrimination	
Privatisation	
Down	Days	
GA	
Contractors	
Unit	consultation	
Track	speed	
Non-cooperation	
Working	conditions	
Individual	bargaining	
Pay	-	individual	
Job	rotation	
Work	equipment	
Labour	mobility	
Corridor	
Direct	Labour	
Councillors	
Advice	role	
Training	
Steward	elections	
Outsourcing	
Redundancy	-	individual	
Members	lying	to	stewards	
Team	Working	
Agency	workers	
Grievance	-	individual	
Users	(service)	&	tenants	
Members	-	inactive	
Management	-	shifted	
Council	policy	
Members	-	demanding	
Lucky	Lotto	
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Unite	-	HQ	
VBA	
Grading	
Redundancy	-	collective	
Lean	production	
Options	(production	model)	
HASC	
Inter-plant	relations	
Steward	committee	
Strikes	
Informal	deal	
Pay	-	collective	
Recruit	-	to	union	
Door	line	
Breaks	
Labour	Party	
Young	worker	
Rumours	
Individualism	(of	members)	
Mental	Health	Teams	
Social	workers	
Unison	national	
C&E	
Political	issues	
EEF	
TAKT	time	
Job	move	
Absenteeism	
Ergonomic	assessment	
Socialism	
Overtime	
Production	issues	
Welfare	issues	
Precedent	
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Performance	
Non-members	
Fairness	
Unison	region	
FTO	
Management	-	double	standards	
Unite	-	political	school	
Big	Car	-	correspondence	
On	the	track	
98ers	
Good	place	to	work	
Shifts	
Lying	to	management	
Flexible	working	
Living	Wage	
Members	-	to	blame	
CSF	
Austerity	&	Budget	cuts	
Down	Days	-	working	
Pensions	
TUPE	
Unite	-	region	
Working	week	
Holidays	
Team	brief	
Car	scheme	
Embarrassment	factor	
Rota	
Stress	
Management	-	renege	
Capability	&	performance	
Manager	(un-named)	
Manager	-	piss-taking	
Morning	Star	
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Thatcher's	death	
Individual	bargaining	-	LFE	
Service	-	seniority	
JIT	
Concessions	
Bluff	
Insecurity	
UAW	
JNC	
IER	
Unite	-	branch	
Compassionate	leave	
Toilets	
Personal	injury	
Theft	
Charity	fund	
Boots	
Doing	deals	-	with	manager	
Sexual	harassment	
Maternity	
ET	
Persistence	
LGBT	
Xmas	rota	
Stewards	
	
	
